This article examines Russia’s nuclear rhetoric during the war in Ukraine as a deliberate tool of influence rooted in the doctrine of “ustrashenie” (deterrence by fear inducement). Moving beyond classical deterrence theory, it argues that Russia employs nuclear signaling not merely to prevent escalation but to coerce adversaries psychologically, shape public perception, and fragment Western decision-making. The analysis traces the evolution of Russia’s nuclear rhetoric from 2022 to 2024, highlighting how it has adapted to battlefield developments and broader geopolitical aims. By integrating ambiguity, psychological manipulation, and information warfare, Russia’s strategy blurs the line between deterrence and coercion. The article assesses the strategic implications of this approach, including the risks of miscalculation, the erosion of nuclear norms, and challenges to NATO’s deterrence posture. It concludes with policy recommendations focused on reinforcing psychological resilience, strategic communication, and alliance cohesion to counter the cognitive effects of nuclear intimidation in modern conflict environments.
BT - Connections: The Quarterly Journal DA - 2025 DO - https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.24.3.30 IS - 4 N2 -This article examines Russia’s nuclear rhetoric during the war in Ukraine as a deliberate tool of influence rooted in the doctrine of “ustrashenie” (deterrence by fear inducement). Moving beyond classical deterrence theory, it argues that Russia employs nuclear signaling not merely to prevent escalation but to coerce adversaries psychologically, shape public perception, and fragment Western decision-making. The analysis traces the evolution of Russia’s nuclear rhetoric from 2022 to 2024, highlighting how it has adapted to battlefield developments and broader geopolitical aims. By integrating ambiguity, psychological manipulation, and information warfare, Russia’s strategy blurs the line between deterrence and coercion. The article assesses the strategic implications of this approach, including the risks of miscalculation, the erosion of nuclear norms, and challenges to NATO’s deterrence posture. It concludes with policy recommendations focused on reinforcing psychological resilience, strategic communication, and alliance cohesion to counter the cognitive effects of nuclear intimidation in modern conflict environments.
PY - 2025 SE - 37 SP - 37 EP - 54 T2 - Connections: The Quarterly Journal TI - Deterrence by Fear Inducement: Russia's Nuclear Rhetoric and the War in Ukraine VL - 24 SN - 1812-1098 ER -