

# *CONNECTIONS*

## *The Quarterly Journal*

Volume XIII, Number 3

Summer 2014

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# Central Asian States: Matching Military Means to Strategic Ends

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Over the past two decades of independent history, the Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) have developed pragmatic and largely non-ideological national security strategies rooted in their perceptions and prioritization of the complex regional realities. The states' attempts to match their military and security services capabilities to handle a variety of external and internal security challenges highlights the fact that the Central Asian states regard these capabilities as critical elements of hard power. At the same time, while often utilized to help quell various sources of domestic instability, all Central Asian militaries have lacked up-to-date operational experience. A review of their tactical proficiency in dealing with internal conflicts shows that although Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have contained socio-political unrest better than Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, all the states struggled to reform and adapt their armed forces to successfully deliver on their doctrinal obligations. This is because they have remained largely outside of contemporary international military interventions such as Operation Iraqi Freedom, the International Security Assistance Force or Kosovo Forces.

This paper outlines the national security objectives of the Central Asian states and analyzes available information on the size, funding, combat readiness and the overall performance of the militaries in recent domestic conflicts. In attempting to effectively respond to the security challenges envisioned in the respective national defense strategies and doctrines, all Central Asian militaries have often struggled with fundamental operational issues and acted in similarly heavy-handed fashion. The continuous balancing of Russian, U.S. and Chinese regional security agendas aided by reform and modernization of the armed services are important to ensuring the Central Asian militaries' successes in fulfilling their current doctrinal obligations. An examination of the great magnitude of challenges faced by the Kyrgyz and Tajik militaries reveals a particularly compelling explanation for their strategic reliance on Russia in the event of a state emergency.

The collective Central Asian military experience of handling recent internal instabilities suggests that as long as a military establishment is capable of containing security challenges in a relatively short period of time and without causing politically unacceptable casualties, it is unlikely to undergo major structural changes. Provided these states' stability is maintained and a restive area resumes government control, a combination of

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significant operational setbacks, lack of tactical expertise and human rights abuses is not bound to cause a sweeping reformation of the armed forces and security services. At the same time, internalization of the sum of all the operational experiences and lessons learned can be expected to influence national geopolitical choices insofar as prompting a country to seek allies most willing to assist it with meeting its key security and military modernization needs. For players outside the region such as the United States and Europe, a rationale for maintaining the current level of regional engagements in Central Asia becomes an almost Clausewitzian derivative of their broader geopolitical strategies. While far from harboring any “Great Game” type of ambitions, continued Western involvement in Central Asia, including in the realm of security cooperation, helps the West gain additional avenues of cooperation with China, possess at least moderate influence over Russian ambitions in the latter’s “near abroad” and, in the case of robust security cooperation with Tajikistan, secure a potential engagement opportunity with Iran.

### **Regional Threats and Challenges**

As identified by contemporary Uzbek political expert Shavkat Arifhanov, at a broad regional level all Central Asian states look at their military and security structures in the context of the following threats and concerns: border security focused on post-ISAF Afghanistan and prevention of the flow of terrorists, narcotics and weapons from Afghanistan into the region (as a source of instability, post-ISAF Afghanistan has the least relevance for Kazakhstan); containing the threat of homegrown and externally-supported religious extremists; preventing escalation of interregional tensions in the potential “conflict zone” of the Fergana valley (for Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) and responding to domestic, social and ethnic unrest caused by increasing unemployment and deteriorating living conditions.<sup>1</sup>

### **Kazakhstan**

The latest of four military doctrines issued since 1993, Kazakhstan’s military doctrine of 2011 reflects the security priorities of a country that does not believe a change of the security situation in Afghanistan after 2014 will necessarily have a significant impact on Kazakhstan and is more concerned with internal security issues.<sup>2</sup> By making only one contextual reference to the persistent instability in Afghanistan as one of the multiple preconditions to the wider regional aggravation, the military doctrine reveals Kazakh security establishment’s belief that its central Asian neighbors will serve as buffer states likely to absorb the brunt of the instability generated from within Afghanistan. While the doctrine mentions the military conflicts close to Kazakhstan’s borders as one of its six key external concerns, it does not explicitly identify Afghanistan as a threat. The prevalence of the non-Afghanistan focused security concerns is further outlined in the IHS

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<sup>1</sup> Shavkat Arifhanov, *Centralinaya Azia: Nastoiaeshee i Budushee* (Central Asia: Present and Future) (Tashkent: Extremum Press, 2010), 143.

<sup>2</sup> “Voennaia Doktrina Respubliki Kazakhstan,” 2011, available at <http://www.nomad.su/?a=3-201111010034>, accessed 15 November 2013.

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment on Kazakhstan which points out that “Kazakhstan faces a lesser threat from radical Islamist militants than other Central Asian states, although it is concerned about the growth of fundamentalist groups and suffered its first suicide bombing in May 2011 which acted as a precursor to several other attacks.”<sup>3</sup>

Despite the fact that the Kazakh Armed Forces remain numerically second to Uzbekistan and, according to IHS Jane's assessment, are underfunded, ill-equipped and poorly trained, they have emerged as the most technologically advanced forces in Central Asia.<sup>4</sup> Kazakhstan's security concerns and aspirations highlight its status as the most developed and internationally open country in Central Asia and one that is attempting to slowly modernize its forces while striking a precarious balance of security cooperation between the West, Russia and China. Over the last fifteen years, Kazakhstan has also emerged as the most advanced peacekeeping force within the region. As per *The Military Balance*, “About 20,000 serve in the army, 12,000 in the air force and 3,000 in the navy. There are about 4,000 special forces, 9,000 border guards, 20,000 Internal Security (police) troops and 2,500 presidential and government guards.”<sup>5</sup>

Specifically, its military doctrine identifies six external military security threats and three domestic military threats. Kazakh security officials find

Socio-political instability in the region as a key external security concern followed by military conflict close to the country's borders, use of foreign nations or organizations of military political pressure and advanced information-psychological warfare technologies to meddle in Kazakhstan's internal affairs, increase influence of military political organizations and unions to the detriment of the state's security service, threat of terrorism and dangers posed by use and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Domestic threats include: extremist, nationalist and separatist movements... seeking to destabilize the domestic situation ... illegal armed groups and illegal proliferation of weapons, munitions and explosives that could be used for sabotage, terrorist acts or other illegal actions.<sup>6</sup>

The country's security experts and officials question the gravity of a potential “bleed out” effect from Afghanistan and feel sufficiently geographically separated from Afghanistan to not gear the country's armed forces for an ultimate confrontation with the Taliban.<sup>7</sup> Instead, the country's military establishment focuses its efforts on the modernization of its armed forces and preparing to contain internal threats while also developing a partnership and peacekeeping capacity. Realizing that large conscript-staffed motorized units have low training and readiness levels, the Kazakhstan Ministry of

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<sup>3</sup> *Security, Kazakhstan* (London: IHS Global Limited, 2012).

<sup>4</sup> *Kazakhstan at a Glance. Executive Summary* (London: HIS Global Limited, 2012).

<sup>5</sup> “Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia,” *The Military Balance* 113, no. 1 (February 2013): 199-244.

<sup>6</sup> Roger McDermott, *Central Asian security post-2014. Perspectives in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2013), available at [http://subweb.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2013/RP2013-12-McDermott-Kazakhstan\\_web.jpg.pdf](http://subweb.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2013/RP2013-12-McDermott-Kazakhstan_web.jpg.pdf) (30 November 2013).

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

Defense has chosen to concentrate on developing special operations and airborne units.<sup>8</sup> In April 2010, Kazakhstan responded to revolution and instability in Kyrgyzstan by relocating air, infantry, police and border protection assets to Taraz in the southern region of Jambyl.<sup>9</sup> Additionally, as per Jim Nichol's Congressional Research Service assessment, "The Zhanaozen violence of December 2011 may have spurred military procurement of added airlift capabilities and redeployment of some troops to Southwestern Kazakhstan."<sup>10</sup> On the issue of reforms, the same assessment states: "Reforms include the transition to a brigade-based organizational and staff structure, the creation of the Cadet Corps School for NCOs, and other elements of a hierarchy of military educational institutions."<sup>11</sup>

Kazakhstan continues to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy and remains an active participant in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a reality underlined by the fact that Russia and China are Kazakhstan's main trading partners. Over the last twenty years, Russia has trained thousands of Kazakh officers and has been given the status of a preferential military procurement partner. As noted in IHS Jane's country assessment, "The 'special relationship' with Russia should allow the Kazakh military to gradually increase its procurement efforts by taking advantage of direct arms transfers and Russia's low domestic prices."<sup>12</sup>

Moreover, the country plays a major role in the CSTO and has participated in all CSTO military exercises, such as "Cooperation 2012" and "Shyghys 2011" as well as the bi-lateral Russian-Kazakh "Tsentr" series of exercises. At the same time, although Astana is the most active Central Asian participant in the CSTO and assigned its best equipped brigade, the 37<sup>th</sup> Air-Assault Brigade, to the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Forces, Kazakhstan has attempted to avoid over-reliance on Russia or the CSTO as its sole military cooperation partner and venue, respectively.<sup>13</sup>

Kazakhstan's military leadership dedicated a BDE minus (KAZBRIG) as a unit devoted to the specific purpose of contributing to future peacekeeping missions. IHS Jane's assessment states that

Achieving full NATO interoperability for KAZBRIG remains a goal in Kazakhstan's NATO's Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). A company from the KAZBRIG was deployed as part of the US-led coalition forces in the early days of the Iraq war, performing de-mining and water purification duties with a Polish-led division.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> *World Armies - Kazakhstan* (London: IHS Global Unlimited, 2013).

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> Jim Nichol, *Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 20, available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/97-1058.pdf> (1 December 2013).

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> *Procurement, Kazakhstan* (London: IHS Global Unlimited, 2013).

<sup>13</sup> *Kazakhstan Armed Forces* (London: IHS Global Limited, 2013).

<sup>14</sup> *World Armies - Kazakhstan*.

Further, Kazakhstan has actively cooperated with NATO through its Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and has continuously hosted the multilateral annual NATO-led exercise, “Steppe Eagle.” However, Kazakhstan has been careful not to get too close to the U.S. and NATO, lest it unduly irritate Russia. In these terms, Kazakhstan’s decision not to host “Steppe Eagle” in 2014 might conveniently serve a dual purpose by, firstly, indicating the Kazakh military’s intent to conduct a larger scale training exercise at the NATO training grounds in Hohenfels, Germany and, secondly, allowing the country to maintain a balance of its partnership between both Russia and NATO.

The country’s overall economic stability, hydrocarbon wealth and successful recovery from the 2008 financial crisis translated into the Kazakh military’s ability to buy equipment with its own money, form several joint ventures with foreign defense companies and bode well for the future of the military to military cooperation. According to *The Military Balance*, Astana spent 0.9 percent of GDP, or USD 2.27 billion, on defense in 2012 and plans for a 13 percent increase in defense spending in 2014 (around USD 2.4 billion).<sup>15</sup> While the Russians also believe that Kazakhstan has been spending considerable amounts on defense, their estimate of Kazakhstan’s 2012 defense expenditures is lower, at about USD 1.3 billion.<sup>16</sup>

Increased defense spending is in line with President Nazarbaev’s intent to have up to 70 percent of its weapons and military equipment manufactured domestically by 2015.<sup>17</sup> Kazakhstan has been actively diversifying its supply of weapons systems and therefore signed agreements with France, Turkey, Italy, Poland, Spain, Ukraine and Israel.<sup>18</sup> In October 2013, IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly reported that Kazakhstan had ordered two new Airbus Military C295 tactical transport aircraft in addition to the two delivered earlier this year.<sup>19</sup> According to an Oxford Analytica report, between 2013 and 2017 Kazakhstan also plans to spend over 1.3 billion dollars on purchasing unspecified high-tech security equipment and training of law-enforcement officers.<sup>20</sup> Kazakhstan has also launched a program to boost its nascent naval capabilities, unveiling it first domestically

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<sup>15</sup> “Kazakhstan to Spend More on Defense and Disaster Prevention,” *BNews.kz*, 11 September 2013, available at <http://bnews.kz/en/news/post/158111/> (15 December 2013).

<sup>16</sup> Murat Beyshenov, “The Armed Forces of Kyrgyzstan: Brief Overview and Perspectives for Development at the Current Stage,” in *Almanac 2012: Governing and Reforming Kyrgyzstan Security Sector*, ed. Aida Alymbaeva, tr. Greta Kerimidchieva (Geneva-Bishkek: Geneva Centre of the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, 2013), 26, available at [www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Almanac-on-Security-Sector-Reform-in-the-Kyrgyz-Republic](http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Almanac-on-Security-Sector-Reform-in-the-Kyrgyz-Republic) (10 December 2013).

<sup>17</sup> “Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia,” *The Military Balance*, 113, no. 1 (February 2013): 199–244.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> Gareth Jennings, “Kazakhstan Signs for Additional C295 Transport Aircraft,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, 24 October 2013.

<sup>20</sup> “Kazakh Security Measures Address Emerging Threats,” *Oxford Analytica Daily Brief*, 12 August 2013.

built patrol vessel in 2012 and signing agreements with French and Spanish firms to produce Exocet-class anti-ship missiles.<sup>21</sup>

Current cooperation with the U.S. is based on the following three pillars: preparing the KAZBRIG Brigade for eventual UN deployment, achieving moderate change within the military education structure through IMET (about twenty Kazakh students attend various military schools in the U.S.) and cooperation in the military intelligence sphere. Most recently, the Kazakh Army has also been placing more emphasis on NCO development.

Overall, compared to other Central Asian states, Kazakhstan has invested the most into modernizing its armed forces. Its multi-vector foreign policy has allowed the country to maintain good relations with all of its international partners and benefit from cooperation with each one of them. Given its wealth and ability to purchase and manufacture military equipment, Kazakhstan sees itself as a willingly-contributing coalition partner not interested in security assistance handouts from other countries.<sup>22</sup> While Russia predictably enjoys an enduring “special relationship” with Kazakhstan, the U.S. and other foreign partners are likely to continue playing important roles in shaping the Kazakh military. There is no reason to believe that the Kazakh Armed Forces are incapable of effectively handling an internal security issue or responding to a socio-political crisis in the neighborhood or on its southern border. At the same time, the post-Soviet military legacy of insufficiently trained, largely conscripted units remains hard to overcome, leading to a division within the armed forces. The existence of better-trained elite airborne and special operations units stands in sharp contrast with the rest of the conscript-manned conventional motorized and armored units.

## Kyrgyzstan

In contrast to Kazakhstan, the July 2013 Kyrgyzstan military doctrine emphasizes the importance of the situation in Afghanistan and ISAF withdrawal, making it a key national security risk.<sup>23</sup> The concept links it to a potential deterioration of the security environment in Central Asia and Kyrgyzstan in particular, while also connecting it with a variety of external threats, such as an expansion of terrorism, religious extremism and drug trafficking (along the so-called “northern route” through Central Asia). In this context, the concept stresses the criticality of ties with the CSTO as a guarantor of regional peace and stability (Bishkek hosts the headquarters of the CSTO’s rapid reaction force).<sup>24</sup> Concurrently, Kyrgyzstan must balance the interests of the U.S., Russia and

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<sup>21</sup> *Procurement, Kazakhstan.*

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> “Voennaia Doktrina Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki (*Military Doctrine of the Kyrgyz Republic*) 2012,” available at <http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1374474180> (21 June 2014).

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*



China as key players influencing Central Asia.<sup>25</sup> When it comes to internal issues as they concern security, the concept stresses inter-ethnic stability and separatism, border-delineation, water and energy tensions as well as high potential for instability in the Fergana valley.

The 2012 defense budget estimates vary considerably from USD 111 million, according to Russia, to about USD 105 million from *The Military Balance* quoted in IISS, to about USD 246 million, according to IHS Jane's budget analysts.<sup>26</sup> As per *The Military Balance*,

Kyrgyzstan's armed forces number about 10,900 active ground and air force troops. Paramilitary forces include 5000 border guards, 3,500 police troops and 1,000 National Guard troops... The small air force (2,400 personnel) consists of 33 aircraft and 10 helicopters based at Kant.<sup>27</sup>

Regardless of the actual defense spending figure, according to an interview given by Kyrgyzstan's defense minister Taalaybek Omuraliyev to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Kyrgyz service, the armed forces have been receiving only half of what they have been requesting from the government.<sup>28</sup> According to IHS Jane's, "The Kyrgyz military remains an embryonic force with a weak chain of command, the ground force built to Cold War standards, and an almost total lack of air capabilities."<sup>29</sup> The Kyrgyz military's most recent operational experience entailed a disastrous deployment of army units to quell ethnic unrest in Jalalabad and Osh in June 2010. Deep-seated tensions between the Uzbek and Kyrgyz communities in the southern cities of Jalalabad and Osh manifested in street violence on June 10-13, 2010. About 470 people (mostly ethnic Uzbeks) were killed in violent clashes, 3,000 primarily Uzbek businesses were destroyed and more than 100,000 refugees temporarily left their homes.

