



Introduction

Deterring Russia: Conceptual Foundations for Integrated Deterrence

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Abstract: This article discusses the foundations of the concept of deterrence, outlines the preconditions for successful deterrence strategies, and offers food for thought on developing strategies to deter Russia. It also suggests how to define the relationship between deterrence, defense, preparedness, and resilience. Successful deterrence is defined as a communication process that is sufficient and effective, influencing the perception of a potential attacker – a process that must be institutionalized.

Keywords: Integrated deterrence, defense, resilience, NATO, Europe, EU, regional security.

Setting the Scene

Since Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, deterrence and defense have been at the top of NATO's agenda.¹ Allies have been reflecting on the challenges associated with establishing an effective deterrent posture that addresses nuclear, conventional, space-based, and hybrid threats in the Euro-Atlantic region. Artificial intelligence and other new technologies, such as autonomous weapon systems, add to the complexity of deterrence. While it is still uncertain what the specific consequences of these new technological developments will be, it is evident that Russia currently poses the most "significant and direct threat to Allies' security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area."²

¹ "Deterrence and Defence," NATO, December 10, 2025, accessed January 13, 2026, www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/deterrence-and-defence.

² "NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid, 29 June 2022," 4, www.nato.int/content/dam/nato/web

To respond to Russia's actions, prevent an armed attack on members of the Alliance, counter Russia's portfolio of influence instruments, and defend NATO territory, NATO members have agreed to strengthen their capabilities in deterrence, defense, and resilience. Here, NATO focuses on deterrence and defense and conceptualizes resilience as a subfunction and an integral part of these two components.³ The dyad of deterrence and defense is further developed in NATO's 2020 "Concept for Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA)" and subsequent initiatives.⁴ At first glance, the Alliance's efforts to strengthen its defense capabilities and adapt strategic and regional plans to the emerging threat seem well developed. On the other hand, NATO's conceptualization of deterrence focuses mainly on the threat of a conventional, nuclear, or cyberattack, or a combination of these elements. Considering the Russian strategic approach and portfolio of "active measures" within the framework of "reflexive control," often referred to as "hybrid threats" or "irregular warfare" in Western debates, the Western concept of deterrence seems to be lagging behind at least some developments in the security policy landscape.⁵

As described above, deterrence, as a traditional security policy concept, is closely associated with NATO. However, in coping with nontraditional security challenges such as "hybrid threats," other organizations may also play an important role. For example, the European Union provides legal frameworks for close cooperation among its member states and has growing experience in countering threats such as cyberattacks, foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), and terrorism.⁶

Since each organization interprets concepts differently based on its focus and needs, it is important to achieve conceptual clarity about the relationship between deterrence and resilience. Although this is not within the scope of this special edition of *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, it is still important to high-

ready/documents/publications-and-reports/strategic-concepts/2022/290622-strategic-concept.pdf.

³ NATO, "Deterrence and Defence."

⁴ NATO, "Deterrence and Defence." A more detailed overview of NATO's DDA can be found in Stephen R. Covington, "NATO's Concept for Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA)," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, August 2, 2023, www.belfercenter.org/publication/natos-concept-deterrence-and-defence-euro-atlantic-area-dda.

⁵ For the Russian strategic approach, see, for example, Dmitry Adamsky, *The Russian Way of Deterrence: Strategic Culture, Coercion, and War* (Stanford University Press, 2024), 57ff.

⁶ For a quick overview, see "Hybrid Threats," European Council, accessed January 23, 2026, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/hybrid-threats/>. For the EU's framework for countering terrorism, see "The EU's Response to Terrorism," European Council, accessed January 23, 2026, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/>. In this edition of *Connections*, Raitis Tiliks provides an in-depth case study of the EU's Integrated Border Management for countering illegal migration and discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the EU approach.

light a few characteristics. As illustrated below, deterrence is a prevention or avoidance strategy. It prevents actions by influencing the perceptions of a potential aggressor. Resilience, by contrast, can be described as an active coping strategy of an entity after an event has occurred. Thus, the idea of resilience includes the idea of active change management, whereas the aim of deterrence is to maintain the status quo.⁷ If NATO conceptualizes resilience as the “first line of deterrence and defence,”⁸ it perceives resilience in the context of its area of responsibility (deterrence and defense) and considers only a small part of the defense-related elements of resilience, which mostly lie in the field of (civil) preparedness.⁹

The figure below presents an attempt to organize the elements that enable an entity or system to persist and cope with shocks, adapt to changing circumstances, and transform to tackle emerging challenges (i.e., resilience).¹⁰ It also shows a possible perspective on the relationship among preparedness, deterrence, defense, and resilience.

