Changing the Paradigm of Education for Security

Andrzej Pieczywok *

Introduction

In our lives we are often exposed to situations that increase the likelihood that existing conditions in our surroundings will deteriorate, risking a loss of balance between our system of values and our capacities. These situations can have a significant influence on people’s sense of existential security. Among the many processes that reflect this modern reality, one seems to be particularly dominant: globalization. Its inevitability and extent can be observed not only in the sphere of production and trade, but on the level of our daily experiences.[1]

It seems that the modern world regularly presents threats to our security other than the dangerous physical, chemical, and biological factors that result in occupational diseases or accidents. Occupational diseases, which have long caused various forms of physical disability, are now associated increasingly often with emotional instability, fear, and depression. We live in a world of permanent and rapid change, a world that offers freedom and closer contact with other people – mainly thanks to the development of global communication networks and the extraordinarily rapid development of mass media. At the same time, however, we live in a world that often works against our sense of security.[2]

The status of education as the great hope of the present is itself at risk, as it is subject to many contradictions, tensions, and failures. Today, we see the lowering of the prestige of many of the humanistic, social, and cultural disciplines as a result of views based in mechanical or psychological reductionism. Education is a social process, organized in order to induce changes in humans. On one hand, education must prepare people to make use of the achievements of civilization, and on the other hand it should lead them toward creative participation in furthering civilization. It is particularly important in the pursuit of scientific truth, and in shaping pro-social and pro-peace attitudes. The modern world requires that education shape human creativity, provide support mechanisms for creative thinking, and aid students in adopting creative perspectives on the world as one that can change and transform.

Under current global conditions, the interdependence of local and global spheres provides the basic pattern of development and creative direction for human activity. And on both the local and global level, education is focused on shaping and developing the level of knowledge in society. This article presents a range of topics and research regarding the implementation of security education at every level of the curriculum. The scope of analysis primarily focuses on the content offered in lower secondary schools and middle schools.

Jerzy Kunikowski writes, “The general goal of school is to educate modern man, who will be equipped with a particular set of ethical rigor, which commonly can be called a formed conscience and set of beliefs about self, his identity and readiness.” [3] Although security is not typically thought of as part of the curriculum in primary and secondary schools, this does not mean that schools at this level do not have an important role to play in security education. The school as a critical educational institution cannot remain outside the mainstream of thinking about improving security. The overall objective of school education is to educate and raise the awareness of young people who not only will be able to quickly and accurately prevent a variety of threats, but also to define them and actively participate in activities related to ensuring security in the social environment.

Security as an Educational Category

Since the end of the Cold War, the concept of security has developed by leaps and bounds. Having been profoundly transformed and extended to include transnational dimensions, the concept of security is now oriented towards both human and global security. Human security is distinguished from the traditional concept of security both by the fact that the threats come from both within and outside the state and by its purpose, which is the protection of individuals. Global security, which also includes human security, takes into account a set of interconnected nonmilitary risks—economic crises, underdevelopment, environmental decline—that cross state borders and above all are beyond the state’s powers of regulation.

New concepts of security are associated with a more general decline of state sovereignty. On one hand, individual citizens have replaced the state as primary holders of the right to security, while, on the other hand, the task of producing security “sans frontieres” has been taken over by international institutions and organizations.

Security as the primary value of human existence is one of the main subjects of discussion within both academic disciplines and the broader society. It is the object of the concerns, aspirations, and desires of people around the word. In this environment, it is important to promote actions that preserve peace. These operations are conditioned by the characteristics of human nature, and, on the other hand, by axiology, or the study of values. Human nature is an object of study of both philosophy (anthropological) and psychology (which examines in detail man’s personality, disposition, development, and opportunity). Systems of values, on the other hand, are the area of study of axiology, a basic component of philosophy. Ethics, above all, establishes cardinal values that are appropriate to the adult human personality. Such a personality is attributed to man, as an entity essentially free to realize its dignity, because he is concerned with great matters. Since ancient times such a philosophical man is in every aspect a model in ethics, and has served as an important ideal in a responsible and fair system of education.[4]

Security, according to its strict definition, means a state of lack of threat, calmness, or certainty. This term is used in different ways in many different disciplines, however, and it is difficult to define. In the most general sense, it is the state in which an individual, a social group, an organization, or a nation does not sense a threat to its existence or basic interests. A secure situation is one in which there are formal, institutional, and practical guarantees of protection. In this sense, security can be perceived in emotional, personal, public, financial, economic, social, and international terms.[5]

In the literature, occupational safety is most often associated with hygiene, understood generally as a set of conditions that have a positive impact on human health.[6] Since this understanding of occupational safety is quite general, it may contain both physical and emotional components. The Occupational Training Teacher Reference Dictionary focuses on a rather technical definition: occupational health and safety is “a set of means and utilities: technical, sanitary and hygienic, socioeconomic and organizational, which, through elimination or limitation of harmful and dangerous physical, chemical and biological factors, exerting impact on employees in the process of work, ensure the conditions of work and the environment, which eliminate the possibility of occurrence of occupational diseases and accidents at work….” [7]

Two distinct perspectives on safety can be distinguished:

1.       A “narrow” perspective, that can be described as a lack of threat, focusing on analysis of the impact on the subject in terms of threats to significant internal values

2.       A “wide” perspective, that treats safety as shaping conditions that enable the achievement of a high probability of survival, possession, and freedom of development; a significant aspect here is ensuring the creative activity of the subject, or the ability to open up and to cooperate with the environment.[8]

At the macro level, security is treated as the real condition of internal stability and sovereignty of the state, which reflects the absence of any threats (in the sense of the satisfaction of the basic existential and behavioral needs of society and the state’s secure status as a sovereign subject in international relations).[9] In the past, issues of security were limited to political and military aspects, but the modern notion of state security includes economic, environmental, social, and ethnic aspects. Still treated as valid are such threats to personal and structural security as violation of the economic, political, moral, and legal order in the society. But also considered as threats to security are such issues as a lack of understanding and compliance on the part of individuals and states with the rule of law or the pursuit of individual interests at any price without considering the common good. Many of these threats have not been eliminated, and they may still pose a potential threat of new conflicts and wars that could ruin the economy, culture, and security of human societies.[10]

In today’s multipolar world, the parameters of the new security landscape are particularly complex. They include a large number of processes and actors, all with particular needs, interests, ideologies, and strategies. In this context, the nature of risk as social construct and the increasing number of situations perceived as risk place a multifaceted and unsolvable risk-security ambivalence at the very heart of the matter.

A key aspect is the fact that the expansion of the concept of security makes it difficult to fully achieve. The problem is further complicated by the fact that, in many situations, it is now, paradoxically, more difficult to distinguish between security measures and sources of risk. Furthermore, public opinion is well aware of the fact that all security measures are also sources of risk—there is no such thing as safe security.

All human activities can be a source of threats and risks. The economy represents an emblematic case. While it is frequently emphasized that the real problem with economic globalization does not affect those involved, but rather those excluded, the increase of investments in regions on the verge of conflict or actually at war and the consolidated policy of international aid during post-war peace-building initiatives has created of new opportunities, but also has generated new risks and instabilities. Consequently, many resources and shrewd care are required.

Paradoxically, even the widely approved defense of human security and human and minority rights and the condemnation of crimes against humanity—a cause of great ferment among organized forms of civil society, spontaneous groups, and even public opinion—can produce undesired effects. Indeed, increased social sensitivity can involuntarily stimulate new conflicts. All minorities can constitute sources of internal conflict in the name of equality, human and cultural rights, and self-determination (among others) in the hope of protecting their ethnic and religious distinctness and attracting the attention and support of the international community for their policies of autonomy, regardless of the grounds upon which they are based.

The concept of risk involves accounting for the probability of an event, while the calculation of this probability requires an interconnected combination of expert knowledge, common sense, opinions, assessments, indicators, and other objective and subjective aspects. Furthermore, all risks have a social dimension. Thus security is a public asset that also has a significant symbolic value.

Increasing citizens’ sense of security refers to the educational impact of programs that contribute to shaping individuals who are convinced that they are capable of dealing with the challenges that life brings. This is possible by building high self-esteem in people, including training in conscious living, individual responsibility, self-acceptance, assertiveness, and personal integrity. The higher our level of self-esteem, the better prepared we are to cope with our problems. The changes that have been made in educational programs are proven useful in developing desirable personality traits.

The basic goals of such education programs in security studies are:

·         Acquisition of knowledge about security processes in various spheres of human activity and their theoretical interpretation

·         Determining the relations between causes and effects in security studies and formulating homogenous knowledge (general security theory)

·         Understanding the concepts, programs, and propositions for the complex security of people, nations, and states

·         Choosing the appropriate criteria to evaluate national and global security.[11]

In human life, security is the fundamental and necessary condition of healthy and well-adjusted development, as well as self-realization in a social community. We assume that the state we define as “social security” is achieved when the following conditions are met:

·         There is harmony between stability and instability in the important matters of life

·         There is favorable ratio of predictable to unpredictable events

·         There is no unfavorable change in the level of security that an individual has achieved, in terms of his career, vital factors, and short- and long-term plans

·         There is no external control or interference in a person’s individual values and private actions.[12]

Personal Insecurity

Insecurity is the most widely debated topic in the world today. Since the events of September 2001, when even the earth’s best protected country was violated and its territory proved no longer immune from the social and human upheavals familiar to other lands, our collective feeling of insecurity has risen dramatically.

The way we experience insecurity depends on individual as well as general factors, both personal and cultural, subjective and objective. Still, one must admit that “insecurity” is a rather vague category, and that it could perhaps be more accurately analyzed and more precisely defined.

Naturally, there is no such thing as an absolute guarantee of security, either external or internal, and very often political battles are fought over the degree of security those in charge of the state are, or are not, able to offer. Moreover, even the most restrictive definition of security cannot be interpreted as the mere safeguard of the citizens’ safety, but must instead also be understood as a system for the defense of their rights and duties—that is, as a global legal system. In this regard, it must be said that when we speak of confidence in the institutions of the state, of their credibility and efficiency, we are ultimately speaking of the quantum of actual security.

In a typical post-industrial society, economic growth rates are lower and more uncertain than they had previously been. Technological changes mean that stable employment in the manufacturing sector is no longer available on a mass scale, with implications for the job security of semi-skilled and unskilled workers and for class structure and the political interests associated with it. These changes create new social risks and new avenues for reform. The new social risks are the risks that people now face in the course of their lives as a result of the economic and social changes associated with the transition to a post-industrial society.

A paradox of a critical educational situation is the fact that independence, resulting from a strong emphasis on independence and personal responsibility, or, to a certain extent, an autonomous education, may also lead to isolation. In such cases, autonomy as a duty to the self to comply with general norms will disappear, resulting in abuse. The cases of such “independence”—an intense focus on the self—are observed when the process of education is dominated by the tendency to focus on the individual.

A substantial impact on the quality of the process of education in many social environments is exerted by the information technology revolution, which, on one hand, has brought so many valuable things into our lives, and, on the other, has resulted in a deep cultural crisis. It seems that a great myth of our era is the human right to the free expression of personality. This myth is often turned into the rule of: everyone can do anything, but not everyone and not anything.

A modern man, as Erich Fromm has put it, only seems to know what he wants; in fact, he wants what he is required to do. As a result of this process, he loses his identity, without which there is no real security for a free individual. Loss of one’s identity intensifies the need to adapt to the obligatory models.[13]

One of the factors that dehumanize social life and threaten human existence are disturbances in the satisfaction of one’s basic needs. These disturbances in terms of the need for security and stabilization, according to the experts in the field, lead to weakening individuals’ sense of purpose in life, which may result in obsessive-compulsive neurosis, reduction of the higher need to focus on issues associated with the sense of order, and a tendency to seek support in someone or something characterized by permanence.

In assessing situations we confront, fear plays a significant role, since it allows us to decide whether a given event will bring us benefits or only negative effects. However, the assessment is not always accurate. Individuals suffering from anxiety qualify various threats as being more menacing in comparison with persons with a stabilized level of fear. However, some threats are assessed as posing the same level of risk, regardless of any differences in the intensity of anxiety between individual persons. Drugs, terrorism, or a bomb attack usually result in strong fear reactions and are assessed as risky events, while recreational activities, such as skiing, swimming, or horseback riding are usually described as relatively safe and not posing a substantial risk. Assessment of a risky situation is influenced greatly by the degree of comfort in dealing with tasks that have not been encountered before. In such situations, no preventive measures are known that could allow us to avoid the negative effects of threats. Persons who fear failure upon the completion of a given task usually overestimate the associated risk.

It seems, nevertheless, that modern society, which is the source of the culture of individualism and relativism, only facilitates the emergence of narcissistic individuals. This term has not been used accidentally, because, as has been stated by Ch. Delsol, “a modern individual, even an adult, remains an unstable youth, characterized by incoherent desires, conflicting opinions, ... irresponsibility.” [14]

In a society of fluid modernity, individual achievements do not translate to permanent property, since assets turn into liabilities in the twinkling of an eye, and advantages turn out to be weaknesses. The circumstances of action and the subordinate strategies of action quickly become outdated. Taking advantage of experience as a source of knowledge and referring to strategies and tactics that had proven efficient in the past is thus unreasonable, as the challenges of the past did not take into account the sudden, usually unexpected changes in circumstances. Forecasting future tendencies on the basis of past events is even more risky, and is usually misleading. It is increasingly difficult to get reliable data, while infallible forecasts have become simply unimaginable.[15]

Passiveness is one of the most typical and yet pathological characteristics of men in modern society. A man wants to be fed, but fails to move, show initiative, even to digest the food that is provided to him. A man is not creative towards his heritage; he only gathers or consumes. Remaining passive, a man does not attempt to find his place in the world, and he is forced to give up his ideals and their attendant requirements. Therefore, he feels powerless, lonely, and full of anxiety. He finds it difficult to define himself, and his sense of integrity is low. Conformism, which seems to be the only way to avoid the unbearable fear, often turns out to be insufficient.[16]

Apart from passiveness, another factor that often influences individual security is obedience and submission. Today, obedience has become a somewhat forgotten virtue. Obedience is a questioned value, because the term is misunderstood, and it is often confused with submission. This confusion between obedience and submission is one of the most dangerous mistakes made in modern education. Submission means giving up freedom, or capitulation. Obedience, on the other hand, is disposal of the self in accordance with the established hierarchical order. Obedience is exercising one’s freedom, but not against one’s superiors; it is a choice of an attitude of cooperation with one’s superior (educator). Teachers are the ones appointed to organize the lives of their pupils. Those who are responsible for discipline also need a positive reply to their actions from their subordinates – that is, they need obedience. Without obedience, there is no normal education. It is impossible to organize any kind of work, or a normally functioning community. Therefore, an upbringing in the spirit of an appropriate understanding of obedience is fundamental to building a free society.

In sociology, it is fashionable today to state that human problems can be analyzed without referring to the emotions associated with them. It is assumed that scientific objectivity requires the opinions and theories pertaining to men to be free from any emotional bonds. It should be emphasized that in Poland we are dealing with a cultural vacuum: on one side, there is a sense of freedom, while on the other we face the material degradation of many families. Moreover, in many Polish families we can observe the phenomenon of the so-called inheritance of poverty, and the intensification of pathological behaviors, such as suicide, addiction, aggression, and abuse. A modern family often experiences an increasing divorce rate, as well as relationships that have not been formally confirmed by the church or state. At the extreme, this flexibility that is brought to bear on open and temporary relationships can result in an acceptance of betrayal. This can lead to a commonly heard attitude, that “Everyone has the right to live the way they want to, so do what you want. You will have no obligations towards me, and I will have none towards you.” This rule of education is encountered increasingly often in open and democratic societies.

The denial of any role for religion and the church is becoming more prevalent, and individuals’ primary life orientations are becoming different. Religion and ethics increasingly seem to symbolize backwardness, and are seen as hindering progress. Modern society is “facing a specific crisis of humanity,” which is marked by an increasing lack of confidence in our own human traits, in our very sense of existence. In many circles, we observe the disappearance of a “universal”—or universally educated—citizen.

The development of civilization (especially in the area of technology) complicates life in each of its aspects. It has positive as well as negative implications for human development; it broadens the range of threats.[17] The border between the sphere of classical threats (that are historically continuous and traditional) and the sphere of freedom from threat is gradually vanishing and being filled with new categories of threats, raising doubts about the difference between security and insecurity, health and disease, good and evil.

The globalization, informatization, and internationalization of socio-economic life are a plexus of dependencies that bring benefits and negative consequences. Especially turbulent are those that directly affect people and the basis of their existence, including dignified, secure, and healthy work conditions.

Modernity brings both progress and explicit threats. Let us analyze the impact of near-universal access to information. It seems as though we are becoming slaves of the technology that was supposed to free us. Although we have access to an unparalleled amount of information, we become more disoriented rather than well oriented. More elasticity denies us any elasticity at all, and more choices limit our freedom.[18] What is worse, massive and unstoppable flows of information fill every blank space and distort the linear flow of time. Under continuous pressure—or, as Thomas Eriksen would say, the tyranny of the moment—we inhabit living spaces deprived of “before” and “after,” “here” and “there.” In reality, even the “here and now” is threatened, because the next moment arrives so soon that it becomes difficult to be in the moment that is now. We live staring a few seconds into the future.[19]

The pressure of time is not the only tension facing modern people. Their actions are not only the object of tyranny of the moment, but are also burdened with freedom of choice. As Anthony Giddens said, “life in a society of risk is life with [an] analytical attitude towards possible actions, positive and negative. … Ahead of individuals and social groups in [a] post-traditional social world in every single moment there is an inexhaustible number of potential means of conduct (along with threats assigned to them).” [20]

An individual that wants to move forward with his career in a big company is hemmed in with uncertainty and anxiety. Every moment he can fail without achieving his goals, becoming a loser in the eyes of his family and friends. This anxiety increases his need for certainty. If he fails, despite the certainty that modern methods of decision-making gives, he doesn’t have to blame himself, at least. One also needs certainty in the field of thoughts, feelings, and aesthetic impressions. Thanks to wide access to mass media and education, the individual quickly learns which thoughts are “good,” which behaviors are proper, which feelings are normal, and which tastes are fashionable. If people stay sensitive to media signals, they can be sure to make no mistakes. Fashion newspapers tell us what style one should like, and book clubs let us know which books are worth reading.[21]

One of the most significant threats to personal and structural security is the dehumanization of education. The strong pressure to achieve success, along with the need to function under continuous rivalry and generational pressure leads (in extreme cases) to the “machiavellization” of behavior. Pragmatism dominates over dialogue, discourse, and reflection. In the world of the new millennium we can notice dangerous tendencies in education to create an “information society” at the expense of an “education society.” Attention is concentrated on creating cognitive abilities, and is oriented toward problems of modernity and the future at the expense of teaching values, which can result later in astonishing choices and decisions made by groups and individuals.[22]

Education and Security

In educational practice, more and more often we notice the need to construct the educational process in such way that gives prominent position to dialogue that is characterized by mutual understanding of the participants.[23] The lack of dialogue, or discussion led in an atmosphere of mutual trust, can effectively weaken the effects of a range of educational actions of both teachers and parents.

In connection with modern threats, the role of school in this area is essential. That is where much of the content of “education for security” programs come from. This kind of education is one of the main parts of the didactic process, and represents one of a range of preventive actions that are centered on civil education, communication and health, and ecological education. Education for security is also one of the areas of preparation for work and life in the modern world.

Education for security consists of education in the following areas: civil society, economics, law, defense, social issues, and the environment. This is the system of education for responsibility for life and health, of both individuals and societies. Responsibility should be manifested in the ability to predict the outcome of actions undertaken; the ability to help victims of accidents and save lives; to intentionally follow the regulations and laws of the nation; to participate actively in efforts centered on maintaining the security of the local area, region, and country; in participation in relief efforts in response to natural disasters and man-made accidents. In consequence, a new formula for security education was adopted as mandatory in Poland’s educational system. Specific contents of a program of education for security are realized in individual classes at different stages of education. Practice shows that the easiest method to prevent threats is a common and systematic approach to education.

This is why, on 21 October 2008, Poland’s Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Education signed the agreement on cooperation. Considering the need to act together in realization of the program of education in traditional obligations and to cooperate in areas of civil, patriotic, and defense education of school youth, the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Defense agreed to cooperate in the following areas:

·         Popularizing actions aiming to shape the historical, patriotic, and defense consciousness in the military and school environments

·         Inspiring NGOs to undertake actions involved in the civil, patriotic, and defense education of students

·         Supporting and promoting initiatives aiming to disseminate the tradition of Polish arms

·         Providing organizational and material support to schools that bear the names of patrons that are related with the tradition of Polish arms and schools that realize the enlarged program of “Defense Education”

·         Popularizing the idea of organizing trips to places that are part of Polish military history, and sport and defense camping trips

·         Supporting the organization of “Open Barracks Days” and visiting tradition rooms, military museums, and national historic sites

·         Using experiences of organizing patriotic events, school competitions, history contests centered around the history of Poland, as well as sports events and defense contests

·         Inspiring school environments to participate in patriotic events organized annually.

In summary, security education is realized in Poland on three levels: school, institutional, and general. The objective that we seek to realize in high schools is an average of thirty hours of security education per year, with the number of hours rising each year within the school. This includes general education for security, along with education on the media, organization, and social associations, as well as on security bodies such as the police, fire service, and the army. Best practices in security education require us to teach safety and teach safely.

* Lt. Col. Andrzej Pieczywok, Assoc. Prof., holds the doctorate in the field of the Humanities and the doctor habilitatus degree in the field of the Social Sciences. He is the faculty member of the National Security Faculty of the National Defence University, Warsaw. His research focuses on questions connected with shaping the commanding skills of the officers: commanders and lecturers, questions relating also to education for security, educational systems in the European Union and NATO.

[1] The globalization process has been described particularly effectively by John Naisbitt and Francis Fukuyama. See John Naisbitt, Megatrends (Poznań: Zyski i S-ka, 1997), 80–105; Francis Fukuyama, “Globalizacja bez końca,” Gazeta Wyborcza 11 (2000): 23; Gordon Dryden and Jeannette Vos, Rewolucja w uczeniu, trans. B. Jóżwiak (Poznań: Zyski i S-ka, 2003), 49.

[2] See J. A. Pielkowa, “Pedagogika społeczna wobec zagrożeń współczesności,” in Człowiek u progu trzeciego tysiąclecia. Zagrożenia i wyzwania, vol. I., ed. M. Plopa (Elbląg: Elbląska Uczelnia Humanistyczno-Ekonomiczna, 2005), 61.

[3] Jerzy Kunikowski, Przygotowanie obronne społeczeństwa (Warsaw: Bellona, 2001), 140–41.

[4] J. Świniarski, “Przywództwo jako osnowa edukacji dla bezpieczeństwa,” Zeszyty Naukowe AON 1 (2001): 134.

[5] See http://leksykony.interia.pl/haslo?hid=173930.

[6] See M. Szymczak, ed., Słownik języka polskiego, vol. I. (Warsaw: PWN, 1978), 147, 740.

[7] E. Goźlińska and F. Szlosek, Podręczny słownik nauczyciela kształcenia zawodowego (Radom: Institute for Technology of Operation, 1997), 10.

[8] M. Cieślarczyk, “Społeczeństwa i społeczności na przełomie wieków – od bezpieczeństwa kultury do kultury bezpieczeństwa?” in Bezpieczeństwo w perspektywie socjologicznej (Warsaw: WBBS, 2001), 31–32.

[9] See Stanislaw Dworecki, “Zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa państwa,” in Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego (Warsaw: AON, 2002), 16.

[10] Ryszard Rosa, Filozofia bezpieczeństwa (Warsaw: Bellona, 1995), 232.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Marek Rybakowski, “Kultura bezpieczeństwa na tle stanu bezpieczeństwa dzieci i młodzieży w ruchu drogowym,” in Edukacyjne zagrożenia początku XXI wieku, ed. K. Pająk and A. Zduniak (Warsaw: Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, 2003), p. 100.