As per the aforementioned assessment, "During the initial phase of military deployment in southern Kyrgyzstan, troops from the Ministry of Defense seemed prepared for an act of aggression committed by Uzbekistan..."<sup>30</sup> Kyrgyzstan's military leaders cited a lack of trained personnel, equipment and funding as well as a general inability to control the situation as main reasons for their inability to rein in the violence in the first two days. The army was so ill-equipped to respond to domestic insurgency that it had to "borrow armored vehicles from fellow CSTO states in order to respond to the situa-

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<sup>25</sup> Jim Nichol, *Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), available at [www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/97-690.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/97-690.pdf) (25 October 2013).

<sup>26</sup> Alymbaeva, *Almanac 2012: Governing and Reforming Kyrgyzstan Security Sector*, 26; "Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia," 199-244; and email to the author from IHS Jane's defense budgets analyst.

<sup>27</sup> Nichol, *Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests*.

<sup>28</sup> "Interview with Kyrgyz Minister of Defense Taalaybek Omuraliev," *Radio Azzatyk*, 23 September 2013, available at [http://rus.azattyk.org/content/kyrgyzstan\\_defence\\_ministry/25114525.html](http://rus.azattyk.org/content/kyrgyzstan_defence_ministry/25114525.html) (12 December 2013).

<sup>29</sup> *Armed Forces, Kyrgyzstan* (London: IHS Global Limited, 2013).

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*

tion.”<sup>31</sup> The army and police units showed complete ineptitude and a lack of tactical prowess, “acting chaotically, often reacting to rumors spread by provocateurs.”<sup>32</sup> The inability of the domestic security forces to deal with inter-ethnic strife effectively was punctuated by then Acting President Roza Otunbayeva’s call to Russia for the deployment of CSTO troops (the CSTO never agreed to send troops and only sent humanitarian assistance).

The poor performance of army and police units in Jalalabad and Osh provided additional impetus for the Kyrgyz military leadership to continue reforming the armed forces in order to develop a compact, mobile force able to effectively respond to internal unrest and serve as a deterrent to Islamic militants and drug traffickers crossing the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. The majority of efforts have been directed towards creating company-sized special operations detachments specializing in mountain and counter-insurgency warfare.<sup>33</sup> The most capable 3rd Special Operations Battalion is considered the best-trained and best-equipped unit in the military.<sup>34</sup> An absence of adequate airlift and air support capabilities is compensated by reliance on the Russian capabilities that would be employed in case of an emergency operation. Russia’s decision to double the number of airplanes on its military airbase in Kant outside of Bishkek by the end of 2013 is a clear indication of its dominance over all Kyrgyz military matters of strategic importance, especially if viewed against the backdrop of the pending closure of the Manas Transit Center.<sup>35</sup> Overall, fighting alongside Russian forces, possibly within the CSTO (Kyrgyzstan participates in all CSTO exercises), appears to be a linchpin of the Kyrgyz defense strategy. A continuous lack of domestic funding requires absolute dependence on military aid from donors, primarily Russia, which, according to a source in the Russian General Staff, has reportedly agreed to provide Kyrgyzstan with

... helicopters, armored personnel carriers and armored automobiles, multiple rocket launcher systems 9K57 Uragan (Kyrgyz armed forces have only six such systems now), artillery systems, small arms, as well as communication and reconnaissance means.<sup>36</sup>

In 2008, the Defense Minister of Kyrgyzstan remarked that about 90 percent of the Kyrgyz army’s foreign-trained officers were educated in Russia.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> *Armed Forces, Kyrgyzstan* (London: IHS Global Limited, 2013).

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> “Official: Russia to Expand Kyrgyzstan Military Airbase,” *Defence News*, 27 October 2013, available at [www.defensenews.com/article/20131027/DEFREG03/310270006](http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131027/DEFREG03/310270006) (3 November 2013).

<sup>35</sup> Ivan Safronov, Elena Chernenko and Kabai Karabekov, “Russia Will Arm Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,” *Kommersant Online*, 2 October 2013, available at <http://www.ebiblioteka.ru/browse/doc/36159922> (5 November 2013).

<sup>36</sup> Sebastien Peyrouse, “Russia-Central Asia: Advances and Shortcomings of the Military Partnership,” in *Central Asian Security Trends: Views from Europe and Russia.*, ed. Stephen J. Blank (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011), 1-34.

Meanwhile, although the scale of contribution by other Kyrgyz partners is far less significant, the country's military leadership is eager to accept aid from any partner. As pointed out by current Defense Minister Taalaybek Omuraliev, low defense spending makes international military cooperation paramount to building Kyrgyzstan's armed forces capacity.<sup>38</sup> In these terms, Kyrgyzstan's cooperation with NATO remains an important dimension of its military modernization strategy. As pointed out in the 2013 working paper released by the EUCAM-Security and Development project,

So far, Kyrgyzstan's practical cooperation with NATO has been guided by the country's annual Individual Partnership Cooperation Programme (IPCP), which includes security and peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, border security and crisis management. In 2007, Bishkek also joined the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP)... Under this framework, NATO has provided military language training, search and rescue education, border security and human rights courses along with the re-training of released military personnel.<sup>39</sup>

On the bilateral level, over the last decade the U.S provided different small-scale training and equipment to Kyrgyz Special Forces units. However, the future volume of military-to-military cooperation is likely to diminish, as the U.S. will be hard pressed to justify providing aid at current levels after the closure of the Manas Transit Center in July 2014.

Turkey, China and India also emerged as minor contributors to Kyrgyz defense, having provided or committed to providing various types of assistance. For instance, over the last fifteen years, India has trained 26 Kyrgyz military students, while according to the January 2012 military cooperation agreement between Turkey and Kyrgyzstan, Turkey will help "build a military institute in Osh and build up the country's defense industry."<sup>40</sup>

A brief assessment of the armed forces' response to ethnic violence in June 2010 in southern Kyrgyzstan, combined with the grave difficulties facing the Kyrgyz armed forces along the lengthy path to modernization, make Russia and the CSTO natural security guarantors. If left to its own devices the Kyrgyz military will likely struggle again to adapt and meet its doctrinal objectives. Even quelling limited-scale civil or ethnic unrest might present a great challenge to the Kyrgyz military. As one of the weakest armed forces in Central Asia, the Kyrgyz military will undoubtedly require Russian/CSTO assistance in order to effectively expel a terrorist incursion or respond to wide-scale border instability. At this juncture no other state, rightfully in the author's view, is willing to compete with Russia for influence over Kyrgyzstan. In this context, the closure of Ma-

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<sup>37</sup> "Interview with Kyrgyz Minister of Defense Taalaybek Omuraliev."

<sup>38</sup> Jos Boonstra, Erica Marat and Vera Axynova, *Security Sector Reform in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: What Role for Europe?* (EUCAM, 2013), available at [http://www.fride.org/download/EUCAM\\_WP14\\_SSR\\_Kazakhstan\\_Kyrgyzstan\\_Tajikistan.pdf](http://www.fride.org/download/EUCAM_WP14_SSR_Kazakhstan_Kyrgyzstan_Tajikistan.pdf) (8 December 2013).

<sup>39</sup> Joshua Kucera, "Turkey Promises to Boost Military Aid to Kyrgyzstan," *Eurasianet.org*, 19 January 2012, available at <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64866> (10 November 2013).

nas signifies an inevitable and justified decrease in American willingness to expend efforts on the failing military of a Russian “client state.”

## Tajikistan

As stated in the 2007 volume on Defense and Security Sector Institution Building in Central Asia published by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), in 2006 Tajikistan was the last Central Asian state to adopt a military doctrine.<sup>41</sup> As the poorest nation in Central Asia and the only country of the former Soviet Union to have experienced a devastating Civil War, Tajikistan struggled a decade longer than its neighbors with establishing a legal basis for military control and planning and with formulating a coherent military strategy.

The Tajik security concept is reinforced by the current political rhetoric and outlines the Tajik foreign and domestic interests.<sup>42</sup> Specifically, the Tajik Armed Forces and Security Services are charged with protecting state borders and repelling any internal and external aggression, preserving territorial integrity and resolving conditions leading to political, religious and ethnic separatism. Additionally, they must also deal with transnational organized crime activities. In *Central Asia Post-2014*, Roger McDermott notes:

The security document outlines the main threats to the country and pays almost no attention to Afghanistan. Security thinking in Dushanbe places very little emphasis on terrorism or inter-state conflict, and more on drug trafficking, organized crime or separatism – in other words the indirect impact of Afghanistan-related transnational threats.<sup>43</sup>

Tajikistan is an original member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and belongs to the CSTO. Tajikistan also joined NATO’s PfP in 2002.

According to *The Military Balance*, the Tajik government allocated approximately USD 164 million, or about 1.5 percent of its GDP to defense in 2012.<sup>44</sup> IHS Jane’s Defense Budget analysts provide a similar figure of USD 169.4 million for the same year, noting that the actual spending might in fact have been different as no revised estimates have been published since 2011. Additionally, the Tajik defense budget “has more than doubled in nominal terms over the past five years” from USD 69 million in 2008 to

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<sup>40</sup> Eden Cole and Philip Fluri, eds., *Defence and Security Sector Institution Building in the Post-Soviet Central Asian States* (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2007), available at <http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Defence-and-Security-Sector-Institution-Building-in-the-Post-Soviet-Central-Asian-States> (1 December 2013).

<sup>41</sup> Arifhanov, *Centralinaya Azia: Nastoiaeshee i Budushee (Central Asia Present and Future)* and Jim Nichol, *Tajikistan: Recent Developments and US Interests*.

<sup>42</sup> Roger McDermott, *Central Asian security post-2014. Perspectives in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2013), available at [http://subweb.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2013/RP2013-12-McDermott-Kazakhstan\\_web.jpg.pdf](http://subweb.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2013/RP2013-12-McDermott-Kazakhstan_web.jpg.pdf) (20 December 2013).

<sup>43</sup> “Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia,” *The Military Balance* (February 2013).

USD 169.4 million in 2013.<sup>45</sup> In sharp contrast, the Center for Military and Strategic Studies of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation provides a low figure of just USD 20 million for the same year.<sup>46</sup>

The Tajik military continues to be plagued by a lack of funding and resources.<sup>47</sup> Standing at about ten to thirty thousand men, depending on the estimate, and consisting of ground, air force, air defense and newly-established mobile rapid reaction forces, the Tajik military and security forces still employ a conscript system and have had difficulties responding rapidly and effectively to domestic security challenges.<sup>48</sup> As demonstrated by the 2010 counterinsurgency (COIN) operation in the Rasht Valley and the summer 2012 operation in Khorog, even in the domestic operating environment, the Tajik military has faced difficulties in conducting successful COIN operations. Both operations demonstrated the government's willingness to squash any internal insurrection, albeit with limited success, and were believed to have been conducted without proper regard for human rights.<sup>49</sup>

A detailed look at the 2012 Khorog operation highlights the current challenges facing the Tajik Armed Forces and Security Services tasked with quelling domestic unrest. In response to the killing of a national security official, General Abdullo Nazarov, the government dispatched about 3,000 security personnel to the Gorniy Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast in southeastern Tajikistan. On July 24, 2012, the government forces entered the capital of the Khorog region and fought groups of insurgents around the town's bread factory. The majority of experts agree that despite a relatively short fighting phase of the operation, which lasted less than 24 hours, the government forces were slow to react, showed complete incompetence in executing basic maneuver tasks and were forced to quickly seek a truce with their opponents. Given the distance between Khorog and Dushanbe (approximately 600 km over partially paved mountain roads) as well as an effective early-warning system employed by Pamiris, the operation was doomed. It did not achieve the element of surprise and resulted in numerous casualties on both sides. Unofficial accounts put the number of deaths at about twenty people on behalf of Pamiris and about as many, if not more, on the side of the government forces. The actions of the Tajik forces during both operations, specifically the units' inability to effectively call for fire, render timely first aid and execute command and control, underline the Tajik government's need to modernize its military and compel it to rely on CSTO forces (201st IN DIV) in the case of a wide-scale coordinated internal or external attack. The Russian 201st IN DIV (approximately 6,000 soldiers) occupies three bases in Tajikistan and is the largest Russian force outside of Russia. Russian troops serve to ensure the Tajik regime's survival in case of a national emergency and protect Russian regional

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<sup>44</sup> Email to the author from IHS Jane's Defense Budgets analyst.

<sup>45</sup> Alymbaeva, *Almanac 2012: Governing and Reforming Kyrgyzstan Security Sector*, 26.

<sup>46</sup> *Tajikistan at a Glance* (London: IHS Global Limited, 2011).

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.* and "Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia," 199-244.

<sup>48</sup> This assessment is based on conversations with several U.S. officials and local observers during the author's visit to Khorog in the Summer of 2013.

interests.<sup>50</sup> As a core CSTO force in Central Asia, the 201st IN DIV will likely play a larger role in defending Tajikistan following the ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014.

Tajikistan's heavy dependence on remittances from migrant workers in Russia, the government's realization of the shortcomings of its forces and perpetual concern about the destabilizing influence of a weak and unstable post-ISAF Afghanistan are all significant reasons why the country's leadership has sought a stronger security alliance with Russia within the CSTO. Additionally, as noted by Sebastien Peyrouse in his article on Russian military cooperation with Central Asia, "For Moscow, the security of the southern borders of Central Asia is seen as a question of domestic security."<sup>51</sup> In light of Moscow's renewed drive to increase influence over Central Asia and Dushanbe's recent extension of the basing agreement for the 201st IN DIV, as well as a possible basing of Russian military-transport aircraft on the recently Indian-renovated Ayni airbase, Russia pledged USD 200 million towards modernizing the Tajik military.<sup>52</sup> In September and October 2013, the CSTO's Secretary General Nikolay Bordyuzha and Russia's Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov confirmed that both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would be receiving various types of heavy military equipment in 2013-2014.<sup>53</sup> However, the fulfillment of this pledge is highly questionable. According to an article in the Russian *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie* in October, Russia's military industrial complex has thus far struggled with re-arming the CSTO militaries with new weaponry and is unlikely to promptly provide the promised equipment.<sup>54</sup>

While the U.S. has never had any bases in Tajikistan, it is helping the Tajik government prepare a battalion for eventual peacekeeping deployment and, in the process, professionalize the Tajik armed forces. In support of this initiative, the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation has directed Tajikistan's State Partnership Program training partner, the Virginia National Guard, to concentrate on teaching a designated Tajik peacekeeping unit first aid, operations in mountainous terrain, call for fire and basic surveillance/recon techniques. Tajikistan's defense ministry intends to host the next iteration of the main NATO Pfp exercise, "Mountain Eagle" (previously known as Kazakh-led "Steppe Eagle"), in Tajikistan in the fall of 2014 reflects Tajikistan's attempts to increase the

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<sup>49</sup> Gregory Gleason, "Why Russia is in Tajikistan," *Comparative Strategy*, 20, no. 1 (2001): 77-88.

<sup>50</sup> Dmitriy Trenin, Sebastien Peyrouse, "Central Asian Security Trends: Views from Europe and Russia," in *Russia-Central Asia: Advances and Shortcomings of the Military Partnership*, ed. Stephen J. Blank (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011), 1-34.

<sup>51</sup> "Central Asia's Military Shifts Strengthen Russian Ties," *The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief*, 15 August 2013.

<sup>52</sup> "Base Agreement Will Boost Russia-Tajikistan Relations," *The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief*, 9 October 2013.

<sup>53</sup> Vladimir Mukhin, "Ochen' Dorogaia Kollektivnaia Oborona (Very Expensive Collective Defense)," *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, 23 October 2013, available at [www.ng.ru/armies/2013-10-23/1\\_oborona.html](http://www.ng.ru/armies/2013-10-23/1_oborona.html).

readiness of its forces and willingness to further deepen its relationship with the U.S. in the security sphere.