As mentioned, this special edition of *Connections* is dedicated to the concept of deterrence. It compiles articles inspired by intensive discussions during an immersive three-week workshop at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, which brought together selected Marshall Center alumni in February 2025. The main objectives of this event were to conduct a deep dive into the conceptual basis of deterrence as a “complex and nuanced enterprise” and to scrutinize its applicability to the current strategic situation and the challenges ahead.¹¹ The starting point of all deliberations was the realization that perception is the dominant variable in deterrence.¹² Therefore, deterrence needs to be tailored to a specific actor – in the case of the Euro-Atlantic area, Russia.¹³

⁷ Stephen L. Quackenbush, “Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?” *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 2 (2011): 741-762, 741, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510000896>.

⁸ NATO, “Deterrence and Defence.”

⁹ See “Resilience, Civil Preparedness and Article 3,” NATO, updated November 13, 2024, <https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/resilience-civil-preparedness-and-article-3>.

¹⁰ This perspective on resilience is in line with the current EU understanding, which highlights the transformative dimension of resilience. See European Commission, “2025 Strategic Foresight Report – Resilience 2.0: Empowering the EU to Thrive Amid Turbulence and Uncertainty,” Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council COM(2025) 484 final, September 9, 2025, 2, https://commission.europa.eu/publications/strategic-foresight-report-2025_en.

¹¹ Michael J. Mazarr, “Understanding Deterrence,” in *NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020: Deterrence in the 21st Century – Insights from Theory and Practice*, ed. Frans Osinga and Tim Sweijts (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2021), 27, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_2.

¹² Mazarr, “Understanding Deterrence,” 21.

¹³ Mazarr, “Understanding Deterrence,” 23.

Resilience




Figure 1: Resilience.

Foundations of a Security Policy Concept

The concept of deterrence entered the security policy debate after World War II¹⁴ and is directly related to the development of nuclear weapons and their strategic implications.¹⁵ While strategists before 1945 explored ways to win wars by exploiting technological advances, the main objective of proponents of deterrence concepts since that time has been to find ways to prevent nuclear war and its consequences.¹⁶ Accordingly, the nuclear component of deterrence has always been the main focus. The aspect of conventional deterrence was added to

¹⁴ There is an abundance of literature on deterrence. A good, brief overview of the development of deterrence theory is provided by Amir Lupovici, “The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory – Toward a New Research Agenda,” *International Studies Quarterly* 54, no. 3 (2010): 705-732, 706-708, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00606.x>.

¹⁵ Lupovici, “The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory,” 706.

¹⁶ For a comprehensive overview of topics such as nuclear war, the balance of terror, first- and second-strike capability, escalation management, and limited war, see Lawrence Freedman, “Introduction – The Evolution of Deterrence Strategy and Research,” in *NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies* 2020, 3-6, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_1. A perspective from the early days of deterrence theory can be found in Bernard Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” RAND Research Memorandum RM-2218 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1958), www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM2218.html.

the discussion later.¹⁷ Regardless of the elements involved—nuclear or conventional—the aim of deterrence is to preserve a given status quo.¹⁸ Schelling describes deterrence as “a theory of the skillful nonuse of military force.”¹⁹

The centerpiece of deterrence is the act of influencing the perception of a potential attacker to persuade it “that he should in his own interest avoid certain courses of activity.”²⁰ Thus, deterrence is a specific way of communication in conflict or strategic situations, in which “the best course of action for each player depends on what the other players do.”²¹ The aim of this communicative process is to influence a potential attacker and to invoke their “fear of consequence.”²² According to some proponents of deterrence theory, this can be achieved either by “denying a potential aggressor confidence in attaining its objectives” or by threatening it with “severe penalties, such as nuclear escalation or severe economic sanctions” in case of an attack.²³ However, in exploring the mechanism underlying deterrence, distinguishing between deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment is secondary.²⁴

As mentioned above, the core elements of deterrence are perception and fear of consequence. According to the concept of deterrence, it is the opponent’s subjective expectation (the element of perception) that it will suffer severe pain if it acts that makes it shy away from action, regardless of whether this pain is inflicted during the action (the logic of deterrence by denial) or after the action (the logic of deterrence by punishment). There is a wide array of possible threats that could deter an aggressor. Certainly, the above-mentioned severe economic

¹⁷ Freedman, “Introduction – The Evolution of Deterrence Strategy and Research,” 5f; or John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).

¹⁸ Quackenbush, “Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?” 741.