[13] Erich Fromm, Ucieczka od wolności (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 2000), 236–37.

[14] Ibid., 91.

[15] Zygmunt Bauman, Płynne życie (Kraków: Literackie, 2007), 6.

[16] Erich Fromm, Rewolucja nadziei. Ku uczłowieczonej technologii (Poznań: Rebis, 2000), 64.

[17] Such threats concern the fact of individual existence as well as health (physical or psychic) and social functions. Some new threats pose the risk of lowering the level of an individual’s social condition.

[18] Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Tyrania chwili. Szybko i wolno płynący czas w erze informacji (Warsaw: PIW, 2003), 13–14.

[19] Ibid., 11–12.

[20] Anthony Giddens, Nowoczesność i tożsamość (Warsaw: PWN, 2001), 41.

[21] Erich Fromm, Rewolucja nadziei (Poznań: Rebis, 2000), 78.

[22] There is an increasing sense among experts that there is a fundamental and urgent need of renewal of earlier modes of teacher education. It is necessary to equip teachers with a broad humanistic base—the knowledge of pedagogical, psychological, philosophical, and sociological thought—to thoroughly explore the world of values and their counters, threats and risk and educational ideals, to achieve the ability to discuss and finally to cooperate with young people. In the case of Poland, there is a clear asymmetry between expectations and educational needs and their realization (expenditures and desires to innovate). Education should ease the perception of reality as a set of values that are to be skillfully explored and internalized, so that they can be used to shape reality and themselves.

[23] Tadeusz Siuda, ed., Kształcenie i wychowanie młodzieży na rzecz bezpieczeństwa. Poradnik dla dyrektorów szkół i nauczycieli (Warsaw: ADAM, 2007), 27.

The Transatlantic Relation in Times of Multipolarity: European Security Implications

Cristian Iordan *

Freedom does not come for free. And any decisions taken to improve our economy must not lead us into a different sort of crisis – a security crisis.

Anders F. Rasmussen [1]

Introduction

The economic growth generated by the globalization of the world economy over the past several decades has supported the rise of emerging powers. This in turn is leading to an expected change in the international system, giving rise to theories of a multipolar or a polycentric world, with higher interdependencies and multiple poles of power. Nevertheless, the consequences of the global financial crisis are currently challenging these theories and forecasts. At the transatlantic level, the combination of several trends—such as continuously shrinking defense budgets and declining public and political interest in NATO on both sides of the Atlantic, and a greater strategic emphasis in the U.S. on the Asia-Pacific region—could affect the United States’ level of engagement in Europe and, consequently, in Europe’s security.

Europe would find itself in a weak spot, facing difficulties in dealing with the possible (military, humanitarian, etc.) crises in its neighborhood, at least in the short to medium term. Yet Europe holds at least some of the right cards in order to remain a relevant actor in the future, based on its economy, internal structure, and functioning; it is well positioned to play an important role at the international and multinational level. In order to achieve this future state, Europe must dedicate thought and resources. The continuation and deepening of the transatlantic relation—even if not on an exclusive footing—would be a natural response to the challenges of the twenty-first century, and would prove beneficial to both sides of the Atlantic.

The Emerging Twenty-First Century Security Environment: From Unipolarity to Multipolarity?

The end of World War II marked the beginning of a relatively stable international system, with two great powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—dominating global economic, political, and military affairs. With the end of the Cold War, the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, and the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, the U.S . survived as the world’s only superpower, and the world entered the unipolar era. Yet, as Jan Andersson notes, “Nevertheless, some twenty years later, military overextension and reckless economic policies have weakened the U.S to the point where it is unable to maintain its dominant role in international affairs.” [2]

Visions

At this point, there are several perspectives on potential future states for the world system: the world could be entering a new phase, with higher interdependencies and multiple poles or centers of power, becoming multipolar or polycentric. The economic growth generated by the globalization of the economy has supported the rise of developing powers—the BRICS [3] and others—which is expected to lead to a change in the international system. The forecasts for the world of 2030 are founded on this trend of power diffusion among countries of the world.[4] On the other hand, several authors speak of an age of apolarity, an anarchic world (Niall Ferguson, Zbigniew Brzezinski), or even of “another Great American Century” (Richard Haass).

Numerous studies focus on the rise of the Asia-Pacific region in the balance of world economics and political power, stating, for instance, that Europe and North America combined will be surpassed “in terms of power (calculated from GDP, population, defense spending, investments in technology) by 2030, if not earlier. Not only Europe and the United States are projected to decline, but so are Japan and Russia.” [5] Following the relative economic success of the rising powers, and also miscalculations, mistakes, and weaknesses from the U.S. side, the world would consist of no hegemon, but rather several powers (U.S., China, India, Brazil, Russia, even South Africa—and, optimistically, the EU), accompanied by middle-tier regional powers such as Turkey, Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, etc.

Yet what would be the caveats of this forecast? As far as the economic trend projections are concerned, recent “returns are throwing cold water on the extravagant predictions.” [6] We should bear in mind that these countries depend to various extents on Western markets for their exports, be they energy or goods. Moreover, a statement on the “U.S., European, and Japanese share of global income (being) projected to fall from 56 percent today to well under half by 2030” must be balanced with a general overview of some of the limitations of the BRICS.[7] They are facing severe internal imbalances and disparities, such as GDP per capita distribution; the stages of development of their internal provinces, regions, and states (in areas like infrastructure, health care, living standards, etc.); and a medium to high potential for internal conflict on ethnic, religious, territorial, social, and democracy-related grounds. In some cases, we are not talking about just a probability, but about ongoing events, such as have been seen in China and Brazil. Speaking of economic growth, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson argue that China is “unlikely to generate sustained growth unless it undergoes a fundamental political transformation toward inclusive political institutions.” [8] Global military spending dropped in 2012 for the first time since 1998 due to cuts in the West, but there were increases in Russia (16 percent) and China (7.8 percent).[9]

There is also the energy dimension to be considered. China, for instance, depends heavily and ever increasingly on imported fossil fuels, and is interested in diversifying and securing its energy routes. Beijing is therefore considering “an energy marriage between China and Iran, (which) could provide a launching point for additional cooperation.” [10] But addressing and mitigating these challenges and vulnerabilities involve considerable resources, planning, but most of all time.[11]

And Ruchir Sharma delivers another blow to this multipolar thesis by saying that “the new global economic order will probably look more like the old one than most observers predict. The rest may continue to rise, but they will rise more slowly and unevenly than many experts are anticipating. And precious few will ever reach the income levels of the developed world.” [12]

Another major setback may be perceived at the coordination level among these powers. “States [forming] the various other poles [of power] are more than willing to sabotage each other. In most cases, even simple bilateral partnerships are impossible.” [13] The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was meant to address this issue, among others, bringing some of these states to the same table. But diverse (political) cultures, different approaches to internal policies and values, and varying stances toward the essential dimensions of democracy, human rights, and civil liberties represent major (and perhaps even irreducible) differences among these countries.

A different perspective is provided by Niall Ferguson and Zbigniew Brzezinski, who oppose the multipolar vision and instead sound a warning: what if, instead of a multipolar world, there would be just an apolar international system, with states unable to deal with instability, sinking into conflict? The fundamental idea is that in the history of world politics, someone is always the hegemon, or bidding to become one.[14] The depicted apolar perspective is quite pessimistic, as it would bring about a New Dark Age, with “waning empires and religious fanaticism; endemic plunder and pillage in the world’s forgotten regions; of economic stagnation and civilization’s retreat into a few fortified enclaves.” [15]

History shows that “domination of one sort or another … has a better chance of preventing the outbreak of war than a system in which no one is really in charge. … Stability is not the natural order of things. … Unless some force can, against considerable odds, reinstitute hierarchy…, we will have more fluidity, more equality and therefore more anarchy to look forward to.” [16] Or, as Joseph Nye puts it, “war was the constant companion and the crucial instrument of the multipolar balance of power.” [17]

“If America falters,” Brzezinski holds, “the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor – not even China.” [18] The United States’ decline could generate, given a more assertive Chinese nationalism, a phase of acute tension in Asia. This would be characterized by the faltering security of weaker states neighboring major regional powers, which could jeopardize the United States’ strategic partnership with Mexico and corrode the management of the global commons. “It is imperative that the U.S. pursue a new, timely strategic vision for its foreign policy,” Brzezinski writes, “or start bracing itself for a dangerous slide into global turmoil.” [19] We may well witness an increase in the number or the degree of severity of near-conflicts like the situation on the Korean Peninsula, or over the remote islands in the South (Spratly Islands) and East China Sea (Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) and who knows what others, some of which could lead to full-scale war.

Richard Haass, on the other hand, envisages another American century, based on several facts:[20]

·         The United States will remain first among unequals in terms of GDP for some time

·         The United States has the world’s most capable armed forces

·         No other major power is in a position to challenge the United States

·         The United States has not provoked a direct challenge

·         The United States has unique demographics and the potential for renewed economic growth, taking into account its internal advantages: its geography, the balance of its population by age, and the diversity and talents of its society.

“What stands in the way of the next American century is American politics,” Haass claims. “Either we resolve our political dysfunction, rethink our foreign policy and restore the foundations of American power,” or the alternative will be as dark as suggested by Ferguson and Brzezinski. America’s existing security and defense problems (overstretch, war fatigue, etc.) have been emphasized by the crisis-driven austerity on both sides of the Atlantic, which is not happening in the case of the rising powers.

The era of post-unipolarity would have on one hand positive effects, with the possibility of growth for some states and also a certain degree of democratization of development and diversification of the international stage. On the other hand, there could also be negative consequences, such as regional domination of some non-democratic great powers, states of conflict, decreased cooperation, or even global chaos. “If this narrative of American decline is at least partially correct, then the United States will be forced to rebalance its foreign policy to a world that is no longer ‘unambiguously unipolar’.” [21] Still, not everything is lost for the United States and its partners, argues G. John Ikenberry: China on the rise should prompt the United States to remember that its leadership of the Western order permits it to mold the environment in which China will make vital strategic choices, and Washington must work to reinforce the rules and institutions establishing that order if it wants to safeguard this leadership.[22]

There are divergent perceptions of the rising powers’ approach to the global economy and the international security regimes, whether they “will overcome their own challenges, and more, if they will accept the current world order, or change it.” Miles Kahler argues that the rising powers “are moderate reformers that seek greater influence within existing forums and also attempt to safeguard their policy-making autonomy.” [23] However, as Sevasti-Eleni Vezirgiannidou notes, “U.S. policy-makers should be aware of the direction in which their current choices are moving the global order; if they do not desire such an order, they should question their strategy towards both rising and minor powers and should show more leadership in the reform of formal institutions.” [24]

As for the EU, it is one of the best situated actors for the multilateral, multipolar world, even if we consider only its culture of negotiation and diplomacy and its globally recognized soft power aura. The topic of multipolarity is addressed by Alvaro de Vasconcelos from such a perspective – multilateralizing multipolarity: “Europe must be able to define together with other world and regional powers the norms and rules that are needed to drive concerted efforts to stay clear of some future clash of competing unilateralisms. … The combination of America’s active return to multilateralism and the desire for global recognition of other main players opens a window of opportunity for the definition of a common agenda for effective multilateralism and for moving on with a reform of global governance institutions,” such as the UN, the framework that is favored by the rising powers.

The rise of several new powers is a noticeable fact; whether they are able to contend with the U.S. on the global scale is debatable. Essential questions arise regarding the consequences of these shifts in power, more exactly about their potential for increased intrastate and interstate conflicts, and on the spillover of regional instability and the potential to create global insecurity. Also, will an economically stronger China or India be able to affirm itself on the international stage on short notice? How long will it take them to transform economic power into military power, and then to project it? With the crisis kicking in, the BRICS may have to delay their moment of defiance of the West. At this point, the transatlantic partnership could demonstrate some of its strong points, consisting in the common values, culture, development level, etc., and the numerous fora that it has built to allow and encourage coordination. The opportunities are there for the transatlantic partners, but essential developments are needed both in the U.S. and in Europe in order to clarify priorities and approaches on global affairs.

U.S. Views and Approaches: A New Balance

Global evolutions such as the rise of other powers have pushed the U.S. toward a process of setting priorities and conducting an in-depth analysis of its global reach, an intimidating task knowing the “significant fiscal and economic constraints imposed by a federal government debt that has mushroomed to nearly USD 16 trillion or about 100 percent of GDP, and a continuing economic slowdown….” [25] After almost thirteen years of engaging in conflict overseas, the U.S. is wary of war, faces serious fiscal problems, and confronts serious questions regarding the challenges to its forecasted waning leadership. The process of updating the United States’ grand strategy was postponed due to several factors, as Vezirgiannidou notes: its “long-standing position as a leader of the ‘free world’ during the Cold War, and then as unrivalled hegemon in the first decade of the post-Cold War geopolitical landscape; also because U.S. decline will happen over a period of time, and therefore some decisions on grand strategy may be delayed accordingly.” [26]

Uncertain Times

Uncertainties abound concerning the United States’ role in the world, with different views on the best approach to its future strategy. Some authors favor retrenchment, while others stand for further projection of military presence and involvement. So “the real question,” Eric Hobsbawm writes, “is whether the historically unprecedented project of global domination by a single state is possible, and whether the admittedly overwhelming military superiority of the U.S. is adequate to establish and … to maintain it.” [27]

According to advocates of retrenchment, such as Barry Posen, the U.S. overstretched its spending in the area of security and defense, based on an “undisciplined, expensive, and bloody strategy, [which] has done untold harm to U.S. national security. … It is time to abandon the United States’ hegemonic strategy and replace it with one of restraint. This would mean giving up on global reform and sticking to protecting narrow national security interests, transforming the military into a smaller force, removing large numbers of U.S. troops from forward bases, creating incentives for allies to provide for their own security.” [28]

As for relations with the United States’ allies, who have reduced their military spending to unprecedented levels (with an average among European NATO member states of only 1.6 percent of GDP), his main point is that the US “should recast its alliances so that other countries shared actual responsibility for their own defense…. U.S. military forces could shrink significantly, both to save money and to send allies the message that it’s time they did more for themselves.” [29] Andrew Bacevich promoted a similar approach: letting the Europeans grow from a security and defense point of view.[30] The U.S. would thus have a more selective presence on the international stage, but could continue “to play a vibrant global role while addressing the ways in which [the U.S.] pursues our objectives. Austerity need not undermine what the United States does.” [31] Postponing the future grand strategy decision poses a grave danger: “Our posture will be unaffordable, misaligned to emerging challenges, and increasingly dominated by patterns of spending that do not directly support the most relevant forms of national power.” [32]

In fact, Christopher Layne’s “offshore balancing” theory states the U.S. is not compelled to intervene; its stance in 1939–40 was not isolationist, but “a shrewd example of offshore balancing. … The United States is secure enough from external threat that … it could choose restraint over intervention…. And it should do so.” [33] Revisited in 2002, this concept is viewed as accepting other players on the global stage, stating that “the United States cannot prevent the rise of new great powers either within (the EU, Germany, and Japan) or outside (China, a resurgent Russia) its sphere of influence. Offshore balancing would also relieve the United States of its burden of managing the security affairs of turbulent regions such as the Persian Gulf/Middle East and Southeast Europe.” [34]

Nevertheless, the retrenchment theories lose sight of America’s long-standing support for and benefit from globalization. The U.S. still is the world’s greatest naval power, which is necessary to protect its commerce and its global interests. On the other hand, to a larger or smaller degree, every major state should be concerned with the safety and security of global sea lines – see, for instance, anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa. China, Brazil, Australia, not to mention the EU (and so on) can all invest in cooperation with the U.S. in this area. The international presence in the Indian Ocean around the Horn of Africa fighting piracy represents a good example in this regard.

Another shortcoming of the above mentioned positions is that they do not take into consideration the complex economic, social, and political relations between Europe and the U.S. After all, it may not be in America’s national interest to break or weaken its transatlantic links,[35] losing friends and falling into some sort of an isolationist trap. Europeans fear the United States turning its back on the rest of the world, and the shale gas energy revolution is seen by some as being a further incentive for retrenchment, as it would make the U.S., as President Obama said last March, “less dependent on what’s going on in the Middle East.” [36] But, the degree to which the U.S. has been dependent on Middle Eastern oil is only one of the reasons for U.S. interest in that region.

Rebalancing the Pivot – Away from What?

This is the context in which many eyebrows have been raised across the Asia-Pacific region, but most of all in Europe, since the 2011 Obama Administration “pivot,” or strategic turn to Asia. Even though then U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described the move toward Asia as a pivot with Europe, obviously Europeans have asked a rather simple question, and yet with a not so simple answer: “Away from what?” [37] A clarification in terms rather than a policy update was issued later by the National Security Council replacing the regrettable “pivot” with “rebalancing,” conveying the idea of a continued process of fine-tuning [38]: “While there’s no question that the Asia-Pacific is more important than ever, the phrase signaled that other regions, notably Europe and Africa, were therefore less important.” [39]

Similarly, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, holds that the United States’ rebalancing of its capabilities and resources toward the Asia-Pacific region should not be misinterpreted. “The U.S. has allies, interests, and responsibilities across the globe. The Asia-Pacific rebalance is not a retreat from other regions of the world. Nevertheless, the world is undergoing a time of historic transformation, and Asia is at the epicenter of that change.” [40] The United States’ military capabilities and capacities are being reoriented in order to better prepare for future global security challenges.

From a practical perspective, the increased military focus for the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific was illustrated by Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, and General James F. Amos, Commandant of the Marine Corps, in the positioning of an initial force of 250 U.S. Marines in the northernmost Australian city of Darwin, which is planned to increase in 2014 up to the level of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (around 1000 strong), the repositioning of U.S. Navy forces in the Pacific region (such as Singapore), and Chinese interest in participation in the next annual “Rim of the Pacific” exercise, RIMPAC 14.[41]

There are several major issues that the rebalancing implies. First, what are the United States’ goals in relation to China: containment (according to Beijing) or hedging (according to Washington), meaning simultaneous balancing and engagement. According to Eleni Vezirgiannidou, until now, the U.S. has been rather reticent in engaging China in a constructive way, in the sense of bringing China more into the international system.[42] Second, on the European side, the reaction was rather wary, showing concern about the future of the transatlantic relationship, which led to a diplomatic tour by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry of several European capitals in the spring of 2013. So how will the U.S. engage the Europeans in this endeavor? It may present an opportunity for even more transatlantic cooperation, with the EU supporting U.S. efforts, at least based on two EU strong points: economy and politics.[43] Europeans, or at least some of them, should also be reminding the U.S. that the pivot may present an opportunity for an ever more assertive contender to extend its influence. Along with the rise of China’s military, Europe’s economy is a key area of concern for the U.S. Thus China and Europe represent “the two areas of the world that are most important in terms of America’s long-term economic and political interests” and that also “require a steadfast commitment of American hard power.” [44]

The Sequester and its Consequences

But setting goals and elaborating strategies involve assessing available resources, which are no longer at hand at the same levels as a few years previous, when most Western capitalist democracies were visibly trapped in the global economic crisis. The consequences extended from social welfare to wages, and obviously to the security and defense sector as well, which had already been buffeted—at least in most of Europe—by the pre-existing trends of declining budgets. In 2013, it was the United States’ turn, with the so-called “budget cap” kicking in on March 1 – an automated mechanism forcing the U.S. public sector to implement cuts in budgets in order to control spiraling deficits. As for the U.S. defense sector, the numbers are astonishing, at least from a European point of view: USD 52 billion in cuts in fiscal year 2013. Eva Gross writes:

If sequestration continues (that is, as long as Democrats and Republicans continue to be unable to agree on a budget that includes the required reductions), as much as $ 500 billion will be slashed from the defense budget over the next decade as cuts in projected increases. … $ 489 billion in defense cuts were already scheduled as part of the BCA [Budget Control Act] of August 2011, the compromise made in order to raise the U.S. debt ceiling. The projected sequestration cuts, $ 500 billion over the next decade, will be made in addition to these cuts.” [45] But that is not all: “beginning in FY 2014, the Department of Defense is likely to have to reduce its budgets by at least some $ 60 billion annually throughout the remainder of this decade.[46]

To complicate things even more, military personnel costs (salaries, health care, and other benefits) have nearly doubled since fiscal year 2001, and now consume one-third of the Pentagon’s base budget – about USD 180 billion per year.[47] In addition, in July 2013 came the furlough of thousands of civilian defense employees.

In this difficult and unusual context for the U.S. security and defense establishment, U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel directed senior Pentagon officials to re-examine the U.S. military strategy approved last year to see how priorities may need to be adjusted due to the budget cuts.[48] As such, the Pentagon’s announcement of scaling back deployments of combat ships around the world is seen as a worrying sign. The recent cancellation of the deployment of the aircraft carrier USS Truman and its accompanying strike group was a direct consequence of the sequester. For the first time in a decade, the U.S. Navy would only have one carrier strike group on patrol in the Persian Gulf region.[49]

Dov Zakheim, a former Under-Secretary of Defense, or Comptroller, notes:[50] “The sequester is a very stupid way for America to manage itself out of its budget problems. Indeed, it may further aggravate them. … Should the sequester persist, the defense budget would have to be reduced through FY 2021, making for a total of $1.2 trillion. Unless the Administration takes major steps to reduce DoD’s overhead costs, it will have to cut back on force levels, force posture, deployments and other operations. As then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta outlined … on November 14, 2011, the sequester would lead to the smallest Navy since before 1915, the smallest Army since 1940, and the smallest Air Force ever.” [51]

The U.S. defense establishment must engage in a strategic overview of the implications of the budget issues, knowing that they terminated some research and development programs and reduced acquisition, military training, exercises, flight hours, etc., thus affecting the readiness of the military and, even more importantly, its long-term preparedness. In times of reassessing priorities and valuing available resources, a temptation might be to go for limited approaches – as has been seen previously, the surgical strike tactic holds appeal during times of budgetary limitations. Still “almost always, a balanced application of military force will be needed to achieve decisive outcomes in war. … Responsible strategists must confront cost and risk as necessary elements of the game. When two B2 stealth bombers cost more than the entire inventory of main battle tanks in the active Army, something is wrong.” [52] Equally it should consider the human dimension, from the decrease in motivation to the likely counterintelligence vulnerabilities. The Snowden case is only the most obviously relevant instance of the potential perils of disgruntled employees’ actions.

The Sequester and its Opportunities

On the other hand, the story of the glass half full could be applied to this topic as well. Some observers feel that the limits imposed by the sequester “may actually be a good thing if they restrain a new burst of expensive American interventionist exuberance.” [53] The U.S. may have to find the strength to alter its current way of doing business and look deeper into several opportunities, such as: flexible forces, modular capacities, and forward presence [54]; an ever increasing role for intelligence and special operations forces, which are intended to function below the radar; a different, more integrated approach to research and technology, and the joint development, acquisition, and delivery across the defense services;[55] and the increased use of unmanned systems in all services, including UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) and UCAVs (Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle) for intelligence gathering, surveillance, and even combat missions. On 10 July 2013, the U.S. Navy ran successful tests with the Northrop Grumman UCAV prototype called X-47B, landing itself on a carrier, with no human support, on two out of three attempts.[56] The development of unmanned technologies points to a shift in the role of the aircraft carrier,[57] given the need to adapt to anti-access area denial technologies and capabilities [58] that other powers are developing, not to mention the expanding realm of cyber capabilities (both offensive and defensive).[59]

In this context, the United States will have to work with its allies or simply not be able to pursue its global interests. It definitely is the world’s superpower, but will it still be in the future? The Europeans might help; they still do have the economic weight, but they will need to display a more strategic orientation and a greater willingness to share the burden of security.