The readiness and ability of the Tajik border guards to repel an organized terrorist attack from the south of the border is another cause of regional concern. Since 2005, Tajik border guards have been patrolling the Afghan border without the help of their Russian counterparts. Although the current manning of an average checkpoint, normally a platoon plus size element (about fifty personnel), deters small groups of terrorists and narcotraffickers from seeking confrontations with the border guards, it is unlikely to stop a coordinated insurgent attack with heavy weapons. Also, a lack of transportation questions the border guards' ability to prevent illegal border crossings. The issue of inadequate border security has not been lost on Russia, the U.S., China and India. All four states have tried to play a role in defending Tajikistan's southern borders.

Over the last ten years, under the auspices of its counter-narcotics program, the U.S. has transferred multiple vehicles, radios and supplies to the Tajik border guards. Currently, all border checkpoints have a functional means of communication with their regional headquarters and troops at some checkpoints capable of patrolling the border using U.S.-provided vehicles.

Apart from Russia and the U.S., India and China are two further states that play an active role in shaping the Tajik armed forces. Many young Tajik officers have had a chance to attend Indian defense colleges in order to learn English and Western military methodology. Additionally, India is in the process of giving Tajikistan two MI-17 transport helicopters and is finishing construction of a military hospital in Farkhor, southern Tajikistan. India has also renovated the aforementioned Ayni airbase. China's exact involvement in the defense sector is less clear. As of mid-2013, the Chinese have been constructing an operational center for the Tajik defense ministry in Dushanbe and inviting several Tajik officers to study in Chinese defense colleges.

A review of the current Tajik military capabilities concludes that, although in their current configuration the Tajik armed forces may be able to successfully quell another geographically isolated domestic insurgency such as Garm in 2010 or Khorog in 2012, the Tajik army and border guards would likely struggle to independently contain a wide-scale internal insurrection or stop a well-trained group of terrorists attempting to infiltrate the southern border of Tajikistan.

## **Turkmenistan**

Of all the Central Asian states, Turkmenistan has always been the least engaged in international security cooperation, sticking to its long-standing doctrine of positive neutrality. Turkmenistan is not a part of the CSTO or the SCO and enjoys only an unofficial associate membership in the CIS. However, since assuming control of Turkmenistan in 2006, President Gurbanguly Berdimukhamedov made some moderate efforts to become more active in the economic sphere and shift away from a strategy of international isolationism of the previous years. According to information provided in *The Military Balance* and used by Jim Nichol in his CRS report,

Turkmenistan's armed forces number about 22,000, including 18,500 ground, 3,000 air, and about 500 naval/coast guard forces. The army has about 700 tanks, 2,000 vehicles, and 560 artillery pieces, the air force has about 110 aircraft and helicopters, and the naval force has six patrol boats (including a former U.S. Coast Guard vessel). During 2011, Turkmenistan purchased four missile boats from Russia and Turkey, and the Russian boats reportedly have been delivered.<sup>55</sup>

As per Turkmenistan's January 2009 military doctrine outlined in IHS Jane's assessment, "the principal function of the armed forces is to repel external aggression. This is split into two missions: to protect the Caspian littoral and ensure that borders with Afghanistan and Iran are as robust as possible."<sup>56</sup> Turkmen defense policy does not have a role for the armed forces in responding to domestic instability and does not allow for any foreign bases to be established in the country. The ground forces are neither tasked nor equipped to project power beyond the country's borders. IHS Jane's assessment considers Turkmenistan's armed forces "among the weakest in the Central Asian region."<sup>57</sup> Defense spending is considered among the lowest in the region, estimated to be between USD 210 to USD 250 million in 2011, or about 0.5 percent of GDP (government budget figures are not public knowledge and there is a total dearth of information when it comes to all aspects of public spending).<sup>58</sup> Turkmenistan's military has had no operational experience since achieving independence and remains tactically weak and incapable. However, the Turkmen armed forces' overall lack of experience is mitigated by the fact that the threat of religious extremism and terrorism in Turkmenistan remains the lowest in the region.<sup>59</sup> Over the last five years, there have been no reported terrorist acts across the country.

As the majority of security issues facing the country are maritime and concentrated around dividing the Caspian energy-rich sea shelf between Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Iran, Turkmenistan's navy has been given considerably more attention than its air and land forces. Over the last three years Turkmenistan reinforced its Caspian naval capabilities by procuring several Russian and Turkish corvettes and patrol boats. When it comes to its ground forces, the situation differs greatly. The president's 2008 announcement about Turkmenistan's willingness to potentially participate in international peace-keeping activities appeared to be empty rhetoric and has not affected military planning.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Jim Nichol, *Turkmenistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/97-1055.pdf> (15 January 2014).

<sup>55</sup> *Turkmenistan Armed Forces* (London: IHS Global Limited, 2013).

<sup>56</sup> *Turkmenistan Executive Summary* (London: IHS Global Limited, 2012).

<sup>57</sup> "Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia", 199-244; and *Turkmenistan Defence Budget* (London, UK: IHS Global Limited, 2012).

<sup>58</sup> Many experts note that the absence of radicalism is largely due to the fact that a uniquely Turkmen brand of Islam is not particularly prone to radicalization. Additionally, the local security services closely monitor the society for any signs of dissatisfaction.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*



Although over the last four years Turkmenistan has purchased 40 Russian-made T-90S main battle tanks and Pechora-2M air defense missile systems, a general lack of training and operational experience paired with abstention from participation in any regional exercises have left the country's ground forces largely incapable of effectively responding to a conventional military threat, envisaged by its own doctrine.<sup>61</sup>

## Uzbekistan

In 2000 Uzbekistan adopted its latest security doctrine that still remains the cornerstone of its defense strategy. Along with the strategy for development of the armed forces updated in 2012, these documents outline Uzbekistan's national defense priorities.<sup>62</sup> Specifically, as noted in Eden Cole's work, the 2000 doctrine "classifies possible conflicts into small and middle range." The doctrine also identifies terrorism and religious extremism as key threats to national security but does not specify domestic sources of instability. It takes into account lessons learned during the Tajik civil war and instability in the Fergana Valley. The 2012 document reflects President Islam Karimov's strategy for further development of the armed forces. Specifically, according to IHS Jane's, in January 2012 President Karimov outlined the following priorities for military development: ensure constant combat readiness and increased mobility, upgrade and modernize military material, expand international military-technical cooperation, improve administrative networks and increase levels of professionalism among officers and sergeants.<sup>63</sup> Uzbekistan maintains a membership in the SCO but suspended its CSTO membership in June 2012. Uzbekistan reaffirmed its participation in NATO's PfP in 2010.

According to information provided in *The Military Balance* and used by Jim Nichol in his CRS report,

The Uzbek armed forces are the largest in the region in terms of manpower... The armed forces consist of about 24,500 ground force troops, 7,500 air force troops, and 16,000 joint troops. There are also up to 19,000 internal security (police) troops and 1,000 National Guard troops. Uzbekistan spent about 3.1 % (about \$1.4 billion) of its GDP in 2011 on the defense sector, which would be about 10 % of the budget.<sup>64</sup>

Jane's analysts agree with the defense spending numbers provided by CRS, further noting that spending on defense in 2013 appears to be around only 2.2 percent of GDP. Between 2011 and 2013, as overall government spending increased by 54.7 percent in

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<sup>60</sup> Aleksei Nikolskiy, "\$500 Million Worth of Tanks," *Vedomosti*, 14 February 2012, available at <http://www.ebiblioteka.ru/browse/doc/26608720> (8 November 2013); and "Turkmenistan Will Not Increase the Air Defense Cooperation with the CIS Countries," *RIA Novosti*, 11 July 2012, available at <http://ebiblioteka.ru/browse/doc/27397091> (2 November 2013).

<sup>61</sup> D. Azizov, "Uzbekistan Presents Army Development Strategy," *Trend*, 14 January 2014, available at <http://en.trend.az/regions/casia/uzbekistan/1979892.html> (8 January 2014).

<sup>62</sup> *Uzbekistan at a Glance* (London: IHS Global Limited, 2013).

<sup>63</sup> Jim Nichol, *Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests*, RS21238 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 2013), available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21238.pdf> (3 January 2014).

nominal terms, IHS Jane's expects that defense sector growth was similar.<sup>65</sup> The Russian estimates are in line with IISS and IHS Jane's figures (over USD 1.5 billion in 2012), according to the Center for Military and Strategic Studies of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.<sup>66</sup>

Experts agree that, with the exception of Kazakhstan, the Uzbek armed forces are also the second best trained military in the region. According to IHS Jane's assessment, the Uzbek military learned from the 2005 Andijan experience and improved its capabilities to conduct COIN operations: "The army's mobile forces command now controls a number of paramilitary units, including the special operations detachment 'Bars'."<sup>67</sup> Also, since 2005 the Uzbek armed forces have increased their rapid deployment capabilities, with air assault and airborne brigades likely being the units with improved readiness capacity.<sup>68</sup> While reflecting the absence of an existential threat to the regime, the Uzbek military's attempts to focus on COIN and counter-terror operations are primarily driven by the necessity of reacting to a potential threat from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Northern Afghanistan, face recurring tensions with Tajikistan over Uzbek gas supply, water sharing and border demarcation as well as socio-economic tensions between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the Fergana valley.<sup>69</sup> At the same time, Uzbekistan's suspension of its CSTO membership in June 2012, along with President Karimov's pledge to never deploy Uzbek forces, have limited Uzbekistan's military's exposure to the current operational environment and the country's ability to learn from the experience of other militaries. The SCO exercise, Vostok Anti-Terror 2012, held in the Jizzah region of Uzbekistan in June 2012 and aimed at improving coordination between SCO units in case of a terrorist attack, was the last regional exercise with Uzbek participation.<sup>70</sup> Uzbekistan only sent observers to the most recent SCO military exercise held in Kazakhstan in June 2013.

Throughout its post-independence history, Uzbekistan has run a nuanced foreign policy, often playing the U.S. against Russia and vice versa. U.S. critique of the Uzbek government crackdown in Andijan in 2005 resulted in deterioration of the U.S.-Uzbekistan relationship and cessation of significant military-to-military cooperation in the mid-2000s. President Karimov's 2008 decision to allow the U.S. to transport non-lethal supplies to and from Afghanistan through its territory as part of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) signaled the latest rapprochement between the two countries. While it remains to be seen how long the current cordial phase of the bilateral U.S.-Uzbekistan relationship lasts, thus far Uzbek cooperation and pledges to keep the NDN going have made it possible to reinstate military-to-military cooperation in the non-lethal sphere.

Following suspension of its CSTO membership in June 2012, Uzbekistan's leadership has taken deliberate steps to ensure the preservation of at least a semblance of a

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<sup>64</sup> Email to the author from IHS Jane's Defense Budgets analyst.

<sup>65</sup> Alymbaeva, *Almanac 2012: Governing and Reforming Kyrgyzstan Security Sector*, 26.

<sup>66</sup> *World Armies – Uzbekistan* (London: IHS Global Limited, 2013).

<sup>67</sup> *Uzbekistan at a Glance* (London: IHS Global Limited, 2013).

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>69</sup> *World Armies – Uzbekistan* (London: IHS Global Limited, 2013).

friendly partnership with Russia. During his visit to Moscow in April 2013, President Karimov highlighted a critical need for bilateral cooperation in the security field, pointing out the eventuality of increased regional instability after the ISAF withdrawal as a reason for enhanced cooperation with Russia.<sup>71</sup> As pointed out by Roger McDermott, “Karimov wants to deepen an already robust level of intelligence sharing and cooperation with Moscow...”<sup>72</sup> However, given the recent history of Uzbek mistrust of any Russian-dominated military alliances, such as the CSTO, any concrete military-to-military cooperation with Russian forces, including joint military exercises, appears unlikely, at least prior to the withdrawal of ISAF forces. Sebastien Peyrose notes that over the last fifteen years, from the Russian standpoint Uzbekistan has been difficult to control.<sup>73</sup> Extensive security cooperation with Uzbekistan also risks potentially upsetting the Russian relationship with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, its primary Central Asian “client states,” which have ongoing border and water sharing disputes with Uzbekistan.<sup>74</sup>

Uzbekistan’s leadership’s continuous emphasis on military reform and efforts to modernize its forces instills moderate optimism in the country’s ability to contain internal insurgency and terrorist threats while also dealing effectively with any instability on its borders. Also, there is no reason to question the government’s determination to use troops to put down any internal insurrection, regardless of external criticism, just as it demonstrated in 2005 in Andijan. However, widespread regional instability would likely challenge even the state’s ability to effectively protect its borders and would potentially force the regime to look for external help. Although the U.S.-Uzbekistan relationship is on the rise again, the future of the long-term bilateral partnership remains fraught with contention. As the operations tempo in Afghanistan slows down and the amount of cargo transported through the NDN decreases, the U.S. is likely to struggle with justifying providing even non-lethal assistance waivers to Uzbekistan. As previously mentioned, when it comes to the military, Uzbekistan’s nuanced foreign policy of maneuvering and picking and choosing its allies has already negatively affected its armed forces and may lead to eventual stagnation within the services.

### **Internal Conflicts Versus National Security Doctrines**

With the exception of Turkmenistan, all the Central Asian militaries have doctrinal obligations, have had experience with responding to domestic inter-ethnic conflicts or were

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<sup>70</sup> Dadan Upadhyay, “Russia, Uzbekistan Agree to Join Hands to Meet Afghanistan Threats,” *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 2013, available at [http://indrus.in/world/2013/04/18/russia\\_uzbekistan\\_agree\\_to\\_join\\_hands\\_to\\_meet\\_afghanistan\\_threats\\_23905.html](http://indrus.in/world/2013/04/18/russia_uzbekistan_agree_to_join_hands_to_meet_afghanistan_threats_23905.html) (26 January 2014).

<sup>71</sup> Roger McDermott, “Tashkent Strengthens Security Ties with Moscow Ahead of NATO Drawdown,” *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 10, no. 36 (2013), 23 April 2013, available at [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\\_cache=1&tx\\_ttnews\[tt\\_news\]=40772&tx\\_ttnews\[backPid\]=7&cHash=3f066ae3ba9455daacbccef05128152fe](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40772&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=3f066ae3ba9455daacbccef05128152fe) (22 January 2014).

<sup>72</sup> Trenin and Peyrouse, “Central Asian Security Trends: Views from Europe and Russia.”

<sup>73</sup> Alexander Hramchihin, “Slaboe Zveno Centralinoy Azii (The Weak Link of Central Asia),” *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, 10 November 2013, available at [www.ng.ru/realty/2013-10-11/3\\_odkb.html](http://www.ng.ru/realty/2013-10-11/3_odkb.html) (12 November 2013).

involved in quelling civil unrest and instability. Although the degree of success has varied by country, some operational lessons learned apply region-wide and highlight the need for developing similar capacities. While the Kazakh and Uzbek militaries have shown some capacity to contain internal or external crisis on their own (albeit brutally and in a repressive fashion), Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have struggled to respond to their respective internal challenges and inevitably sought increased cooperation with Russia and the CSTO. Turkmenistan has remained outside of all regional alliances, its military remaining a mostly obsolete force with no tactical expertise.

Kazakhstan's hydrocarbon wealth has allowed it to initiate an ambitious rearmament and modernization program while achieving moderate changes across its armed forces and further developing its most regionally advanced peacekeeping capacity. An eventuality of instability spreading to Kazakhstan from a neighboring country (2010 events in Kyrgyzstan could have potentially caused unrest in Kazakhstan), as well as a need to respond to an incident of domestic civil unrest similar to Zhanozen in December 2011, led to the regional realignment of forces as well as an additional focus on developing airlift, airborne and special forces capabilities. Despite huge discrepancies between elite airmobile forces and regular units, Kazakhstan's armed and security services appear somewhat better trained, and definitely better equipped, than its neighbors to handle internal unrest or a crisis on its borders. Internationally, Kazakh multi-vector foreign policy has afforded the country the maintenance of robust security cooperation with all of its foreign partners.

Faced with continuous political instability, the turmoil of two revolutions and inter-ethnic strife in 2010, the Kyrgyz state has been consistently unable to devote sufficient resources to its struggling and tactically incapable armed and security services. Kyrgyzstan's current defense posture emphasizes an increased reliance on the CSTO and Russia as ultimate guarantors of its peace and stability. The Kyrgyz military brass does not plan on conducting independent maneuvers or fully-fledged military operations. A recent deal with Russia on the Kant airbase and an expected procurement of a substantial amount of Russian heavy weapons highlights the current emphasis on increasing security cooperation with Russia. Additionally, with the U.S. getting ready to close the Manas Training Center and possibly significantly downsize its already modest security cooperation with Kyrgyzstan, Russian and CSTO influence over the security sector can be expected to grow.

