Eastern Europe

Methodological Foundation of State’s Information Security in Social Networking Services in Conditions of Hybrid War

Defining the Concept of ‘Hybrid Warfare’ Based on the Analysis of Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine

Implementation of the Concept of Critical Infrastructure Protection in Ukraine: Achievements and Challenges

Arms Control Arrangements under the Aegis of the OSCE: Is There a Better Way to Handle Compliance?

Dunay, Pàl. "Arms Control Arrangements under the Aegis of the OSCE: Is There a Better Way to Handle Compliance?" Connections: The Quarterly Journal 16, no. 3 (2017): 57-71.

Arms Control under OSCE — Downloaded 3730 times
Arms Control under OSCE -- EPUB — Downloaded 4259 times
Arms Control under OSCE -- for Kindle — Downloaded 4355 times

The Image of Security Sector Agencies as a Strategic Communication Tool

From Wales to Warsaw and Beyond: NATO’s Strategic Adaptation to the Russian Resurgence on Europe’s Eastern Flank

A Changing Security Paradigm. New Roles for New Actors – The Russian Approach

Banasik, Mirosław. "A Changing Security Paradigm. New Roles for New Actors – The Russian Approach." Connections: The Quarterly Journal 15, no. 4 (2016): 31-43.

 

Introduction

In 2014, the Russian Federation conducted two separate phases of operations in Ukraine. Despite substantial differences in the objectives of and methods used within the operations, it is worth noting that their natures have much in common. Both operations were planned and conducted in accordance with the doctrine followed by Gerasimov and on the basis of the concept hybrid war­fare.

NATO Nuclear Deterrence: The Warsaw Summit and Beyond

Anderson, Matthew P.. "NATO Nuclear Deterrence: The Warsaw Summit and Beyond." Connections: The Quarterly Journal 15, no. 4 (2016): 5-30.

Introduction

NATO, for its part, has consciously and conspicuously de-emphasized nuclear weapons in its defense policy and posture since the end of the Cold War. As a consequence, the Alliance now lacks the policies and capabilities needed to deter, and if necessary to respond to, a limited Russian nuclear strike.

– Dr. Matthew Kroenig, 2015, US Senate testimony [1]

NATO Nuclear Deterrence after Warsaw — Downloaded 6879 times

Pages