EU Perceptions and Developments

The high impact of the large-scale conflicts across its history has determined a European sense of wariness regarding its military spending and culture. It looks like Europe is still afraid of its past; it rejects war to an extent that Council on Foreign Relations President Richard N. Haass described it as a “pronounced anti-military culture.” [60] This stance was exacerbated by the perception of the absence of any major threat during the post-Cold War era (and the small scale of most conflicts at the time), leading to a postmodern (according to some [61]) and idealistic (according to others [62]) approach to global affairs.

To its credit, the European Union has shown that it has successfully diminished the probability of war among its member states to the level of “unimaginable.” But what is Europe’s status on the international stage? Why does defense matter in the post-Cold War era as far as Europe is concerned? Is Europe doomed to remain a “normative power”? Is there a European threat perception?

What Kind of Power?

The European Union is not a state, but neither is it a classical international organization. Rather, it is a strange object in international law, being identified as a postmodern entity on the international stage.[63] Due to its disproportionate influence in the international economy, especially when compared to its military capacity, the EU remains rather unclassifiable and, in its role as an international actor, generates numerous debates.[64] The critics say that its decision-making autonomy is insufficient in order to warrant being granted international actor status.

According to John Mearsheimer, the EU is not a great power, as it does not fulfill the necessary cumulative criteria: it has the resources and the population, but not the military strength.[65] This consists not only in the sheer numbers and the quality of training of its troops, but also in its lack of an advanced armament industry. To be more specific, the industry exists in Europe, but it is not European – rather, it is fragmented, with each state supporting its national champion.[66]

Other authors have approached the notion, identifying four criteria that the EU must fulfill in order to aspire to an international actor status: [67]

1.       The acknowledgment of this status by other actors on the international stage

2.       Legal authority to act internationally

3.       A certain level of decision-making autonomy of the EU (Commission) with respect to its member states [68]

4.       Minimal coherence in managing its external relations.

The Lisbon Treaty (2007) addressed these points, bringing about some innovations, however modest, such as:

·         A permanent position of President of the European Council (the Belgian Herman Van Rompuy)

·         A new High Representative for the Union in Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

·         A Vice-President of the Commission (Lady Catherine Ashton)

·         The creation of the European External Action Service supporting the High Representative

·         The development of a single legal personality for the Union

·         Allowing for reinforced cooperation amongst a smaller group of member states in the Common Security and Defense Policy.

Still, obstacles persist to the Union’s full strategic existence, and Nicole Gnesotto admits that “one of the biggest … can be found inside Europe itself, in these old European nations which have invented and then raised national sovereignty as the founding principle of the political order and hesitate, or disincline, to transcend it. … The political Europe, even more so the military one, remains a sum of nations that are sovereign and are eager to remain so.” [69] One should bear in mind the inherent institutional complexity of the EU—its dependence on twenty-eight member states, but equally the conflict between the supranational and the intergovernmental views—that works against any coherent description of the EU as “collective actor.” [70] The EU does exert an international influence, be it in international trade, humanitarian aid, or conflict resolution, which leads to it being accepted as an international actor in spite of its incompleteness.

If so, now the question becomes what kind of international actor is the EU. Does it embody soft, civilian, or normative power? In fact, these concepts or visions are interconnected, and based on the EU’s non-coercive influence in international relations, supported by “the export or diffusion of norms.” [71] Europe could not escape the notion of soft power, which considers the use of cooperative means in order to convince third parties of your own arguments, exerting an attractive power upon them, deploying resources on three levels: culture, political values, and foreign policy.[72] The concept of civilian power, as defined by Hanns Maull,[73] involves the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives; the concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction; and a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management. As for the normative power concept, it suggests that the EU is built on norms, and that it can act in a normative way in world politics. So far, so good – the problem is expecting the same from other actors on the world stage. As Ian Manners notes, “Rather than being a contradiction in terms, the ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics is, ultimately, the greatest power of all.” [74]

Limitations

The theory of Europe as a normative power proposes a high-end, intellectual debate, but sadly there is no Plan B. What if you cannot convince or negotiate your way out of a problematic situation?

Not willing to devote serious thought and resources to its security and defense, Europe appears to be thinking that it can simply remain aloof from it all, focusing on the pressing issues related to the prolonged economic crisis, in some sort of ongoing free-ride attitude. Thus, European states have ended up paying only 20 percent of the overall NATO bill, and even though EU member states cover a quarter of global military spending, only a fraction goes towards the CSDP, which lacks in capabilities and experts, but most of all in (strategic) coherence. The EU defense budget has shrunk from EUR 251 billion to EUR 194 billion during the last decade.[75] The ESDP is not driven by considerations of efficiency; it is reactive, “event-driven.” It took some time for Europeans to intervene in theatres like Kosovo, the Horn of Africa, Libya, and Mali.

The EU is still trying to find its strategic path(s), and has initiated a joint foresight capacity—the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System, or ESPAS—that “assesses long-term global trends to help them strengthen policy planning. … What is often meant by [strategy] is a clear objective, an action plan, a roadmap, a compass, a sense of direction, … overcoming muddling through and purely reactive behavior.” [76]

There is a fair amount of risk that the EU will lose relevance in the realm of security – if it ever had it in the first place. The member states may be underestimating the decline of their role, at least in international affairs. The 2011 conflict in Libya showed the limitations of the European states and the EU itself, and of the current security and defense mechanisms, as Europe had difficulties in projecting power (airlift, fuel, logistics). Libya should have been the wake-up call, but then came Mali, where France/the EU were forced to ask for assistance in another medium-scale military operation in the European vicinity.

Listing the ongoing problems, a EUISS document [77] mentions excessive resources dedicated to personnel and land-based facilities; force structures encompassing an excess of certain military capabilities while neglecting other capability shortfalls; the EU defense equipment market’s high degree of fragmentation; resources devoted to research and development remain limited, and are even shrinking; and cross-national coordination, cooperation, and integration – from research to procurement, from logistics to military force and defense planning. To these might be added the fact that EU policy is spread across distinct and often separate agencies and institutions, with tools that are hard to bring together to generate the desired coherence and synergies, and where none has an exclusively military competence.

The Rebalance and Europe

Given the challenges outlined above, is Europe doomed to remain only a “normative power”? In a previous paper, the question asked was if Europe is facing a security crisis at a strategic level, and what would happen if the United States were not able or willing to intervene in support of Europe.[78] The U.S. is already more selective in engaging in wars – it pursued a limited intervention in Libya, even less in Mali, and almost none at all in Syria. What if this is precisely what the rebalance is about?

When U.S. decision makers started addressing the Asia pivot, Europeans got nervous. First of all, we have to take into consideration that the “pivot” (or “rebalancing”) has multiple dimensions: trade, cultural, and military. From Europe’s perspective, for the EU to have a say about events in its own backyard, the European security and defense capacity does not need to be an offensive one along the lines of the U.S. military concept. It would be far too costly, it would not fit the European mindset, and it would not be politically acceptable. However, a proper modular expeditionary force must be built according to military criteria (not those of political expediency), having as its goal the management of both humanitarian (Libya) and military (Mali) crises. But this demands something that is in extremely short supply in Europe – consensus, or political will, whichever you prefer. It is not enough to address the value of the transatlantic community and partnership only in speech. As poker players say, Europe needs to put its money where its mouth is. Children hear this often: if you value something, you take care of it. “Barack Obama does not look at the world in traditional ‘Atlanticist’ ways. Nor, increasingly, do other Americans,” Michael Cox cautions. “The old certainties, and in part the old diplomacy, that held the Western alliance together no longer pertain; and the sooner Europeans recognize this, the sooner they will be able to forge a new role for themselves in a fast changing world. The answer lies in their—and nobody else’s—hands.” [79]

Nevertheless, increasing defense spending in the Asia-Pacific, squabbles over the islands in East and South China Sea (territorial disputes between China and the Philippines, Japan, and others), and proliferation of nuclear technologies should thus be of equal interest to all member states of the EU. But the EU’s approach, compared to that of the U.S., focuses mainly on trade and development issues, as shown in the trip taken by Catherine Ashton in May 2012, with the largest ever delegation of EU officials to an EU-ASEAN ministerial dialogue, which promised deeper institutional ties on everything from counter-terrorism to trade, and even more eloquently in a EU official saying: “The U.S. will be an Asian power. We will be an Asian partner.” [80] And “there are a number of areas where the EU could potentially play a useful role in East Asian security”: common cross-border challenges, conflict mediation, and the potential military role.[81]

Reasons for (Moderate) Optimism?

But maybe not everything is lost. For a balanced approach, one should admit that the EU has the edge in civilian and diplomatic crisis management (with 57,000 diplomatic personnel around the world), which contributes to its competitive advantage. After long years of work, Europe has managed to mediate a Serbia-Kosovo agreement through its diplomatic capacities. It takes a while for the states to understand, to get involved, as the “small steps policy” bore witness throughout the history of the construction of the EU. Another relevant moment is scheduled to begin in December 2013, with the EU Summit dedicated to security and defense—the first such summit since 1999—and preparations for the revision of the European Security Strategy. The European strategic reflection is visible in two informal reflection groups, known as “European Global Strategy” and the “Future of Europe Group.”

The first initiative, “Towards a European Global Strategy: Securing European Influence in a Changing World,” was achieved via a think-tank process, reuniting representatives of several member states (Italy, Poland, Spain, and Sweden), and was meant to provide inspiration and input for the formulation of a future European Global Strategy by the EU institutions and all the member states, and with the High Representative and the European External Action Service playing a central role. It holds that an agreement on EU strategic objectives should increase its readiness for action, which would gain in effectiveness based on the ability to deploy standardized and interoperable civilian and military capabilities, such as the Battlegroups.[82] Changes are necessary in how EU missions are financed, in order to facilitate deployment and implement fairer burden-sharing among member states, with pooling and sharing among groups of member states applied to the whole of defense spending (research, procurement, maintenance and logistics, military education).[83] Equally important are deepening of the EU’s defense market and coordinated investment in dual-use technologies.

A second interesting development is the “Future of Europe Group,” which reunites the foreign ministers of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and Spain. In the foreign dimension, it has identified several issues and is providing bold proposals:

·         Improving the overall functioning of the EU, with adjustments in institutional functioning (Commission, Foreign Affairs Council)

·         A revision of the EEAS, HR/VP responsible for key external action areas

·         More majority decisions in the CFSP

·         Joint representation in international organizations

·         The development of a European Defense Policy, with a single market for armament projects, and (for some members, at least) with a European army – an ambition beyond pooling and sharing.

Both initiatives, even though they are informal, represent positive developments in the past year, marking a new approach to the strategic challenges Europe is facing, and bringing constructive critiques to bear in order to address these challenges. They also indicate that Europe has to make some choices and changes, some of which may be painful in terms of economy or sovereignty. Patching the old coat may no longer be enough; it’s time for a new one. European states may also need to consider giving up on some of their major ambitions, which will be a very difficult thing for their constituencies to accept – for example, the European welfare model, based on a balance of population leaning toward the young and active segment. Given that the statistics show that the population is getting older, and not only in Europe, but in the “Western”/developed states, this cherished European model of the welfare state may no longer be sustainable.

Another element that will have to be addressed in the future is related to the relationship between CSDP and NATO, which currently is not entirely functional. For a number of reasons, which include resource issues and then basic common sense, there has to be a clarification and a division of labor, in spite of the two groups’ different member states, visions, and strategic cultures and so on. It is significant, though, that a number of European countries, members of both NATO and the EU, do not consider the relationship between the two as problematic, but rather as mutually supportive. Such are the cases of Poland and Romania, which for years have stated very clearly their commitment to both the transatlantic partnership and to the European project, being involved in both organizations in security-related areas. Poland represents an interesting case. It is very active in the area of security and defense and is actively engaged in the NATO missile defense project, but is also involved in the European Battlegroups (Poland, France, Germany) and is represented in the European informal reflection groups.

Not least, a very important factor is public support in Europe – precisely from the younger generations, who are assertively pro-European, and who have put their faith in the role Europe can and should play in the world. The values that the EU is based upon and continues to support, similar to NATO, are universal: democracy; respect for human rights, individual liberties, and minorities; good governance; peaceful resolution of conflicts; economic integration; and free trade. The EU is known worldwide for supporting these realities and concepts. In fact, the EU itself represents the best example for successfully putting into practice the abovementioned values. And yet, Europe has had few means of enforcing its beliefs and values, and each instance when it has done so has come with caveats: the Western Balkans, Horn of Africa (anti-piracy operations), Libya, Mali, etc. After twenty years of efforts, the last two represent important landmarks for the state of European ambitions,[84] revealing that Europeans are still not able to manage a crisis in their neighborhood on their own, a situation aggravated by the economic crisis, the need to rationalize expenditure, and also by the U.S. pivot toward the Pacific. Given an increase in coherence and effectiveness, the CSDP could represent Europe’s means of putting into practice what it stands for when its diplomatic and crisis management negotiation skills run out or are irrelevant. Using the CSDP not necessarily as a power projection tool, à l’américaine, but as the extension of international law, which it highly esteems, “would greatly strengthen the EU’s political standing at home and abroad.” [85] Moreover, the power of normative Europe should be addressed and studied as events unfold in East Asia, as Europe may selectively apply its international aura in delicate, diplomatic negotiations.

Trends, Risks, Challenges

Several authors have recently addressed the differences between Americans and Europeans on major strategic and international issues. In 2002, Robert Kagan’s “Mars and Venus” theory described how the Hobbesian U.S. was asserting its power in pursuit of its objectives, while Kantian Europeans, lacking such power, favored a rule-based system. Then, Robert Cooper, in his essay on the need for a new “liberal imperialism,” warned Europeans not to overlook the importance of military power in a world that still required it. Cooper identified a postmodern approach at the European level, which had given up on power politics; but Europe could not let down its guard in dealing with the rest of the world, which had not.

The circumstances of the 2003 Iraq war strained transatlantic relations and underscored the differences in approach and policy that had come into stark relief after President George W. Bush took office. The election of Barack Obama then seemed to guide the United States and Europe back into alignment. But the most serious threat to the Western alliance was not foreseen, meaning the crisis of governance afflicting both sides of the Atlantic: the United States – political dysfunction, while the EU is struggling to bring financial stability.[86]

The Declension Theories

Hence talk of the fading West and the declining Western alliance started anew, based on the change in generations and the change in the global arrangement of power – namely, the rise of multiple non-Western nations/powers. Michael Kimmage wrote, “Within the Obama administration, the West is not an entity to be rejected or transcended. It does not matter much. Obama and his generation were not educated to believe in the West. The decline of the West has encouraged Obama in his ‘pivot’ to Asia. Europe happens to find itself, for the first time in centuries, in a more provincial place. The Atlantic is ceding its stature to the Pacific.” [87] Under such conditions, as Simon Serfaty points out, the combination of U.S. austerity and European detachment can ensue in “a form of neo-isolationism that neither the West nor the rest can afford.” [88]

But when addressing Europe and transatlantic issues, an essential observation must be made: NATO and the EU share a majority of members (22 out of 28 members in each organization). We should remember the essential internal political choices (Norway’s twofold rejection of EU accession and yet its active participation in NATO); limitations, such as neutrality (Austria); and sometimes plain rivalry (Turkey and Greece). Europe is very far from being a bloc, even though, when considered together, the cold numbers are impressive. The challenge is there because the combined numbers speak so loudly. Transforming the EU—the world’s largest economy, with the world’s second-highest defense budget after the United States—a genuine soft power, into a relevant player and partner on the new international stage is a tremendous challenge. For now, even though weaker than some of its prominent member states, the EU is far from falling into irrelevance on the international stage, due to its inner, proven strengths.

Gaps in NATO’s Armor?

As for the transatlantic alliance, its strength is visible in the fact that it has survived the threat it was based upon. Think of Lord Ismay’s famous saying: U.S. in, Germany down, and Russians out! All jokes aside, the primary definition of this alliance still is political-military, assuring the security of almost one billion people living in some of the world’s most advanced capitalist democracies.

But there are several points where NATO is and will be challenged. The first is in the context of the diminished capabilities of its militaries. The shortcomings of the Europeans surfaced in the Libya episode, determining powerful voices such as (then) Secretary of Defense Gates to bluntly state the perspectives of a “dim, if not dismal” future for the Alliance (2011). As Heather Conley and Maren Leed write,

Simply put, NATO’s future rests on the prospects for European defense spending and European political willingness to use the capabilities in which they invest. European military capabilities are fragmented, duplicative, and more expensive than they need to be. According to NATO, the 26 European allies combined spent $ 282 billion on defense budgets in 2011 (or about 27.2 percent of the NATO total), while the United States spent $ 731 billion (70.5 percent). Washington policymakers are now arguing that NATO must quickly move toward a 50/50 rather than a 75/25 alliance.[89]

If the current trends of demilitarization and illogical and ineffective choices continue, with European military capabilities shrinking to meaninglessness, “Europe contemplates losing geopolitical relevance.” [90] The Europeans have already shown twice in two years that they are unable to act without U.S. military support. The U.S. has nevertheless maintained a relatively reduced presence, “leading from behind,” appreciating the fact that (some) of its European allies are willing and able to act when needed. But for how long? Will France be able in several years to sustain another Mali, knowing that the full impact of continuing defense reductions has not been felt yet? Hence an American perception that (small) European countries are security consumers, not providers, even in a NATO context – that Europeans focus on welfare, instead of security, and when needed, it is the United States that sacrifices.

Moreover, there have been voices asking about NATO’s future after Afghanistan, fearing that there would not be a security project to bring the members together. But there are plenty: emerging security challenges, defense austerity in NATO nations, and Smart Defense represent profound topics for NATO concern, on which the military and civilian staff can reflect without smoke and fireworks. The project is the same as when the Alliance was launched – our better integration and interoperability, better planning, and more preparedness in order to face common risks, threats, and challenges.

NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen expressed his fear that leaving Afghanistan may provide an excuse for further budget cuts. On the contrary, these are some of the valuable lessons of the more than a decade-long presence in Afghanistan, which—as Secretary-General Rasmussen declared—need to be preserved and enhanced as NATO moves from a combat operation to a training mission in Afghanistan, beginning in 2015. The initiative bears the name Connected Forces Initiative (CFI), and aims to maintain NATO’s readiness and combat effectiveness through expanded education and training, increased exercises, and better use of technology.[91]

Second, “Smart Defense,” defined by Rasmussen as a “renewed culture of cooperation,” [92] encourages the Allies to cooperate in developing, acquiring, and maintaining military capabilities to meet current security problems in accordance with the new NATO strategic concept. The approach involves pooling and sharing resources (also addressed in the EU related section), setting priorities, and coordinating efforts better. The other Allies must reduce the transatlantic gap by equipping themselves with capabilities that are deemed to be critical, deployable, and sustainable.[93] But “‘Smart Defense’ has to become much more than another ‘bumper sticker’ slogan in order to ensure real change in developing and sharing the critical capabilities needed to address threats,” [94] for which the essential element is political determination. At this point, a successful example is the Strategic Airlift Capability, which reunites ten member and two partner nations, hosted in Hungary and operating Boeing C17s.

Finally, there are two interrelated issues: a successful balance and articulation between the EU and NATO (including by clarifying the CSDP–NATO connection on capabilities, planning, deployment, etc.) could represent an advantage also in dealing with the vicinity (Northern Africa, Turkey, Caucasus, Belarus, Ukraine) and in engaging Russia. These will continue to represent topics high on NATO’s agenda, on several topics of common interest: geographical proximity, managing emerging security challenges, missile defense, energy security, etc. In this regard, France and Turkey play essential roles. Their flexibility and desire to overcome past differences can make a difference.

Opportunities

An effort to reinforce the solidity of the partnership, from an economic perspective, started on 14 June 2013, when the European Commission, on behalf of the EU, initiated talks with the United States on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), a proposed free trade area agreement between the United States and the European Union. Even though each side is trying, obviously, to protect certain sectors of its economy, it still is the biggest bilateral trade deal ever negotiated, and potentially the largest regional free-trade agreement in history. It could result in millions of Euros of savings to companies and could create hundreds of thousands of jobs, covering “more than 40 percent of world GDP, and accounting for large shares of world trade and foreign direct investment. The TTIP would eliminate all trade tariffs and reduce non-tariff barriers, including in agriculture; expand market access in services trade; closer regulatory harmonization; strengthen intellectual-property protection; restrict subsidies to state-owned enterprises; and more.” [95] This will only lead to more interdependence, to both economic and political integration. Nobody can allow this to unravel, based on the profound economic and social benefits.[96]

Another area where the transatlantic dialogue is crucial in order to have a coherent and efficient approach is critical infrastructure protection. Most such infrastructures in NATO and EU countries are under private ownership or administration; of even greater importance is the fact that both military and civilians use, most of the time, the same fiber optic cables, energy grids, and water supplies. At the EU level, the process of identifying and designating national and European critical infrastructures is a fairly advanced, and member states are working with the public and private sectors on a set of protective measures. Now think of securing the information systems and networks of the twenty-eight NATO member states, from the U.S. to Albania. That is quite a security project, I would argue.

For NATO to remain the primary vehicle of transatlantic cooperation, it must see its role deepen and become relevant in areas such as emerging security challenges, including cyber security,[97] turning it into an area of cooperative security and defense. Creating common standards has proved its utility in armaments; it may prove useful in this area as well. Cyber could, among others, continue the link between the two sides of the Atlantic, covering its several sub-domains—crime, espionage, warfare—that are of greater or lesser concern for the Atlantic community (member states and international organizations). It becomes relevant when states and international organizations alike are faced with an ever increasing number of attempts on the part of various entities—whether state-sponsored or not—to gain illegal access to sensitive data of various kinds. Cooperation in the area of cyber security and defense thus turns into an opportunity for creating new “alliances” (at both the internal and international level), but also building on previous efforts and experience, deepening existing, functioning security mechanisms.

This may lead to two possible scenarios:

1.       The states will go for the option of double-speak, stating that they want to work together, while, in fact, sinking into isolationism

2.       They overcome their survival/isolationist reflexes and build a real security community.

Collaboration through sharing threat data, including through a public-private partnership,[98] could be one way of turning our collaborative culture and open societies into a competitive advantage, allowing us to mitigate, stop, and (even more important) prevent information security breaches and attacks.

The twenty-first century transatlantic relationship may not necessarily mean having U.S. tanks or A10 Thunderbolts based in Europe, but rather the two sides of the Atlantic managing the transition to a world in which the West is no longer in charge while still working together on new and complex issues. We can find strength in numbers and the way we function; transatlantic solidarity is still rooted in our common interests and values. James Howcroft writes, “Military partnerships today are more important than ever before. America’s current national strategy, coupled with global fiscal and political problems, makes it unlikely for Americans to deploy unilaterally to address the security challenges of the 21st century.” [99] It is a moment in which subtler areas of cooperation could see a boost (if that has not already happened), such as intelligence and cyber security. With this in mind, there is something more that transatlantic leaders have to consider: how best to engage the populations on the topic of today’s and tomorrow’s security challenges and threats.