In Tajikistan, the latest COIN experiences of Rasht Valley in 2010 and Khorog in 2012 revealed the overall tactical incompetence of the Tajik armed and security forces. The inherent difficulties of operating in restrictive mountainous terrain coupled with troops' lack of operational experience underscored a critical need for the significant enhancement of basic infantry and medical skills along with a development of airlift and air-assault capabilities. As the country is projected to remain in dire economic straits and lack the financial means to modernize its military on its own, it is likely to continue relying on the Russian 201st IN DIV as the ultimate guarantor of its security, while also attempting to slowly develop a peacekeeping battalion with U.S. help. At the same time, in preparation for the "doomsday Afghanistan post-2014 scenario" the country's border

guards will continue to be reinforced by regular army units. In these terms, receiving assistance from both Russia and the U.S. will remain important to the country's ability to stem a potential Taliban offensive.

Despite recent efforts by Turkmenistan's government to shore up its Caspian naval capabilities, Turkmenistan remains a largely marginal player in the Central Asian security realm. Protected by its doctrine of positive neutrality, the Turkmen military is only tasked with defending the state's sovereignty against external aggression, a task that, under current circumstances, it is unlikely to handle effectively. The absence of any operational experience and modern military equipment as well as an abstention from all regional military cooperation leaves the Turkmen military unprepared to deal with any external threats. However, the situation is mitigated by a perceived lack of religious extremism and external danger.

In Uzbekistan, the relative success of the armed forces' modernization efforts rooted in the need to contain the ever-looming IMU threat and its experience of responding to the 2005 Andijan crisis instill moderate optimism in the country's ability to handle a variety of domestic security challenges. Although Uzbekistan's security services' handling of the Andijan crisis was brutal and repressive, it proved effective and brought to the forefront a need for increased rapid deployment capabilities and focus on COIN operations. At the same time, the scenario of a mass insurrection in the Fergana Valley would probably challenge Uzbekistan's forces' capacity for effective independent response and potentially lead to a sparking of wider regional instability.

### **Policy Implications for Military-to-Military Cooperation with the U.S.**

As the U.S. is considering the best and most inexpensive ways of stabilizing Central Asia after the withdrawal of ISAF forces from Afghanistan, U.S. security policy towards Central Asia will continue adapting to the changing regional dynamics.

The current unstable security situation in Tajikistan dictates that the U.S. maintains the current level of engagements with the Tajik military and continues developing Tajik peacekeeping and border protection capacities. Tajikistan's decision to host the 2014 "Mountain Eagle" exercise is expected to be an important military-to-military event serving to further enhance the current level of cooperation.

In Uzbekistan, the usage of the NDN will likely continue affecting the overall level of cooperation with the U.S. Although an eventual decrease in NDN usage along with another situation involving a violation of human rights would complicate the security and military-to-military cooperation, abandoning Uzbekistan would risk leaving U.S. unprepared to deal with the possible global consequences of a potential explosion in the Central Asia's most volatile region of Fergana Valley.

Kazakhstan's successful conduct of true multi-vector foreign policy compels the U.S. to stay involved in its current advisory role and continue emphasizing developing an already robust, by regional standards, peacekeeping capacity. At the same time, given Kazakhstan's ability to finance its own military without foreign help and a perceived lack of future wide-scale internal instability, it is unrealistic to expect the current level of security cooperation to increase in the short to medium term.

The 2014 closure of Manas Transit Center coupled with an increasing Russian involvement in the Kyrgyz security sphere make an increase in the military-to-military cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and the U.S. all but impossible. While Kyrgyzstan continues to face multiple internal and border security issues, U.S. military-to-military cooperation will likely remain limited and even be further reduced from current levels.

Turkmenistan's self-imposed doctrine of positive neutrality will continue to keep the level of military-to-military cooperation with the U.S. at its current low. Turkmenistan's largely moribund military will likely remain internationally isolated and not become involved in any regional exercises.

# NATO, Russia and European Security: Lessons Learned from Conflicts in Kosovo and Libya

*Philip Spassov* \*

**Abstract:** The essay analyses the role of NATO in the post-Cold War period by conducting a comparison of the cases of NATO's operations in Kosovo and Libya. The article reveals the enhanced weight of the Alliance member states and the European countries' active role in protecting their regional interests and also show how the state interests of the USA and Russia played a significant role in the two cases. This analysis of the behavioral patterns of the former Cold War adversaries could provide a useful interpretation and perhaps an explanation of the current events in Ukraine. The pursuit of power continues to dominate the international relations arena as the confrontation between the USA and Russia is far from over.

**Keywords:** European security, power politics, geopolitical influence, national interest.

## Introduction

European security has a rich history of violent and destructive conflicts. It has gone through countless state-to-state wars, two World Wars, the ideological confrontation of the two superpowers during the Cold War period, and the new threats of terrorism and ethnic violence in the modern era. In the twenty-first century, Europeans face a number of new security challenges, such as regional conflicts and genocide, terrorism, economic, technological and energy issues, all of which affect European security.

With the end of the Cold War, NATO experienced a major transformation. The Alliance's decision-makers acknowledged that, with the disappearance of the Soviet Union, new threats had emerged. It was essential for European security that NATO should develop a strategy for tackling future security threats. This strategy engaged NATO in numerous assignments that would ensure the protection of western-projected democracy.

In other words, NATO remains the main factor for European and regional security. The Alliance's recent missions and expansion could lead the organization even to a global role in the future. NATO stands as a pillar of European security and defends western values and interests.

As international security is the most important global issue there are several political theories that emphasize the importance of providing better comprehension. The understanding of global security matters has been best explained by the international relations

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theory of realism.<sup>1</sup> According to this theory, which has long dominated the study of international relations:

Despite the end of the cold war, the basic structure of the international system remains largely unchanged. States are still the key actors in world politics, and they continue to operate in an anarchic system.<sup>2</sup>

Its explanations of security competition among great powers remain applicable and provide a logical explanation to the events in the international arena nowadays. The traditional security focus on nation-states and power remain central for international relations regardless of all the changes in the global order in the last 60 years.<sup>3</sup> Despite being strongly criticized after the end of the Cold War, realism should not be underestimated or neglected for international relations. Realism can offer a lot to political analysts because the major powers will continue to compete for supremacy and wars will continue to occur.

This essay analyzes the role of NATO in the post-Cold War period and the importance of how powerful states' interests are concerned, mainly the USA and Russia. Within this framework, the cases of the Kosovo crisis and the Libya uprising will be compared. European security was threatened in similar ways during these two conflicts. Although violations of human rights and crimes against humanity were the official reasons for the military interventions of NATO, the present article will also show how these conflicts affected the interests of the major NATO members and of Russia.

It will be argued that state interests and competition between the major powers in the global arena remained essential and that the USA and Russia took similar approaches to resolve the European security crisis without disregarding their national interests.

The comparative case study method is used here, since it is not limited in terms of descriptive or explanatory goals and, therefore, it is useful for a deeper analysis using the similarities or differences of the cases. Comparative case studies are particularly useful for the study of change over time. The review of the cases over a given period of time will show a specific trend and whether this has changed.

Furthermore, the operations in both cases would be used for examining the new purposes and goals of NATO and whether the organization has become more efficient and capable in the period between the two wars.

In order to illustrate the behavior of the USA and its Allies and Russia, the realism theory will be used, since its relevance in international politics has not waned. On the contrary, its basic ideas still remain essential nowadays. According to realist logic, the state remains the main actor in contemporary international relations. States control most of the planet's military power and resources and they issue world currencies. International organizations are formed by states and they are governed by states. They depend

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<sup>1</sup> Sean Kay, *Global Security in the Twenty-First Century: The Quest for Power and the Search for Peace* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), 16.

<sup>2</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, *Realism, the Real World, and the Academy*, in *Millennial Reflections on International Studies* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), 26.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.



on the military power and economic support of the states as well as on state's territory on which they operate. Therefore, from a realistic perspective, international organizations could be successful only if they are backed by powerful states.<sup>4</sup>

States are still considered the main actors and they assess their security needs in terms of power.<sup>5</sup> Security competition evolved from traditional military armament to researching advanced technologies, competition for markets and strategic resources. This competition is likely to continue, as great powers will pursue economic gains and power distribution to achieve a dominant position within the global system.<sup>6</sup>

The new threats in international relations in the twenty-first century, namely terrorism, global warming, overpopulation and regional conflicts, no matter how serious and how difficult to resolve, do not pose a sufficient threat for the existence of any of the major states.<sup>7</sup> However, they pose an exceptional threat to human security, development and human rights.

International organizations are dependent on the self-interest of great powers and have little impact on state behavior.<sup>8</sup> This means that international organizations are interpreted as tools in the power competition between the most advanced countries and for achieving their national interests. Especially when it comes to security issues, realism theory explains international politics in a clear and simplified way. States aim to maximize their power and influence over the other states. Every state competes with others, aiming to acquire more power and influence over them, because this is the best way to ensure its future. The best outcome for a state's survival is to end up as the hegemon in the system.<sup>9</sup> This would lead to maximizing the power of one state at the expense of the other major powers. The United States and NATO represent a significant example of this.

### **Background of the Conflicts: Kosovo**

Kosovo is located in the southwestern part of the Balkan Peninsula. The region was part of Serbia within former Yugoslavia. It is inhabited mainly by ethnic Albanians and its territory has been disputed between Serbs and Albanians for generations. Before 1989 Kosovo enjoyed a relatively high degree of autonomy in Yugoslavia, but with the election of Slobodan Milošević things rapidly changed. Kosovo's autonomy ceased as the territory was put under the direct command of Belgrade. This led to organized protests of thousands of Albanians demanding more civil rights and freedom. Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo were isolated and separated. This increased the number of protesters demanding autonomy and independent governance. More than 400 000 Kosovo Albanians

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<sup>4</sup> J. Samuel Barkin, *International Organization: Theories and Institutions* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 8.

<sup>5</sup> Kay, *Global Security in the Twenty-First Century*, 33.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 36.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 331.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 337.

ans fled because of the oppression and the rapidly deteriorating socio-economic conditions. Passive opposition and peaceful protests were soon replaced by violence as nationalistic movements in Kosovo spurred further tension. The situation became very unstable and escalated into armed clashes between Albanian and Serbian military and police forces.<sup>10</sup>

The international community condemned the escalation and called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of Serbian forces, fearing that the conflict could spread to other regions in the Balkans. The UN Security Council adopted resolution 1199 in September 1998 condemning “all acts of violence by any party, as well as terrorism in pursuit of political goals.”<sup>11</sup> It was later followed by another resolution (1203 from October 1998) calling for immediate ceasefire and the establishing of an observer mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).<sup>12</sup>

Despite these measures, the situation intensified in 1999 and numerous clashes occurred. The presence of OSCE observers prevented some incidents but the situation deteriorated further. Diplomatic talks ground to a halt and Serb forces increased their military presence in Kosovo. The USA issued an ultimatum to Milošević but he did not comply with it and on 23 March NATO’s Operation Allied Force commenced. It lasted for seventy-seven days and ended on 10 June 1999.

The results of the clashes between Serb military forces and Kosovo Albanians were reportedly around 3,400 missing and a total of more than 13,000 killed (mainly Albanians), according to a document published by the International Committee of the Red Cross.<sup>13</sup> By November 1999, around eight hundred thousand refugees had returned to their homes.<sup>14</sup>

## **Background of the Conflicts: Libya**

Libya is located in the northern part of the African continent and was ruled by Colonel Muammar Al-Qaddafi for more that four decades. He came into power after a coup against King Idris and his willingness to kill civilians that threaten his position was well known to the international community. His leadership of the country, which included banning political parties and sponsoring terrorism, was always controversial. Also, Colonel Qaddafi was often accused of siphoning off much of the profits from oil exports, the main source of revenue for the country, for himself and his family.<sup>15</sup>

The recent events in Libya were part of the Arab Spring processes that spurred over the North African states in 2011. Following the democratic changes in Egypt and Tuni-

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<sup>10</sup> *Historical Overview NATO's role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo*, NATO official statement, 15 July 1999.

<sup>11</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 1199 (1998).

<sup>12</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 1203 (1998).

<sup>13</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yugoslavia, “Provisional Assessment of Civilian Casualties and Destruction in the Territory of the FRY from 24 March to 8 June 1999” (8 June 1999), 24-26.

<sup>14</sup> US State Department Report, December 1999.

<sup>15</sup> Anup Shah, “Crisis in Libya,” *Global Issues* (April 2011), 2.

sia, the people of Libya likewise wished to turn their back to the oppressive regime of Muammar Al-Qaddafi. However, their hopes for a peaceful transition of power did not come true. Qaddafi's dictatorial regime reacted to the protests with the use of violence, threatening to kill all dissidents. The situation continued to escalate and the clashes between Qaddafi's forces and protesters became a serious threat to both human rights and the stability of the region. Thousands of refugees fled to neighboring countries as their lives were in danger. The UN reacted quickly and imposed an arms embargo and a no-fly zone, banning all flights over Libyan airspace except those for humanitarian aid purposes.<sup>16</sup> UN resolution 1973 condemned the human rights violations, torture and executions, and allowed an intervention by the international community. NATO responded and on 22 March started Operation Unified Protector. The operation aimed to protect the civilian population of Libya by enforcing the arms embargo and no-fly zone. Throughout the conflict, the Alliance was in close contact with the UN, the Arab League and other international partners. This essentially contributed to the efficiency and success of the operation. Furthermore, NATO helped to overthrow Qaddafi's regime by conducting air strikes against military forces that were threatening protesters in areas populated by civilians.<sup>17</sup> The operation ended on 21 October 2011, a day after the opposition captured and executed Qaddafi. The casualties of the conflict were estimated to be around 20,000 with many more wounded or chased away from their homes.<sup>18</sup>

### NATO's Role Reviewed

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a military institution the role of which has changed over its more than sixty years of history. In the twenty-first century, when the United States is the sole dominant superpower, NATO is seen as a hegemonic tool for the pursuit of American national interests.<sup>19</sup> The military operations in Iraq, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya gained strategic influence and accumulated assets for the USA and, in smaller part, for the western European allies. It is no secret that all the aforementioned states, except Kosovo, possess significant reserves of oil and natural gas.

Furthermore, one could argue that NATO's security policy in Europe consists in serving Washington's interests in order to constrain Germany and Russia as security competitors.<sup>20</sup> The United States' interests in Europe are essential in order to maintain its world supremacy. Establishing a strong military presence and eastward enlargement are also steps towards limiting Russia's strategic positions in Europe. As Kenneth Waltz noted, "The effort to maintain dominance stimulates some countries to work to over-

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<sup>16</sup> NATO official report on Libya, May 2011.

<sup>17</sup> NATO official report on Libya, May 2011.

<sup>18</sup> Paul Rogers, *The Casualties of War: Libya and Beyond*, Oxford Research Group, 7 July 2011, available at [www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/casualties-of-war-libya-and-beyond](http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/casualties-of-war-libya-and-beyond) (13 May 2014).

<sup>19</sup> Alexandra Gheciu, *NATO in the New Europe: The Politics of International Socialization after the Cold War* (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 214.

<sup>20</sup> Kay, *Global Security in the Twenty-First Century*, 41.

come it.”<sup>21</sup> And yet, no one has challenged America’s dominance and NATO’s role in the post-Cold War era.

NATO’s dialogue with Ukraine, Georgia and the Mediterranean countries further extends its transatlantic influence and disturbs Russian interests. This hegemony of the United States has a positive influence over the new members and the strategic partners of NATO. By promoting western values and democratic norms, it has opened a door for economic cooperation and thus accelerated states’ development. Security aside, this is one of the main reasons why many of the former Soviet allies declared their desire to join the Alliance.

