Aiko Holvikivi *
Introduction
The United Nations Security Council resolutions on “Women, Peace and Security” identify security sector reform (SSR) as a tool for their implementation.[1] Nonetheless, the resolutions are often seen as the purview of women’s organizations and the responsibility of ministries of foreign affairs, leaving the role of security sector institutions and their obligations for reform murky.[2] On the other hand, a body of literature oriented toward practitioners and policymakers charts out the rationale and practical tools for ensuring SSR interventions are gender responsive. This literature tends to view the women, peace and security resolutions as a tool for integrating gender perspectives in SSR interventions.[3] However, this literature’s ultimate goal remains the good governance of the security sector.
In this article, I seek to bridge this gap through an examination of the roles and responsibilities of the security sector in implementing the women, peace and security agenda.[4] More precisely, I examine the processes and principles associated with security sector reform, and argue that its technical components and ultimate objectives are key to the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda. In other words, I ask what SSR can bring to the women, peace and security agenda, rather than how the integration of gender furthers SSR.
As other contributions in this volume have already introduced the women, peace and security agenda, the following section focuses on the concept and key tenets of SSR and engages in a brief discussion on mainstreaming gender into SSR interventions. The analysis that follows is structured around the four pillars of the women, peace and security agenda, and examines what reform and good governance of the security sector can contribute to the realization of these goals. In other words, it identifies roles and responsibilities for the security sector in implementing this agenda. The final section summarizes how SSR is key to the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda, and how SSR approaches can complement its further development.
Understanding SSR
The elaboration of the concept of “security sector reform” [5] emanates from several developments in the international arena in the past three decades. The historical and political “building blocks” of the notion that reform of the security sector is fundamental to democratic governance include: the shift from a state-oriented to a people-oriented notion of security, often referred to as “human security”; the increasing recognition of linkages between security and development; and post-authoritarian transitions to democratic civil-military relations.[6] From these shifts in the international political and ideological landscape emerged the notion that reform aimed to ensure good governance of the security sector is paramount to stability and democratic governance.
While no universally accepted definition of security sector reform exists, the most widely used definition is found in the 2005 OECD DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform, which describe SSR as:
…the transformation of the ‘security system’—which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions—working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework.[7]
In other words, SSR strives for the twin objectives of establishing an effective and accountable security sector. It aims to balance effectiveness, efficiency, and affordability while ensuring accountability through democratic and civilian control of the security sector. Notably, this definition encompasses a wide range of interventions, which transcend a narrower focus often associated with training and equipping security forces found in stabilization missions.[8] In this definition, security actors refer to a broad range of security and oversight providers, including both formal and informal actors, ranging from statutory security forces like the police and armed forces to legislative oversight bodies like parliamentary committees, and from customary security and justice providers like traditional justice systems to civil society watchdogs. Furthermore, while usually associated with post-conflict or fragile states, it is worth noting that SSR interventions and the consolidation of good governance of the security sector can be undertaken in any context, including more developed states and established democracies.[9]
It follows logically that, in principle, the goals of gender equality are inherent to the principles of SSR and to the standards of governance it seeks to establish. In order to be accountable, the security sector must be accountable to the entire population – including both women and men. Moreover, security sector personnel must be held accountable for violations of the rights of civilians, including sexual and gender-based violence. To be effective, the security sector must address the security and justice needs of the entire population and the men, women, boys, and girls that comprise it. Effectiveness and efficiency both demand that the security sector invite and encourage equitable participation by women and men. Given the pervasiveness of gender inequality across the globe, and given that security institutions have historically been designed by and for men, particular attention must be given to gender dynamics and the promotion of the participation and protection of women in order to achieve equality and realize the principles of SSR.[10] Accordingly, it is widely acknowledged, though not uniformly implemented, that SSR interventions must include a gender perspective.[11]
A wealth of technical and practically-oriented literature on gender-responsive SSR has emerged in support of these efforts, largely in the form of policy guidance, handbooks, toolkits, checklists, and manuals.[12] This literature often presents the women, peace and security agenda as a tool for integrating gender considerations in SSR as a set of international norms that can be leveraged to argue for the integration of gender into SSR interventions.[13]However, relatively few resources exist discussing why SSR is crucial to the implementation of the themes of the women, peace and security agenda.[14] Such an undertaking is necessary as it demonstrates to the security sector its roles and responsibilities in implementing the women, peace and security resolutions, while demonstrating to civil society why the security sector must play a part in this undertaking.