Both parties have some things to learn from and must support each other, as the conditions of twenty-first century geopolitics make it impossible for any of them to act alone on the world stage. The European soft power approach to international affairs can provide useful insights and support to U.S. interests. “On many of today’s key issues—international financial stability, drug trafficking, the spread of diseases and especially terrorism—military power alone simply cannot produce success, and its use can sometimes be counterproductive. Instead, the U.S. must cooperate with Europe and others to address these shared threats and challenges.” [100] In fact, in a recent article, Gen. David Petraeus praised the value of (foreign aid as) soft power, alongside its armed forces, improving national security and advancing U.S. global interests.[101] This soft power dimension of the EU has proved its value through its significant contribution to achieving peace and maintaining stability in the Balkans, and it has the potential to be a sustainable, long-term solution. The prospects for Turkey to join the EU and also the special trade agreements with Northern Africa may represent useful instruments to address the issue of stability in Europe’s neighborhood. Questions thus arise as to the possibility of exporting the European model in the world: can peace, stability, and development take root elsewhere, under different conditions? As Joseph Nye puts it, “For a security partnership to work, it may be necessary for the U.S. to rediscover the value of ‘soft power’ and for Europeans to develop ‘hard’ power resources of their own.” [102]

Even though it looks like it is very difficult to strike the right balance, I would submit that the transatlantic alliance still is “inevitable.” [103] But there is a strong need for political will across the board, in parliaments and governments alike, on both sides of the Atlantic, not least when dealing with budget deficits, and even more so in explaining to their constituencies why it is important to invest in security and defense and outlining the considerable costs of failure. In Europe, at least, this was not and still is not a prominent issue in public debate. Things have to change for us to remain viable partners engaged in an efficient and effective relationship.

Conclusions

Uncertainty describes the international system today, perhaps more than ever. We have witnessed a rise of several other powers, but they are all affected—to various extents—by the financial and economic crisis, or internal problems and imbalances, all of which stymie their rise to the status of “great powers.” Therefore, the theories of multipolarity or polycentricity (depending on the perspective) still are debatable topics.

The United States has seen its role and power challenged and diminished due to its internal economic problems, resulting even in declining defense budgets and a reduction in its military capability. Still, even facing the current problems, opportunities for the U.S. to regain the lost ground are at hand: “viable alliances and partnerships, economic adaptability, flexibility and innovation, significant soft power attractiveness in the culture and ideology of an open society,” [104] prospects of energy independence and the resulting economic growth, the highest-ranking universities in the world, and a general sense of purpose. Added to this, the projections of GDP cannot be the only argument for the rise of other states as potential great powers. The key, Nye argues, resides in the combination of the hard power of coercion and payment with the soft power of persuasion and attraction into successful strategies – a combination that can be defined as smart power.

Europe has been the home of the world’s great powers for centuries, as well as their battleground. We have overcome this sad and bloody episode of our history, achieving the longest period of peace and stability in European history, becoming a global model and supporter of democracy, human rights, rule of law, social welfare, health care, and peaceful resolution of conflicts. Peace has paid its dividends. But this flourishing is in no small part due to the transatlantic relationship and the security it has assured.

Nevertheless, Europe should pay more attention to the “other” means that can be used to address our sometimes volatile neighborhood. We keep seeing how European military power is declining – in two years, we have witness two such disheartening examples, in Libya and Mali. Why is it important to address this? In the absence of sufficient military capabilities, Europe could find itself in a weak spot, vulnerable, unable to deal with military crises in its neighborhood, at least in the medium term.

This is not to say that Europe or the U.S. or anyone else should adopt a belligerent attitude. Far from it. I am not necessarily offering a defense of the doctrine of liberal imperialism, but basic common sense should tell us all that armies are not supposed to shovel the snow and clear the roads in winter. The military should not be a social welfare organization, but rather a strong, mobile, connected, interoperable force, able to move and act swiftly for the reasons (humanitarian or other) that the UN would sanction, to deal with twenty-first century threats having the potential to cause major disruptions to our societies.

Is the transatlantic vehicle still working? NATO is preparing for its withdrawal from Afghanistan, and not necessarily with an ensuing peace dividend. Rather, it too is facing a “do more with less” logic, the inevitable topic of security and defense budget cuts. The attention given to emerging security challenges will increase. Cyber security could be among the factors that will impose changes on national security and defense strategies, and NATO’s strategic vision and the Atlantic partnership, as a possible area for (among others) deepening cooperation among “Western” democracies.

As for the way ahead, adjustments have to be made on both sides, depending on political courage and vision. Europe must become aware of its strong points, to find and renew its commitment to further its project, to become more responsible and credible in global foreign policy and regional security and defense. Europe must also confront its demographic challenge, with declining and aging populations,[105] which will exert an ever increasing pressure on the welfare system. An interesting process is underway in a European Commission initiative aimed at strengthening the European defense industry, with a view to creating a single European defense market. In order to become a real partner, the old, familiar concept of “burden-sharing” has to once again be taken into consideration by the Europeans, but seriously this time. This involves a shift in European thinking, in the attention given to security and defense, in order to identify proper sources of financing, draft realistic defense budgets, and develop more relevant modes of defense cooperation.

The U.S. defense establishment has to attentively and responsibly address the national deficit and its implications on both internal dimensions (e.g., investing in infrastructure) but also on the instruments of power projection (hard power, such as military and intelligence capabilities, but also soft power, such as alliances, foreign aid, diplomacy, and culture). “The United States needs to see Europe as part of a global strategy, rather than a relic of the past, to be shed as America moves on to an Asian strategy. … The United States and Europe should now be leading the way in defining an international order for the future – one that fully enfranchises emerging regions and powers while enlisting their support in reinforcing the core democratic values and liberal international economic order that have brought us this far. It can be done, but—as in 2002—it means overcoming our tendencies toward playing the roles of Mars and Venus, and instead putting our efforts together in common purpose.” [106]

In summary, we are all living in times of change, of uncertainty, of strategic shifts. But the choices we make now will shape our future. The so-called “decline of the West” may not be that close. What if, after all, the biggest challenge for Europeans and Americans is to continue what we started together, to pursue and deepen our partnership? The reasons are numerous: we should not underestimate the power of our common values, trust, civilization and, yes, our common goals. Together we represent the first economic, military and—not least—soft powers of the world.

There is no viable alternative to the transatlantic partnership. It has demonstrated its benefits over the years, and it can definitely do so in the coming years, whether NATO, on a political and military level, or (hopefully soon) TTIP [107] on the economic and trade level. Moreover, in a multipolar, polycentric, multimodal, or even multiplex world, both the U.S. and Europe would, by definition, lose a part of their influence on world affairs, and as a consequence they would find themselves in a position of increased dependence on each other, mutually reinforcing, based on their shared history, values, and—hopefully—vision, interests, and trust, addressing challenges that we cannot deal with separately, such as climate change, changes in global governance, cyber (in)security, and so on. Even though it may be troubled from time to time, our relationship must continue.

* Cristian Iordan works in the area of cyber security as a specialist in international cooperation. His areas of interest and study include security, defense, terrorism, civil liberties, human rights, intelligence, critical infrastructure protection and cyber security, particularly at the level of the European Union. He holds a master’s degree in international relations and a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Bucharest. He is also a 2011 graduate of the Program in Advanced Security Studies at the Marshall Center and a 2013 Marshall Center Scholar.

[1] Keynote speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Prague, 12 November 2012; available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-68853CD7-CAC1A3AE/natolive/opinions_91210.htm.

[2] Jan Joel Andersson, “The Transatlantic Relationship,” Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) (2013).

[3] Brazil, Russia, India, China and, since 2010, South Africa.

[4] These include “Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds,” The National Intelligence Council (available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/GlobalTrends_2030.pdf) and “Citizens in an Interconnected and Polycentric World. Global Trends 2030,” from the European Union’s Institute for Security Studies (available at www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESPAS_report_01.pdf). There is an interesting difference between the NIC and EU ISS reports. The NIC methodology is based on several possible scenarios, while the EU ISS adopted a normative approach, based on a rather optimistic, or best-case belief in the “decompression effect,” giving all states of all dimensions greater freedom of maneuver in the international arena.

[5] Andersson, “The Transatlantic Relationship.”

[6] Ruchir Sharma, “Broken BRICs: Why the Rest Stopped Rising,” Foreign Affairs (November/ December 2012): 2–7.

[7] “Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds.”

[8] Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Why Nations Fail. The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty (London: Profile Books, 2012), 151.

[9] SIPRI Yearbook 2013: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2013); available at http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2013.

[10] “China and Iran: Best Chance for a ‘Multipolar ‘World,” Stratfor (12 November 2004); available at www.stratfor.com/analysis/china-and-iran-best-chance-multipolar-world.

[11] For a more detailed approach, see Samir Tata, “Recalibrating American Grand Strategy: Softening U.S. Policies Toward Iran in order to Contain China,” Parameters 42/43 (Winter/ Spring 2013): 47–58.

[12] Sharma, “Broken BRICs.”

[13] “China and Iran: Best Chance for a ‘Multipolar’ World.”

[14] Niall Ferguson, “A World Without Power,” Foreign Policy 143 (July/August 2004): 32–39; available at www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/07/01/a_world_without_power.

[15] Ibid., 34.

[16] Robert D. Kaplan, “Anarchy and Hegemony,” Stratfor (17 April 2013); available at www.stratfor.com/weekly/anarchy-and-hegemony.

[17] Joseph S. Nye, “The Future of American Power,” in War, Peace and Hegemony in a Globalized World, ed. Chandra Chari (New York: Routledge, 2008), 36–49.

[18] Zbigniew Brzezinski, “After America,” Foreign Policy (January/February 2012): 26–29; available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/after_america.

[19] Ibid., 28.

[20] Richard N. Haass, “The Second American Century? It’s Already Here,” Washington Post (28 April 2013).

[21] Nicholas Kitchen, ed., The United States After Unipolarity: Executive Summary, IDEAS reports SR009 (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2011); available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43473/1/The%20United%20States%20after%20unipolarity_executive%20summary%28lsero%29.pdf.

[22] G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West,” Foreign Affairs 87:1 (January/February 2008); available at www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63042/g-john-ikenberry/the-rise-of-china-and-the-future-of-the-west.

[23] Miles Kahler, “Rising Powers and Global Governance: Negotiating Change in a Resilient Status Quo,” International Affairs 89:3 (May 2013): 711–29.

[24] Sevasti-Eleni Vezirgiannidou, “The United States and Rising Powers in a Post-hegemonic Global Order,” International Affairs 89:3 (May 2013): 635–51.

[25] Samir Tata, “Recalibrating American Grand Strategy.”

[26] Sevasti-Eleni Vezirgiannidou, “The United States and Rising Powers in a Post-hegemonic Global Order.”

[27] Eric Hobsbawm, “War, Peace and Hegemony at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century,” in War, Peace and Hegemony in a Globalized World, ed. Chandra Chari (New York: Routledge, 2008), 15–24.

[28] Barry R. Posen, “Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 92:1 (January/February 2013).

[29] Ibid.

[30] Andrew Bacevich, “Let Europe Be Europe: Why the United States Must Withdraw from NATO,” Foreign Policy (March/April 2010); available at www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/let_europe_be_europe.

[31] See the very in-depth, detailed, policy-oriented paper by Michael J. Mazarr and the NDU Strategy Study Group, “Discriminate Power: A Strategy for a Sustainable National Security Posture,” The Philadelphia Papers 2 (May 2013); available at www.fpri.org/articles/2013/05/discriminate-power-strategy-sustainable-national-security-posture.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy,” International Security 22:1 (Summer 1997), 86–124.

[34] Christopher Layne, “Offshore Balancing Revisited,” The Washington Quarterly 25:2 (Spring 2002): 233-248, quote on 245.

[35] For instance, the multi-trillion USD transatlantic free-trade agreement “Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP),” currently under negotiation.

[36] Benjamin Alter and Edward Fishman, “The Dark Side Of Energy Independence,” The New York Times (28 April 2013).

[37] Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy 189 (November 2011): 56–63.

[38] See “Looking Forward: U.S. National Security Beyond the Wars,” conference organized by the Center for a New American Security, 12 June 2013; details at http://pomed.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/POMED-Notes-CNAS-conference.pdf.

[39] James Joyner, “Jones: ‘Pivot to Asia’ Regrettable Word Choice,” New Atlanticist (3 January 2013); available at http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/jones-pivot-to-asia-regretable-word-choice.

[40] Chuck Hagel, “The U.S. Approach to Regional Security,” speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1 June 2013.

[41] See “Military Strategy Forum on The Future of Maritime Forces,” The Center for Strategic and International Studies, a discussion with Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, and General James F. Amos, Commandant of the Marine Corps, CSIS, Washington DC, 11 July 2013.

[42] Sevasti-Eleni Vezirgiannidou, “The United States and Rising Powers in a Post-hegemonic Global Order.”

[43] See Henriette Rytz, “The Pivot to Asia – Overcoming a Communication Problem,” German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) (11 February 2013); available at http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/point-of-view/point-of-view-the-pivot-to-asia-overcoming-a-communication-problem.html.

[44] Robert D. Kaplan, “The Virtues of Hard Power,” Stratfor (22 May 2013).

[45] Eva Gross, “The American Sequester and Us,” European Union Institute for Security Studies, Brief No. 19 (22 April 2013); available at www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/the-american-sequester-and-us.

[46] Dov S. Zakheim, “The Strategic Implications of a Freefalling U.S. Defense Budget,” The American Interest (July–August 2013): 43–51; available at www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1431.

[47] U.S. Department of Defense, Overview – United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2012), 43; available at http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2013/FY2013_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. See also Lawrence J. Korb, Alex Rothman, and Max Hoffman, “Reforming Military Compensation: Addressing Runaway Personnel Costs Is a National Imperative,” Center for American Progress (7 May 2012); available at www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/ 2012/05/07/11573/reforming-military-compensation.

[48] See David Alexander, “Defense Chief Orders Strategy Review in Response to Budget Cuts,” Reuters (18 March 2013); available at http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USBRE92H0S620130318.

[49] Jan Joel Andersson, “The Transatlantic Relationship,” Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) (2013). See also David Alexander, “Update 1 – Pentagon Delays Carrier’s Mideast Deployment over Budget Woes,” Reuters (6 February 2013); available at www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/07/usa-budget-pentagon-idUSL1N0B6ME520130207.

[50] Principal assistant and adviser to both the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all budgetary and fiscal matters.

[51] Zakheim, “The Strategic Implications of a Freefalling U.S. Defense Budget.”

[52] Richard D. Hooker, “‘The Strange Voyage’: A Short Précis on Strategy,” Parameters 42 (Winter–Spring 2013): 59–68.

[53] Zakheim, “The Strategic Implications of a Freefalling U.S. Defense Budget.”

[54] “Military Strategy Forum on The Future of Maritime Forces,” The Center for Strategic and International Studies, a discussion with Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, and General James F. Amos, Commandant of the Marine Corps, CSIS, Washington D.C., 11 July 2013.

[55] Claudette Roulo, “Hagel Meets with Troops on Fort Bragg, Discussed Budget,” U.S. Department of Defense Website (15 July 2013); available at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120456.

[56] The onboard parallel computer systems decided the UCAV should land on firm ground on its third attempt. See Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr. and Colin Clark, “Navy, Northrop Score Historic First With (Mostly) Successful X-47B Drone Carrier Landings,” Breaking Defense (10 July 2013); available at http://breakingdefense.com/2013/07/10/navy-northrop-score-historic-first-with-successful-x-47b-drone-carrier-landing/.

[57] “The aircraft carrier is in danger of becoming like the battleships it was originally designed to support: big, expensive, vulnerable – and surprisingly irrelevant to the conflicts of the time.” Capt. Henry J. Hendrix, USN, “At What Cost a Carrier?”, Center for a New American Security (March 2013); available at www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Carrier_Hendrix_FINAL.pdf.

[58] See a document prepared for the United States Army by John Gordon IV and John Matsumura, The Army’s Role in Overcoming Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013); available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR229/RAND_RR229.pdf.

[59] Such as the Chinese Dong Feng 21D missile, an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) with a range of approximately 2000 km. See J. Michael Cole, “The DF-21D or ‘Carrier Killer’: An Instrument of Deception?”, The Diplomat (22 April 2013); available at http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/04/22/the-df-21d-or-carrier-killer-an-instrument-of-deception.

[60] Richard N. Haass, “The Second American Century? It’s Already Here,” Washington Post (28 April 2013).

[61] James A. Caporaso, “The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Post-modern?” Journal of Common Market Studies 34:1 (March 1996): 29–52.

[62] Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Alfred E. Knopf Editions, 2003).

[63] Caporaso, “The European Union and Forms of State.”

[64] See Roy H. Ginsberg, “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical Capability–Expectations Gap,” Journal of Common Market Studies 37:3 (September 1999): 429–454. See also Franck Petiteville, “L’Union Européenne comme acteur international ‘global.’ Un agenda de recherche,” Revue Internationale et Stratégique 47:3 (2002): 145–57; Franck Petiteville, La politique internationale de l’Union Européenne (Paris: Presses Sciences Po, 2006), 193–231.

[65] John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).

[66] Cristian Iordan, “Le système européen d’acquisition d’armements. Facteur de soutien de la PESD,” Romanian Journal of European Affairs 10:4 (December 2010): 87.

[67] Joseph Jupille and James A. Caporaso, “States, Agency and Rules: The European Union in Global Environment Politics,” in The European Union in the World Community, ed. Carolyn Rhodes (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 213-229.

[68] This represents a debated topic itself, more important in trade and cooperation issues, rather than in security and diplomacy.

[69] Nicole Gnesotto, La politique de sécurité et de défense de l’UE. Les cinq premières années (1999 – 2004) (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 21.

[70] Jupille and Caporaso, “States, Agency and Rules,” 214.

[71] Franck Petiteville, La politique internationale de l’Union Européenne (Paris: Presses Sciences Po, 2006), 229.

[72] Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), 6.

[73] H.W. Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers,” Foreign Affairs 69:5 (1990): 92–93. See also Karen Smith, “The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?”, The International Spectator 35:2 (April–June 2000): 11–28.

[74] Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, JCMS 40:2 (2002): 252–53.

[75] See Anna Barcikowska, Securing the Future of European Defense (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, July 2013).

[76] Antonio Missiroli, “Strategic Foresight and the EU,” Brief Issue 13 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2013); available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_13.pdf.

[77] Antonio Missiroli, ed., Enabling the Future European Military Capabilities 2013–2025: Challenges and Avenues, Report No. 16 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, May 2013); available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Report_16.pdf.

[78] Cristian Iordan, “Defending Europe,” Per Concordiam 3:2 (2012): 46–53; available at www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/MCDocs/files/College/F_Publications/perConcordium/pcv3n2eng.pdf.

[79] Michael Cox, “No Longer Inevitable? The Transatlantic Relationship from Bush to Obama,” in Europe in an Asian Century: Visions for Europe, LSE IDEAS, ed. Nicholas Kitchen (London: The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2012), 22–28.

[80] Laurence Norman, “EU Looks to its Own Asia Pivot,” Wall Street Journal (3 May 2012).

[81] Daniel Keohane, “The EU’s Role in East Asian Security,” in Look East, Act East: Transatlantic Agendas in the Asia Pacific, ed. Patryk Pawlak (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, December 2012), 45–50; available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Final_Report_13LEAE.pdf.

[82] The EU has issued a set of “Battlegroups Standards and Criteria,” which have been encouraged to rely on existing NATO standards, in order to avoid duplication and promote interoperability.

[83] For instance, the Netherlands has given up on their entire contingent of tanks, and they share naval training with Belgium.

[84] Luis Simón, interview with Jolyon Howorth, European Geostrategy (4 September 2012); available at http://europeangeostrategy.ideasoneurope.eu/2012/09/04/interview-with-jolyon-howorth.

[85] Mary Kaldor, “A European Conception of Security,” in Europe in an Asian Century: Visions for Europe, LSE IDEAS, ed. Nicholas Kitchen (London: The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2012).

[86] Charles A. Kupchan, “A Still-Strong Alliance,” Policy Review 172 (30 March 2012); available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/111956.

[87] Michael Kimmage, “The Decline of the West: An American Story,” Transatlantic Academy Paper Series (4 June 2013); available at www.transatlanticacademy.org/publications/decline-west-american-story.

[88] Simon Serfaty, “The Folly of Forgetting the West,” Policy Review 174 (1 August 2012).

[89] Heather A. Conley and Maren Leed, “NATO in the Land of Pretend,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (26 June 2013); available at http://csis.org/print/44880.

[90] See Kupchan, “A Still-Strong Alliance.”

[91] The Connected Forces Initiative, NATO website, at www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-3A1489DD-47A3C221/natolive/topics_98527.htm.

[92] NATO press conference by NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen after the first session of the North Atlantic Council in Heads of State and Government format, 20 May 2012; available at www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_87598.htm.

[93] “Smart Defence,” NATO website, available at www.nato.int/docu/review/Topics/EN/Smart-Defence.htm.

[94] Martynas Zapolskis, “NATO’S Strategic Challenges: The Alliance Strives to Maintain Integrity in an Uncertain Global Environment,” Per Concordiam 4:2 (2013): 24–29.

[95] Michael J. Boskin, “Transatlantic Trade Goes Global,” Project Syndicate (16 July 2013); available at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-global-implcations-of-eu-us-freet-trade-by-michael-boskin#k0EPsyF5Mrk0ALsZ.99.

[96] See Thomas Ilgen, “The Future of the Transatlantic Partnership,” in Hard Power, Soft Power and the Future of Transatlantic Relations, ed. Thomas Ilgen (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2006), 195.

[97] “Cyberwar: War in the Fifth Domain,” The Economist (1 July 2010); available at http://www.economist.com/node/16478792.

[98] See Wade Williamson, “Combating Emerging Threats Through Security Collaboration,” Security Week (17 December 2012); available at www.securityweek.com/combating-emerging-threats-through-security-collaboration.

[99] James Howcroft, “Things Americans Need to Know: How to Be Better Partners,” Small Wars Journal (25 June 2013); available at http://smallwarsjournal.com/print/14148.

[100] Joseph Nye, “Soft Power and European-American Affairs,” in Hard Power, Soft Power and the Future of Transatlantic Relations, ed. Thomas Ilgen (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2006), 25–35.

[101] Gen. David Petraeus and Michael O’Hanlon, “Fund—Don’t Cut—U.S. Soft Power,” Politico (30 April 2013); available at http://www.politico.com/story/2013/04/david-petraeus-defense-diplomacy-soft-power-90781.html#ixzz2a8Y1fbSt.

[102] Nye, “Soft Power and European-American Affairs.”

[103] Vittorio Parsi, The Inevitable Alliance: Europe and the United States Beyond Iraq (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

[104] Joseph Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).

[105] See Matthew Rhodes, “U.S. perspectives on NATO,” in Understanding NATO in the 21st Century, ed. Graeme P. Herd and John Kreindler (New York: Routledge, 2013), 33–49.

[106] Kurt Volker, “Reaffirming Transatlantic Unity,” Policy Review 172 (30 March 2012); available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/112246.

[107] The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) represents a deepened and more integrated relationship between the world’s two largest economies—the U.S. and the EU—and offers considerable potential benefits to consumers and companies alike. See www.acus.org/content/ttip.

Post-Soviet States Between Russia and the EU: Reviving Geopolitical Competition? A Dual Perspective

Teodor Lucian Moga and Denis Alexeev *

The last two decades have witnessed a tectonic upheaval in the international political milieu. In Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Soviet Union meant the sudden emergence of newly independent states and required a quick and proper reaction to the changing geopolitical context. Such is the challenge confronting Russia and the European Union (EU), the two major players in the region. In times of economic crisis and political uncertainty, both parties seek to achieve their goals and protect their interests in the shared vicinity by expanding cooperation with their neighbors. However, each side is conducting its actions in a different fashion, according to its own strategic plans. The pressing issue coming out of this situation is whether it is possible to label this dual struggle for broader political clout a new strategic competition. Or it is just an inevitable process of restructuring the regional political environment – a process that is still incomplete after the dissolution of the Soviet Union? Thus, this essay examines the practical nature and the ideological background of both the EU and Russian approaches and policies towards the common proximity of the former Soviet republics.