The Alliance has offered partnerships for peace and consultations to all former Warsaw Treaty members and conducted talks with Mediterranean and Middle Eastern states for possible future cooperation.<sup>22</sup> The North-Atlantic Treaty Organization has been preserved and transformed in such a way as to tackle new issues and threats in the aftermath of the Cold War era. Former secretary general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated that the Alliance share common visions and ideas:

Europe and North America can disagree, sometimes quite strongly, but they remain the world’s closest community – not only in trade or shared security interests, but also in common values.<sup>23</sup>

NATO is still an important player in international affairs because the USA maintains its interest to keep the organization intact. NATO also serves the interests of its European members as it allows them to focus on development and cooperation, as well as on resolving national matters. Although many researchers consider NATO’s existence to be unnecessary in the post-Cold War period, we can only speculate what consequences its dismantling would have. The United States maintain its strategic influence in Europe and in the Mediterranean and use NATO to preserve its national interests as a superpower. On the other hand, European allies require US military support in order to feel safe and protected from any threats, including one from among themselves. Thus, European states can implement their beautiful project for a united Europe. Moreover, America and the EU share a common vision of NATO’s existence and expansion. NATO serves the interests of its members by protecting their shared traditions and western values.<sup>24</sup>

NATO’s military operations, no matter how criticized they might have been, provide stability and guarantee security across the continent. The shared vision of its members and the effective methods for tackling new security threats show that NATO will be an important part of the international security in the future.

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<sup>21</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” *International Security* 25 (Summer 2000), 37.

<sup>22</sup> Sten Rynning, *NATO Renewed: The Power and Purpose of Transatlantic Cooperation* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 1.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>24</sup> Rynning, *NATO Renewed*, 4.

## The Crisis in Yugoslavia: Kosovo War and NATO's Intervention

NATO remains the main provider of security in Europe in the post–Cold War period. One of the most notable examples of its changed role was the operation undertaken against the Serbian authorities in the Kosovo War in 1999. NATO went to war for the first time in its history against the leadership of Slobodan Milošević.<sup>25</sup> The ethnic crisis in Kosovo was a considerable challenge for the Alliance. Human rights violations and atrocities against the Albanian population in the Kosovo region had put Europe on the brink of disaster. For the European members of NATO and their respective governments the stakes were extremely high as a result of the high expectations from their own voters. Moreover, NATO's existence and, more importantly, NATO's purpose, had been questioned since the end of the Cold War. Therefore, the organization had to respond to the crisis in Yugoslavia.

After the escalation of the conflict, US and European leaders condemned the violence and implemented measures to restore international peace and security. Although legitimized by humanitarian reasons, an intervention did not receive UN approval because of the vetoes of Russia and China.<sup>26</sup> Despite this, NATO started air strikes against Serbian authorities on 24 March 1999. Russia strongly criticized the operation because it bypassed the UN Security Council and it was a violation of both international law and Serbia's sovereignty, since Kosovo was part of its borders.<sup>27</sup> The military actions of NATO and the US government concerned the other major powers in the world, most notably Russia. On the other hand, "[m]any in the United States and Europe were stunned in turn at the extreme nature of Russia's reaction, since NATO's goal—as defined by NATO—was to stop genocide."<sup>28</sup>

From the Russian perspective the war in Kosovo was a projection of American imperialism aiming to establish a strategic presence in the region. The tension between the USA and Russia reached its highest level since the Cold War era. The situation became more complicated with the deployment of a small Russian contingent at the airport of Pristina, the capital of the Kosovo region. If the Russians had been able to fly in reinforcements, they could have secured part of Kosovo for the Serbs, thus destabilizing NATO's command.<sup>29</sup> The crisis of 1999 appeared to be much more than a peacekeeping mission, since it involved the regional interests of the great powers, the United States and Russia.

Was European security threatened in the case of Kosovo? Simply put, it was, and this is true for several significant reasons.

First, NATO had to restore peace in the region and make sure that violence does not spread to other regions. Tension had been building up since 1989 in the predominantly

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<sup>25</sup> James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, *Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy Toward Russia after the Cold War* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2003), 247.

<sup>26</sup> Rynning, *NATO Renewed*, 72.

<sup>27</sup> Goldgeier and McFaul, *Power and Purpose*, 247.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 247.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 266.

Albanian inhabited Kosovo region. Diplomacy measures failed to stop the violence and NATO started an air-strike campaign to persuade Milosevic to end the violent outrage. According to NATO's official position on the conflict, the political objectives of the air campaign were to stop all military and repressive actions; to withdraw armed forces and position an international contingent; to guarantee the safe return of all refugees and to establish a political agreement complied with international law and the UN.<sup>30</sup>

Second, the Alliance had to operate without UN Security Council approval, which is a major violation of international laws and increased even further the diplomatic pressure on NATO. The United States and the United Nations attempted to stop the violence perpetrated against Kosovo Albanians by the Yugoslav government during the year before war.<sup>31</sup> UN Security Council resolution 1160, adopted in March 1998, condemned the violence and put in place an arms embargo, while advocating the autonomy of Kosovo.<sup>32</sup> After discussing the matter, the USA and Russia passed another resolution within the UN, the Security Council resolution 1199, "calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of Yugoslav security forces from the province, as well as access to Kosovo for nongovernmental and humanitarian organizations."<sup>33</sup> Despite all these precautionary actions violence continued and the crisis deepened. Russia supported the UN talks for a ceasefire and issuing resolutions, but it strongly opposed the use of force. Milošević did not comply with UN resolutions and NATO launched air strikes without the official agreement of all UN Security Council members as a result of Russia's veto. The intervention in Kosovo, without UN Security Council authorization and in violation of a state's sovereignty, was ambiguous for international diplomacy.<sup>34</sup> This compromise could allow the USA to conduct more operations outside its Alliance territories in the future without Security Council approval.<sup>35</sup> From a realist point of view, NATO's new tasks and purposes serve as a perfect cover for the pursuit of US national interests. As realism theory explains, powerful states strive to maximize their power and influence. The case of Kosovo allows the United States to increase its influence on the Balkans at the expense of Russia. An escalation in the region would also accelerate the eastward expansion of NATO, with the admission of Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria to the Alliance, and increase the zone of stability. As a result, the Alliance would increase its military capabilities, territory and influence.

Third, the United States and its allies had to be very careful with Russia's interests in the region because, in a worst-case scenario, the crisis could have triggered an even larger conflict. Russia supported Yugoslavia and established and preserved its influence and interests in the region during the Cold War. The crisis in Kosovo strained US–Russian relations to a critical level for the first time since the crisis in Hungary and in

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<sup>30</sup> Goldgeier and McFaul, *Power and Purpose*, 249.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 249-250.

<sup>32</sup> Peter van Ham and Sergei Medvedev, *Mapping European Security after Kosovo* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 93.

<sup>33</sup> Goldgeier and McFaul, *Power and Purpose*, 249-250.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 266.

<sup>35</sup> Rynning, *NATO Renewed*, 87.

Czechoslovakia in the Cold War period. Just over a year before the Kosovo war, NATO and Russia had signed the Founding Act for cooperation, but Russia's negative behavior could not be easily offset. The idea at the basis of the creation of such a partnership after the Bosnia War (1995) was to prevent cases of crisis like the one in Kosovo.<sup>36</sup> This cooperation failed when it was put to the test of Kosovo war as a result of a conflict of interests. Although the crisis did not threaten vital security interests for preserving the national sovereignty of the two superpowers, the positions of Moscow and Washington confronted and all forms of cooperation between them faded. This is another example that shows that states cooperate with each other when they have a mutual benefit, but cooperation fails when there is a conflict of interests.

The conflict in Kosovo was the first real collision of interests between the Cold War adversaries. Russia was a long-time strategic ally of Yugoslavia and NATO's military intervention was not well received by Moscow. However, a major conflict between the two powers was avoided due to Russia's economic and military weakness and the policy of President Boris Yeltsin.<sup>37</sup> The Kosovo crisis escalated the tension in the relations between the two countries, and the future expansion of NATO did not favor their improvement. In fact, the distance between the two major powers increased and Russian political elites remained opposed to NATO actions more than ten years later, as the case of Libya shows.<sup>38</sup>

The Kosovo war was an important case for NATO, since the organization had struggled to prove its transformed role after the end of the Cold War. With many specialists criticizing its continued existence, the Alliance needed to prove that it was capable of resolving security threats and conflicts elsewhere. The interests of the USA, along with the shared norms and values for the promotion of democracy, remain as a base for NATO's future actions and cooperation. In President Clinton's own words, "[w]hat NATO did here this weekend, was to reaffirm our commitment to a common future, rooted in common humanity."<sup>39</sup> The explanation given for NATO's undertaking actions outside the UN Security Council mandate was the need to protect the western values on which NATO was founded.<sup>40</sup>

NATO is a key organization in tackling external threats, but in Moscow's view NATO's actions in Kosovo aimed to enhance the US influence on the Balkans. Clearly, Russia regarded the US-led NATO peacekeeping operation in Kosovo as an extension of the US sphere of influence to the Balkans – a region historically dominated by Russia. This argument was strongly supported by NATO's acquisition of three central European states less than two weeks before the conflict.<sup>41</sup> Russian decision-makers considered

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<sup>36</sup> Goldgeier and McFaul, *Power and Purpose*, 248.

<sup>37</sup> Oksana Antonenko, "Russia, NATO and European Security after Kosovo," *Survival* 41, no. 4 (Winter 1999-2000), 124-44.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> USIS Washington File, *Remarks by the President at the Close of the Washington Summit*, EPF108, 26 April 1999.

<sup>40</sup> Rynning, *NATO Renewed*, 86-87.

<sup>41</sup> Goldgeier and McFaul, *Power and Purpose*, 249.

NATO a political organization that aims its operations in accordance with the interests of the United States.

Russia's authority took a severe blow during the Kosovo crisis because its veto in the Security Council of the UN was ignored.<sup>42</sup> That left Russian leaders with not many options but to offer diplomatic support to the military operation and to bring Milošević regime to an end. President Yeltsin did not take any measures to balance against NATO in Serbia, which showed the Russian leader's desire to maintain close relations with Washington, but also the significant decline of Russia's power and influence in the international arena. The actions of the US leaders in Kosovo and NATO's eastward expansion provided another nail in the coffin of US-Russian relations.

If NATO's intervention had been postponed or had not taken place and Russian interests had prevailed, the results for the Balkans would have been catastrophic. Ethnic violence would have spurred in other parts of the peninsula with disastrous consequences for European security. Failure to take action in the Kosovo crisis would have been deleterious for the region, for Europe as a continent and also for the USA and Russia.<sup>43</sup> Therefore, NATO had to create and implement a successful plan in Kosovo that would restore peace and stability and would enhance the authority of the highly criticized institution.

NATO's intervention in Kosovo was successful and saved countless of innocent lives, but only because the Serbian regime was no match for NATO military capabilities and had no nuclear weapons.<sup>44</sup> There were human rights violations in Chechnya and the Caucasus, too, but the USA and other major states could do little because of the nuclear power of Russia. "States take up human rights only if doing so does not contradict the pursuit of power,"<sup>45</sup> and this is why many conflicts in the world remain unsolved and violence continues to emerge.

The war in Kosovo allowed the USA to broaden its influence in a region in which it faced serious opposition, and ultimately to establish its international influence. The renewed role of NATO in protecting western ideology and values is successful because the USA continues to claim benefit.<sup>46</sup> The Alliance serves the interests of its most powerful member and for this reason preserves peace and development in conflict areas like Kosovo. Peace and stability in Kosovo would not have been achieved through diplomatic actions and sanctions alone:

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 249.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 251.

<sup>44</sup> Robert D. Kaplan, "Why John J. Mearsheimer is Right (About Some Things)," *The Atlantic* (January/February 2012), available at [www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/01/why-john-j-mearsheimer-is-right-about-some-things/308839](http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/01/why-john-j-mearsheimer-is-right-about-some-things/308839) (13 May 2014).

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Goldgeier and McFaul, *Power and Purpose*, 249.



NATO prevailed in Kosovo because the United States invested heavily in the air campaign and because the fear of failure took hold of all allies who became convinced that Milošević's victory would spell NATO's demise.<sup>47</sup>

NATO's role in the post-Cold War era would indeed be considered irrelevant and unnecessary if it had failed to achieve victory in Yugoslavia. Neither the UN nor the OSCE were capable of handling an armed conflict as serious as the Kosovo crisis. The UN's lack of authority confirmed the realist theory that the international system represents anarchy and there is not a single legitimate institution that could prevent the occurrence of war.

European security was threatened even if some would argue that the conflict was merely regional and did not endanger the major European powers directly. It was NATO that restored security and promoted peace, despite the fact that the casualties and damage to infrastructure exceeded initial expectations. The successful military operation in Kosovo guaranteed the primacy of NATO in Europe's future.<sup>48</sup>

### **NATO's Operation Unified Protector in Libya**

The case of Libya as part of the Arab Spring created serious issues for European Security. The proximity of the North African state to Europe faced NATO decision makers with the possibility of another "out of borders" mission. The inhumane actions taken against the democratic ambitions of the people of Libya during colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi's dictatorship as well as the flow of refugees towards southern Europe left NATO with no choice but to intervene in order to put an end to the oppressive regime.

When the Arab Spring events reached Libya in 2011, the oppressed population hoped for non-violent protests that would follow the successful democratic processes in Tunisia and Egypt. But instead of resigning, as Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak had done, Qaddafi started violent clashes with the protesters, resulting in civil war.<sup>49</sup> The international community responded to the aggression by imposing an arms embargo, freezing Libyan assets, suspending the country from the Arab League and imposing a no-fly zone. The escalation of violence led to UN Security Council resolution 1973, authorizing military intervention.<sup>50</sup>

Was European Security threatened during the Libyan case and in what way? European Security was threatened, and this was due to several important reasons.

First of all, the major human rights violations and the killings of protesters on Qaddafi's orders provoked the UN Security Council to take actions. The regime of Qaddafi was accused of "gross and systematic violation of human rights, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and summary executions."<sup>51</sup> NATO took

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<sup>47</sup> Rynning, *NATO Renewed: The Power and Purpose of Transatlantic Cooperation*, 76.

<sup>48</sup> Peter W. Rodman, "The Fallout from Kosovo," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 4 (1999), 45-51.

<sup>49</sup> Ivo H. Dadlender and James G. Stavridis, "NATO's Victory in Libya," *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 2 (2012), 2-7.

<sup>50</sup> Dadlender and Stavridis, "NATO's Victory in Libya."

<sup>51</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011).

the UN mandate very seriously and conducted Operation Unified Protector, supplying arms to the rebels and establishing total control over the country by sea and air. The Alliance's military actions were aimed at protecting areas populated by civilians. During the entire operation, NATO held consultations with the UN and the Arab League to maximize efficiency.<sup>52</sup> The operation proved very efficient and could serve as a model for future military interventions. Although the events in Libya did not threaten the security of Europe directly, Europeans could not allow a conflict to emerge in their own backyard as it had in the Balkans. Failure to act on the part of NATO and, more importantly, its European members would have undermined their ability to respond to security threats and hence the authority and purpose of the Alliance itself. The emerging crisis needed a swift response from the international community, which NATO provided with exceptional accuracy. NATO succeeded in protecting those civilians and, ultimately, in providing the time necessary for local forces to foster their freedom from Muammar al-Qaddafi.<sup>53</sup> As Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen remarked, "we created the conditions for the people of Libya to determine their own future."<sup>54</sup> The successful results of the operation were even more important because of the cooperation and task-sharing actions between NATO members – proof that NATO's new role was justified.

Second, Libya's location is not far from Southern Europe where major NATO members such as Italy, Greece and France were worried about the enormous flow of refugees that swept through Southern Europe, especially Italy and France. Refugees fled from Libya to the Italian island of Lampedusa and to Malta, the closest European shore and a passage to other nearby destinations. The problem of refugees became even more serious when their number increased. Although most of them were well-educated and qualified to work, they were issued only temporary residence permits and were not allowed to work or stay. The European states already faced a difficult situation with increasing unemployment and social unease towards emigrants. The conflict in Libya created extra problems for the countries of Southern Europe. Italy requested help from the EU to relocate and provide support for the refugees. However, the European states did not reach a consensus on the matter and every concerned state had to deal with the issue on its own. Another serious problem this situation posed for European security was organized crime, which was taking advantage of the growing number of people willing to leave Libya in search for better living conditions. From a financial perspective, this was a heavy burden for the strained European economies.

Third, a conflict in Europe's immediate neighborhood means that European security was threatened, at least indirectly, since the interests of European states were affected. Libya is rich in oil and is the third largest exporter of oil to European states. With Norway and Russia as the current dominant suppliers and since the latter was not regarded as reliable partner on the grounds of its attempts at energy monopoly, Libya was re-

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<sup>52</sup> NATO's Official Statement on Libya, March 2011.