¹⁹ Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Harvard University Press, 1979), 9. In another publication, Schelling discusses the use of force as a bargaining tool, which can be applied to influence people’s or decision makers’ behavior. See Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Yale University Press, 2020), 2. The use of force and violence to shape an opponent’s decision making is also part of non-Western strategic thinking. For the Russian example, see Adamsky, *The Russian Way of Deterrence*. For a profound overview of options regarding the use of force, see Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, 28ff.

²⁰ Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, 9.

²¹ Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, 1.

²² See, for example, Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, 23; Lupovici, “The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory,” 716; Quackenbush, “Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?”, 741; or Freedman, “Introduction – The Evolution of Deterrence Strategy and Research,” 2.

²³ Mazarr, “Understanding Deterrence,” 15.

²⁴ However, “denial” and “punishment” gain some importance for the theoretical identification of possible motives behind an opponent’s inaction. They also play a role in implementing deterrence as a strategy and in theorizing questions of threat credibility as a function of willingness and capability. For the relationship between deterrence and military strategy, see Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, 28ff.

sanctions and nuclear escalation represent two points on a continuum of applicable means. The fear of losing international reputation or alienating international partners might also lead an adversary to refrain from certain actions.²⁵ The most potent means for inciting fear, however, is military force – whether nuclear or conventional. According to Schelling, “the power to hurt can be counted among the most impressive attributes of military force.”²⁶ The threat of using violence to inflict suffering can be considered a necessary condition for deterrence to work.

Although applying a deterrence strategy thus entails threatening an opponent with the promise of severe harm, the concept is generally considered defensive because it emphasizes the maintenance of the status quo. In the context of the Cold War, Brodie states that “the philosophy of deterrence ... takes account of the enormous American cultural resistance to hitting first in a period of threatened total war.”²⁷ Freedman sees the great value of deterrence as a concept not so much in its “reliability or effectiveness as a strategy ... [, but] more because of its inherent normative appeal.”²⁸ According to Freedman, deterrence “implies a defensive intent without weakness. It seeks to prevent aggression while being non-aggressive.”²⁹

Prerequisites for Successful Deterrence

Communication in a Strategic Situation – Invoking “Fear of Consequences”

Deterrence seems to be a straightforward concept. However, several preconditions must be fulfilled for it to work. Most importantly, as described above, deterrence is a specific kind of communication between actors in a strategic situation. In the case of deterrence, successful communication first and foremost requires that the actors realize they are in a strategic situation with competing interests. Although that might sound trivial, a common understanding of the social situation in which the actors find themselves is essential to avoid misunderstandings. Actors also need to learn a common repertoire of signs or signals and share a common set of experiences that enable them to imagine the consequences of

²⁵ In this context, the term “self-deterrence” was originally used. See TV Paul, “Self-Deterrence: Nuclear Weapons and the Enduring Credibility Challenge,” *International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 71, no. 1 (2016): 20-40, p. 20, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702015618682>.

²⁶ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 2. The power to hurt can be seen as an expansion of the traditional tasks of military forces. Traditional tasks include taking or holding territory and destroying or neutralizing opponent forces.

²⁷ Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” 2.

²⁸ Freedman, “Introduction – The Evolution of Deterrence Strategy and Research,” 1. The effectiveness of deterrence strategies and the explanatory power of deterrence theory have frequently been discussed. See, for example, Lupovici, “The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory,” 706f; or Quackenbush, “Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?”

²⁹ Freedman, “Introduction – The Evolution of Deterrence Strategy and Research,” 1.

the action their opponent is signaling.³⁰ This puts Schelling's idea of deterrence as the "skillful nonuse of military force" into perspective. The potential aggressor needs to have an idea of what harm military force could cause in the event of an unwanted action. This idea could stem from one's own experience, or from pictures, narrations, etc., of the use of force and its potential results. This is especially important when new weapon systems are introduced, such as the nuclear bomb at the end of World War II, or unmanned systems that might revolutionize warfare in the days to come.³¹

Capabilities and Willingness

To support the imagination of possible consequences, the deterrer also needs to signal certain capabilities to cause harm and the resolve to do so.³² Most proponents of deterrence theory consider these two factors the most important because they lend credibility to the threat, while taking the prerequisites for successful communication for granted. That might have been justified during the Cold War, when deterrence, as an established social construct, was learned, internalized, and institutionalized in interactions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries.³³ In the currently evolving conflict between Russia and the West, it seems at least uncertain whether the requirements for successful communication between those parties are still being met.³⁴

Common Interest

Under the strong assumption that the above-mentioned prerequisites are present, deterrence still does not work automatically. Schelling argues that "the

³⁰ Communication theory defines this as "intersubjectivity" or an "intersubjective context." See, for example, Lupovici, "The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory," 711.