* * *

The growing importance of the EU as a strong center of gravity in the European post-Cold War milieu, coupled with the collapse of the Soviet Union, has sparked the development of a wide range of cooperative mechanisms between the Union and its Eastern European neighbors. The EU’s increasing geopolitical weight has taken concrete form through the development of its enlargement strategy and the launch of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), followed by the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and, most recently, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) have been envisaged in the case of Eastern Europe as alternatives to the enlargement strategy, albeit this equivalency has not been officially stated. They were policies meant to enhance political dialogue and cooperation in many areas, ranging from security issues to trade, migration, visa facilitation, energy, and environment. A number of relevant projects have been set up, such as the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (part of the Association Agreements), institutional appropriation, common negotiation and cooperation platforms (cross-border links, Euro-regions, civil society and business forums, biennial summits, annual ministerial meetings, etc.). This article holds that the Union’s paramount goals in Eastern Europe have been first and foremost regional stability and security. However, Brussels has realized that the EU could best promote stability and security indirectly through measures aimed at encouraging the spread of democracy, human rights, good governance, and market economy. Moreover, in order to attain the aforementioned objectives, the EU should further engage in the wider European security environment (through its CFSP/CSDP instruments) and seek to strike a balanced stance towards Russia. Amid sensitive issues, EU policy makers and heads of state need also to work to arrive at a consensus with Moscow that might involve common approaches for facilitating regional cooperation.

The strategy centered on the integration-security spectrum has been the main rationale that stood behind the EU’s approach towards Eastern Europe. The ideas under which the European integration process has been conceived dealt with threats and risks in a rather politicized way, rather than using hard power (best reflected in the concentric circles model). This is because Brussels perceives regional stability from a liberal security perspective of normative transformation based on the EU’s core values: democratization, rule of law, human rights, and market economy. This perception stands in contrast to the more traditional realist understandings of international relations, premised on material interests and balance of power. However, in the Eastern neighborhood of the EU, this article argues that an interplay of liberal/realist perceptions of security exists, and that it stems from the persistence of a geostrategic competition between the EU and Russia over the post-Soviet Newly Independent States (NIS). Because of their sensitive “pivot” location, the NIS are often regarded as a bone of contention between the two regional players.

The EU enlargement process to include countries in Central and Eastern Europe has shed light on new territorial horizons by bringing parts of the former Soviet space into the EU’s focus. But since the enlargement solution to pan-European security has reached an obvious point of fatigue (nearly to exhaustion),[1] Brussels has devoted its support to developing alternative cooperative arrangements, such as the development of the ENP, aimed at forging a new way of approaching the immediate neighborhood. This has meant the creation of a stable area, a ring of friends at the EU’s borders, which in turn would ensure regional security.[2] According to the aforementioned concentric circles model, the first ring (circle) is represented by the EU itself, governed by a series of laws, norms, and rules known as acquis communautaire. The second circle consists in the European Economic Area (EEA), created in 1994 between the members of the EU and the three states of the European Free Trade Association (Norway, Iceland, and Lichtenstein) by the adoption of the internal market acquis. The third circle contains the states subject to the enlargement process: the states in the former Yugoslav space, Turkey, and Iceland. This meant a gradual and significant yet far from complete adoption of the acquis. The ENP represents the fourth and the largest circle gravitating around the EU, comprising six former Soviet states from Eastern Europe and also the ten Mediterranean states included in the Barcelona Process. These states exhibit flaws in political and economic governance, and the EU acquis is being only selectively introduced, according to the will and capacity of absorption of each state. Some countries from the eastern rim of Europe (Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia) aspire to a long-term perspective of accession into the European structures, but this is not currently encouraged; Brussels provides them instead the possibility of economic integration and thorough Association Agreements.[3] Moreover, in Eastern Europe, the ENP’s additional multilateral frameworks—the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and Black Sea Synergy (BSS)—reiterate Brussels’ interest in the eastern proximity of the EU by providing the premises for pushing the states involved a step closer to the EU.

Security has again been a salient issue. The timing of the policies illustrate, among other things, that they were designed in response to new security challenges. The ENP emerged in the aftermath of the big 2004 enlargement, and shortly before Romania and Bulgaria became members (2007), which brought a troubled region closer to the EU’s borders. The EaP (2009) came about as a result of Russia’s August 2008 invasion of Georgia (most prominently), the gas disputes between Gazprom and Kiev (2006, 2009), the growing interest in energy supplies, and the persistence of the protracted conflicts in Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Complementarily, the Black Sea Synergy (2007) has been envisaged as helping to avoid any other geopolitical divisions around the Black Sea basin and to further regional cooperation between the region’s littoral states (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine) and adjacent states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece, and Moldova). This increased concern for security beyond the borders of the EU followed the same rationale that underpinned the enlargement strategy following the dissolution of Yugoslavia (1991–95) and the war in Kosovo in 1999. The devastating events of the 1990s gave momentum to a consideration of enlargement both as a response to the threats of authoritarian revival and ethnic conflict and as a strategy for security promotion in Central and South Eastern Europe, first by including the Visegrad countries and then Romania and Bulgaria.

A brief analysis of the eastern neighborhood “grand chessboard” of the EU cannot ignore the region’s geopolitical complexity. In Eastern Europe, the Euro-Atlantic community, on the one hand, and Russia on the other seek to assert their influence and delineate their spheres of interest. These spheres often overlap, leading to consequences at the local and national level. Such is the case of the six EaP states (Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan), whose geographic position of “in-betweenness” constrains their internal and external political decisions. Since their emergence as independent states after the disintegration of the USSR, these states have walked an unstable political tightrope, a multifaceted judgment often being employed to strike a balance between East and West. To a certain extent, this multi-vectoralism—fomented also by Brussels’ deliberate ambiguity—weakens the neighborhood policy’s credentials as being a reliable tool to fulfill its agenda.[4] Moreover, the current economic downturn has frequently hindered or postponed Brussels’ plans towards its vicinity.

In Eastern Europe, the EU and Russia are the most important actors in the shared vicinity, both exercising structural and normative power to shape their neighboring environment and both trying to coordinate the external challenges emanating from the region. Moscow is generally considered as a normative and political rival to Brussels, and consequently as the main stumbling block to any cooperation between the EU and the EaP states. Since the launch of the ENP and, particularly, the EaP and the BSS, Russia has opposed any institutional encroachment upon its own neighborhood, and has thus adopted an antagonistic stance toward the ENP (first by assuming an alarmist approach towards the EaP, which was regarded as premeditated intrusion into Moscow’s region of “privileged interest,” [5] and later by downplaying the EU’s neighborhood initiatives and by launching competing agendas). Russia spearheaded the creation of the Customs Union (2010) and the Common Economic Space (2012) between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and Vladimir Putin’s project of a Eurasian Union (2015) is at odds with the EU’s goals. By and large, Russia rejects the implication carried by the ENP that European values, norms, and practices are the only game in town.

Over the last two decades the EU has been an anchor of stability for neighboring countries, and has influenced to a considerable extent their economic and political institution-building process. Economic cooperation has triggered further integration and consolidated interdependence and, not coincidentally, a feeling of reliance (of trust) between states. This rationale has not changed in the last couple of years; however, the EU’s economic strength is fading. As the single market, the monetary union, and the constitutional treaty have been seriously shaken, this has cast doubt on the EU’s internal and external governance models. Moreover, in spite of growing dialogue, and several initiatives and institutional collaborations, reform on the ground has been limited, while political freedom and civil liberties are still a sensitive issue in the western post-Soviet states (Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus) and the South Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan). The rise of the authoritarian and “hybrid” regimes in these states (defined as neither completely authoritarian nor completely democratic) has been highlighted in all international ratings. And this is surprising for countries located on the EU’s eastern fringe, where Union influence is supposed to be strong. Furthermore, the EU’s reluctance to meet the membership aspirations of some of the EaP countries will continue to hinder the development of further relations.

The EU has the capacity and necessary means to play a vital role in Eastern Europe. From this standpoint, expressions such as “enlargement fatigue,” “third countries,” “partial inclusion,” “anything but institutions,” etc.—phrases that are often used in the EaP progress reports—seem counterproductive and create ambiguity. The principle of “more for more” that the EU is using with respect to its neighborhood should also be applied to Brussels’ agenda. Lately the EU has emerged as being willing to offer less in relation to the post-Soviet space, which could look hazardous for the near future and detach the EaP from the EU’s orbit. Hence, a much more vigorous political determination and stronger common voice could increase the EU’s weight and influence and bring added value to its external governance. The EU should practice and invest more in what it preaches and stands for. And this could involve the need for an ambitious overhaul of Brussels’ toolkit in order to efficiently engage with countries for which the prospect of full-fledged membership is still not part of this relationship. While the EU is seriously rethinking its current role on the international stage where new global actors have risen, it should not forget that its main strategic power lies in its near abroad. Even the EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle has stressed the importance of the Association Agreements as “a quantum leap towards the real transformation in that post soviet space” and “a game changer.” [6] This has also been stated in the European Commission’s Strategy Paper, “Eastern Partnership: A Roadmap to the Autumn 2013 Summit”: “Cooperation between the EU and its Eastern European partners—the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine—is a crucial part of the Union’s external relations.” [7] Thus, it becomes obvious that creating an integrative frame for regional cooperation depends, to the largest extent, upon the success of the external governance that the EU wishes to transfer to its vicinity.

* * *

Just like for the EU, the republics of the former Soviet Union occupy a very important place in Russia’s foreign policy agenda. The long history of being a part of one state, as well as the wide spectrum of close economic, social, political, and cultural ties are interpreted by Russia as a very strong argument in favor of searching for common strategies of cooperation and development in the twenty-first century.

The history of Russian efforts to reunify the post-Soviet space—with an accent on Russia’s central role within new political, economic, and military constructions—dates back to the late 1990s. At that time, the Russian political establishment openly proclaimed the change in its foreign policy priorities from rapprochement with the West towards the deepening of relations and cooperation with the former Soviet republics.[8] Russia’s interest in strengthening its position in the post-Soviet space was not spontaneous. The series of economic and political crises that collapsed on Russia and its neighbors in the early 1990s resulted not only in economic weakness and political turbulence, but also in a constant U.S. and European presence in the NIS. This took shape in some bilateral and multilateral economic and energy projects, political and military assistance, and finally rounds of NATO and EU enlargement as strong evidence of expanding Western influence in the region. These steps were perceived by Russia as evidence of trends that that might lead to its isolation, undermining traditional concepts of national security. In other words, the major drivers for this new approach towards the neighborhood could be described as general disappointment in the rapprochement with the West, which neither brought expected levels of prosperity nor smooth integration of Russia into the Western community of nations. It was also perceived as a gradual loss of common ground and influence among the former Soviet republics, and finally, as an ideological shift among a new political elite (the idea of Russia’s revival as a strong regional leader, supported by quick economic growth, oil prices, and favorable economic conditions).

The process of rethinking Russia’s stance toward its neighbor states and the reunification strategy and ideology could be divided into three stages. The first stage extended from the late 1990s until the early 2000s, and was characterized by a reverse in Russian policy towards the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) after the rule of Boris Yeltsin. This period also saw the acceleration of cooperation with Russia’s neighbors, and the implementation of some initiatives for the creation of a formal organizational network in the former USSR (e.g., the Eurasian Economic Community, Unification of Russia and Belarus, etc.) These organizations, despite their ambitious goals, were destined to remain nominal or demonstrate insignificant progress in their development due to a variety of internal economic and political problems Russia and many of its neighbors faced during this period. In general, Vladimir Putin’s first presidential term was characterized by the elaboration of political and strategic mechanisms of strengthening influence over the post-Soviet space to sustain closer political and economic ties between Russia and the former Soviet republics.

The second stage occupied most of the mid-2000s, and was very much shaped by Russia’s reaction to the series of “Color Revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and the Kyrgyz Republic. As a result, this stage saw Russia’s decisive turn towards its neighbors, and the display of a will to play a greater political role in the region, as well as strict competition with the United States and the European Union for economic and political influence in the former Soviet Republics. This is the stage when Russia started to exert pressure on its neighbors who openly demonstrated their ambitions for EU and NATO membership while simultaneously hoping to continue to enjoy economic benefits and energy subsides inherited from the Soviet past.[9] These years proved to the Kremlin leadership that such a period of competition would require some strict measures to remain a strong player in the region, and, at the same time, the need for a long-term strategy that would enable Russia to envision a new paradigm for post-Soviet integration.

The third stage occupied the late 2000s, and was characterized by the systematization of Russia’s political and economic approach. Elaboration of a long-term strategy based on the strengthening of the economic, military, and political ties with the post-Soviet states, which constitute the post-soviet integration core (Belarus and Kazakhstan), has demonstrated Russia’s most prominent interest in regional integration since the Soviet Union’s collapse. The third stage refers to a new integration logic, partly borrowed from the EU experience (where all of the existing political constructions are based on sustainable economic cooperation between major European players). This phase saw the development of a new cooperation and integration philosophy that was intended to boost rapprochement using more pragmatic mechanisms of mutual interest, especially in opening new markets and business opportunities. During the time of global economic turbulence, these measures could be perceived as a policy of pragmatic regionalism with certain ambitions for political integration.

Rethinking Russian policy toward its neighbor states can also be seen through the prism of two major tendencies: political and ideological. The first tendency appeared during the 1990s, and draws some of its internal factors from the period when the collapse of Soviet ideology, Russian economic decline, and general ideas of sovereignty and disintegration resulted in the destruction of the political and economic ties between former integral parts of the Soviet Union, combined with Russia’s inability to remain a pole of gravity to former Soviet republics. The second tendency has had a pronounced external dimension, most notably during the 1990s and early 2000s when the intense actions of influential regional players like the U.S. and the EU were perceived in Russia as an attempt to exclude her from her traditional area of strategic interests. There was a solid basis for these kind of Russian concerns. The emergence of Western-oriented political and security alliances (GUUAM/GUAM), the support offered to some Russian neighbor states in fulfilling their NATO ambitions, and bilateral economic projects (which very often undermined Russian interests and created new barriers) provoked suspicion vis-à-vis almost any type of European or U.S. blueprint toward the former Soviet states. Another external factor that raised serious concerns in Russia was the escalating competition between the U.S., EU, China, and Russia for access to energy resources and transportation routes in Central Asia and the Caucasus. A number of energy projects and the building of pipelines that provide alternative energy supplies to Europe seriously shook Russia’s status of regional energy superpower (which became of paramount importance once global market prices for oil and gas started to rise significantly). It also forced Russia to adopt decisive economic and political measures against some neighbor states and to accelerate its actions to secure its status as the major energy source for Europe.

Finally, the process of regime change and the series of “Color Revolutions” “orchestrated by the West” not only nourished Russia’ s mistrust toward any European or U.S. initiative in the former Soviet space, but also produced a serious concern that such policies could be used at some point against Russia itself.[10] This determined Russia to alter its foreign policy priorities and elaborate long-term strategies for dealing with its neighbors. One of the first conceptual theses undergirding Moscow’s new strategy could be traced to “The New Eurasian Strategy,” written by Sergey Rogov, the Director of the Institute of the U.S. and Canada at the Russian Academy of Sciences. His message was somehow a quintessence of ideas held by a large group of Russian politicians and intellectuals who were interested in reversing Russia’s waning trend as a regional power.[11] Even now, more than a decade after its elaboration, the idea of the development of a special political, economic, and social space in Eurasia has special currency among Russian foreign policy makers and politicians.

Alongside with the rational political and economic concepts, some specific ideological constructions and new geopolitical approaches that fall under the rubric of Eurasianism have gradually assumed popularity among government officials and right-wing intellectuals. These ideas were a mixture between traditional geopolitical and philosophical ideas of Slavophiles and Russian geopolitical thinkers of the nineteenth century who associated themselves with the then-popular doctrine of Eurasianism. However, the Eurasianism of the new millennium is based mostly on the idea of confrontation between Russia and the West, and holds that the former Soviet republics are supposed to play a certain buffer role between Russia and the unfriendly West. The most prominent ideas of contemporary Russian Eurasianism have been formulated by Alexander Dugin, one of the leaders of the right-wing Eurasianist and nationalist movement in Russia. They include the following:

·         Steering the post-Soviet space in several key areas—political, economic, energy, and strategic—is a key goal for Russian policy and politics

·         Developing the “Greater Eurasia” Project (the creation of a buffer between Russia and influential Western and Asian players)

·         Making the Eurasian space attractive to former Soviet republics (the idea of a “Eurasian Project” that included the creation of a Eurasian Union was first articulated by Eurasianists in the early 2000s) [12]

·         Guaranteeing the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the NIS in exchange for their loyalty to Russia.[13]

Despite the controversial character of some of the thoughts expressed by the Eurasianist ideologists, many of their tenets have been accepted by the Kremlin and have become especially clear in the integration strategy methods utilized by the Russian leadership in early and mid-2000s.

Generally speaking, post-Soviet integration strategies could be divided into three major segments. First, there was a push for the creation of purely political constructions, such as the CIS, as a form of regional cooperation to replace the framework that had been provided by the Soviet Union. The main attribute of such political constructions was their “blurry” character, in which many areas of cooperation are very perfunctory, and a variety of activities and joint projects exist only on paper and never come true.[14] Most cooperative decisions are made on the basis of ad hoc consensus among particular members who are interested in one project or another. The reason for that was obvious; none of former Soviet republics welcomed the re-emergence of a new Soviet Union. Yet at the same time it was necessary to sustain some instruments for cooperation that could be used when necessary and beneficial for all members. It was true not only for the CIS, but also for the United State of Russia and Belarus, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and other fora of post-Soviet cooperation.[15] Hence, when we evaluate the efficiency of these organizations in bringing some unity to the post-Soviet space, it is difficult to expect significant progress, because they were not designed to facilitate such goals. And this justifies Russia’s endeavor to adopt an additional strategy to be more effective in the area of unification.

The second post-Soviet integration strategy revolved around a variety of decisive measures undertaken by the Russian government in support of its idea of reintegration during the first and second term of Vladimir Putin’s presidency. Such measures included either political and financial support for or undermining the acting regimes in the former Soviet Republics (depending on the character of their foreign policy and the willingness to follow a pro-Russian course). This was converted into a “multi-speed and multi-level integration” concept used in relation to the NIS. Russia frequently employed its diplomatic and especially economic instruments to interfere into the sphere of internal politics of its neighbor states in order to offset U.S. and EU activity.

The results of these measures remained very controversial. The Kremlin’s goals often were not achieved, due to a variety of reasons. On the contrary, it has been more than a decade since the post-Soviet republics were proclaimed Russia’s top foreign policy priority, yet relations between Russia and many of its neighbors have reached their lowest point since the collapse of Soviet Union. Some indicators of this dismal state of affairs could be found in the series of gas disputes between Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus; the solid drift of some former Soviet republics toward the West and aspirations for NATO and EU membership; the “multi-vector” foreign policy of influential CIS and CSTO members, who seek to pursue their national interests balancing between Russia, the U.S., the EU, and China; and finally, armed conflict between Russia and Georgia. All these may be considered in many respects as signs of Russian political failure in the field of reintegration. The rough results of the integration politics could be described with the “3Ds formula”: Disappointment (some regional leaders were disappointed by the perspective of being drawn into the powerful vortex of Russian gravity); Distrust (when it comes to sensitive areas of cooperation between Russia and its neighbors); and Devaluation (for many representatives of the post-Soviet elite, the prospects of reintegration were no longer valuable).

These inconclusive results forced Moscow to rethink its attitude toward the process of post-Soviet integration and switch from empty political constructions and tactics of pressure to a more comprehensive approach, which is more or less based on economic fundamentals and mutual interests as perceived by the CIS members. This third stage of Moscow’s reintegration strategy includes prominent measures that should put the integration process on a more pragmatic path, such as the creation of a common market that unifies a significant number (up to 200–250 million) of potential customers and joint industrial and modernization projects.

The major attributes of this newly adopted strategy include several phases:

·         Creation of a Customs Union between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, with the potential of inclusion of other CIS states (started in June 2010)

·         The development of a Common Economic Space between the members of the Customs Union, which includes coordination and unification of members’ legal, customs, and financial policies, as well as free movement of capital, goods, and labor force (started in January 2012)

·         The formation of the Eurasian Economic Union, with certain elements of political unification (planned for 2015).

It should be mentioned, however, that certain gestures toward economic rapprochement have been accompanied by some steps in the sphere of military cooperation between the members of the above-mentioned structures. Those security areas include common air-defense capabilities, joint counter-narcotics and counterterrorist measures, common approaches toward the issues of regional political stability, etc. In other words, the new reintegration strategy is trying to sustain the nexus between the Soviet legacy and the new regional realities of the twenty-first century (e.g., common interests, threats, and visions of regional development). The Russian idea of the creation of common economic structures goes hand in hand with its interest to strengthen military and security ties with members of newly created organizations. It means that the modern form of regionalism based on shared economic interests has a strong dimension of building a political alliance inherited from the Soviet past.

* * *

However, the big question that arises from the above-mentioned strategy is to what extent the idea of the EU’s Eastern Partnership could co-exist with Russia’s reintegration strategies? Russia made no secret of its suspicion of any modes of political cooperation between the former Soviet Republics and the West, but could this be seen through the prism of new geopolitical competition?

The EU and Russia are the most important actors in the shared vicinity, both exercising structural and normative power to shape their neighboring environment and both seeking to coordinate the external challenges emanating from the region. Whereas the EU has launched a concrete strategy for its immediate eastern neighbors (most prominently, through the EaP), Russia has also striven to maintain an upper hand by envisaging a range of hard- and soft-power instruments and institutional frameworks to exploit its structural power in the post-Soviet space. Both players endeavor to mold the neighboring countries according to its own pattern. The most recent example has been the effort to entice the six post-Soviet states from Eastern Europe into either Association Agreements or the soon-to-be Customs Union. There is a lack of compatibility between these two forms of integration, which lies both in the mechanisms for setting the external tariff and the competition between different standards and regulations. This places some of the countries from the common proximity in a conundrum over whether to choose deeper integration into the EU or a closer relationship with the future Eurasian Union. Nonetheless, looking at both processes of EU and Russian activities in the post-Soviet space, we may assert that they could be mutually beneficial for the countries involved. This implies a genuine, constructive approach rather than a competitive one, which is the unequivocal message both Russia and the EU ought to convey to each other in order to reach their goals. Such an approach ought to be simultaneously realistic and complementary to the greatest possible extent. The essence of this message—cooperation based on mutual benefit—should also undergird the negotiations for a new basic agreement on a Strategic Partnership to update and replace the existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Having in mind the current backdrop—which is marked by emerging security challenges, new international developments, and the persistent effects of the global economic crisis—we uphold the view that both the EU and Russia need to undergo a paradigm shift from geopolitical competition to consolidated partnership. A strong partnership under which the two important players could genuinely cooperate would maximize the strengths of necessarily similar approaches, bring about regional stability, and spare the neighboring states from having to negotiate a difficult balancing act between East and West.

* Teodor Lucian Moga is lecturer at the Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, former researcher at the Romanian Academy of Science and visiting researcher at the George C.Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Germany. Denis Alexeev is Associate Professor of International Relations at Saratov University, Russia and Visiting Fellow at George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Germany. The views expressed here are solely those of the authors.

[1] Despite Croatia’s accession to the EU on 1 July 2013.

[2] It should be noted from the outset that the ENP was adjacent to, but distinct from the EU’s enlargement policy. This policy cannot be regarded as a pre-accession exercise, as the states concerned have not been targeted as potential EU candidates. Belonging to Europe and being associated with Europe are two distinct phases that draw a blurred line between the EU states and their neighbors. “The blurring of a boundary, however, does not then mean its elimination but that interactions across the line take on an increased intensity and complexity. This amounts, in short, to a growing interdependence between the EU and its neighbours, and requires deliberate efforts by both sides to manage effectively that interdependence.” Michael Smith and Mark Weber, “Political Dialogue and Security in the European Neighbourhood: The Virtues and Limits of ‘New Partnership Perspectives’,” European Foreign Affairs Review 13 (2008): 74.

[3] It was expected that talks on the Association Agreements (AAs) would be finalized around the time of the EU–Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius on 28–29 November 2013, which will eventually reshape their relationship with the Union.