<sup>53</sup> Dadlader and Stavridis, "NATO's Victory in Libya."

<sup>54</sup> Press conference by NATO Secretary General on the latest developments in Libya and Operation Unified Protector, 21 October 2011.

garded as exceptionally important for European energy security.<sup>55</sup> When the conflict escalated into a civil war, European states had another very good reason to interfere and protect their interests in the energy sphere. Libyan energy resources cover 17 percent of Europe's needs, but as the EU has yet to establish a common energy policy, trade relationships with Libyan exporters must be determined on an individual basis.<sup>56</sup> The EU Commission stated that "following the demise of the Qaddafi's regime the EU will facilitate Libya's full integration in regional and EU-Mediterranean energy cooperation structures."<sup>57</sup> In other words, the EU wanted to increase its influence in Libya and assist its oil companies to receive an even larger share of Libyan oil output. With Great Britain and France taking the leading role of the operation, and Italy providing military bases, airships and naval forces, it was obvious that the most concerned states were the ones investing heavily in the operation. The economic consequences of a sudden outflow of Libyan oil would be dire, especially for the powerful countries that depend on it. The EU member states were also looking for a way around their dependence on Russian energy supplies, and the geostrategic proximity of Libya was appropriate for such diversification policy.<sup>58</sup>

The United States took a different course in this conflict, allowing the European members of NATO to prove their ability to conduct a military intervention without US support. NATO successfully coordinated the actions of 18 countries and 4 partner states under a unified command. Despite not taking the leading role in the operation, the USA provided crucial intelligence, targeting capabilities and support to its allies.<sup>59</sup> Washington did not miss the opportunity to increase its international influence with the intervention in Libya, but it was too preoccupied with its own wars fought in the Middle East. Ellen Hallams and Benjamin Schreer noted in a recent article that "while the US will certainly maintain an interest in NATO as an instrument of its foreign and security policy, its willingness to lead it in operations of lesser national interest will diminish."<sup>60</sup> Domestic demand for military budget cuts also played a role in the decision of NATO's largest member. American politicians had long criticized their European counterparts' lack of defense spending, and with pressure on its own budget another US-led operation would be unsustainable.<sup>61</sup> American leaders prioritized foreign policy in order to maximize efficiency in conflicts they regard as vital for national interest. Despite the non-US leadership, the intervention in Libya was very successful from an economic point of view with only several billions of dollars spent – a fraction of what was spent on the

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<sup>55</sup> Namiq Abbasov, "Energy potential of Libya: How is it essential for the European Energy Security?" *Caspian Weekly*, 2-3 October 2011.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-3.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-3.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-3.

<sup>59</sup> Dadlader and Stavridis, "NATO's Victory in Libya."

<sup>60</sup> Ellen Hallams and Benjamin Schreer, "Towards a 'post-American' alliance? NATO burden-sharing after Libya," *International Affairs* 88, no. 2 (2012), 313–327.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*

interventions in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>62</sup> The air-strike campaign was a success that showed the future of NATO cooperation and task-sharing operations with increased efficiency.

One could argue that, in the case of Libya, NATO was used as a tool for proclaiming the foreign and security interests of its major European members and, therefore, for increasing western influence. The states that played the biggest role in the intervention were the ones that had the biggest benefit from its successful outcome. In the intervention in Libya, US interests were not essentially concerned. The strategic resources of Libya are far more important to NATO's major European members than to the USA. The region is substantial for European energy security and American decision-makers acknowledge this fact. With France and the United Kingdom responsible for more than a third of the amount of used force, and Italy providing a large number of bases and aircrafts, it is clear that the countries that are most dependent on Libyan oil were also the most active in the resolution of the conflict.<sup>63</sup> The Arab Spring gave western states the opportunity to increase their influence and establish firm control of the region.

Consequently, the assumption that states act according to their national interests is confirmed. With many conflicts in the world left unresolved, alliances and coalitions created for humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping show that they are simply interest-related. The state's self-interested and individualistic behavior often exploit humanitarian intervention to gain benefit. If the operation in Libya was intended to achieve peaceful ceasefire and a change of regime, why was it carried out with military means, and why did power politics still dominate international relations?

European states had to protect their interests in Libya because they are dependent on its oil exports. The United States felt that its interests were not sufficiently concerned and took a supporting role in the intervention. Russia was against the military operation and called for a diplomatic resolution of the conflict. With Moscow's overwhelming presence in the European energy market, one would have expected another veto in the Security Council of the UN. However, Moscow did not use its veto power because its national interest was remotely concerned and its oil and natural gas deliveries would continue to supply Europe.

Soon after the success of NATO against Qaddafi, the clashes between government forces and protesters in Syria have been far more serious from a humanitarian point of view. The raging conflict is one of the most violent in recent memory, with more than 100,000 people killed, at least half a million wounded, millions of people displaced and tens of thousands detained.<sup>64</sup>

Despite the disaster in Syria, Russia and China vetoed against a UN resolution and military intervention. Atrocities and massacres seem to fade from the limelight and pave the way to national interests. For both Moscow and Beijing it was of the utmost impor-

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<sup>62</sup> Dadlder and Stavridis, "NATO's Victory in Libya."

<sup>63</sup> Hallams and Schreer, "Towards a 'post-American' alliance?"

<sup>64</sup> International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) newsletter, March 2014.

tance to prevent the USA from spreading its influence in this strategic region through NATO and to prevent the western Alliance from setting foot in their neighborhood. Whilst in Libya the interests of Russia and China were not crucially concerned, in Syria they were. As a result of geographical proximity, most of the oil exports from Syria and Iran go to Russia and China. Syria's powerful ally Iran has been a long-time target for the USA and recent events have increased tension between the two countries. The current events in eastern Ukraine clearly demonstrate the confrontation between NATO's and Russia's strategic interests.

These two examples show that power politics is still relevant in the post-Cold War era. The overall trend in the behavior of superpowers has not changed, and this appears clearly from a comparison of the cases of Kosovo and Libya.

### **Comparison of the Cases of Kosovo and Libya**

The cases of Kosovo and Libya have much in common. Their similarities could be summarized in the following way. First, both conflicts were characterized by serious atrocities and disregard for human rights. In Kosovo the ethnic cleansing of the Albanian population almost ignited a disastrous conflict in Europe. Thousands of civilians were killed or threatened. In Libya the clashes between the forces of self-proclaimed head of state colonel Qaddafi and protesters against his dictatorship escalated into a civil war. NATO operations, although not perfect, saved countless lives from certain death in both events. European security was threatened in both cases. Due to its location in a region with ethnic tension, the conflict in Kosovo could have spurred further clashes between other states and thus create havoc on the European continent. In Libya the European security was threatened in a slightly different way – not by a direct armed conflict on the continent, but by economic and strategic issues. The immense outflow of refugees in both cases created serious problems for the European governments. In both cases, NATO was the only institution that was capable of restoring peace and security swiftly and efficiently. Despite being criticized for its seemingly pointless existence in the post-Cold War era, the Alliance showed that it is not only capable and powerful, but also an effective protector of western security and interests.

Second, both Yugoslavia and Libya were under a dictatorship, that of Slobodan Milošević and Muammar Al-Qaddafi, respectively. The Yugoslav leader took decisions that led his country to war with NATO and was condemned by the international community. His actions led to a loss of thousands of lives, an arms embargo, serious economic and infrastructural damages, deeper ethnic divide and tension. Similarly, Colonel Qaddafi's authorization of the use of military force against all those who opposed him was an inhumane and disastrous judgment. He threatened to cleanse his country "house by house" from all the "rats" that were protesting against his rule following the Arab Spring events in North Africa.<sup>65</sup> In both cases NATO's actions proceeded in a similar fashion: arms embargo, no-fly zone, economic and diplomatic sanctions and ultimatum for ceasefire. Air strikes started soon thereafter, and NATO restored Euro-

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<sup>65</sup> Dadlader and Stavridis, "NATO's Victory in Libya."

pean security and prevented further genocide. The similarities here are connected with the form of governance. The new threats for NATO in the post-Cold War era are mostly related to terrorism, regional and ethnic conflicts and weapons of mass destruction.<sup>66</sup> The cases of Kosovo and Libya share a form of autocratic governance using its authority and power to oppress the population. NATO responded in the same positive way towards the atrocities and human rights violations in both cases and carried out successful operations. The intervention in former Yugoslavia was considerably more expensive and caused more infrastructural damage for Serbia and the Kosovo region. In Libya the results of Operation Unified Protector exceeded expectations, achieving a successful democratic transition with low operational costs and minimum damage. This shows how much the organization improved its security capabilities and efficiency.

Third, the strategic interests of the USA, Russia, and major European states, except Germany, were involved in both conflicts. It was a turning point for NATO, because the organization had struggled to find its new purpose in the post-Cold War period. With many criticizing the continued existence of the Alliance on the grounds of a lack of a real threat, NATO had to prove that it was still important and capable of protecting European security. NATO's failure to intervene in the Kosovo crisis would have meant the end of NATO as a collective organization. The United States also had a serious strategic interest in maintaining NATO as an active and responsible organization. In Kosovo, the USA was investing heavily because of the opportunity to establish its international influence in a traditionally pro-Russian region. In many ways, the conflicts of interests between Washington and Moscow are reminiscent of behavioral patterns from the Cold War era. In Libya it was not the USA but the European major powers that invested the most in military operations, since their own interests were concerned. The oil supplies of Libya presented an excellent opportunity for the EU to diversify its energy supplies and decrease its dependence on Russia. Libyan oil and natural gas allowed European countries to consolidate their energy security, whilst also accelerating Libya's development.<sup>67</sup>

Both cases confirm that international organizations are guided by the self-interest of its members. States continue to compete for power and influence and use every opportunity to increase their dominance in the international arena. In Kosovo the USA wanted to achieve a strategic position and expand its influence in the Balkans to the detriment of Russia. As a result of the hegemony of the United States, NATO is used as a military tool that serves the interests of its most powerful member. In Libya the US only supported its allies because of immense domestic pressure for military budget cuts and because Washington's interests in Tripoli were not of vital importance and did not require heavy investment. In Libya, however, the interests of the major European states, except Germany, were affected. They widened their sphere of influence by establishing advantageous trade relations for importing strategic resources. Using military power to

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<sup>66</sup> *NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement*, NATO Official Texts, 17 May 2010.

<sup>67</sup> Namiq Abbasov, "Energy potential of Libya: How is it essential for the European Energy Security?" *Caspian Weekly*, 1 October 2011.

resolve the conflict in Libya, the EU sought to establish new profitable relations with an oil-rich country.

A fourth similarity that further confirms the realism theory's assertions concerns Russia's position against NATO's military operations. In the case of Kosovo, Moscow voted against the use of force to resolve the conflict in the UN Security Council, calling for more diplomatic pressure on Milošević instead. If NATO had refrained from intervening to stop the massacres because of the Russian veto, Milošević would have had the time and opportunity to gain advantage and continue the pursuit of his dictatorship goals. The decision to start air strikes against Belgrade, made by the President Clinton's administration, prevented further casualties in Kosovo but strained US–Russia relations to an extent reminiscent of the Cold War. Russia's position was almost identical in the Libya conflict, but it refrained from vetoing the UN resolution authorizing NATO's intervention. Russia was against an intervention, knowing that the resulting benefits for the EU states would jeopardize its monopolistic position in the energy market in Europe. The events in the North African state shared the tone of the Kosovo case with regard to the disharmony and lack of unanimity within the UN Security Council, with ten states voting for resolution and five absenting.<sup>68</sup> The foreign policy actions of Russia were similar to the ones taken in Kosovo, calling for immediate ceasefire and more active diplomatic actions in order to prevent human losses. Moscow criticized the UN resolution for not being in line with the practice of the Security Council and for not answering important questions such as how it would prevent a destabilization of the region after the operation.<sup>69</sup> Russia also argued for a different, peaceful resolution of the crisis but did not receive the support of its partners, who were more interested in measures of force.<sup>70</sup> Russia's protection of its national interests through its veto power and diplomatic pressure in the UN Security Council confirms the realism theory according to which states continue to compete for power in the international arena. Human rights violations and the suffering of civilians are still reported every day, and the UN has done nothing to prevent them. Superpower confrontation has hindered many humanitarian operations, for example in Chechnya, the North Caucasus and Tibet.<sup>71</sup>

The eastward expansion of NATO has further strained its relations with Russia and has undermined the importance of the military power of the major states. In Russia's national security concept, President Putin outlined the importance of military power in international relations:

The formation of international relations is accompanied by competition and also by the aspiration of a number of states to strengthen their influence on global politics, includ-

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<sup>68</sup> Timothy Bancroft-Hinchey, "Libya: The position of the Russian Federation," *Pravda*, 18 March 2011, 1.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> Huseyn Aliev, "Neo-Realism and Humanitarian Action: From Cold War to Our Days," *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (May 2011), 6, available at <http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/1173> (13 May 2014).

ing by creating weapons of mass destruction. Military force and violence remain substantial aspects of international relations.<sup>72</sup>

Russia continues to see NATO's actions as a threat to its national interests. The intervention in Kosovo was regarded as the expansion of US influence and dominance through NATO. In that particular case, NATO's proposed intervention did not receive the authorization of the UN Security Council due to Russia's veto, but this did not prevent NATO from intervening anyway. This episode shows that the legitimacy of the UN as a leading peace institution was undermined. With an intervention conducted without the authorization of the UN, how could the international community guarantee the absence of military interventions and conflicts in the future? Even an organization as vast as the UN could not unify the positions of its powerful Security Council members. Once more, institutions showed their significant dependence on states and their behavior. After the events in Kosovo, the UN suffered a major blow to its authority, and NATO strengthened its aspiration to a role of a global security organization.<sup>73</sup>

Twelve years after the Kosovo crisis, Moscow could do little to prevent NATO's operation against Qaddafi's regime. For the transatlantic allies, Russian influence and interests in the western part of the Mediterranean are not as strongly represented as in other regions of the world. Therefore, the EU states were right in thinking that Russians should not interfere in business that is strictly European. That is not the case in the conflict in Syria, where Russian and Chinese interests are seriously concerned in view of a future military operation. The previously mentioned example of the situation in Syria validates the claim that the states' self-interested behavior will continue to dominate the world order. States will continue their quest for power and will not cease to pursue their nationalistic goals by balancing power against each other.

Fifth, the operations in Kosovo and Libya were conducted outside the borders of NATO members. Since its creation, the organization's original purpose was to act as a defense alliance against any type of aggression from a non-member state, presumably from the Soviet Union. However, NATO significantly changed after the end of the Cold War. It adopted a new role in tackling new security threats and could therefore operate outside its borders if European security is threatened. In Kosovo, NATO decision-makers reckoned that the Alliance must respond to a humanitarian crisis even if there was no direct attack on one of its members. NATO needed to show its determination to resolve the crisis and to demonstrate its leading role for the future of European security. In Libya and Afghanistan, NATO extended its military actions even beyond the borders of its member states.

NATO's expansion and acquisition of new members means not only increased capability, but also more responsibility. With its dialogue for cooperation and partnership in the Mediterranean, Ukraine and Georgia, NATO reaches further for international influence, power and the spreading of democratic principles. The Alliance's operational

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<sup>72</sup> "Russia's National Security Concept," *Arms Control Today* (January/February 2000), [www.armscontrol.org/act/2000\\_01-02/docjf00](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_01-02/docjf00) (12 April 2014).

<sup>73</sup> Van Ham and Medvedev, *Mapping European Security after Kosovo*, 98.



scope is now no longer limited to the transatlantic region, but has spread throughout the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The actions in Kosovo and Libya show the enlarged role of the Alliance. In the light of the aforementioned considerations, this could be interpreted as a further step towards the growth of NATO into a global security organization led by the hegemonic ambitions of the USA and its allies. Only the future will tell how far this will go and how powerful the organization will become.

The comparison of the two cases reveals numerous similarities and shows that the behavior of states remains essential for international relations and security. Twelve years elapsed between the two conflicts. During that period, the efficiency of NATO operations clearly increased. Success in Libya was achieved at a lower cost, with less infrastructural damage and collateral casualties than in the Kosovo scenario. In both cases, humanitarian disaster was prevented and innocent lives were saved. Further threats from the ethnic violence in Kosovo and from the atrocities in Libya, along with refugee problems and economic issues were avoided thanks to the success of the intervention.