SSR as a Tool for Implementing the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions
The commitments and principles outlined in the women, peace and security resolutions can be described as falling into four broad pillars: prevention, participation, protection, and relief and recovery.[15] In this section I examine these themes, noting what role the security sector plays in their implementation and analyzing what an SSR approach brings to their realization.
Prevention
Resolution 1325 affirms “the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts,” [16] while the UN Strategic Results Framework on Women, Peace and Security 2011-2020 identifies the goal of “prevention of conflict and all forms of violence against women and girls in conflict and post-conflict situations.” [17] Prevention of violence against women and girls is intricately linked to the goal of protection, and will be discussed in the sub-section on protection. For the purpose of this discussion, prevention will focus on the prevention of conflict.
As can be extrapolated from the political commitments outlined in Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions, the UN Strategic Results Framework identifies as key components of conflict prevention the use of early warning mechanisms that include gender-specific indicators and support to women’s conflict prevention efforts.[18] SSR interventions focus on accountability of the security sector and an SSR approach identifies civil society, including women’s groups, as exercising an informal oversight role in security sector governance. Accordingly, SSR efforts can further this aspect of the women, peace and security agenda by working with civil society and women’s groups to support their capacity to act as a watchdog that holds authorities accountable and informs early warning systems, or that facilitates dialogue between policymakers, security sector institutions, officials, and the population.[19]
Numerous examples point to the role of women’s organizations in gathering information and reporting on gender violence as an indicator of simmering intra-state conflict and the militarization of a politically tense situation. In the Philippines in the 1980s Gabriela, a broad coalition of women’s organizations, documented cases of rape contributing to an analysis of the low intensity conflict carried out by the Aquino administration against the leftist insurgent New People’s Army.[20] In a similar manner, Cynthia Enloe notes how, in “May 1998, a full year before most of the world was paying any attention to the escalating militarism in Kosovo, Belgrade’s women activists published a warning [of ongoing militarization and a prediction that] the outcome in today’s world is not likely to be a merely local conflict; it is likely to become an internationalized war.” [21] Such anecdotes highlight the value of SSR interventions in supporting civil society and women’s groups in making their voices heard and in contributing to an inclusive analysis of security threats.
A gender-responsive SSR approach can also support the development of a more comprehensive approach to women, peace and security. Some observers have stressed that a gender-inclusive approach to conflict prevention requires more than simply including women; it requires addressing the root causes of conflict, among which militarized gender norms are an important factor.[22] In other words, conflict prevention requires addressing normative frameworks that valorize aggression and violence as a desirable form of masculinity, and which rely on notions of femininity that depict women as vulnerable wives and mothers in need of protection from a hostile enemy.[23]Security sector institutions are by no means the only places in society where such norms are at work, but SSR and institutional reform can and should play a role in addressing institutional cultures in security sector institutions as a way of addressing these norms. In practice, such reform might include examining whether military/police recruitment, training, and job descriptions reward aggression and unnecessary violence by, for example, prioritizing physical strength over non-violent conflict resolution.
Multiple studies across several fields have documented how gendered institutional cultures affect the performance of an institution. Recently, ethnographic studies of gendered cultures in financial institutions have shed light on research finding that, in the 2008 financial crash in the United States, higher numbers of women in a companies’ management correlated inversely with the fall in share price, demonstrating the pitfalls of certain types of hyper-masculinized institutional cultures.[24] Closer to the field of SSR, Didier Fassin’s ethnographic study of urban policing in France similarly draws parallels between entry requirements into elite squads that privilege physical strength and aggression over non-physical policing skills, including knowledge of legal procedure on the one hand, and an increased propensity for the excessive use of force on the other. He notes that “[a]ll urban riots in France since the early 1980s … followed the death of youths in the context of interactions with the police, and more specifically, in the case of the most recent and most serious disturbances, with these special units.” [25] Addressing the gendered norms and ideals at work in security sector institutions is therefore an important part of increasing public accountability and mitigating the risk of conflict.