[4] The EU members are often divided over the appropriate approach vis-à-vis the six post-Soviet states. Whereas Poland, the Baltic states, Sweden, Slovakia, and Romania are the most vocal advocates of deepening relations between Brussels and the EaP states, the other EU members are rather cautious, if not reluctant.

[5] Oana Lungescu, “EU Reaches out Toward Troubled East,” BBC News, 7 May 2009; available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8035710.stm.

[6] Štefan Füle, “Ambitions of EU and East Partners for the Vilnius Summit,” Press Releases Rapid (28 May 2013); available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-477_en.htm.

[7] European Commission, “Eastern Partnership: A Roadmap to the Autumn 2013 Summit,” May 2012, 1; available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2012_enp_pack/e_pship_roadmap_en.pdf.

[8] This significant change of priorities toward CIS countries in Russian foreign policy was first articulated by then Minister of Foreign Affairs Evgeny Primakov in 1996–98. Later on, this idea was supported and developed by Vladimir Putin, who once called the collapse of Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of twentieth century.”

[9] The mid-2000s resulted in the series of gas conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, a variety of Russian economic sanctions against some sensitive export products from Georgia and Moldova, arguments with Azerbaijan on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, etc.

[10] It is widely accepted in Russia that the “Color Revolutions” were the result of Western machinations.

[11] Sergey Rogov, New Eurasian Strategy for Russia (Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences, 1998).

[12] See “The Program of the Political Party ‘Eurasia’,” (Moscow, 2002); available at http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=76.

[13] Alexander Dugin, Project “Eurasia” (Moscow: Eksmo, 2004), 512.

[14] As many as 90 percent of decisions made by CIS structures are not ratified by the member states.

[15] That is the reason why, for example, many experts and politicians tend to refer to the creation of the CIS as a form of “civilized divorce.”

Balanced Scorecard as a Control Tool of the National Security Strategy

Aneta Nowakowska-Krystman *

Introduction

The Nash Equilibrium assumes that countries can reach the state of equilibrium only when none of them stands out in any special way. This, along with the fact that some countries consciously make other countries poorer on their own path to development—nonetheless giving them compensation exceeding the suffered loss (the Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency)—still results in more dynamic development in the benefiting countries than in the losing countries. This leads to discrepancies in the dynamics of different countries’ development, and provides one of the explanations for the existence of social unrest. However, the existence of threats resulting from differences in the level of development between countries is one of many causes that bears upon the issue of security, with regard to individual states as well as regions, and in fact the entire world.

All people intuitively understand the issue of security; moreover, most people agree on the importance of the problem. Security is the basic need of individuals, social groups – in fact, of any subject, including a nation. (For the purposes of this article, we will refer to all of these subjects as the beneficiaries of security.) It is associated with the certainty of existence, possession, functioning, and development. The problem is that security is not a state that can simply be achieved once and then sustained forever; rather, it requires constant actions to be taken in order to provide an acceptable level of security.[1] Security depends on many factors in both the external and the internal environment. The analysis of these factors requires a constant control, and any conclusions that are drawn constitute a basis for actions which themselves must also be controlled. The control also takes into account the effects of actions taken and performed. It should be noted that when discussing control one can have in mind a variety of aspects (Figure 1). The most simplified definition of control assumes that this is the process of comparing the required state and the real state.

There is a tight bond between control and planning, since control enables one to measure progress toward the achievement of specific goals and permits the optional adjustment of the initial plan. I have attempted in this essay to explain the problem of controlling the obtained result. The simplified definition of control has been applied here, however, with a broader scope that flows from the applied methodology, which is based on the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) concept. It stems from the attempt to present the possibilities of BSC application in the control of strategy implementation in the bodies of government administration following the example of the national security strategy. Thus, the thesis is based on one of the most popular tools that is used in the planning, implementation, and control of strategy: the Balanced Scorecard. It investigates the process of strategic management from the cause-effect perspective, and deals with the correlation between the chosen strategy and certain actions with indications of how to control their results through the use of carefully chosen quantitative and qualitative indicators. However, the scorecard does not force the employees and organizational bodies to strictly follow the plan set in advance. Thus it is treated as a system of communication, information exchange, and learning, and not as a system of control.[2] The thesis, however, uses the tool in order to show the control possibilities available that will help achieve the strategic goals of the national security strategy.

Figure 1: Types of Strategic Control.[3]

National Security Strategy

Strategy cannot be limited to the general view of the executive. In the classic meaning, it is treated as the method by which the set strategic goals are realized.[4] Having said that, it is worth emphasizing that strategic goals, in case of the national security strategy, must first of all focus on satisfying the needs of beneficiaries in the realm of security.

The definition of security, and as a natural consequence the strategic goals, depend to a great extent on personal opinion; moreover, the definitions provided in much of the literature are not mutually exclusive. In the traditional realist approach to the subject of security, the military is the dominant factor. This means that maintaining military security is a priority for the state, which implies the need to grow in power (military power, in particular). A liberal paradigm proves that security does not only refer to countries, but also to interior actors (individuals, social groups). In the process of security analysis, the following aspects were taken into consideration, among others: political, economic, social, cultural, ideological, and ecological. Neo-Marxist theory places particular emphasis on economic issues, with particular reference to the propertied class, since the state mainly realizes their goals. In this view, the key subjects of security are not countries but individuals with certain property in their disposal. Constructionism, on the other hand, defines security through such aspects as ideas and values.[5]

Therefore, national security emphasizes the protection of a country’s interests as a whole, as well as the interests of the society and its constituents, including individuals. Thus, security consists of: [6]

· The elimination of both external dangers and internal weaknesses (negative activities)

· The assurance of the survival, territorial integrity, functioning, and free development of a country and its people (positive activities).

The above can lead to a definition of security as a balance between external and internal, current and potential hazards, and the existence of a counteraction efficient enough to ensure the development of a country and its people. It means that the interior potential and activities allowing a nation to make use of external resources must be coordinated in order to serve the national interest, keeping in mind the fact that the latter factor results from national and international determinants.

In order to provide security for different beneficiaries, there is a need to develop a methodology of conduct. Looking at the issue as a process, it can be presented as is shown in Figure 2 below. The main focus here is on the realization of security, which is achieved on the basis of rules that have been worked out through strategic management.

Figure 2: Process Approach to Security.

The rules of security provision should be entailed in a strategy, in our case the national security strategy. Such a document can be defined as combining the art and science of development with the usage and coordination of national resources in order to achieve goals that contribute to national security.[7] Thus, strategy implementation is the process of the search for resources which, when used properly, allow a state to achieve its strategic goals. Therefore, it must focus on:[8]

· The development and adjustment of organizational structures to the chosen strategy

· Introduction and sustenance of necessary functions in the activity performed for the accepted strategy to be effectively realized

· The monitoring of particular stages of strategy implementation

· Assessment of the results.

The control of realization as well as the assessment of the results should lead to conclusions and the introduction of activities to correct the shortcomings (Figure 2).

The development and creation of strategy can be based on the balanced scorecard methodology. In such a case, the process of national security strategic management can be depicted as in Figure 3.

The project of strategy commences with setting a vision and elaborating a mission. The vision and mission are crystallized, and as a result strategic goals can be developed, subject to the national interest.[9] The goals can be presented in the form of a “Goal Tree.” Strategic goals are realized through strategic tasks. They can be ascribed to certain positions, units, or people. Last but not least, it is necessary to set measures that will allow policy makers to assess the goals’ realization (see Figure 4). Vital issues in order to realize the mission, national interests, and goals include: ways to complete the mission; ways to achieve the goals; and preferences in the choice of resources.

To sum up, the analysis of the present state of security focuses on different subjects, individuals, social groups, institutions, organizations, systems, and countries. The attitude, whose expectations should be satisfied by the country, has been changing with the passing of time. Thus, the analysis needs refer to different aspects of security, including political, economic, cultural, and military security – that is, it must consider security from the perspective of subject hazards.

Establishing a national security strategy is a process. It calls for a sequence of activities performed by a country in order to provide national security for a long period of time, taking into consideration different perspectives. It means that the state attempts to sustain and develop national power [10] to be able to counteract all hazards in certain surroundings, having at its disposal certain domestic resources as well as the necessary external support.[11]

The acceptance of the methodology of a strategic Balanced Scorecard can be helpful in the preparation of the formula of strategy creation, assuming that a strategy is a process that allows one to move from vision to tasks that result from the establishment of measurable goals. Any sector that provides services to society is expected to communicate in particular the vision, mission, goals, and measures that will allow the polity to assess its performance. The provision of such services is a premise for the existence of the state. It is worth adding that the BSC is used not only to explain and communicate a strategy – it is also a tool of strategy management. Thus, it is aimed at developing a system of strategic management.[12]

Measurement of National Security Strategic Goals

It is vital to determine the strategic goals of national security and the measures that are related to them. In our case, strategic goals are perceived as the future desired state or

Figure 3: Process of Strategic Management of National Security on the Basis
of the BSC Concept.[13]

Figure 4: Strategy in Measurables.[14]

result of the country’s activity in an isolated strategic area of national security. The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland of 2007 distinguishes eight strategic areas (see Table 2, Column 1). The general strategic goals in the scope of national security are delineated by the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997,[15] and are described in more detail by the national security strategy that is currently in force.[16] Later, strategic goals should be translated into operational goals through the methodology of management by objectives with the use of the BSC.

The Strategic Balanced Scorecard is a management technique that, according to significant research, is effective both in private businesses as well as in institutions that provide public services. Since its emergence as a management theory in the 1980s, it has become one of the most widely used management methods in the world.[17] Robert Kaplan and David Norton developed the Balanced Scorecard to satisfy the needs of an organization to effectively monitor the effects of strategy realization. It was an attempt to search for solutions to the problem of subjects’ failures in the implementation and realization of their accepted strategies. The goal of the BSC was the translation of lofty and, at the same time, general formulations used in organizational vision and mission statements into a language comprehensible to junior managers through the use of a system of cascading objectives. Thus, a strategy was translated into operational goals, tasks, action, and activities, with the use of a set of measures, so that everyone could consciously contribute to the success of the subject (see Figure 5).

Strategic goals

Units of measurement

Program of action

Performed activities

Extent of goal realization

Financial perspective

If you are not able to measure it, you cannot manage it

Perspective of beneficiaries

What can be measured can be done

Process perspective

Activity is a thing that can be calculated

Potential perspective

You cannot control unmeasureable goals

Figure 5: Idea of Measurable Goals in the Balanced Scorecard.[18]

Measures must be properly chosen and adjusted – only then they can provide information about the current situation of an organization and consequently allow managers to make proper decisions. Therefore, a multidimensional scorecard was created based on measures in four perspectives (see Table 1):

1. Financial

2. Customer-based (in our case the term “beneficiary” is applied)

3. Internal processes

4. Potential (also called the perspective of development, increase, improvement, knowledge, innovation).

Authors refer to it as a starting point that can be supplemented depending on the type of organization. (For example, institutions providing public services often analyze their organization from the point of view of social perception.) They suggest a certain sequence to the analysis. It should commence with the beneficiary perspective, since it is their needs that are to be safeguarded. The ability to satisfy needs stems from processes; therefore, the second analyzed perspective should be the perspective of internal processes. Both perspectives are characterized by potential parameters. They are key elements for the effective satisfaction of the beneficiary’s needs in the future. Financial measures indicate how the strategy of the subject contributes to its development. It should be noticed that the financial perspective in the case of the subject under consideration here—a country—is not a goal but a limitation, because expenditures must be limited to the amount foreseen in the budget.[19]

Table 1: Relationship Between Time and the Perspectives of BSC.[20]

Perspective

Characteristics

Goals

Measures

1.

Financial

Presented through financial measures, which allow the assessment of the financial effects of the implemented strategy. It determines how the realized strategy influences the economic condition of the subject, using (among other indicators) profitability, increases in provided services, cost of employees in relation to their effectiveness.

g1

g2

g3

m1

…

m7

2.

Beneficiaries

The goal is to determine a market segment in which the subject intends to provide services. We use here measures that reflect the role of the subject in serving beneficiaries (e.g. individuals, social groups, society). The level of their satisfaction is conditioned by the time of delivery, quality, cost, and functional values.

g1

g2

g3

m1

…

m7

3.

Internal processes

These are presented through indicators referring to internal processes that are valuable for the beneficiary, e.g. internal communication, technology, workers’ effectiveness.

g1

g2

g3

m1

…

m7

4.

Potential

It presents measures that are the basis for long-term development and improvement, e.g. improvement of a product or services, methods of operation, broadened functional qualities.

g1

g2

g3

m1

…

m7

In each of the perspectives there is a set of measurable, balanced, long- and short-term goals, chosen through the consideration of both financial and non-financial measures, that serve as indicators of the effects of operational activities as well as external and internal effectiveness.[21] Taking into account the range of enumerated perspectives prevents a focus on only a single measure, as all of them have been chosen from a large group of measures and each of them is equally important for enabling management to exert influence on putting strategy into action. In the selection of the measures it is helpful to follow the Pareto principle (which holds that 80 percent of the effects result from only 20 percent of the causes). Moreover, it is important that the criteria are compliant with the SMART rule (Specific, Measurable, Ambitious, Realistic, Time-bound). Additionally, they should be characterized by such traits as:

· Directness, which means an exact relationship to the stage of goal realization

· Objectivity, or an unambiguous illustration of the stage of goal realization

· Accuracy, which means that in cases when it is difficult to find a synthetic measure reflecting the stage of goal realization, it is advisable to strive to create a set of different measures.

The Balanced Scorecard includes indicators that can be divided into two groups: trailing indicators, which refer to what has already happened; and leading indicators, which look into the future. Leading indicators often have more of a qualitative than a quantitative character, giving information how things that have happened can influence the subject’s functioning in the future. It is important to notice that when more than one indicator has been assigned to one goal, it is necessary to determine whether there is a relation between them of:

· Neutrality: the improvement of one indicator does not have an influence on other indicators

· Complementarity: the improvement of one indicator has a positive influence on the other indicators

· Competitiveness: the improvement of one indicator has a negative influence on the other indicators.

When we determine what are the most useful indicators for the goals that have been set in the eight outlined areas of security of the Republic of Poland (RP)—the areas of security strategy correspond to the areas enumerated in the Poland’s National Security Strategy of 2007—we must keep in mind the accepted perspectives (see Figure 7). The perspectives differ from those given in Table 1, and are determined in a different sequence, which stems from the character of the deliberated problem. The modified structure of the Balanced Scorecard includes the following perspectives:[22]

1. Beneficiaries: this perspective mainly concerns the aspiration to satisfy the expectations of the party providing financial assets; the expectations of the parties receiving the services; and taxpayers, in order to gain their support

2. Social benefits: this includes benefits for individuals, social groups, and organizations that result from the activity of bodies providing security in certain areas

Figure 7: Perspectives of the National Security Strategy in BSC.[23]

3. Financial costs: this perspective considers the expenses of the subject as well as the social costs borne by the society and connected with the subject’s activity; the primary goal is to reduce direct costs and social costs necessary for the realization of the vision, mission, and strategy

4. Internal processes: this perspective determines how the subject should master the processes to best satisfy the needs of the beneficiaries

5. Potential: determines how the subject (employees, services) should develop itself in order to realize the intended vision, mission, and national security strategy.

Kaplan and Norton believe that, in the modified structure of the Balanced Scorecard for a subject involved in providing public services, the key role is played by the first three perspectives (i.e. beneficiaries, social benefits, financial costs). Only after the proper goals in those dimensions have been set can one move to identify internal processes and the potential of development (see Figure 8).

Kaplan and Norton emphasize the fact that most scorecards for such subjects expose operational excellence—i.e., they focus on the perspective of internal processes, while placing insufficient focus on beneficiaries. However, in cases of relatively long life-cycles of a given service, the key element of success is the perfection of processes with the needs of customers in mind.[24] It is worth adding that each of the mentioned perspectives of the Balanced Scorecard may require from four to seven measures. Thus, the number of measures will depend on the number of perspectives.[25]

Figure 8: Modified Balanced Scorecard for an Organization Providing
Public Services.[26]

To sum up, the idea of the Balanced Scorecard has changed over time. First, it was used as a tool to monitor the process of management, and later as a tool to support strategy implementation. Presently, it is an instrument integrated with a strategy, used to transform long-term strategic goals into current goals. It also enables constant control, but only if the subject’s activity and its vision, mission, and strategic goals are in alignment.

BSC offers a new model of results measurement and an alternative to traditional systems of measurement and results reporting. Nowadays, financial indicators alone are not sufficient, since along with information about financial results of past activities there is a need for information concerning activities that can have an influence on future financial results. The Balanced Scorecard determines the strategic goals of an organization that go beyond the scope of financial indicators.[27] Assuming that management is not restricted to the management of material assets, and the measurement of its performance (effectiveness and profitability) is not only based on financial indicators, it is becoming more important to gain and use intellectual resources and non-financial indicators of activity on all levels of management. However, all the measures should be balanced.[28] Thus, BSC is an attempt to balance financial and non-financial indicators. Hence, it is applied to the operation of organizations that provide public services. Moreover, it strives to balance long- and short-term goals, trailing and leading indicators, and external and internal effectiveness.

It seems that the Balanced Scorecard can be adopted to help realize a nation’s security strategy. There is only one question: if the determined perspectives are sufficient to describe the goals of national security, should they be supplemented and exchanged with others? If the answer is yes, which perspectives should replace them? And what indicators should be chosen for the selected perspectives? Those and other issues can be discussed by the representatives of science and practitioners from the security sector.

Control of Strategic Goals of National Security

The determination of strategic goals is extremely vital, but if it is not followed by implementation and control it may become immaterial. Without control, assumptions—even if they are the proper ones—will not come into force. The Balanced Scorecard may become a tool that is helpful in the effective transition of strategic assumptions onto the executors, which may exert a significant influence on a balanced development of a country.

On the grounds of a document entitled National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, eight areas of security have been identified (Table 2, column 1). In accordance with the BSC methodology, we should identify strategic goals (Table 2, columns 3,4) and operational goals (Table 2, column 6) in these eight areas, and on this basis derive balanced measures (Table 2, column 11). In order to measure a public task within the distinguished perspectives, we must keep in mind: [29]

1. Gravity (weight): To what extent are goals important in relation to the gravity of needs? (see Table 2, column 5)

2. Effectiveness: How much does a task contribute to the achievement of a specific goal? Is the cost/benefit ratio greater than one? Is the system of values applied while the task was being realized acceptable to society?

3. Functionality: Does the task have an impact on the target group of beneficiaries as far as satisfaction of their needs is concerned?

4. Stability: To what extent should we expect changes resulting from the task’s completion?

A formula presented in the form of Table 2 and Table 3 should be helpful in the implementation of the given assumptions referring to the structure of the Balanced Scorecard for the preparation, implementation, and control of the national security strategy.

In the process of the realization of goals and tasks in the scope of national security, it is necessary to take political, economic, and military actions that involve specific actors for this purpose—i.e., bodies and institutions that belong to the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, including the Parliament, the President of the Republic of Poland, the Council of Ministers, and central bodies of government administration (see Table 2, column 10).[30] While setting the scope of responsibility of the various government bodies and institutions, it is important to pay attention to the legal regulations that refer to particular areas of national security and regulate the tasks and competencies of the executive bodies.[31]

In accordance with the methodology developed for the Balanced Scorecard, the realization of a strategy is accompanied by constant monitoring of the compliance of the current activity of a subject with the long-term goals of national security and by assessing the effectiveness of the tasks carried out by various actors. This point of view should be coherent with the attitude towards management control, which determines that in public sector organizations these activities are undertaken as a rule to safeguard the goals and realization of tasks within the guidelines of binding legislation in the most effective, economical, and time-sensitive way.[32]

The assessment of management control and advisory activities supporting a minister in the achievement of his/her goals and tasks is carried out by the internal audit function. The analysis of discrepancies (compliance) in strategy realization can be done separately for each strategic area, and even for each strategic goal, according to the formula presented below (see Table 3). It is very important that the variances that are identified from the accepted values of measures achieved in the planned time (Table 3, column 6, column 7) be analyzed in great detail. For gaps referring to values and time, it is possible to set a deviation; if the variance is higher than that, it will require a correction of strategic assumptions, or a change in the way the subject responsible for the implementation of a given strategic goal functions (Table 3, column 12). Thus it is necessary to determine a critical value. If it is exceeded (the achieved value is lower), it will result in

Table 2: Balanced Scorecard for the Republic of Poland’s National Security Strategy

Strategic areas of

national security

Weight of strategic area (1-3)

Strategic goal

Description of a goal

Weight of strategic goal (1-3)

Operational goals

Strategic tasks

Rate of complexity (1-3)

Time of performance/ realization

Responsibility

Measures of strategic goals realization

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

1. External security

weight1

g1.

...

ws1

g1.1, g1.2

t1,t2,t3

...

tp1

M…

w1-w5

...

...

…

…

…

...

…

M…

w1-w5

gn.

...

wsn

g5.1, g5.2

t1,t2,t3

...

tp…

M…

w1-w5

2. Military security

weight2

g1.

...

ws1

g1.1, g1.2

t1,t2,t3

...

tp…

M…

w1-w5

...

...

…

…

…

...

…

M…

w1-w5

gn.

...

wsn

g5.1, g5.2

t1,t2,t3

...

tp…

M…

w1-w5

3. Internal security

weight3

g1.

...

ws1

g1.1, g1.2

t1,t2,t3

...

tp…

M…

w1-w5

...

...

…

…

…

...

…

M…

w1-w5

gn.

...

wsn

g5.1, c5.2

t1,t2,t3

...

tp…

M…

w1-w5

4. Civic security

weight4

g1.

...

ws1

g1.1, g1.2

t1,t2,t3

...

tp…

M…

w1-w5

...

...

…

…

…

...

…

M…

w1-w5

gn.

...

wsn

g5.1, g5.2

t1,t2,t3

...

tp…

M…

w1-w5

5. Social security

weight5

g1.

...

ws1

g1.1, g1.2

t1,t2,t3

...

tp…

M…

w1-w5

...

...

…

…

…

...

…

M…

w1-w5

gn.

...

wsn

g5.1, g5.2

t1,t2,t3

...

tp…

M…

w1-w5

6. Economic security

weight6

g1.

...

ws1

g1.1, g1.2

t1,t2,t3

...

tp…

M…

w1-w5

...

...

…

…

…

...

…

M…

w1-w5

cn.

...

wsn

g5.1, g5.2

t1,t2,t3

...

tp…

M…

w1-w5

7. Ecological security

weight7

g1.

...

ws1

g1.1, g1.2

t1,t2,t3

...

tp…

M…

w1-w5

...

...

…

…

…

...

…

M…

w1-w5

gn.

...

wsn

g5.1, g5.2

t1,t2,t3

...

tp…

M…

w1-w5

8. Info and comm security

weight8

g1.

...

ws1

g1.1, g1.2

t1,t2,t3

...

tp…

M…

w1-w5

...

...

…

…

…

...

…

M…

w1-w5

gn.

...

wsn

g5.1, g5.2

t1,t2,t3

...

tpn

M…

w1-w5

Legend:

weight1–weight8: weight of strategic areas: (1 – other essential, 2 – important, 3 – vital)

ws1 … ws5: weight of strategic goal (1 – other essential, 2 – important, 3 – vital)

Complexity of tasks: (1 – easy, 2 – complex, 3 – very complex)

Measures of the strategic goal from: w1 –beneficiary perspective; w2 –perspective of social benefits; w3 – financial perspective; w4 – internal process perspective; w5 – the perspective of potential

M – Ministry

taking definite corrective action through proper channels (Table 3, columns 10, 11). Therefore, control can exert a significant influence on the decision-making process.[33]

Table 3: Control of the Effect of the National Security Strategy according to Accepted Measures.