The cases of Kosovo and Libya have much in common and present an interesting comparison. Ethnic violence in Kosovo and oppressions in Libya show that state-to-state conflicts are less likely to occur in the post-Cold War period. Nonetheless, the international reaction was very similar despite the lapse of time between the conflicts. Disagreements within the UN Security Council continue because states persevere in the pursuit of their egoistic interests. When diplomacy fails, military force comes in, or, to paraphrase Clausewitz, war is the continuation of diplomacy by other means. NATO has been severely criticized by theorists for struggling to find its new purpose.

## Conclusion

Great powers, grand strategy, and national competition continue as the United States dominates, but the other powers—including Russia, China, and Europe and regional powers—contend for influence.<sup>74</sup>

NATO provides stability and security across Europe but it is no secret that the Alliance is a military organization. No other institution, including the OSCE, the EU and the UN, could perform this task better and with higher efficiency. For more than sixty years, the continent that was once plagued by violent state-to-state conflicts, has not experienced a major war thanks to NATO's presence and actions. The Americans and Europeans share a common vision of security matters, and the hegemonic leadership of the USA has played an essential role in maintaining European security. The comparison of the two cases has also shown the enhanced weight of the member states and the European countries' active role in protecting their regional interests and values. NATO has significantly contributed to the increased cooperation and efficiency of its members.

As the cases of Kosovo and Libya show, NATO has proved that it protects western ideology and values as well as the interests of its most powerful members in a world

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<sup>74</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, "Realism, the Real World, and the Academy," in Michael Brecher and Frank P. Harvey, eds., *Realism and Institutionalism in International Studies* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), 23-33.

dominated by state competition and pursuit of national interests. It could be concluded that the Alliance survived in the aftermath of the Cold War not only because it assimilated new goals and strived to achieve them, but also because it was in the best interest of the USA. Relations between the USA and the European states are very important for the interests of Washington. America's leadership of NATO gained influence and power with NATO's intervention in Kosovo. In Libya it was the European allies that gained profit and protected their interests with the help of NATO.

The two cases examined showed how the interests of the USA and Russia played a role affected in NATO's operations. Russia's position was similar in both conflicts, as it opposed the use of force for the resolution of the crisis. The United States' course of action was slightly different in the two cases, but overall it aimed at increasing its geopolitical influence.

This analysis of the behavioral patterns of the former Cold War adversaries could provide a useful interpretation and perhaps an explanation of the current events in Ukraine. The confrontation between the USA and Russia is far from over. The continued expansion of NATO and, hence, American geopolitical influence has predictably angered Moscow's officials and has directly concerned their essential security interests. The promise of the Bush administration in 2008 that Georgia and Ukraine would eventually be admitted to join NATO forced President Vladimir Putin to state clearly that this is a line the US should not cross.<sup>75</sup> As John J. Mearsheimer wrote in a recent article, "Georgia and Ukraine are not just states in Russia's neighborhood; they are on its doorstep."<sup>76</sup> Major powers, especially Russia, are very sensitive to possible threats near their borders and sometimes they act ruthlessly to counter potential dangers.<sup>77</sup>

As in the case of the never-ending bloodshed in Syria, the escalating tension in eastern Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimean peninsula, the international community and the UN seem once again stranded and powerless, unable to find a solution and to prevent killings and with few options to counter Russia's moves. When vital interests are at stake, states inevitably try to ensure their safety at all costs, international law and human rights giving way to the more powerful solutions of decision-makers.

The pursuit of power and state interests continues to dominate the global political arena, as countries do not cease to look for opportunities to increase their influence on others in order to ensure their own safety and prosperity, and we may well see more military interventions in the future.

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<sup>75</sup> Stanley R. Sloan, "Differing Perspectives on Ukraine, Russia, NATO and US Policy," *War on the Rocks*, March 2014, <http://warontherocks.com/2014/03/differing-perspectives-on-ukraine-russia-nato-and-us-policy> (18 April 2014).

<sup>76</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, "Getting Ukraine Wrong," *The New York Times*, March 2014, [www.nytimes.com/2014/03/14/opinion/getting-ukraine-wrong.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/14/opinion/getting-ukraine-wrong.html?_r=0) (18 April 2014).

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*

# The Kosovo Model: A (Bad) Precedent for Conflict Management in the Caucasus?

*Pierre Jolicoeur and Frederic Labarre*\*

**Abstract:** Resolution 1244 adopted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1999 was conceived as an interim settlement to allow conflict de-escalation while postponing the search for a lasting solution to the Kosovo crisis. The final settlement should have been negotiated between Serbian authorities and representatives of the Kosovo Albanians and then endorsed by the UNSC, as stipulated in the resolution. However, Kosovo Albanians declared independence unilaterally in February 2008 and Kosovo was recognized as such by the United States and its allies. The Kosovo Albanians promptly abandoned the peace process.

Instead of an internationally-endorsed negotiated outcome, the Kosovo Albanians' initiative unilaterally imposed a political settlement on the mediating powers in complete disregard of UNSC authority that had placed Kosovo under international administration. The subsequent involvement of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) failed to resolve the remaining issues between Serbs and Kosovars.

In addition to creating a troubling legal precedent, the Kosovo example establishes a bad precedent for future conflict management initiatives, especially for ongoing conflicts in the Caucasus. Issues of concern include the viability of future interim agreements, good faith negotiations and the legitimacy and guarantees provided by the internationalization of conflicts, including the authority of international organizations, multilateral agencies and established legal standards. This paper draws parallels between the Kosovo example and territorial disputes in the Caucasus as well as the implications of the Kosovo model on conflict management processes.

**Keywords:** Conflict management, Kosovo, South Caucasus.

## Introduction

This article focuses on conflict management as it has evolved between the end of the Cold War and since the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) by the provisional authorities in Kosovo on 17 February 2008. As such, we can now speak of a post-UDI conflict-management practice and there is a risk that the post-Cold War conflict management methods that offered so much hope in terms of cooperative international problem-solving are waning. Whether or not this spirit will return depends on the mutual trust between the major powers and of those powers in the international conflict management system, characterized by interlocking multilateral international organizations such as the UN, the OSCE and NATO.

The argument proceeds from a short discussion of post-Cold War conflict management, its definition and practice as the antithesis of Cold War (or traditional) conflict

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management and how it seemingly applied to Kosovo. It then analyses the significance of the Kosovo UDI as a break in the practice of conflict management. Three consequences follow from this break. First, incapacitating distrust of multilateralism owing to the unpredictability of outcomes. Second, suspicion of self-determination movements and small powers as being unable to follow the lead of great powers or the ordinances of international organizations. Third, return to an antecedent form of state-based conflict management, antithetical to the cooperative practice that evolved during the post-Cold War years that is now the new norm.

Conflict management, in the case of Kosovo, cannot be taken apart; it has to be seen as a whole. The diplomatic maneuvers that generated the Rambouillet Accords in March 1999, NATO's Operation Allied Force from March until June 1999, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 in June 1999, the Kosovo UDI on 17 February 2008 and the subsequent recognition of Kosovo's independence by certain Euro-Atlantic powers a few days later need to be understood in concert. The result is known as the "Kosovo Model" of conflict management. This article suggests that the consequences of this approach are nefarious for comparable international problems in other parts of the world, especially in the Caucasus. In fact, the Kosovo UDI and the Russo-Georgian war cannot be examined in isolation. For this reason, the final part of this essay will discuss the impact of the Kosovo Model on conflict management in the Caucasus.

### **Post-Cold War Conflict Management**

During the Cold War, conflict management was mostly the purview of states. Mutual nuclear destruction by the United States and the USSR assured the peace, as did United Nations peacekeeping activities, preventing superpower confrontation in the non-aligned world.<sup>1</sup> Realism was the dominant paradigm of international relations; multilateralism was nearly always subject to the interests of the competing alliances. Conflict was managed through high-level diplomacy and military deterrence (or action). This paradigm shifted in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Free from ideological motivations, states now have a greater incentive to cooperate rather than confront one another. Unshackled by bipolar confrontation, the UN was then able to pursue its mission of managing conflict with renewed vigor. The number of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions rose, a testimony not only to the disorderly collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, but to the corresponding desire by the UN membership to address the unrest. Mostly, however, conflict management evolved to include the principles of conflict prevention, peace operations (including enforcement) and post-conflict peacebuilding, buttressed by international law. To meet the securitization of these new issues, an international "civil society" emerged, empowered by non-governmental organizations, security think tanks and other associations.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Sean M. Maloney, *Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970* (Toronto: Vanwell Publishing, 2002).

<sup>2</sup> See Craufurd Goodwyn and Michael Nacht, eds., *Beyond Government* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995).

Conflict management was elevated to the multilateral level. States were expected to conform and adapt their behavior in accordance with the procedures of international organizations, such as voting rules for the UN General Assembly, the Security Council and its manifold agencies. Multilateralism made international relations more predictable, since the wealth of international organizations that in the post-Cold War world was accompanied by due process and an expectation of adherence to international legal regimes by states, groups and persons.<sup>3</sup> A characterization of post-Cold War conflict management, detailed by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in *An Agenda for Peace* (published in 1992 and amended in 1995, following the early post-Cold War peacekeeping setbacks of the UN), is illustrated in Figure 1, below.

Conflict Prevention	Peacekeeping (and Enforcement)	Peacebuilding
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Figure 1: A Rudimentary Visualization of post-Cold War Conflict Management 1990-1995.

As early as 1995, the model ran into trouble; the inability of the United Nations to have its authority respected owed much to the lack of coercive power at its disposal. NATO became, for a time, the instrument of choice to enforce peace and UNSC decisions. This is all the more significant as UNSC decisions can be vetoed by two of its permanent members that are not members of NATO; Russia and China. The UNSC's NATO members (France, the United Kingdom and the United States) also have a fundamentally different conception of the state than its non-NATO members. To Robert Cooper, the former are part of the "post-modern" lot, who see states as having rights and obligations, whereas the latter "modern" states perceive a central authority's rights over its territory and population as inviolable.<sup>4</sup> Disagreement in international fora between the latter and the former is a function of disagreement over human versus state rights.

This evolution also introduced the concept of "rogue states"; those that refuse to comply with the rules and norms of behavior of the international community. Conflict management reflected the international community's interest in achieving stable security on a number of new issues shaping the landscape of international relations, such as human rights, development, international trade and proliferation.<sup>5</sup> When wars occur, the temptation to "let them burn," as Edward Luttwak once advocated in *Foreign Affairs*, becomes unacceptable to much of the international community: "...stable security can

<sup>3</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Understanding International Conflict*, 6<sup>th</sup> ed. (New York: Pearson-Longman, 2007), 279.

<sup>4</sup> Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2004), 16-30.

<sup>5</sup> See John Baylis and Steve Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

only be achieved by people and groups if they do not deprive others of it; this can be achieved if security is conceived as a process of emancipation.”<sup>6</sup>

“Emancipation” became a security issue at the individual, group and national level. We are only beginning to grasp how the expression of those grievances affected two cherished concepts of international politics: the respect for human and minority rights on the one hand, and the preservation of state authority (and territorial integrity) on the other. This is why it is argued that to mount

...armed multilateral intervention to right all such wrongs would be another principle of disorder... intervention is a matter of degree, with actions ranging from statements and limited economic measures at the low end of the spectrum to full-fledged invasions at the high end.

With Operation Allied Force by NATO’s resolve to intervene in the humanitarian emergency in Kosovo, conflict management at the most coercive level had eschewed the UN and morphed into the model of Figure 2, below.

Conflict Prevention (UN)	Enforcement (Unilateral or Allied)	Peacebuilding (UN)
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**Figure 2: A Rudimentary Visualization of post-Cold War Conflict Management from 1999.**

Jettisoning peacekeeping and peace enforcement precipitated the soul-searching by the UN in the aftermath of Operation Allied Force as it struggled to stay relevant as an organization and as a model for managing conflict. According to Manuel Fröhling, three critical reports establish the failure of multilateral conflict management in the post-Cold War strategic environment: the Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Srebrenica, the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the Genocide in Rwanda and the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (also known as the Brahimi Report). All were issued between 15 November 1999 and 21 August 2000 in the wake of the Kosovo air raids.<sup>7</sup>

Operation Allied Force punctuated a decade of failed UN peace operations. As a case of humanitarian intervention, it was not legally sanctioned by the UNSC. Legitimiz-

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 255, quoting Booth and Wheeler.

<sup>7</sup> Manuel Fröhlich, “Keeping Track of UN Peace-keeping: Suez, Srebrenica, Rwanda and the Brahimi Report,” *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law* 5 (2001): 187. The reports are respectively, A/54/549, S/1999/1257 and S/2000/809. The last report is the most important, because it reveals a strong tendency already evident during the 1990s that peacekeeping could not be counted on to maintain peace, and if peace enforcement was the new task, the UN could not perform it well on its own and had to rely on regional organizations, such as NATO. Many UN members were not keen on having the UN engage in peace enforcement missions. This effectively re-oriented the focus on the internationalization of disputes and conflict management by the UN towards conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building.

ing action, as Katariina Simonen has argued, does not make it legal.<sup>8</sup> Former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov feared that the unilateral decision in favor of armed intervention confirmed a tendency to replace the UN as a conflict management apparatus.<sup>9</sup> Primakov insisted that the use of force is acceptable only in cases of patent aggression against a UN Member State, which Kosovo was not.<sup>10</sup> That is to say, not only did NATO knowingly defect from accepted UN rules of procedures and contemporary international law (especially from the Helsinki Final Act of 1975), but, in doing so, it gave the impression that Kosovo was indeed a sovereign state. With the attack on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Kosovo, NATO not only obliterated international legal customs, but also answered a characteristic desire of the international community—and its constituents—to retaliate against Serbia for the violence it had authorized against the Kosovar minority.<sup>11</sup>

On 10 June 1999, the UNSC issued Resolution 1244 (UNSCR 1244), aimed at resolving the humanitarian crisis unfolding in Kosovo. It set forth the principles of cessation of hostilities (annex 1 of the resolution) and of the future development of institutions based on a transitional international administration in Kosovo. The resolution was necessarily the result of a consensus among the five permanent member states of the UNSC.

The UNSC intended to resolve the humanitarian crisis while simultaneously preserving the territorial integrity of the FRY, that is, of Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo. UNSCR 1244 provided for “the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648)”.<sup>12</sup> The Rambouillet Accords of March 1999 guaranteed Serbia’s territorial integrity, as stipulated in Chapter 1 (Constitution), Chapter 1, Article 3 (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has competence in Kosovo over... [a] territorial integrity) and also in Chapter 7, Article I, Paragraph 1 (a) where the parties including Kosovo are invited to reaffirm the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Yugoslavia.”<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> See Katariina Simonen, *Operation Allied Force: A Case of Humanitarian Intervention?*, NATO Defense College Occasional Paper (Rome: NDC, 2001). See also G. Gerard Ong, “Credibility over Courage: NATO’s Mis-Intervention in Kosovo,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 26, no. 1 (2003): 82-83.

<sup>9</sup> Evgueni Primakov, *Le Monde après le 11 Septembre et la Guerre en Irak* (Paris: Presses de la Renaissance, 2003), 127.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 129; Pierre Jolicoeur, “Qui reconnaît l’indépendance du Kosovo doit en assumer les conséquences,” *Points de Mire* 9, no. 4 (May 2008), available at [www.ieim.uqam.ca/IMG/pdf/Jolicoeur\\_vol9no4.pdf](http://www.ieim.uqam.ca/IMG/pdf/Jolicoeur_vol9no4.pdf).

<sup>11</sup> Frederic Labarre, “The Kosovo War in a Constructivist Perspective,” *Connections: The Quarterly Journal* 6, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 52-53; Jolicoeur, “Qui reconnaît l’indépendance du Kosovo doit en assumer les conséquences.”

<sup>12</sup> S/RES/1244 (1999), 11 (a).

<sup>13</sup> Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo (Rambouillet Agreement), March 1999, [www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo\\_ambouillet\\_text.html](http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_ambouillet_text.html).