At the level of the system as a whole, SSR can also contribute to the implementation of the conflict prevention agenda in the broader women, peace and security agenda. The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995) is commonly viewed as a precursor to the Security Council resolutions, and is referred to in all women, peace and security resolutions except for two (resolutions 1960 and 2106). The Beijing Platform for Action includes an aspect of conflict prevention that is not explicitly referred to in the somewhat narrower focus of the Security Council resolutions: it prioritizes demilitarization through reductions in military expenditure and the trade in arms.[26] An SSR approach to conflict resolution has the potential to support this form of conflict prevention: it aims to make the security sector effective, but also efficient and affordable. In other words, reductions in excessive military expenditure form a component of the work towards an efficient and affordable security sector.[27] An example of an SSR engagement that supports conflict prevention through reductions in military expenditure could comprise working with legislators, who approve budgets, to increase their capacity to assess and approve an adequate but proportionate allocation of funds, responding to national security priorities.[28]
For example, in the SSR (or security sector transformation) process in post-Apartheid South Africa, female parliamentarians demanded honesty and transparency when faced with arms trade deals that were conducted without public knowledge, and that were rife with allegations of corruption. Furthermore, women criticized the government for diverting funds to arms procurement instead of poverty alleviation, prompting one female parliamentarian to resign in protest.[29] In other words, female activists and legislators brought to the forefront the human security aspect of national security, emphasizing poverty alleviation and social concerns over arms procurement. SSR aims to further public accountability and proportionate military expenditure, foster the involvement of legislators, and ensure a space for an inclusive discussion, which are crucial to accurately determining national security priorities based on the needs and priorities of the population.
Participation
Resolution 1325 stresses “the importance of [the] equal participation and full involvement [of women] in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.” [30] This goal can be understood as having a two-fold objective: promoting the participation of women in decision-making, as well as increasing the participation of women in the security sector, including among personnel deployed on UN peace support operations. The call for participation highlights the important recognition that, contrary to entrenched gender stereotypes, women are not only victims and innocent civilians in need of protection; they are also actors – they are political agents, community organizers, security providers, and combatants.
The language of the Security Council resolutions as regards the participation of women in decision-making has evolved and become more nuanced over thirteen years. While the early resolutions called for the participation of women in decision-making, the most recent, Resolution 2122 (2013), speaks of focusing “more attention on women’s leadership.” [31] It also recognizes a more diverse group of actors than a monolith of women, making specific reference to the need to include “socially and/or economically disadvantaged groups of women.” [32] The security sector has an important role to play in advancing women’s participation and leadership, not only through balanced representation in the ranks of security sector institutions, but also in overcoming common challenges to women’s full participation such as violence and intimidation faced by female political actors.
The Somali women’s peace movement provides an insight into the problems women face in participation and in reconciling multiple identities, such as those of ethnicity and gender. In what is commonly seen as a clan-based conflict involving Somalia’s five foremost clans, Somali women often find themselves torn, as they are regarded as belonging to both their father’s and husband’s clans. One leader of the women’s peace movement, Asha Hagi, commented: “This war was clan-based, and my husband and I are from two different clans. My husband’s clan saw me as a traitor; my clan of birth as an outsider.” [33] Faced with competing clan loyalties and shared experience of being denied a voice in negotiations and government, a network of Somali women’s organizations declared themselves “The Sixth Clan,” bridging ethnic divides and seeking political recognition as women.[34] However, an unstable security situation, intimidation, and lack of resources faced especially by female politicians have hampered their demand for political representation and inter-clan dialogue.[35] SSR interventions that target political processes and national security policymaking structures have the potential to foster more inclusive decision-making that includes the voices of (marginalized) women.[36]
The Security Council resolutions also heed the role of women in security sector institutions. Again, the language of the resolutions notes that specific technical aspects are required. Resolution 2106 not only calls for the participation of women in security and justice institutions, but also specifically notes “the inclusion of women at professional levels in these institutions.” [37] This call applies both to security sector institutions in a country affected by or emerging from conflict, as well as troop-contributing countries to UN peace operations. Institutional reform within an SSR framework is crucial for the meaningful (including at professional levels) participation of women. Improving the gender balance includes, but does not stop at, the targeted recruitment of women. Their meaningful participation also requires adequate training, as well as ensuring a healthy and non-discriminatory workplace in which they can realize their full potential. Institutional reform measures aimed at creating such a work environment may include introducing family-friendly human resources policies, establishing sexual harassment policies, training, and disciplinary mechanisms.