³¹ This contradicts the idea of "classical structural deterrence theory," which proposes that certain weapon systems—here, nuclear weapons—are deterrent *per se*. For further discussion, see, for example, Frank C. Zagare, "Classical Deterrence Theory: A Critical Assessment," *International Interactions* 21, no. 4 (1996): 365-387, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629608434873>.

³² Lupovici, "The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory," 709.

³³ On deterrence as a "social construct," see Lupovici, "The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory," 706. For a summary of the singularity of Cold War deterrence in this regard, see Lupovici, "The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory," 713.

³⁴ During a Chatham House Rule conversation at the George C. Marshall Center in February 2025, a NATO representative explicitly mentioned the danger of escalation in the conflict with Russia, because Russia seemed not to understand the signals NATO uses to deter it. Russian officials seem to have shared this concern on the eve of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. See the press release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, with a link to a proposed draft treaty: "Press Release on Russian Draft Documents on Legal Security Guarantees from the United States and NATO," December 17, 2021, accessed January 22, 2026, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1790809/.

power to hurt is bargaining power.”³⁵ The minimal requirement for bargaining, and thereby for deterrence, is that all partners need to share at least some common interest while they are in conflict.³⁶ Consequently, in zero-sum situations or “situations of pure and complete antagonism,” where the winner wins it all, and the loser loses everything, and where there is no room for compromise, deterrence does not work.³⁷ It is important to note that actors who believe they are in an existential fight will most likely interpret strategic situations as zero-sum. Deterring such an actor will be very difficult.

Actors, Not Actions, Are Deterred

There seems to be a tendency in the security policy debate to consider deterrence the remedy for emerging challenges or “any new security threat.”³⁸ However, some security policy experts are skeptical that every potential action can be deterred.³⁹ Instead of focusing on generic actions, potentially successful deterrence strategies need to address actors, as deterrence depends on the subjective perceptions of the potential aggressor. Deterrence measures also have to be tailored to a concrete situation. In this context, Mearsheimer stresses the direct relationship between (conventional) deterrence and military strategy.⁴⁰ He analyzes the chances of deterring a potential attacker depending on the attacker’s offensive strategy—blitzkrieg, attrition, or limited aims strategy—and the posture of the defender.⁴¹ The higher the subjectively estimated costs relative to the achieved gains, the greater the chances of successful deterrence. In this logic, a costly attrition strategy aimed at destroying the opponent’s army in a decisive victory is easier to deter than a blitzkrieg strategy with the same aim. Military actions with limited aims—for example, the occupation of a small part of enemy territory in a surprise attack before the defender can employ most of his troops—on the other hand, can hardly be deterred. However, it is hard to

³⁵ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 2.

³⁶ Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, 11; Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 1. For bargaining, see Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, 21ff. For conceptual considerations and limitations of classical deterrence theory and perfect deterrence theory, see Quackenbush, “Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?” 761f. Here, Quackenbush questions the assumption of classical deterrence theory that armed conflict is the worst outcome for all actors in a strategic situation and that, therefore, avoiding armed conflict is *per se* a common interest.

³⁷ Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, 11.

³⁸ Freedman, “Introduction – The Evolution of Deterrence Strategy and Research,” 1.

³⁹ Freedman, “Introduction – The Evolution of Deterrence Strategy and Research,” 1; Lupovici, “The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory,” 718f.

⁴⁰ Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, 28f. One could argue that Mearsheimer’s argument is not restricted to conventional deterrence alone. Currently, the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons seems to be very high. Therefore, their use is most likely restricted to existential situations. Nevertheless, the nuclear threat is always present. In this edition, Megi Benia scrutinizes Russian nuclear rhetoric in Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine.

⁴¹ Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, 28ff.

estimate how much the attacker is willing to sacrifice. Thus, even an attrition strategy might be hard to deter in a certain situation. It might also be the case that an attacker tries to employ forces for a blitzkrieg and ends up in a war of attrition. Russia's unsuccessful attempt to invade Ukraine in a blitzkrieg-like operation in February 2022, and the following war of attrition, is a good example of this. Detering actions that are less costly than an armed attack, such as most of the so-called "hybrid threats," might also be difficult. For example, some of them are hard to attribute and therefore hard to "punish" (plausible deniability); for some activities, such as sabotage, it is not countries like Russia that need to be deterred, but several anonymous "disposable"⁴² agents in a "gig-economy" style situation who commit the respective action.⁴³

Russia's Strategic Interest

Deterrence strategies need to be tailored to the strategy of a potential aggressor – for Europe, this is Russia. Moscow's strategy depends on its perception of the current situation, its intentions and capabilities, and its willingness to take risks and bear costs. Most of these elements are currently uncertain. The figure below illustrates potential Russian desired end-states that could serve as a basis for scenarios supporting the development of a tailored deterrence strategy.




