Conflict

NATO and Intermediate Force Capabilities: Why Human Effects Matter

Foley, Shannon, Caitlin Jackson, Susan Aros, and Anne Marie Baylouny. "NATO and Intermediate Force Capabilities: Why Human Effects Matter." Connections: The Quarterly Journal 21, no. 2 (2022): 123-134.

Introduction

On February 24, 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine, the international order was impacted sharply and abruptly. Russia’s invasion put the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) on center stage. As a contribution to international security, NATO’s deterrence capabilities take many forms. From nuclear weapons to cyberattacks, to be effective, deterrence must be scalable across a conflict spectrum that includes non-kinetic actions.

21.2.09_ifc_human_f.pdf — Downloaded 782 times

Gaming Intermediate Force Capabilities: Strategic Implications of Tactical Decisions

Dobias, Peter, Kyle Christensen, and William Freid. "Gaming Intermediate Force Capabilities: Strategic Implications of Tactical Decisions." Connections: The Quarterly Journal 21, no. 2 (2022): 97-109.

Introduction

Hybrid Threats

In recent years, analysis of the international security environment has increasingly focused on hybrid threat tactics in the grey zone.

21.2.07_gaming.pdf — Downloaded 746 times

Developing a NATO Intermediate Force Capabilities Concept

Nelson, John. "Developing a NATO Intermediate Force Capabilities Concept." Connections: The Quarterly Journal 21, no. 2 (2022): 67-84.

Introduction

What Motivates the Need for an IFC Concept?

Adversaries know NATO’s lethal capabilities and the thresholds for their use. And they exploit this. They avoid direct symmetrical engagements, instead maneuvering below lethal thresholds, pursuing their aims observed but undeterred. Or, they act indirectly through proxies or intermediaries, blending in and engaging only at times and places of their choosing.

21.2.05_nelson.pdf — Downloaded 727 times

Nonlethal Weapons and Intermediate Force: A Necessary Complement to Lethality

LeVine, Susan. "Nonlethal Weapons and Intermediate Force: A Necessary Complement to Lethality." Connections: The Quarterly Journal 21, no. 2 (2022): 55-66.

Introduction

The phrase nonlethal weapons often brings to mind capabilities such as bean bags, rubber bullets, pepper spray, and electric stun guns. These capabilities are used domestically by law enforcement and by the military, primarily for protection and security missions. Nonlethal weapons (NLW) technology, however, has advanced significantly over the past 20 years.

21.2.04_intermediate_capabilities.pdf — Downloaded 1039 times

Hybrid Warfare and the Need for Intermediate Force Capabilities

Dobias, Peter. "Hybrid Warfare and the Need for Intermediate Force Capabilities." Connections: The Quarterly Journal 21, no. 2 (2022): 5-9.

Analyses of the international security environment have increasingly drawn attention to what is often referred to as the gray zone.[1] A RAND study exploring hybrid warfare/gray zone challenges defined this part of the competition continuum as “an operational space between peace and war, involving coercive actions to change the status quo below a threshold that, in most cases, would prompt a conventional military response, often by blurring the line between military and non-military actions and the attrib

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Distorting Your Perception of Russia’s Aggression: How Can We Combat Information Warfare?

Hung, Ho Ting. "Distorting Your Perception of Russia’s Aggression: How Can We Combat Information Warfare?" Connections: The Quarterly Journal 21, no. 3 (2022): 77-101.

Introduction

Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine clearly violates Ukraine’s territorial integrity and international law. The West has shown unity in countering Russia by imposing unprecedentedly harsh sanctions.

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Putin’s Last War: Narratives, Counternarratives, and Early Lessons Learned

Tagarev, Todor, Lada Roslycky, and Philipp Fluri. "Putin’s Last War: Narratives, Counternarratives, and Early Lessons Learned." Connections: The Quarterly Journal 21, no. 3 (2022): 5-8.

In the turmoil in the spring of 2014, immediately following the Revolution of Dignity, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin ordered an attack on Crimea and instigated and supported the separatist activities in Donbas. Encouraged by Russia’s early successes in its war on Ukraine and the lukewarm approach of some Western countries to imposing sanctions, Putin ordered the massive February 2022 invasion, initially focused on Ukraine’s capital and leadership.

21.3.00_ukraine_war.pdf — Downloaded 1192 times

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