The multiple measures required to improve gender balance in the security sector are well illustrated in the case of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP). In 2011, the SLP undertook an institutional gender self-assessment process, which, among many other issue areas, examined efforts to improve the gender balance and remaining challenges in this regard. The study found several areas of concern, ranging from lack of sustained efforts to recruit female personnel to certain operational units, difficulties policewomen faced in reconciling family and professional life when posted away from their family home, and widespread resistance to an accelerated promotion scheme for female personnel.[38] Furthermore, the study revealed that despite a well-known policy on sexual harassment, this was still experienced by police personnel, hindering the meaningful participation of female staff in particular.[39] The case of the Sierra Leone Police illustrates the many levels of institutional reform required to further the participation of women at professional levels in the security sector.
Protection
The Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security stress the need “to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict.” [40] The emphasis on the protection of women and girls in conflict situations reflects an understanding that civilians, especially women and children, account for the majority of those adversely affected by conflict.[41] Among these protection needs, sexual violence is a topic that has attracted high levels of policy and public attention in recent years.[42] Of the women, peace and security resolutions, four resolutions—1820, 1898, 1960 and 2106—specifically focus on conflict-related sexual violence. The topic has also attracted widespread public attention, including through a high-level global summit on the topic held in London in 2014.[43] A chronological reading of the resolutions highlights the need for an SSR approach to preventing and responding to sexual violence.
While Resolution 1325 (2000) calls for an end to impunity and prosecution of those responsible for war crimes, including sexual violence,[44] Resolution 1820 (2008) not only calls for a cessation of acts of sexual violence by parties to armed conflict, but also outlines specific measures for institutional reform to end sexual violence. These measures include developing and enforcing military disciplinary measures, training troops on the prohibition of sexual violence, and vetting armed and security forces for past crimes.[45] Resolution 1888 (2009) highlights the necessity of female military and police personnel in this response,[46] as well as the role played by civil society and traditional leaders.[47] It further expands on the comprehensive legal and judicial reforms required to bring perpetrators to justice and ensure that survivors have access to justice and are treated with dignity.[48] Resolution 2106 (2013) further elaborates on these requirements for security and justice reform. Resolution 2106 also extends the consideration of protection needs, insofar as it recognizes that men and boys may also experience sexual violence, and in recognizing the phenomenon of secondary victimization, mindful of the trauma experienced by those who have witnessed sexual violence committed against a family member.[49] In other words, the text of the resolutions has evolved from emphasizing the prohibition on sexual violence based on protection of women and calling for arresting and prosecuting perpetrators to an obligation to effect institutional and legal reform in the security and justice sectors.
It is worth noting that the resolutions use the umbrella term “sexual and gender-based violence.” Under this expression, they focus on sexual violence (and especially sexual violence perpetrated against women and girls), while remaining curiously silent on the issue of domestic violence and other forms of abuse which constitute gender-based violence.[50] Testimonies from refugee camps and communities emerging from conflict, from the Western Balkans to West Africa, indicate that domestic violence is a persistent problem with links to conflict and post-conflict trauma.[51] Nonetheless, the focus of the Security Council agenda remains somewhat narrowly focused on the question of sexual violence.