Figure 2: Potential Russian Desired End-States.

⁴² Elisabeth Braw, "Gig Model of Russian Subversion Is a Nightmare for Western Intelligence Services," *Politico*, June 2, 2025, <https://www.politico.eu/article/gig-model-russian-subversion-nightmare-western-intelligence-shopping/>.

⁴³ See, for example, Daniela Richterova et al., "Russian Sabotage in the Gig-Economy Era," *The RUSI Journal* 169, no. 5 (2024): 10-21, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2024.2401232>.

In an effort to better explore the notion of deterrence, as mentioned above, the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies held a Future Lab on integrated deterrence in February 2025. Over the course of three weeks, security practitioners from nine nations developed scholarly articles on the various elements of and approaches to deterring Russia today, from their countries' perspectives. Select articles from that event were refined and further developed for inclusion in this special issue.

In his article, "Know the Enemy: Understanding Russia's Global Political End-State," Gintaras Bagdonas argues that Russia's war against Ukraine is central to Russia's efforts to restore its imperial power and restructure the current global order, rather than being a conflict with aims limited to Ukraine alone. When viewed this way, Russia projects strategic consistency across the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic spheres.

Megi Benia's "Deterrence by Fear Inducement: Russia's Nuclear Rhetoric and the War in Ukraine" delves into Russian strategic culture to argue that the Kremlin's nuclear rhetoric from 2022 to 2024 conflates deterrence and coercion, using such signaling to shape public opinion and frustrate Western decision-making. She explores the strategic implications, including miscalculation risks, norm erosion, and challenges to NATO's deterrence posture.

In "Rebuilding NATO's Conventional Deterrence: Lessons from the Cold War for the Contemporary Russian Threat," Kamil Sobczyk focuses on the conventional dimension of deterrence and compares the current situation with that of the Cold War. He finds NATO's conventional deterrence on its Eastern Flank insufficient for the task and argues for accelerated NATO transformation that includes increased ready forces, improved logistical support, and sustained higher levels of defense investment.

Several case studies follow these more conceptual contributions.

Anca Anescu's "Deterring Hybrid Warfare: NATO Approaches to Russian Sabotage" explores options for deterring hybrid threats, with an emphasis on sabotage. She argues that NATO can achieve effective deterrence against sabotage and other hybrid threats only through the mechanisms of integrated deterrence, including improved intelligence sharing, greater infrastructure resilience, and the implementation of anticipatory, whole-of-society defense.

In his article, "Integrated Border Management as a Potential Deterrence Measure at the North-Eastern Flank of NATO and the Schengen Area," Raitis Tiliks discusses ways to counter and deter Russian and Belarusian weaponization of illegal migration against other European countries. He finds that current NATO and EU policies fall short in terms of strategic concepts and operational clarity. In response, both organizations, through their member states, should look to their north-eastern flanks for examples of solidarity, a resolute mindset, and societal resilience.

Vitalie Armasu's contribution, "Increasing Moldova's Deterrence Potential: Integrating National and Societal Resilience in Combating Russian Disinformation

and Manipulation,” uses a case study to examine Moldova’s endeavors to counter Russian malign influence, especially in the context of the 2025 Moldovan elections. A more nuanced and in-depth understanding of these attacks in the informational realm will help Moldovan policymakers develop effective countermeasures and adequate post-incident responses.

Although the focus of this special edition is Russia, limiting the perspective to the European theater would necessarily ignore otherwise critical external factors and considerations. Fauzia Cempaka Timur, therefore, closes this edition with her contribution, “Russia’s Shadow in the Global South: Deterrence and Influence in Southeast Asia.” She examines Russia’s deterrence and influence operations in the Global South and analyzes ASEAN member states’ responses, including hedging, while emphasizing how Russia’s limited economic capacity and growing dependence on China as a partner constrain its appeal.

In sum, readers interested in international approaches to deterrence—regional, state-based, and from the perspective of leading international bodies—will find much here that is relevant to the theoretical and practical challenges of deterring Russia successfully.

Disclaimer

The opinions, findings, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Partnership for Peace Consortium, its participating institutions, or any governmental or international organizations affiliated with its governance structure.

About the Author

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