Goals in strategic area

Plan

Performance

Gap

Acceptable deviations

Critical values

Description of corrective action

measure value

realization time

measure value

realization time

measure value

time-bound

measure value

time-bound

measure value

time-bound

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

g1.

wp1

tp1

ww1

tw1

ww1–wp1

tw1–tp1

...

...

...

...

...

g2.

wp2

tp2

ww2

tw2

ww2–wp2

tw2–tp2

...

...

...

...

...

g3.

wp3

tp3

ww3

tw3

ww3–wp3

tw2–tp2

...

...

...

...

...

In summary, before the Balanced Scorecard was developed, the ability to control compliance with the results achieved from a prepared strategy was limited.[34] In spite of its broad scope, the Balanced Scorecard does not burden managing units with excess information, due to the selection of a limited number of indicators. Moreover, it is also very important that in the BSC it is possible to create new measures that are better suited to the situation.

The national security strategy is superior to executive strategies. Assuming that the national security strategy is superior, we should decide how detailed it is to be, especially with regard to adjusting measures to fit the set strategic goals. This is because the individuals or bodies responsible for implementing particular executive strategies will bear responsibility for the gaps in goals realization, calculated on the basis of certain measures.

Finally, there is a problem: who should realize the strategy? One can assume that primary responsibility lies with the public administration, whose analysis could be implemented by non-governmental organizations. However, there is still the question of who will assess its implementation, and on the basis of what measures. Those questions are reflected in many aspects of life, and formulating the national security strategy on the basis of the Balanced Scorecard can help to find correct answers.

Conclusions

From the point of view of the balanced development of a country in the realm of security, the preparation of a document that balances interests in different areas is extremely important. The document should provide guidelines that can be translated into specific goals and activities. A country, while preparing a strategy—including a national security strategy—must have knowledge about the state of both the external and internal environment. Research carried out correctly conditions proper strategic assumptions. The implementation of the Balanced Scorecard in the area of national security management demands the adjustment of a method to the character of a problem. Thus, we can expect that soon we should find on the market publications presenting possibilities to prepare and cascade the Balanced Scorecard, pointing at perspectives, areas, strategic goals and measures, and calculating the rate of their realization for the use by a country.

In conclusion, in the light of the knowledge provided by the subject literature, it seems that the BSC will be an effective form of planning, implementation, and control of a national security strategy. The construction of a Balanced Scorecard for the national security strategy should commence with setting the vision and mission of a country in the scope of security. Then, the effort must be made to prepare a strategy that determines priorities, such as strategic factors of security success, in order to be able to define strategic goals in each of the enumerated areas. Finally, the measures of achievement are chosen within the delineated perspectives. This may present the most significant obstacles, since we need to create such indicators that will measure the rate of realization of a national security vision, which is determined through strategic goals. Thus, the specific character of the subject imposes the necessity to prepare a unique set of indicators used in the process of BSC method application, with reference to each area, within the set perspectives.

* Aneta Nowakowska-Krystman received her Ph.D. from Warsaw University. Presently, she is an adjunct faculty member in the Institute of Management of Poland’s National Defense University. She is interested in issues of management, and in particular, strategic analysis, including the construction and implementation of strategies.

[1] Adam D. Rotfeld, Europejski system bezpieczeństwa in statu nascendi (Warsaw: PISM Publishing House, 1990), 5.

[2] Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, Strategiczna karta wyników, Jak przełożyć strategię na działanie (Warsaw: PWN, 2001), 42.

[3] Based on T. Gołębiowski, Zarządzanie strategiczne. Planowanie i kontrola (Warsaw: Difin, 2001).

[4] See Z. Drążek and B. Niemczynowicz, Zarządzanie strategiczne przedsiębiorstwem (Warsaw: PWE, 2003), 27; M. Rajzer, Strategie dywersyfikacji przedsiębiorstw (Warsaw: PWE, 2001), 13; S. Tilles, “How to Evaluate Corporate Strategy,” Harvard Business Review 41 (July-August 1963): 111-121; M. Marchesnay, Zarządzanie strategiczne. Geneza i rozwój (Warsaw: Politext, 1994), 17.

[5] J. Zając, “Bezpieczeństwo – aspekty terminologiczne,” in Współczesny wymiar bezpieczeństwa. Między teorią a praktyką, ed. J. Pawłowski (Warsaw: RWO, 2011), 18.

[6] Ibid., 19.

[7] Compare to Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2001), 358.

[8] E. Urbanowska-Sojkin, P. Banaszyk, and H. Witczak, Zarządzanie strategiczne przedsiębiorstwem (Warsaw: PWE, 2007), 11.

[9] National interest is not explicitly defined in the literature. The advocates of political realism define it as the synonym for survival, security, power, and its derivatives. The authors of a Brookings Institution study defined national interest as “a set of general and stable goals being the object of state activity.” The mentioned goals lead to the direct goals, which consequently become tasks to be realized. Others have defined national interest prospectively, defining it as a set of goals which the nation declares to realize in the international relations. In the descriptive meaning, national interest refers to goals realized in a given period of time. Lerce and Said looked at the national interest from the perspective of a final goal, long term goals, mid-term goals, direct goals and political action. Brower suggested replacing the term “national interest” with such notions as: general goals, specific goals or strategies. Schleicher went even further, and rejected the term “national interest” in favor of “basic goals” and “derived direct goals.” The representative of neorealist theory, G. Modelski, suggested departing from the notion of national interest, which assumes one type of community, and replacing it with “state interest.” State interests are “demands, wishes and desires concerning the behaviour of other countries, they are formulated to be later realized by politicians.” Thus, interests articulate goals, and goals shape interests. Therefore, they are correlated. Another neorealist, J. Frankel, remained faithful to the concept of national interest, and distinguished three levels: aspiring, operational, and polemic. See R. Zięba, “Bezpieczeństwo jako cel polityki państwa: aspekty teoretyczne,” Współczesny wymiar bezpieczeństwa. Między teorią a praktyką, ed. J. Pawłowski (Warsaw: RWO, 2011), 22–24; and G. Modelski, A Theory of Foreign Policy (London: Praeger, 1962), 70–72.

The division of interests varies in different countries. In Poland, they are referred to as: vital, important, essential, etc. National interests can be also examined in two dimensions: absolute and relative. Absolute national interest is connected with the security of citizens’ lives, survival of the nation and the country. Relative national interest stems from the quality of citizens’ lives and the functioning of the country. They are adjusted to realization through the formulation of goals that act as an incentive for the country to take action, including activities for the provision of security. See R. Zięba, “Bezpieczeństwo jako cel polityki państwa.”

[10] H. J. Morgentau, in Decyzje polityczne. Elementy teorii (Warsaw: A. Bodnar, 1985), 220.

[11] See Alfred D. Chandler, Strategy and Structure in History of the American Enterprise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 14.

[12] Kaplan and Norton, Strategiczna karta wyników, 19, 171.

[13] Based on D. A. Decenzo, Podstawy zarządzania (Warsaw: PWE, 2002), 146; K. Obłój, Strategia sukcesu firmy (Warsaw: PWE, 2000), 34; E. Urbanowska-Sojkin, P. Banaszyk, and H. Witczak, Zarządzanie strategiczne przedsiębiorstwem (Warsaw: PWE, 2007), 242; and T. Gołębiowski, Zarządzanie strategiczne. Planowanie i kontrola (Warsaw: Difin, 2001).

[14] Based on J. Czuchnowski, Balanced Scorecard (Gdańsk, 2002); available at www.zie.pg.gda.pl/zzti/dydaktyka/strategie_informatyzacji/si_bsc_wyklad.pdf.

[15] Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe Polski w XXI wieku (Warsaw: Bellona, 2006), 160, 171.

[16] Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (Warsaw, 2007), 5–6.

[17] See Strategiczna Karta Wyników, available at http://www.bmconsult.pl/karta-wynikow-rsc.html; and Wdrażanie Strategicznej Karty Wyników; available at http://karstans.pl/wdrazanie-strategicznej-karty-wynikow,67,l1.html.

[18] Based on Czuchnowski, Balanced Scorecard.

[19] A. Nowakowska-Krystman, “Strategiczna karta wyników jako narzędzie strategii bezpieczeństwa narodowego,” in Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego. Część II – praca naukowo-badawcza, ed. J. Gryz (Warsaw: NDU, 2011), 122.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Kaplan and Norton, Strategiczna karta wyników,166–67.

[22] A. Nowakowska-Krystman, “Strategiczna karta wyników jako narzędzie strategii bezpieczeństwa narodowego,” in Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego. Część II – praca naukowo-badawcza, ed. J. Gryz (Warsaw: NDU, 2011), 129.

[23] A. Nowakowska-Krystman, “Strategiczna karta wyników jako narzędzie strategii bezpieczeństwa narodowego,” 130.

[24] Kaplan and Norton, Strategiczna karta wyników, 25.

[25] Enterprises should use up to 25 strategic measures. See Kaplan and Norton, Strategiczna karta wyników, 151–53.

[26] Ibid., 131.

[27] P. Zob. P. Dżurak, and E.R. Stanoch, “Czy mamy do czynienia z ‘rewolucją’ systemu pomiaru i oceny działań przedsiębiorstwa?” Controling i Rachunkowość Zarządcza 1 (2001).

[28] Kaplan and Norton, Strategiczna karta wyników, 17, 23, 29.

[29] A. Nowakowska-Krystman, “Strategiczna karta wyników,” 134.

[30] Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (Warsaw, 2007), 21.

[31] See Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe Polski w XXI wieku (Warsaw: Bellona, 2006), 171–80.

[32] Art. 68 ust. 1 z dnia 27 sierpnia 2009 o finansach publicznych (Dz. U. Nr 157 poz. 1240).

[33] A. Nowakowska-Krystman, “Strategiczna karta wyników,” 134.

[34] See A. Nowakowska-Krystman, “Strategiczna karta wyników.”

U.S.–Russian Cooperation in Science and Technology:
A Case Study of the TOPAZ Space-Based Nuclear Reactor International Program

Richard Dabrowski *

The TOPAZ International Program (TIP) was the final name given to a series of projects to purchase for testing in the United States the TOPAZ-II, a space-based nuclear reactor of a type that had been more fully developed in the Soviet Union than in the United States. The TOPAZ-II represented the more than twenty years of the Soviet space program’s experience with nuclear thermionic power system technology, which matured during the period from 1969 to 1990. In the changing political situation associated with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it became possible for the United States to not just purchase the system, but also to employ Russian scientists, engineers, and testing facilities to verify its reliability. The TIP presented the only opportunity for Russian scientists and engineers to continue the development of thermionic space nuclear power systems for civil (non-defense) applications, as funding for these efforts in the USSR had been cut off. The TIP became the first prominent example of international cooperation between Russia and the United States in a formerly highly classified area of technology following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The TIP story began in January 1989, when Russian scientists led by Academician Dr. Nikolay N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy of the Kurchatov Institute first described the TOPAZ-II reactor at a scientific symposium in Albuquerque. Several U.S. engineers recognized the commercial potential of this technology and succeeded in obtaining funding from the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) to arrange for delivery and testing in Albuquerque of six functioning models, eventually employing up to fifty Russian scientists, engineers, and technicians at any one time and over 250 Russians total from 1991–95 to work with U.S., British, and French scientists and engineers on proving its effectiveness.

They began working together as the Thermionic System Evaluation Test (TSET), conducting thermal vacuum, electric power, and mechanical testing and evaluation of the USSR-built TOPAZ-II without nuclear fuel. The successes of TSET led to the ambitious Nuclear Electric Propulsion Space Test Program (NEPSTP), which proposed placing a TOPAZ-II reactor in space; however, NEPSTP was cancelled before this was attempted. Meanwhile, ancillary testing regimens, such as the Thermionic Fuel Element Verification Program (TFEVP), provided valuable insights into the durability of components and materials science in general as well as ways to ensure the nuclear safety of the space reactor. For complex political and technical reasons, funding for TIP was cut in 1996, forcing the return of the scientists and the functioning TOPAZ models to Russia. The lessons learned from the TIP illuminate some of the institutional and cultural challenges to U.S.–Russian cooperation in technology research that remain true today.

The Science of TOPAZ

“TOPAZ” is a Russian acronym for “Thermionic Experiment with Conversion in Active Zone.” The TOPAZ power system utilized thermionic energy conversion, a process in which a heated surface emits electrons that are collected by a cooler surface. This transfer of electrons generates electrical power. This process is completely static, meaning that there are few moving parts, making the reactor highly durable and reliable.

There were two types of TOPAZ reactors: the TOPAZ reactor developed by the Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) Scientific Industrial Association and the Institute for Physics and Power Engineering, and the TOPAZ-II reactor developed by the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, the Central Design Bureau for Machine Building, and the Research Institute of the LUCH Scientific Industrial Association. The TOPAZ-II reactor featured a single-cell construction of the Thermionic Fuel Elements (TFEs), while the TOPAZ used a multi-cell construction. The single-cell TFEs in the TOPAZ-II allowed for a non-nuclear testing process in which tungsten electric heaters could be substituted for nuclear fuel, which reduced the financial costs and improved the safety and environmental considerations of determining power system performance and reliability characteristics.

What made the thermionic fuel elements in a TOPAZ-II reactor work efficiently was the manufacture of single crystal, refractory metals, and insulating ceramics in large amounts, all capable of withstanding severe radiation and plasma environments. This materials science research and development at the Soviet Scientific Industrial Association “LUCH” in Podolsk under Dr. Yuri Nikolaev was extensive and generally more advanced during the 1970s and 1980s than comparable efforts at Western institutions. The combination of innovative design and unique materials made the TOPAZ-II reactor highly desirable for powering space-based sensor platforms.

Historical Context

Thermionics have the potential to supply more electrical power to satellites than could be provided by solar arrays and to operate in more hostile environments. However, developing thermionic energy conversion devices has proven difficult. The United States made progress in thermionic technology during the 1960s, but momentum waned in the early 1970s due to a shift in space technology funding priorities. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union invested substantial resources to establish research institutes, testing facilities, and manufacturing plants dedicated to the development of thermionic reactors.[1]

The advent of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in the early 1980s rekindled interest and investment in thermionics to power a space-based ballistic missile defense system led by the United States Air Force. In 1981, Joseph Wetch brought together research colleagues from the 1950s and 1960s-era “Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power” (SNAP) program into a new company named Space Power Incorporated (SPI). Their first contract with the U.S. Air Force was to survey technology worldwide that might advance U.S. capabilities in space nuclear power. SPI reviewed thermionic research in France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, and the Soviet Union. Of these countries, only the Soviet Union had conducted power tests of the TOPAZ thermionic reactor-converter in the early 1970s.[2]

Soon thereafter, SPI landed a NASA-managed contract to determine the feasibility and conceptual design of space nuclear power systems for ballistic missile defense. While this development work was going on during 1987–88, the Soviets launched two new thermionic reactors, which operated in space for several months. The launches prompted a meeting between the USAF and its contractors in late 1988, during which ideas were solicited for a smaller and quicker reactor system development than the Space Power 100 project. Joe Wetch jokingly suggested buying one of the new Soviet reactors that had just debuted in orbit, an idea that was taken seriously by Richard (Dick) Verga of the Department of Defense’s Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO).

Mr. Verga was dissatisfied with the technical progress being made on the Department of Energy-managed Space Power 100 program, which was the closest comparable U.S. effort at that time. The dollars and time required to complete the program were both growing. In addition, the test facility for a full nuclear test was going to cost approximately USD 100 million. The United States needed to rethink its approach to developing space nuclear power. While it was known that the Russians had twice launched a TOPAZ reactor into space, the technical differences between the TOPAZ and TOPAZ-II and who had developed them were just emerging.

A few months later, in January 1989, Verga invited the key leaders of the Russian space nuclear power program to the Albuquerque Space Nuclear Power Symposium. There, Joe Wetch first met the Russian lead, Academician Nikolay Nikolayevich Ponomarev-Stepnoy of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy (KIAE), and learned that he was interested in a partnership with the United States. Also at the symposium, Dr. Georgi M. Gryaznov, director of the Krasnaya Zvezda Scientific Industrial Association, gave a formal presentation describing the design of the new “TOPAZ” reactors, which had just completed their two initial flight demonstrations. The Krasnaya Zvezda’s multi-cell design was very similar to the General Atomics’ multi-cell fuel elements that were under development in the United States. Early the next morning, Academician Ponomarev-Stepnoy suggested to Joe Wetch that the United States purchase the Russian reactor. Wetch and his partner from SPI, Dr. Ned Britt, invited the Russian delegation to a dinner and while there came to an agreement in principle to do exactly that, provided the arrangement was approved by the Soviet Union and the United States.

Getting Started

What followed was a series of meetings and site visits in Russia to come to an agreement about this potential purchase. During their first meeting in Moscow at the KIAE, Wetch and Britt received a briefing on a heterogeneous zirconium hydride moderated thermionic reactor, with the entire thermionic fuel element (TFE) as one long single cell. It was simpler to fabricate a single-cell fuel element than a multi-cell fuel element; a single-cell TFE was more reliable and maintained reasonably good efficiency and performance over its lifetime. Wetch and Britt named it “TOPAZ-II” to distinguish it from the multi-cell TOPAZ that had been assembled at Krasnaya Zvezda Scientific Industrial Association and which had already been flown in space; later they learned that the Russians called the single-cell reactor the “Yenisey” after the Yenisey River in Siberia. The Russians also informed them that they had built several of the TOPAZ-II systems and had a plan and facility for testing the reactor without going critical and generating any radioactivity. However, they would not release more information until together they had formed a joint venture and submitted a test and financial plan to the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) to obtain approval for working with the United States.

Joe Wetch and Ned Britt formed a new company called International Scientific Products (ISP), which could legally communicate on an unclassified basis with the Russian scientists. During several more visits and tours over the course of 1989, they agreed to establish a joint venture between ISP, KIAE, and the other organizations involved in creating and testing the TOPAZ-II: the Scientific Industrial Association “LUCH” in Podolsk (represented by Deputy Director Yuri Nikolaev), the Central Design Bureau for Machine Building in St. Petersburg (represented by its Director Vladimir Nikitin), and the Keldysh Institute of Rocket Research in Moscow (represented by its Director Academician Anatoli Koreteev). The joint venture was named “International Nuclear Energy Research and Technology”—or INERTEK—with Academician Ponomarev-Stepnoy as the president and Joe Wetch as his first deputy. Each company/institute signed the protocol, and it was submitted to the Ministry of Atomic Energy, finally becoming official in December 1990.

Upon returning to the United States after each trip, Wetch and Britt informed Dick Verga of their progress. Verga kept his management briefed, and the SDIO agreed to negotiate for the purchase or lease of the Topaz-II, but performance verification tests had to be done in the United States. It was mostly Verga who finally persuaded Minatom that the full reactor tests had to be conducted in the United States with a joint Russian-U.S. technical team if the United States were to join in flight testing and future commercial applications. Minatom agreed after including a provision that the TOPAZ-II reactors had to be returned after the tests and that they should not be used for military purposes. Verga also convinced the United Kingdom and France to assign researchers to the project, mostly as a cost-savings measure, though their participation did make the TOPAZ project truly international. The United States Air Force contracted with ISP, who in turn contracted with INERTEK for the purchase, packaging, transport, reassembly, installation, testing, and final repackaging and return of the TOPAZ-II reactors together with vacuum and other test equipment. This initial international cooperative project was called the Thermionic System Evaluation Test (TSET).

TOPAZ-II Delivery to the U.S.

To satisfy both the TSET and NEPSTP projects, there were two purchases and shipments to Albuquerque of TOPAZ reactors and associated technology. The first of the shipments was for TSET, and involved the purchase of two TOPAZ-II reactors and all associated test equipment as well as the required Russian technical support to reassemble everything and conduct testing. The second shipment in 1994 of four (unfueled) reactors was for NEPSTP, two of which were capable of being space flight qualified. One of these flight capable units was expected to be launched into orbit as the power source for a prototype spacecraft was being designed by the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.

First Shipment. In late April 1992, a team from the United States (led by Army Major Fred Tarantino of SDIO) traveled to Russia to complete the TOPAZ-II purchase, take delivery of the hardware, prepare the hardware for shipment, and ensure delivery to the United States. United States Air Force Major Dan Mulder was in charge of the logistics—seeing that all the equipment, some eighty-five large crates, and two TOPAZ reactors in shipping containers—were hauled by truck to the Polkova I airport. There were three issues: identifying crates that contained hazardous material so they could be properly marked; ensuring that a crane was available to lift crates onto the pallets that fit into the American military cargo planes; and securing a large enough area at the airport to store the crates until the cargo planes arrived. Major Mulder was able to get all of the crates moved to the airport over the next two days and had a crane waiting in place to load the aircraft pallets. The rest of the operation was far from simple.

A United States Air Force Airlift Control Element Team (ALCE Team) had been arranged to ensure that the cargo was properly prepared for transport. On 26 April 1992, a C-141 and a C-130 brought in the ALCE Team and all their loading equipment. All seemed to go well, until it came to loading the extremely delicate tungsten heaters. Although these units were packed in special cases, there was great concern about vibration and jostling during flight. They could not find any packing material that would effectively cushion the cases containing the heaters. Finally, Britt had the Russian technicians go to furniture stores in St. Petersburg and buy foam sheets. The heater cases were nestled between stacks of foam sheets and strapped down on top of the crates – an approach that must have worked, because the heaters arrived intact.

Unfortunately, a significant difficulty then arose with the issue of the export license for all the TOPAZ equipment. The official in charge of the customs office at the St. Petersburg airport would not recognize the existing export license, as it had been approved by the Soviet Union, which had ceased to exist, and had been supplanted by Russian Federation. Without an export license, Major Tarantino could not provide the U.S. Air Force with a firm date and time for pickup. In addition, since May Day celebrations were approaching, there was no one available in Latvia or Estonia to arrange country overflight clearance for the aircraft. They had the equipment at the airport, but an invalid export license and no airlift.

The sale/export still needed approval from the customs office. Late in the evening of 27 April 1992, Academician Ponomarev-Stepnoy and the Director of INTERTEK, Benjamin Usov, were able to arrange a meeting in Moscow with the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, Alexander Shokhin, and reported to him about the critical situation involving the shipment. Shokhin consulted with the Minister of Foreign Economic Relations, Sergei Glazev, and a decision was made to immediately issue a one-time export license. The following morning, a new export license was signed and clearance for shipment was approved for 1 May. A charter flight was quickly arranged to get the export license to St. Petersburg.

However, it took another five days to get the required overflight clearance for Latvia and Estonia because of the approaching weekend, two days of Baltic holidays, and no established after-hours diplomatic procedures for obtaining overflight clearance. They still needed two C-5 aircraft to pick up the loaded pallets; while these planes were on the way to Russia, one had broken down in England. The other C-5 landed in St. Petersburg on 6 May 1992. The two TOPAZ reactors and as much equipment as possible were loaded on this C-5 and it departed the same day. The second C-5 arrived on 8 May and was loaded with the remaining equipment and departed. Unfortunately, the second C-5 experienced another maintenance problem during a layover in England. After another two days of delay the second C-5 finally arrived at Kirtland AFB in New Mexico on 12 May, five days after the arrival of the first aircraft.

Second Shipment. For the second shipment in 1994, it was decided to charter a commercial transport aircraft rather than use military planes. ISP arranged a charter flight with Russian Volga Dnepr Airlines for an Antonov-124. The An-124 was the world’s largest cargo aircraft, and this plane was able to haul all four of the TOPAZ reactors in their shipping containers. There were a few administrative problems, but none so difficult as had occurred with the first shipment.