Recalling the principles of SSR outlined in the previous section, it becomes apparent that the resolutions’ call to prevent and respond to gender-based violence requires an SSR approach – requiring reform of both troop-contributing institutions in peacekeeping operations, as well as in conflict-affected areas. As the next section focuses primarily on troop-contributing countries, outlined here are several ways in which reform of the security sector in conflict-affected areas can help prevent and respond to gender-based violence. Efficiency and accountability require much more than peacekeepers catching perpetrators of mass rape and bringing them to the International Criminal Court. They require not only individual reactions, but also reforms in the security sector institutions, and call for a holistic, system-wide approach. Such reforms touch upon the police and armed forces and their institutional policies related to discipline and codes of conduct to prevent abuses by security sector personnel, as well as the development of standard operating procedures for responding to cases of gender-based violence. Both require training and capacity building. Prevention of and response to gender-based violence also has implications for staffing: staff must be vetted for human rights abuses, and the availability of trained female and male personnel must be ensured. In order to promote accountability and give survivors access to justice, justice institutions must have the capacity to respond and a national legal framework must be available to support them. Furthermore, a holistic approach involves informal or untraditional actors, civil society, including women’s groups, plays a role both in charting protection needs, providing security, and giving assistance to survivors. In contexts where traditional leaders or security and justice providers are influential, their cooperation and support is crucial to these efforts. The involvement of multiple actors, extending beyond the military and police, underlines the holistic approach that is characteristic of SSR.[52]
A recent study of domestic accountability mechanisms for gender-based violence in Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Uganda by the UC Berkeley School of Law highlighted the need for a cross-sectoral approach. In this study, Kim Thuy Seelinger notes difficulties related to investigation, prosecution, and adjudication of gender-based violence cases due to both victims’ unwillingness to report and the lack of capacities and resources in the responsible agencies to receive them. Seelinger notes that specialized agencies have been established in both police and justice systems—such as the Liberian National Police Women and Children Protection Unit and the country’s specialized court for victims of sexual and gender-based violence, Criminal Court E—but that lack of coordination between these agencies remains a problem.[53] In other words, SSR efforts that take a holistic approach to sector-wide reform are a key component to responding to gender-based violence.
Relief and Recovery
The women, peace and security resolutions mention several areas of relief and recovery efforts, which are pertinent to the agenda. These include the integration of gender perspectives in the design of refugee camps,[54] repatriation and reintegration,[55] disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration,[56] and humanitarian response.[57] Closely linked to these elements is the integration of gender perspectives in peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities.[58] Relief and recovery efforts are closely linked, but do not form a part of SSR per se.[59] However, this section argues that the effective integration of gender perspectives in relief and recovery efforts requires SSR in troop-contributing countries.
The reason SSR is required in troop-contributing countries, especially among militaries, stems from the changing nature of military operations. The armed forces are an organization designed to fight wars, but, as Annica Kronsell and Erika Svedberg note, “[w]hat seems new, and rather paradoxical, is that making war is increasingly associated with making peace ... The change is also associated with a reevaluation of the skills needed.” [60] This change can be conceptualized as requiring a two-fold reform in troop-contributing countries/institutions: ensuring the integration of gender perspectives into planning and conduct of new kinds of operations, and in ensuring internal or national accountability for the conduct of peacekeeping personnel.
The nature of peacekeeping missions requires military personnel to interact with the population in a gender-responsive manner. Accordingly, the reevaluation of the skills needed, mentioned by Kronsell and Svedberg, relates to the military often being called upon to undertake functions more closely related to policing. A number of practical manuals and guidance documents seek to better prepare military personnel for such tasks. For example, the 2010 UN guidelines for integrating a gender perspective in military peacekeeping note that “the military may be the first point of contact for victims of domestic violence, in situations where they are providing medical services” and further outline related protection tasks such as ensuring the safety of victims and respecting confidentiality.[61] While international actors such as UN agencies and NATO have been proactive in producing guidelines and training requirements, the integration of protection aspects into national pre-deployment training remains inconsistent. For example, NATO’s 2013 review of the implementation of Resolution 1325 pointed to “the general absence of pre-deployment training as a major detriment to gender mainstreaming.” [62] This suggests that in order to fulfill the obligations for gender-responsive relief and recovery outlined in the Security Council resolutions, troop-contributing nations must undertake reform of their militaries’ education and training frameworks in order to equip troops with the skills required.
Another issue surrounding relief and recovery, and necessitating reform in troop-contributing countries, relates to the conduct of personnel engaged in peace support operations. The UN has been mired in scandals related to sexual exploitation and abuse committed by peacekeeping personnel since reports emerged in the 1990s of the involvement of members of the International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the trafficking of women into sexual slavery. Despite the serious nature of these crimes, no IPTF officer was prosecuted, and the UN has been accused of trying to conceal the events.[63] While the UN has since adopted a zero-tolerance Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Policy and several preventative measures have been taken, the fact remains that the onus to prosecute and penalize such abuses rests on troop-contributing countries. In a damning report issued in the 2005, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Al-Hussein, Permanent Representative of Jordan, advised the UN Secretary General that “[t]here is a widespread perception that peacekeeping personnel, whether military or civilian, who commit acts of sexual exploitation and abuse rarely if ever face disciplinary charges for such acts and, at most, suffer administrative consequences.” [64] In other words, reform of security institutions and accountability and justice mechanisms in troop-contributing countries is required in order to address the obligations of the women, peace and security resolutions.
