Deterring Hybrid Warfare: NATO Approaches to Russian Sabotage

This article presents a comparative analysis of how the concept of deterrence is understood and applied, with particular emphasis on its role in hybrid warfare, by the Russian Federation (action before reaction, coercive escalation), as opposed to NATO’s approach, centered on the prevention of aggression through credible deterrence and a posture of collective resilience. Building on this comparison, the article further examines NATO’s deterrence strategies against Russian hybrid warfare, focusing on sabotage as a key asymmetric tool rooted in Soviet-era covert practices and revived in recent years amid escalating gray-zone threats, particularly following the invasion of Ukraine and the targeting of NATO strategic infrastructure.

Applying an integrated methodology combining historical analysis, theoretical frameworks, case studies of recent incidents (2022–2025), theoretical modeling, and policy evaluation, the study argues that effectively countering sabotage within the hybrid domain can be achieved only through integrated deterrence. Such an approach should encompass proactive strategic anticipation based on historical patterns and precedents, enhanced intelligence-sharing, infrastructure resilience, and the operationalization of the principle of whole-of-society defense. Ultimately, the article argues that NATO and its allies must shift from a reactive posture to an anticipatory posture of defense and deterrence, aligning strategic foresight with adaptive defense capabilities.