Testing in Albuquerque

In April 1990, Dr. Mike Schuller and Major Dan Mulder met with Dick Verga of SDIO while attending the Space Power Workshop at the United States Air Force Space Division. Verga introduced them to the possible purchase of a Russian TOPAZ reactor. Would the Air Force Weapons Lab be interested in testing it for SDIO? Both said they would be very interested in testing the reactor if SDIO purchased it. They didn’t have a test team, a building to test in, or for that matter anyone who had managed a large hardware project. Later they found Frank Thome of Sandia National Laboratories, who did have experience managing large hardware programs, and in December 1990 he was hired to manage the Thermionic System Evaluation Test (TSET).

The U.S. Air Force Phillips Laboratory felt it would be advantageous both technically and politically to include Los Alamos, Sandia, and the University of New Mexico in the program. They formed the New Mexico Strategic Alliance for Thermionic Space Nuclear Power. This alliance ensured political support from U.S. Senator Pete Domenici (a Republican from New Mexico), access to additional government scientists from Sandia and Los Alamos during the course of the program, technicians with the required skills to conduct system level tests in vacuum, and over USD 500,000 worth of excess equipment from the salvage yards of Sandia and Los Alamos.

The decision was made to place TSET at the University of New Mexico (UNM) for its availability and large test space in an unclassified environment. The transparency of the location was important to the Russians, as it allowed them to highlight the peaceful nature of the research program. In addition, having UNM as sponsor gave management considerable organizational flexibility. Contract manager Tim Stepetic reported, “The University was very cooperative and accommodating. … UNM allowed me to open checking accounts to provide responsive payments for the support requirements of the INTERTEK and LUCH contracts – I don’t think they’ve ever permitted such checkbook arrangements either before or since….” Approximately USD 400,000 to cover all Russian per diem, local travel, and other associated expenses were run through these checking accounts. When this unorthodox situation came to the attention of others through a routine audit, it provoked a General Accounting Office (GAO) investigation into this and other management practices, though no significant irregularities were found.[3]

Test Facility

In April 1991, the USAF signed a contract to lease a building belonging to the New Mexico Engineering Research Institute (NMERI), part of the University of New Mexico. However, an empty building was a long way from a finished test facility and trained people. Frank Thome and his team put together modification specifications for the building, reviewed drawings, set up Russian language training, vacuum and liquid metal training courses, developed a program plan, and worked long hours to prepare the facility. TSET training manager Scott Wold supervised the required structural changes and equipment installation. By the time the Russian TOPAZ team arrived in April 1992 to provide training on the TOPAZ-II reactor and demonstrate how to conduct a system level test, they had the building ready.

TSET

The TOPAZ-II system, ground support equipment, and the “Baikal” thermal vacuum test stand were delivered in May 1992, together with previously documented results from manufacturing records, assembly inspection reports, system acceptance tests, modification records, repair logs, and high temperature performance evaluations. Russian and U.S. specialists worked side-by-side in the TSET laboratory to install, calibrate, and accept the technology as well as to demonstrate and verify the previous Soviet test results. The TSET experience established the baseline for development and demonstration of future thermionic space nuclear power systems. In addition, TSET successfully showed how former Cold War adversaries could work together effectively and economically; that military technology could be adapted to peaceful, non-military applications; and that Russian specialists who were previously employed for military purposes could successfully cooperate with foreign specialists.

NEPSTP

Once the safety and reliability of the TOPAZ-II system had been demonstrated on the ground, the next step was to fly a prototype in space. The Nuclear Electric Propulsion Space Test Program (NEPSTP) was an international space mission sponsored by the SDIO/Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) as a testbed for the development of nuclear electric propulsion technologies. The mission proposed using the TOPAZ-II thermionic nuclear reactor as the power source and a variety of advanced experimental electric thrusters from international sources for propulsion. A shock-and-vibration test was done on a complete satellite that simulated launch conditions and it passed with few mechanical or electrical problems. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory designed a prototype spacecraft and testing program, although the spacecraft was never developed beyond the design phase, as BMDO cancelled NEPSTP in 1993.[4]

While NEPSTP was ultimately cancelled due to budget and anti-nuclear political pressures, the testing program in Albuquerque showed that safety concerns and cost-effectiveness could be balanced. Retired Sandia National Laboratories scientist Albert Marshall commented, “We were able to convince critics and openly hostile groups that NEPSTP could be carried out safely. I believe that the success of our approach will set a valuable standard for all future space reactor missions.” Evidence for that included the (since-cancelled) 2003 “Project Prometheus,” a NASA-sponsored effort to develop nuclear-powered propulsion for long-duration space missions, which included non-nuclear pre-launch testing similar to what had been learned from Russia during TSET.

Ancillary Programs

A major adjunct to TSET was the Thermionic Fuel Element Verification (TFEV) program. At the same time as negotiations were proceeding for the TOPAZ purchase, Dick Verga became interested in purchasing a TFE test rig (then located in Podolsk), as it might speed the development of thermionic fuel elements in the United States. Based on the past accomplishments of the Department of Energy thermionic fuel element program, the life of thermionic reactors was projected to be about one year. The TFEV program validated the potential of thermionic reactor systems to meet mission life requirements ranging from three to seven years, and there were indications that longer life might be possible. This was not the only side project: The unprecedented access to thermionic technology, testing documentation, testing facilities and equipment, and most importantly direct contact with former Soviet scientists and engineers, allowed for joint and international developments in materials science.

These other efforts included researchers from the United Kingdom and France and were conducted in Albuquerque alongside TSET and TFEV, leading to breakthroughs useful in severe radiation and plasma environments. British scientist Paul Agnew recalled, “I started to design a test facility to evaluate the influence of long-term exposure to cesium vapor on the surface electrical properties of various insulating ceramics. We began construction of the experimental facility in a corner of the bay housing the TFE rig. I was joined by Judith Ing (also from the U.K.). … Our materials studies were very much a ‘side show of the big show,’ but everyone made us feel part of the team and that our work was important.” Judith Ing concurred, “It was an extremely exciting and effective working environment which achieved a huge amount in a short period of time.” This contribution to scientific advancement is suggested by the bibliography of the Soviet/ Russian history of space nuclear power, which lists sixty-two journal articles and scientific conference presentations worldwide related to all aspects of thermionics development.[5]

Lessons Learned

All of the key Russian and U.S. personnel involved contributed to a 1995 report titled TOPAZ International Program: Lessons Learned in Technology Cooperation with Russia.[6] This report divided the lessons learned into five categories:

1. U.S./Russian Perspective

2. U.S. Federal Agencies and Legislative Environment

3. Russian Institutional Partnership

4. Business and Management Differences

5. Human Relations Issues.

The lessons are summarized below and updated with insights gathered from more recent interviews, emails, and published sources.

U.S./Russian Perspective

Neither the United States nor Russia can assume technological superiority in all areas, yet political considerations can hamper the willingness to cooperate if the exchange is seen as one-sided. The TOPAZ program showed the value of a technology partnership that gave the Russians an active role in the future of the technology they developed. As the report states, “A well thought-out partnership allows both Americans and Russians an opportunity to learn about each other’s capabilities and to develop a trusting relationship.” [7] The TOPAZ International Program included three such opportunities:

· Joint Testing and Evaluation. Russian specialists participated in the TSET system tests and safety assessments in Albuquerque, which included the training of the U.S. facility operators to take over their roles.

· Joint Technology Demonstration. Russians worked with U.S. engineers to design reactor safety modifications for the NEPSTP proposed launch of a fueled nuclear reactor. In addition, nuclear criticality tests and post-irradiation examination of reactor components were conducted at Russian test facilities.

· Joint Development. U.S. firms teamed with Russian institutes to start advanced reactor development that was to follow NEPSTP.

From the U.S. perspective, the work done in Russia had the potential to reduce the cost and time required to develop an equivalent U.S. technology base. Another consideration is that joint thermionic technology efforts kept highly skilled Russian nuclear experts employed in Russia. Funding for their institutes also allowed Russian scientists and engineers to adopt new skills that were useful in an open-market economy so that they were better able to market products that they had created. Using funds received from the United States under these contracts, the Russian institutes were able to convert some of their defense activities into peaceful civilian ones and develop a number of new technologies such as ozone-friendly refrigerants, ceramic/metal x-ray tubes for medicine, ultra-strong mono-crystalline alloys, and other products.

U.S. Federal Agencies and Legislative Environment

The United States has enacted significant legislation and regulations restricting sales of technical components and technology to and from foreign countries. Some of these restrictions may be obsolete in an evolving political environment, yet they still exist. For international science and technology cooperation to succeed, persistence is required to work through these bureaucratic obstacles. In the early days following the collapse of the Soviet Union, advocates of Russian-U.S. scientific cooperation had to deal with Cold War-era regulations and also a residual almost paranoid mindset among some officials, both in Russia and in the United States. This was particularly evident in the drama surrounding a non-functional full-scale TOPAZ exhibit.

Before the TOPAZ reactors were purchased, a display TOPAZ unit was shown as an exhibit at the Eighth Symposium on Space Nuclear Power held in Albuquerque, New Mexico in January 1991. Once in the United States, the display unit became trapped in tangle of bureaucratic red tape that prevented it from being returned to Russia. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) determined that it was illegal to export a “nuclear utilization facility,” as they had classified the display reactor. Even though it was a non-functioning exhibit, the NRC claimed it might be possible to modify and convert it into a functioning unit, and therefore it could not be returned to Russia. It took five months of wrangling and pressure from both sides, including the intervention of New Mexico Senator Pete Domenici, to define the TOPAZ exhibit as not a “nuclear utilization facility” so it could be sent home.[8]

In view of the problems with the TOPAZ display unit and other issues related to a license needed to import a nuclear system, it was decided to bring the unfueled reactors into the United States as property of the U.S. government. This created a complication, because the reactors were to be purchased from INERTEK (a Russian joint venture company) by International Scientific Products (a private U.S. corporation). It was intended that ISP would then resell the reactors to the U.S. government. A solution was found: after the first reactors and all of the crates with the test equipment had been loaded onto a C-5 cargo plane, a signing ceremony was held inside before it took off. As the vice president of ISP, Ned Britt signed the contract to purchase the hardware from INERTEK and immediately signed another set of papers to resell the same items to the U.S. government. In this way, by the time the planes landed in Albuquerque, all of the cargo was already government property and exempt from most of the challenges to importing nuclear hardware.

Such bureaucratic obstacles existed on multiple levels. As an example, TSET training manager Scott Wold described that on more than one occasion the TOPAZ team would be notified by some outside organization that after careful consideration, “they had concluded that an experiment we proposed to do wouldn’t be possible and that we should just stop all work on the project as it was obviously a waste of time. Our typical response would be to provide them with the results of the experiment we had just wrapped up.” Wold credited Thome and Mulder for the success of the TOPAZ program, as they provided the “top cover” needed to be able to focus on the tasks at hand without getting involved in the politics associated with the program.

Russian Institutional Partnership

In order to strengthen the partnership, the U.S. and Russian team members needed to become acquainted with each other. The primary lesson learned was that building a close relationship between Russians and Americans could allow for communication exchanges that would otherwise not take place. This was not an issue of language barriers, as those working together on the TOPAZ program were able to get by using a few key words in each other’s language and numerous drawings and sketches, supplemented when necessary by staff technical interpreters. Rather this was an issue of willingness to take the extra steps necessary to resolve a difficult situation such as that which occurred with the export license for the initial TOPAZ shipment. This willingness resulted from the friendships that were formed during site visits, attendance at academic and technical exchanges, and especially social interactions.

While the Russian and U.S. participants have many fond memories of time spent together, two occasions stood out: a visit to the Trinity Test Site at White Sands, New Mexico, and riding in a hot air balloon. There were fourteen Russian engineers and technicians who arrived on 3 April 1992 to begin a joint Russian–U.S. training program to acquaint everyone with the TOPAZ equipment and testing protocols. The arrival date was chosen because 4 April was one of only two days per year that the Trinity Test Site (where the first atomic bomb exploded) was open to the public. This was seen as a unique opportunity for a cultural excursion that would particularly appeal to those working in nuclear science. Despite getting only three hours of sleep after a transatlantic flight, the Russians were awoken at 5 AM to be loaded into vans together with their American hosts and families for the trip. Georgiy Kompaniets recalled, “It was like for a picnic! And at the entrance to the site there were souvenir vendors selling t-shirts with bombs and rocks supposedly from the epicenter of the blast….” The Russians quickly became the center of attention for the media and were interviewed for television. They were able to tour the McDonald ranch house, which was where the first atomic bomb was assembled and from where it was detonated. It was all “simply a wonder.”

Another cultural excursion that made an indelible impression was the chance to ride in a hot air balloon. A hot air balloon club based in Albuquerque offered free rides to the Russian guests, who had become minor local celebrities – an offer that was eagerly accepted, as no member of the group had ever had such an opportunity. Boris Steppenov recalled, “The greatest difficulty, it seemed, was landing. And it was absolutely forbidden to touch down on reservations belonging to Native Americans, as this would be seen as an attack on their land and an affront to their ancestors.” Yet winds cannot be controlled, and this is exactly what happened to the balloon in which he was riding; the tribal police were notified, and they came and gave the balloon pilot a ticket for the transgression. Steppenov was then able to rejoin the other first-time riders in a ceremony to celebrate the occasion. “There were speeches, there were oaths, there was baptism with champagne and many other rituals. A memory for an entire life!”

Business and Management Differences

The arrival of the TOPAZ scientists and technicians was likely a much greater culture shock for the Russians than for the Americans. As Valery Sinkevych, lead engineer, noted: “It was incredible that several hundred Russians, who had worked their entire adult life under the strictest security, could suddenly plunge into another world altogether.” This was evident on the first work day in Albuquerque, when Ned Britt explained to Sinkevych that he should start by opening boxes, arranging equipment, etc. Sinkevych replied that before he could do that, as was customary he needed authorization from his director. Britt immediately placed a call to Russia to Central Design Bureau of Heavy Machine Building Director Vladimir Nikitin and asked that Sinkevych as INTERTEK representative in Albuquerque be delegated the responsibility for such decisions. Nikitin agreed and from then forward there was a reasonable allocation of powers between those in Russia and those in the U.S., which contributed to a quick resolution of technical issues.

Sinkevych worked with Glen Schmidt and Scott Wold on the daily tasks of setting up the equipment and running the tests. Schmidt held a standup meeting each morning before testing and assembly began to make sure all personnel were present, knew their assignments for the day, and had the resources they needed for that day. During the day, Sinkevych and Schmidt would walk around the work areas and observe, inquire, and/or assist each person, as needed. At the end of the day, a standup meeting was held to review progress, problems, and identify actions to be taken during the night or next day. The Russian engineers and technicians called Schmidt “the walking stick,” and Schmidt told them that was his management style: “Management by Walking Around.”

The estimated time required for installation and test was more than nine months from start to completion of the TOPAZ-II test systems and successful demonstration of an operational thermal cycle of the power system. The actual elapsed time was six and a half months from start to completion of the acceptance test. Sinkevych explained, “The trust that was formed between the Russian and the American side allowed us in an unusually short time to complete the assembly of the complex and demonstrate its capabilities.” The shortened time from start to successful completion of the thermal-vacuum test saved a lot of money for the fixed price ISP/SPI effort and gained future programmatic respect.

Because time and money were being saved by the joint efforts of Russians and Americans, Schmidt recommended to Wetch and Britt that a bonus should be paid to each Russian to show appreciation for their unusual accomplishment. Bonuses were paid in relationship to their technical assignment, duration of performance, and quality of workmanship. This was the first time that any of the Russians had been paid a bonus. About a month after the first bonuses, several Russians asked if they would/could get another bonus if even more time was saved. Schmidt’s answer to them was a qualified “perhaps.” They did save more time, and they were given another, smaller bonus. In this and a myriad of other ways, the Russian personnel became acquainted with Western management practices, which benefited them personally and contributed to the success of the program.

Human Relations Issues

TSET training manager Scott Wold recorded many of the “culture shock” moments that reflected what it meant for Russians to work with Americans during this time and place. He particularly remembered:

· Taking the Russian engineers and technicians on tours of the local electrical, valve and fitting, hardware, and fastener supply companies and explaining that Americans can get almost anything we may need at any time.

· Having the Russian engineers sitting in our training courses, only to find out that even though they worked on the project for years, they only knew what their particular component did – only a few had knowledge of how the entire system operated.

· One of the engineers was returning to Russia as his son was having an operation to remove a brain tumor, and the surgeon asked the engineer to bring back some Tylenol if possible. It was amazing that (at that time) Russia was a country capable of performing brain surgery but incapable of providing basic medicines.

The U.S. support staff in Albuquerque worked to reduce Russian culture shock and adapt more readily to living in the United States. They did this by having the Russians live in the same housing complex so that they could support each other; by allowing personal phone calls back to Russia (with limits); by providing the senior official with amenities commensurate with his position; by recognizing that Russians were generally frugal and would want to save their per diem however possible; and generally by identifying and effectively addressing human relations issues as they surfaced.

Value to Both the U.S. and Russia

On 27 March 1992, President George W. H. Bush approved the TOPAZ purchase at a meeting with Secretary of State James Baker and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, as the first Russian-U.S. government-to-government cooperative program in science and technology since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.[9] As Al Marshall commented, “An enlightened foreign policy opened the door to the TOPAZ program, and the TOPAZ program encouraged good relations between the United States and Russia.” TOPAZ preceded the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program (which provided assistance for dismantling or safely storing the weapons of the Soviet nuclear arsenal), although it was in its spirit, in that the TOPAZ program provided continued employment for certain former Soviet nuclear scientists, engineers, and technicians who might otherwise have been tempted by job offers from rogue states. What is important to remember is that the TOPAZ purchase was not intended as an assistance program; rather it allowed the United States to obtain advanced space nuclear power technology at a fraction of the cost of internal development. As Frank Thome commented, “The Russian TOPAZ design was unique to anything America had ever devised. This was done by using non-nuclear electrical heat for testing and qualification on Earth. The only thing we could say was, ‘Why hadn’t we Americans thought of this?’” It is unlikely the United States will ever design a space reactor again without incorporating the Russian non-nuclear pre-launch testing design features that add safety and reduce risk.

The initial TOPAZ purchase was the model for a portion of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction known as the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC). The ISTC helped the newly independent Soviet republics by sponsoring research and development to utilize weapons technology for commercial purposes. However, after twenty years the Nunn-Lugar program and the ISTC were renegotiated following Russian complaints that the original agreements implied it was a recipient of aid rather than an equal partner. Russian analysts Vladimir Orlov and Alexander Cheban commented that, among other complaints, Nunn-Lugar had given the United States the opportunity to intrusively visit secret facilities, a humiliating practice that had to be allowed as the U.S. was financing improvements to their security.[10]

The United States and a skeptical Russia have been discussing for many years how they might benefit from cooperation in scientific research and development.[11] From the year 2013 forward, only limited cooperation will continue in those areas that are deemed to be in the national interests of both Russia and the United States. The New York Times reported that the United States will continue to help Russia secure nuclear and radiological material, but will no longer participate in destroying old missiles, securing the transportation of nuclear warheads, or eliminating chemical weapons. Russia has promised to continue such activities, but on its own, and as a result some U.S. contractors will leave Russia.[12]

Many of the Russian scientists, engineers, and technicians involved with the TOPAZ program continue to pursue the development of space nuclear power together with the leading Russian scientific research institutes independently of the United States.[13] They have a goal of building a TOPAZ-II type power module by 2018 for use in propulsion in space for missions to the Moon and Mars; as a power source for commercial applications of manufacturing in zero-gravity; and as a means of dealing with the danger of asteroids.[14] Academician Ponomarev-Stepnoy noted, “An effective way of [developing] space nuclear power should be the organization of international programs, allowing the use of the highest achievements of the participating countries.” If such cooperation can be seen as a true partnership benefiting all the countries involved, there is cause for optimism that the warm friendships fostered by the TOPAZ program could continue in this and other fields of scientific cooperation.

In the twilight of the Cold War, the TOPAZ International Program represented a prominent example of international cooperation in the peaceful application of thermionic space nuclear technologies that were highly classified in the past. The TIP was highly cost-effective: with NEPSTP it came close to space flight testing of the TOPAZ-II system, though this did not happen due to the anti-nuclear stand of the Clinton Administration. The program served as a model for U.S.-Russian cooperation in other domains, and led to many discoveries and product developments involving materials science. While the TOPAZ-II has never been flown in space, it has flown to the United States and returned back to Russia, thus paving the way to international science and technology cooperation.

Appendix: Photos of the TOPAZ International Program

Figure 1: Soviet scientists led by Krasnaya Zvezda Director Georgiy Gryaznov (front center)
with the TOPAZ-II display reactor at the New Mexico Space Nuclear Power
Symposium, Albuquerque Convention Center, New Mexico, January 1991.

Figure 2: TOPAZ-II reactor in shipping container being loaded on a United States Air Force
C-5 in St. Petersburg, Russia, April 1992.

Figure 3: Russian technicians at the New Mexico Engineering Research Institute,

University of New Mexico in Albuquerque, July 1992.

Figure 4: Academician N. N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy and Russian managers of the TOPAZ-II

project with author, Kurchatov Institute, Moscow, Russia, April 2013.

* Richard Dabrowski is a Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Air Force. He holds a doctorate in instructional systems technology from Indiana University, and is currently a faculty member at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. The publication of the information contained herein does not constitute endorsement by the United States Department of Defense, or any other U.S. government agency, of any activity of the publishing organization, or other organizations referenced or published by them, or the information, products or services they provide. The United States Department of Defense does not exercise any editorial control over the information provided by these entities. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

[1] The history of the Soviet space nuclear energy program is detailed in N. E. Kucharkin, N. N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, and V. A. Usov, Космическая ядерная энергетика (ядерные реакторы с термоэлектрическим и термоэмиссионным преобразованием – «Ромашка» и «Енисей») [Space Nuclear Power (Nuclear reactors with thermo-electric and thermionic conversion – “Romashka” and “Yenisey”), 2nd ed.] (Moscow: IzdAt, 2012), 12–136.

[2] The history of the U.S. space nuclear energy program is detailed in National Research Council Staff, Thermionics Quo Vadis? An Assessment of the DTRA’s Advanced Thermionics Research and Development Program (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2001), 26–32.

[3] Rachel Smolkin, “TOPAZ Nuclear Program Called Failure; GAO Report Claims Mismanagement in Tech-Transfer Effort,” Rocky Mountain News (21 December 1997).

[4] John Fleck, “TOPAZ Research Funds at Risk,” Albuquerque Journal (11 January 1996).

[5] Kucharkin, et al., Космическая ядерная энергетика [Space Nuclear Power], 203–11.

[6] Booz, Allen & Hamilton, TOPAZ International Program: Lessons Learned in Technology Cooperation with Russia (Springfield, VA: Stephenson Printing, 1995), 55–74.

[7] Ibid., 54.

[8] R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Won’t Let Soviets Take Reactor Back Home; Conference Exhibit Trapped in Legal Limbo,” Washington Post (20 April 1991).

[9] William J. Broad, “White House Drops Barrier to Buying Soviet Technology,” New York Times (28 March 1992).

[10] Vladimir Orlov and Alexander Cheban, “Life after Death: Will the Nunn-Lugar Program Give Way to New Partnership?” Russia in Global Affairs (April/June 2013); available at http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Life-After-Death-16057.

[11] Anton Khlopkov, “What Will a Nuclear Agreement with the United States Bring Russia?” Security Index 13:2 (2007): 69–86.

[12] Jackie Calmes, “Obama Asks Russia to Join in Reducing Nuclear Arms,” New York Times (19 June 2013); available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/20/world/europe/obama-asks-russia-to-join-in-reducing-nuclear-arms.html.

[13] Valery Yarygin, “Apophis Can Change Priorities: TOPAZ, Enisey and Space Nuclear Power Systems (NPS) of the Second Generation,” Atominfo.ru (10 December 2007); available at http://www.atominfo.ru/en/news/e0225.htm.

[14] Kucharkin, et al., Космическая ядерная энергетика [Space Nuclear Power], 199–201.