Conclusion
This article makes no claims to covering all thematic aspects of the women, peace and security agenda, nor does its scope permit an exhaustive exploration of the ways in which SSR efforts support the implementation of its goals. However, it does aim to demonstrate more generally that reform of the security sector and its institutions—both in conflict-affected areas and in troop-contributing countries—is required for the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda. Through this exploration, the article provides some illustrative examples of the issues at stake and the ways in which SSR can contribute to addressing them. Examples have ranged from how working with women’s organizations and female politicians, reforming institutional cultures, reducing excessive military expenditure, applying a sector-wide approach to addressing sexual and gender-based violence, and capacity- and accountability-building with troop-contributing countries’ police and military can support the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda.
This discussion has also underscored a number of ways in which the women, peace and security agenda focus has narrowed over the years: primarily through the focus on women rather than gender, and the increasing focus on conflict-related sexual violence. Noting that the agenda has narrowed does not detract from the importance of addressing the needs and roles of women, nor does it belittle the necessity to improve prevention of and response to sexual violence. However, what is argued is that a renewed focus on gender and close attention to the reform of structures and institutions is better suited to address these concerns and the issues that underlie them. Examining how gender works in the context of peace and security points to some promising avenues in pursuing the women, peace and security agenda: it allows for the possibility of addressing pathological gender norms and inequalities, thereby reducing the likelihood of conflict and gender-related abuses. It also creates space for the examination of underlying gender norms that may also contribute to the victimization of men through sexual violence. Further, adopting a system-wide approach touches upon what should be the heart of the women, peace and security agenda. The women, peace and security agenda should not, as leading advocate and drafter of Resolution 1325 Sanam Anderlinin has argued, be about “making war safe for women.” [65] It should be about formulating an inclusive understanding of security and a gender-equal vision of peace.
* Aiko Holvikivi holds a Master’s degree in Political Science from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies and an undergraduate degree in International Relations from the University of St Andrews. She currently works in the Gender and Security Programme of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and co-chairs the SSR Working Group of the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes. Her work includes support to international institutions, research, and technical advisory and capacity-building projects on gender and SSR with NATO, UN Women, and national partners in the Western Balkans, Southern Caucasus and West and Southern Africa.
[1] For example, UN Security Council, S/RES/1820, 19 June 2008, par. 10; UN Security Council, S/RES/1888, 30 September 2009, par. 8, 17; UN Security Council, S/RES/2106, 24 June 2013, par. 16; and UN Security Council, S/RES/2122, 18 October 2013, par. 10.
[2] This perception stems from the key role played by the international women’s movement, along with the governments of Namibia, Bangladesh and Canada, in lobbying the Security Council to put the theme of women, peace and security on the agenda. Torunn L. Tryggestad, “Trick or Treat? The UN and Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security,” Global Governance 15 (2009), 540–541, http://journals.rienner.com/doi/abs/10.5555/ggov.2009.15.4.539 (accessed 18 March 2015).
[3] Eirin Mobekk, “Gender, Women and Security Sector Reform,” International Peacekeeping 17:2 (2010), 281.
[4] In this article, the “women, peace and security resolutions” refer to the Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013). The term “women, peace, and security agenda” is used to signify a slightly broader agenda, including the resolutions, but also their precursor, the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.
[5] Other terms used to refer to a similar concept include: security system reform, security and justice sector reform, security sector transformation, security sector reconstruction, security sector governance, etc.
[6] For a succinct overview, see Nicole Ball, “The Evolution of the Security Sector Reform Agenda,” in The Future of Security Sector Reform, ed. Mark Sedra (Ontario: CIGI, 2010), 154, available at https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/the_future_of_security_sector_reform.pdf (accessed 16 March 2015).
[7] OECD, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series: Security System Reform and Governance (Paris: OECD, 2005), 20, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/19900988 (accessed 31 March 2015).
