South Caucasus, PME and Intelligence Services’ Transformation in Focus
None of the important time-critical processes described and analyzed in the articles presented here could have been realized without expert advice provided by NATO initiatives and the cooperation with NATO member and partner countries. Thus, the Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP) played and continues to play a crucial role in Professional Military Education (PME) and interoperability in the Southern Caucasus.
Cyberwar in Russian and USA Military-Political Thought: A Comparative View
Cross-domain Coercion as Russia’s Endeavor to Weaken the Eastern Flank of NATO: A Latvian Case Study
Deterrence and Defense at the Eastern Flank of NATO and the EU: Readiness and Interoperability in the Context of Forward Presence
NATO Presence in Eastern Europe after the Changes of 1989 
The elaboration in this article is based on developments of multinational formations in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)/South Eastern Europe (SEE), improving their interoperability and readiness through multinational projects, especially in the area of Communications and Information (C&I), and adequate education and training, including exercises.
Deterrence in Eastern Europe in Theory and Practice
Defense Education Enhancement Program in Ukraine: The Limits of NATO’s Education Program
The so-called “Revolution of Dignity,” that took place between November 2013 and March 2014 in Ukraine, gave Russia a pretext to seize the Crimea and engage proxy forces in the Donbas to rebel against the new Ukrainian administration. Seen from the point of view of NATO, this is an unprovoked action that threatens the status quo in Europe. It seems therefore normal that thus challenged, prudence would counsel the strongest possible support to Ukraine, to demonstrate resolve and reassure the Alliance’s Eastern flank.
Defence Institution Building in Ukraine at Peace and at War
In 1991, independent Ukraine inherited from the Soviet Union sizeable conventional military contingent equivalent to Europe’s second largest armed forces and had on its territory the third world largest nuclear arsenal. The process of conversion of this rather chaotic massive post-Soviet force and building the coherent national military of Ukraine went through two major stages – peace-time decline (1991-2013) and war-time transformation since the start of Russian invasion to Crimea in 2014.
Ukraine’s Security Sector Reform: Is Ukraine Taking Western Advice?
Since Ukraine joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace program in 1994, and especially following the 2014 Euromaidan, the West has been supporting Ukraine in its security sector reform. The long time of the reform design and implementation may cause difficulties in assessing the reform’s progress. It has merit, therefore, to assess the Security Sector Reform in Ukraine in the aspects of its two key variables: governance and effectiveness.
Defense Institution Building from Above? Lessons from the Baltic Experience
There is nothing better than ‘NATO dirt’ under the ‘fingernails.’ So said then NATO Supreme allied commander in Europe, General John Shalikashvili, in reference to the goal of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). In the aftermath of the Cold War, the states of Eastern Europe looked for aid from the West. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) was NATO’s response. The goal was to bring members of the former Warsaw Pact into closer cooperation with NATO.
NATO’s Defense Institution Building in the Age of Hybrid Warfare
Projecting stability through increasing resilience of NATO partners’ institutions or using their unique experiences as elements maximizing the effectiveness of collective response strategies works to the advantage of NATO. By making its Partners more secure and able to effectively respond to challenges to their security, as well as by working with them to confront common threats, NATO directly contributes to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. At the same time, insecurity and vulnerability of Partners negatively influence Allied security.