[8] Ann Fitz-Gerald, “Stabilization Operations and Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform: Strange Bedfellows or Close Allies?,” in The Future of Security Sector Reform, 154.
[9] Kristin Valasek, “Security Sector Reform and Gender,” in Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit, ed. Megan Bastick and Kristin Valasek (Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW, 2008), 18.
[10] Heather Huhtanen and Veerle Triquet, Gender Equality and Good Security Sector Governance, SSR Backgrounder Series, ed. Fairlie Chappuis (Geneva: DCAF, 2015); Veerle Triquet and Callum Watson, Gender Equality and Security Sector Reform, SSR Backgrounder Series, ed. Fairlie Chappuis (Geneva: DCAF, 2015).
[11] Mobekk, “Gender, Women and Security Sector Reform,” 278; Jennifer Erin Salahub and Krista Nerland, “Just Add Gender? Challenges to Meaningful Integration of Gender in SSR Policy and Practice,” in The Future of Security Sector Reform, 154.
[12] See, for example: OECD DAC, “Section 9: Integrating Gender Awareness and Equality,” in OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (Paris: OECD, 2009), www.oecd.org/social/gender-development/42168607.pdf (accessed 27 March 2015); UN SSR Task Force, Security Sector Reform Integrated Technical Guidance Notes (New York: UN, 2012), available at http://unssr.unlb.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=XM6t1lKwBaA%3d&tabid=145& mid=438 (accessed 27 March 2015); Bastick and Valasek, ed., Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit, 18.
[13] Salahub and Nerland, “Just Add Gender? Challenges to Meaningful Integration of Gender in SSR Policy and Practice,” 266.
[14] One of which includes Megan Bastick and Daniel de Torres, “Implementing the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions in Security Sector Reform,” in Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit, 18.
[15] Following the UN strategic results framework. United Nations, UN Strategic Results Framework on Women, Peace and Security 2011–2020 (New York: United Nations, 2011), available at www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/wps/Strategic_Framework_2011-2020.pdf (accessed 19 March 2015).
[16] UN Security Council, S/RES/1325, 31 October 2000, preamble.
[17] UN, Strategic Results Framework.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Karen Barnes and Peter Albrecht, “Civil Society Oversight of the Security Sector and Gender,” in Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit, 18.
[20] Cynthia Enloe, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 126.
[21] Ibid.,150–1 .
[22] Saferworld, Saferworld Briefing: Reviving Conflict Prevention in 1325 (London: Saferworld, 2015), 3, available at http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/890-reviving-conflict-prevention-in-1325 (accessed 19 March 2015).
[23] Laura Sjoberg, Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 263–268.
[24] Cynthia Enloe, Seriously! Investigating Crashes and Crises as if Women Mattered (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), Kindle edition, 69.
[25] Didier Fassin, Enforcing Order: An Ethnography of Urban Policing (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), Kindle edition, Location 1680.
[26] Although the preambles of both of the 2013 resolutions (2106 and 2122) do acknowledge provisions in the Arms Trade Treaty, adopted by the General Assembly in the same year, that exporting states must take into account the risk of arms being used to commit or facilitate acts of gender-based violence. Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (Beijing: UN, 1995), 59; Hannah Wright, “Beijing, 1325 and Beyond: Taking Women, Peace and Security Back to its Roots,”Saferworld, 31 October 2014, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/news-and-views/comment/151-beijing-1325-and-beyond-taking-women-peace-and-security-back-to-its-roots (accessed 9 March 2015).
[27] Rahel Kunz and Kristin Valasek, “Learning from Others’ Mistakes: Towards Participatory, Gender-sensitive SSR,” in Back to the Roots: Security Sector Reform and Development, ed. Albrecht Schnabel and Vanessa Farr (Geneva: DCAF, 2012), 115, available at www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Back-to-the-Roots-Security-Sector-Reform-and-Development (accessed 29 March 2015).
[28] Ilja Luciak, “Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector and Gender,” in Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit, 18.
[29] Ibid., 6.
[30] UN Security Council, S/RES/1325, 31 October 2000, preamble.
[31] Par. 1 (emphasis added).
[32] UNSCR 2122, par. 7(a).
[33] “Asha’s Story,” Peace Direct, http://www.peacedirect.org/us/peacebuilders/past-projects/somalia (accessed 29 March 2015).
[34] Sumie Nakaya, “Women and Gender Equality in Peacebuilding,” in Building Sustainable Peace, ed. Tom Keating and W. Andy Knight (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2006), 156.
[35] “Somalia: Somali Political Process under Threat: UN,” Horseed Media, 1 August 2012, available at http://horseedmedia.net/2012/08/01/somali-political-process-under-threat-un (accessed 29 March 2015).
[36] Peter Albrecht and Karen Barnes, “National Security Policy-making and Gender,” in Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit, 18.
[37] Par. 16 (c) (emphasis added).
[38] Aisha Fofana Ibrahim, The Integration of a Gender Perspective in the Sierra Leone Police (Geneva: DCAF, 2013), 27, available at http://dcaf.ch/Publications/The-Integration-of-a-Gender-Perspective-in-the-Sierra-Leone-Police (accessed 29 March 2015).
[39] Ibid., 41.
[40] UNSCR 1325, par. 10.
[41] Ibid., preamble.
[42] Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War? Perceptions, Prescriptions, Problems in the Congo and Beyond (London/New York: Zed Books in association with the Nordic Africa Institute, 2013), 60.
[43] For more information, see the Summit website, https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/sexual-violence-in-conflict (accessed 18 March 2015).
[44] Par. 11.
[45] Par. 3.
[46] Par. 17.
[47] Par. 15.
[48] Par. 6.
[49] Par. 16. See also Chris Dolan, “Has Patriarchy Been Stealing the Feminists’ Clothes? Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and UN Security Council Resolutions,” IDS Bulletin 45:1 (January 2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1759-5436.12071 (accessed 15 March 2015).
[50] Eriksson Baaz and Stern, Sexual Violence, 95.
[51] Enloe, Maneuvers, 147 and International Rescue Committee, Let Me Not Die Before My Time (New York: International Rescue Committee, 2012), 7, available at http://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/resource-file/IRC_Report_DomVioWAfrica.pdf (accessed 1 April 2015).
[52] Maria Eriksson Baaz and Mats Utas, “Beyond ‘Gender and Stir’,” in Beyond ‘Gender and Stir’: Reflections on Gender and SSR in the Aftermath of African Conflicts, ed. Maria Eriksson Baaz and Mats Utas (Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute, 2012), 9, available at http://nai.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:570724/FULLTEXT01.pdf (accessed 18 March 2015). For specific recommendations, see Bastick and de Torres, “Implementing.”
[53] Kim Thuy Seelinger, “Domestic Accountability for Sexual Violence: The Potential of Specialized Units in Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Uganda,” International Review of the Red Cross (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1816383115000090 (accessed 29 March 2015).
[54] UNSCR 1325, Par. 12.
[55] Ibid., Par. 8(a).
[56] Ibid., Par. 13.
[57] Ibid., Par. 14.
[58] Ibid., Par. 5.
[59] Bastick and de Torres, “Implementing,” 10.
[60] Annica Kronsell and Erika Svedberg, “Introduction,” in Making Gender, Making War: Violence, Military and Peacekeeping Practices, ed. Annica Kronsell and Erika Svedberg (New York/London: Routledge, 2012), Kindle edition, 2.
[61] UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, DPKO/DFS Guidelines: Integrating a Gender Perspective into the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping Operations (New York: UN DPKO/DFS, 2010), 31, 36.
[62] Helené Lackenbauer and Richard Langlais, ed., Review of the Practical Implementation of UNSCR 1325 for the Conduct of NATO-led Operations and Missions (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency FOI, 2013), 37, 61, available athttp://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2013_10/20131021_131023-UNSCR1325-review-final.pdf (accessed 30 March 2015).
[63] Jennifer Murray, “Who Will Police the Peace-builders? The Failure to Establish Accountability for the Participation of United Nations Civilian Police in the Trafficking of Women in Post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Columbia Human Rights Law Review 34 (2002–2003), 505.
[64] HRH Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, UN A/59/710, Par. 66, available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SE%20A%2059%20710.pdf (accessed 31 March 2015).
[65] Sanam Anderlini, “Resolution 1325 is a Starting Point,” Public Broadcasting Service, 5 November 2010, available at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/women-war-and-peace/features/essay-1325-is-a-starting-point/ (accessed 1 April 2015).