Serbia endorsed UNSCR 1244 after abdicating to NATO's Operation Allied Force. By virtue of the linkage established in UNSCR 1244, Serbia found itself forced to agree with the principles of Rambouillet (which Serbia had repudiated in March 1999). It also meant that there was an apparent continuity in the international community's desire to preserve the territorial integrity of the FRY. Any discussion pertaining to the future of Kosovo as part of or separate from the FRY would have to take into consideration these two principles in the context of security as provided by and institutions developed under international administration.<sup>14</sup>

The wording of the resolution incorporates two worldviews: that of state rights (with an emphasis on territorial integrity)<sup>15</sup> and that of human rights (with an emphasis on self-determination of Kosovars within the FRY). The latter was mandated to be carried out first by the international community and subsequently be transferred to local jurisdiction. The political settlement between the parties was shaped by the relationship between the local (now indigenous) administration of Kosovo and Belgrade.<sup>16</sup> As such, it can be interpreted as an attempt by "post-modern" states to soothe the outrage of the "modern" members on the UNSC at NATO's intervention over Kosovo. UNSCR 1244 is simultaneously a peacebuilding plan imposed on Kosovo by the UNSC and a measure to restore NATO/US – Russia relations after the NATO intervention.

### **The Rupture of Norms: Post-UDI Conflict Management**

Still, instead of working through the issues, Kosovo Albanians unilaterally declared their independence from Serbia in direct contravention of international legal practice, in contravention to the principles of the Rambouillet Accords, flouting UNSCR 1244 and against the will of the international community, on 17 February 2008. Nevertheless, it was recognized by major powers: the United States, France, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia and Belgium all formally recognized Kosovo within a week. The current sum of countries that have followed suit stands at 101, with Egypt as the most recent country to recognize Kosovo on 26 June 2013.<sup>17</sup>

Kosovo's UDI in February 2008 did not doom post-Cold War conflict management per se; instead, the rapid recognition of independence by the main Euro-Atlantic powers is to blame. Russia and China felt that they had been double-crossed. In the nine years between UNSCR 1244 and Kosovo's UDI, the international community had held the principle of territorial integrity sacrosanct. Now, those same major powers promptly recognized Kosovo's independence. Nadia Arbatova, speaking at an ISODARCO meet-

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<sup>14</sup> S/RES/1244 (1999), annex 2, para. 5 and para. 8.

<sup>15</sup> S/1244/1999, preamble: "Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2," Annex 1, and Annex 2, para. 8. This is in addition to statements pertaining to territorial integrity of FRY contained in the Rambouillet Accords.

<sup>16</sup> S/1244/1999, para 11, d), e) and f).

<sup>17</sup> [www.kosovothanksyou.com](http://www.kosovothanksyou.com) (9 August 2013); [www.utexas.edu/cola/centers/european\\_studies/\\_files/PDF/Secession%20Paper%20Joseph.pdf](http://www.utexas.edu/cola/centers/european_studies/_files/PDF/Secession%20Paper%20Joseph.pdf).



ing in 2002, summarized the thinking of Russia's political elite: NATO's intervention in Kosovo had as its objective the creation of a "NATO state" in the middle of Europe *all along*.<sup>18</sup> The International Crisis Group seems to echo this sentiment, saying that Kosovo's UDI "was the outcome of a long, internationally-supervised process and based on a framework designed by UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari that set in place its internal structure and statehood."<sup>19</sup> The General Assembly asked the International Court of Justice to submit an advisory opinion on the international legality of the provisional government of Kosovo's UDI in October 2010. It concluded that although the UDI "did not violate international law,"<sup>20</sup> this did not necessarily mean that Kosovo could separate from the FRY. However, the ICJ was not mandated to offer this opinion:

The Court considers that it is not necessary, in the present case, to resolve the question whether, outside the context of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation, the international law of self-determination confers upon part of the population of an existing State a right to separate from that State, or whether international law provides for a right of "remedial secession" and, if so, in what circumstances. It recalls that the General Assembly has requested the Court's opinion only on whether or not the declaration of independence is in accordance with international law.<sup>21</sup>

In addition, the ICJ seemed to be judging the UNSC instead of the legality of the UDI. The Court interpreted and applied the meaning of UNSCR 1244. It found that since the UNSC did not render an amendment to UNSCR 1244 on the occasion of its meeting of 18 February 2008 in which it could have rejected any possibility of UDI, one was consequently not prohibited.<sup>22</sup> The ICJ basically explained that the unilateral character of the declaration was not illegal, that "independence" was not necessarily tantamount to separation and that the UNSC had the option of invalidating the declaration at any time.

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<sup>18</sup> Notes taken by the author from a speech by Nadia Arbatova to the ISODARCO group, January 2002. This impression is corroborated by the apparently unfortunate wording of a cable between US Ambassador Christopher Dell to Deputy Assistant Foreign Secretary Phil Gordon, leaked by *The Guardian* on December 9, 2010; the cable, dated January 29, 2010, begins; "Integrating Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo society and preserving the country's territorial integrity is central to Kosovo's and the region's long-term stability and has been a core U.S. policy objective since 1999." This suggests that the aim of US policy since 1999 had in fact been the independence of Kosovo. Edward P. Joseph, Senior Fellow at Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies, claims that this was a "highly coordinated event backed by the US and leading European capitals", cf. Edward P. Joseph, "Kosovo's Independence and Secessionist Movements: Dire Consequences or Benign Impact?" *Secession Redux: Lessons for the EU* (Washington D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, March 2013), 6.

<sup>19</sup> International Crisis Group, "Abkhazia: The Long Road to Reconciliation," *Europe Report* 224 (10 April 2013), 1.

<sup>20</sup> International Court of Justice, *Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence with respect of Kosovo*, Summary, 2010/2, July 22, 2010, 15.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

This development shaped the conflict management model of the post-Cold War years. In fact, we can speak of a new era of conflict management that harkens back to the self-help paradigm of *Realpolitik*. The Kosovo episode gravely affected the other preventive and post-conflict components of conflict management. Since it appeared that a certain portion of the UNSC engaged in peace operations to effect democratic regime change, conflict prevention (in the form of preventative deployments) and peacebuilding schemes became suspect. The UN tried to re-focus its activities around conflict prevention and peacebuilding, but its efforts in those areas remain limited.<sup>23</sup> On 7 June 2001, the UN Secretary General reported on “Prevention of Armed Conflict” in which peace-keeping operations had only a preventative function.<sup>24</sup> Later on, the UNSC requested from the Secretary General, via Resolution 1645 of 20 December 2005, that a Peacebuilding Commission be created within the UN Secretariat.<sup>25</sup>

Carrie Manning has pointed out that peacebuilding is actually state-building. In other words, a predominant vision of the state will tend to operate under international tutelage. This vision is permeated by liberal democratic ideals, that is, pushing for the “practical establishment of state authority throughout the national territory.”<sup>26</sup> In essence, UNSCR 1244 appears designed to precipitate this very outcome within the territorial integrity of the FRY, lest it be forgotten that only effective state control can provide national minorities with effective protection under international law.<sup>27</sup> Unsure of the guarantees of the international community, the provisional authorities of Kosovo felt safer in declaring independence.

Legally, the recognition of Kosovo’s UDI was a further evolution of the international legal principle of *uti possidetis*, which had permitted the dissolution of Yugoslavia (not the secession of its autonomous provinces). In recognizing Kosovo’s independence,

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<sup>23</sup> Fred Tanner, “Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution: The Limits to Multilateralism,” *International Review of the Red Cross* 839 (30 September 2000), www.icrc.ch. More critically, the recent Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) has limited its engagement to six countries (Burundi, the Central African Republic, Liberia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone), none of which are within the immediate sphere of interest claimed by the five permanent members of the Security Council. The PBC has pushed this agenda at every turn in its reports. The fact that no new countries are set up on the PBC’s agenda, that its reports pertain so widely to organizational matters and aim at the transition of UN missions out of the countries under scrutiny without evidence that peace has been established, suggests that the UN is also being pushed out of the peacebuilding arena.

<sup>24</sup> Report of the Secretary General, *Prevention of Armed Conflict*, S/2001/574, paras. 81-85.

<sup>25</sup> UN Security Council Resolution establishing a Peacebuilding Commission, S/1645/2005, para. 23.

<sup>26</sup> Carrie Manning, “Local-level Challenges to Post-Conflict Peacebuilding,” *International Peacekeeping* 10, no. 3 (2003), 26.

<sup>27</sup> John Williams, *Legitimacy and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia* (London: McMillan, 1998), 33.

some major powers in fact decreed that the principle of *uti possidetis* also applies to a non-autonomous province of the FRY.<sup>28</sup>

Certain members of the international community may have felt that continued stability could be secured through recognition. Were Kosovo deemed a “special case,” it would not lead to “copycat secessionism.”

“Special cases” should not encourage “Pandora’s boxes.” But it has, and the United States and other supporters of Kosovo’s independence have had a difficult time attempting to defend the faulty logic that self-determination is acceptable in areas of their strategic interest and that the sanctity of sovereign borders must be upheld where it is not.<sup>29</sup>

In fact, the contagious effect of the Kosovo UDI has quickly spread to other minority groups seeking self-determination, not only in the former Yugoslavia, but in the former Soviet Union as well. Hensel, Allison and Khanani demonstrated in 2006 that the *uti possidetis* principle has not, in its application, prevented territorial disputes or challenges from occurring.<sup>30</sup> The Kosovo Model of conflict management, thus modified by the UDI, prompted the Kosovo Serbs to seek independence, encouraged the creation of a Republic of Sandjak and the secession of Republika Srpska from Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>31</sup> It stood to inspire Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transdnistria and perhaps Nagorno-Karabakh as well. Yet, now that the Kosovo Serbs want to rejoin Serbia proper, the UNSC has found itself unable to address this “new” issue.<sup>32</sup>

The Kosovo Model of conflict management appears inherently flawed insofar as it has abused the procedures of the UN and the principles of multilateralism as a forum for oppressed minorities and an equalizer of power among states. By its very nature, multilateral conflict management allows states to maintain harmonious relations because it offers predictability. Since the Kosovo Model was tainted by the defection of the

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<sup>28</sup> Pierre Jolicoeur, “Reconnaissance étatique, autodétermination et sécession: les problèmes que posent les cas du Kosovo et de l’Ossétie du Sud en droit international,” Panel C4(a) “International Law and Institution, 2,” *Canadian Political Science Association (CPSA)*, 13-15 June 2012, Edmonton.

<sup>29</sup> Michael Rossi, “Five Inconvenient Truths about Kosovo,” 17 July 2013, [www.transconflict.com/2013/07/five-inconvenient-truths-about-kosovo-177](http://www.transconflict.com/2013/07/five-inconvenient-truths-about-kosovo-177).

<sup>30</sup> Paul Hensel, Michael Allison and Ahmed Khanani, *Territorial Integrity Treaties, Uti Possidetis, and Armed Conflict over Territory*, paper presented at the 2006 Shambaugh Conference “Building Synergies: Institutions and Cooperation in World Politics,” University of Iowa, 13 October 2006, 24.

<sup>31</sup> Milos Subotic, “Northern Kosovo: The Underestimated Conflict at the Heart of the Balkan Powder Keg,” 4 August, 2011; and Mark Lowen, “Kosovo Tense after Deadly Clash on Serbian Border,” *BBC News*, 6 July 2011. The cases of Sandjak and the Republika Srpska are mentioned in the proceedings of some workshops of the Regional Stability in South East Europe, a Study Group of the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes (2004-2009), see [www.bmlvs.gv.at](http://www.bmlvs.gv.at) and [www.pfpconsortium.org](http://www.pfpconsortium.org).

<sup>32</sup> According to the work programme of the UN Security Council, available at [www.un.org](http://www.un.org), there have been only two debates on UNMIK at the UNSC in 2013, one in June and one in August.

Western powers from those principles, it no longer offers predictable outcomes. Bringing a dispute or a crisis before the UNSC now seems pointless, even imprudent.

Roughly half the world's countries have answered Kosovo's call for recognition, including some NATO countries. This suggests that for some of these countries, non-recognition was decided on merit. While this did not produce a schism in NATO, one can still perceive a rough alignment between new and old NATO members, with the former against (and, therefore, in support of the FRY's territorial integrity) and the latter more or less in support of Kosovo independence. For some countries, such as Slovakia and Belgium, the fear that a Pandora's box might trigger secessionist movements in their own countries echo Russia's concerns about its restive regions. The inherent mistrust is therefore directed at minority independence claimants and small group irredentism that do not follow the agenda of their sponsors. This mistrust is likely to extend past any successful declaration of independence as in Kosovo. The future health of *international* and *regional* relations is, therefore, put in peril because the motivations of small groups cannot be trusted.

Moreover, the multilateral agenda has been irreparably damaged. The capacity of states to engage in constructive problem-solving through the UN has been exhausted – for the time being. The ability of peoples and small countries to internationalize a dispute and appeal to the UN system is correspondingly affected as, in many cases, the assent of the UNSC, that is, consensus among the permanent five, will be required. The outcome will accentuate the fragmentation of the international system and put a premium to self-help.

Three observations thus characterize the post-Kosovo UDI conflict management model:

- Western powers on the UNSC, and NATO members, could not be trusted to keep their word when it came to the preservation of territorial integrity.
- Provisional or transitional governments' intentions and commitments to the prerequisites of international conflict management would henceforth appear suspect to major powers.
- The capacity of groups in distress to internationalize a dispute, to raise awareness of tensions or to call on the international community to intervene would be contingent upon the degree of control that the major powers could maintain over the conflict management agenda. Since the multilateral solution became discredited, a propensity for "self-sufficiency conflict management" would take hold.

The next section illustrates each observation with concrete examples.

### **Three Consequences of Post-UDI Conflict Management from the Perspective of the Caucasus**

Georgia's South Ossetian adventure in 2008 only makes sense in the context of Kosovo's UDI. As a country dealing with a dual threat of fragmentation from South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Georgia may have felt genuinely threatened in its territorial integrity

when it saw the international community welcoming Kosovo's independence. Its attempt at forcibly reintegrating South Ossetia and Abkhazia was intended to mitigate the threat of "copycat" separatism. At that precise, fleeting moment, Georgian, Russian and Western interests could have been reconciled by denouncing Kosovo's independence. That did not happen. NATO countries' credibility was staked on the triple promise of respect for Georgian territorial integrity, NATO membership and assurance that Kosovo would not become an example to follow by Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia's unilateral intervention in the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict produced a "Kosovo in reverse" and exposed Western duplicity when it refused to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

### *The New Mistrust of Multilateralism*

Even if there had been the will, no one could have hoped to present the Georgia-South Ossetia dispute to the UNSC. The legacy of Kosovo made that impossible and Russia, least of all, would have been able to trust the word of the NATO members on the UNSC. As Keohane and Nye remind us, in multilateral settings, states that flout international law may be unable to secure future agreements with other states, groups or minorities.<sup>33</sup> Since the Kosovo Model of conflict management no longer offers any predictable outcome, Russia could no longer invoke the intervention of the UN under Chapter VI or VII for the threat to international peace that it perceived on its southern flank, even if it had wanted to. There would either have been a deadlock or the plans that could be obtained through negotiation at the UNSC could not be expected to function, as the word of the Western powers could not be trusted.

The UNSC resolutions pertaining to Georgia in the aftermath of the Kosovo UDI contain language reflecting such mistrust. For example, S/1808/2008

*reaffirms* the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders and *supports* all efforts by the United Nations and the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General, which are guided by their determination to promote a settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict *only by peaceful means and within the framework of the Security Council resolutions*.<sup>34</sup>

The emphasis on the last part of the paragraph is significant and seeks to establish the primacy of the UNSC as the principal organ of conflict management with the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) as its principal instrument. UNSCR 1808 comes nearly two months after Kosovo's UDI and two weeks after NATO's promise to Georgia that it would one day be a member of the alliance. It would be the last UNSC resolution before the war in August.

The fact that no multilateral institution could deal with even the post-conflict phase of conflict management is illustrated by the celerity with which France, as president of

<sup>33</sup> Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Power and Interdependence Revisited," *International Organization* 41, no. 1 (1987), 743.

<sup>34</sup> Para. 1. (emphasised by the authors).

the EU Council, seized upon the role of mediator, negotiating a six-point agreement between Georgia and Russia. The agreement did not mention Georgia's territorial integrity, gravely impeded after Russia's and a handful other countries' recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.<sup>35</sup> Even if it was on behalf of the EU, it was Nicolas Sarkozy who interceded directly between the parties, knowing full well that with the polarity of opinions in the EU regarding the responsibility for hostilities, no resolution of any significance could have been obtained from an EU mechanism.<sup>36</sup> The only EU instrument presently deployed in Georgia is the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM), which reports to the EU Council. As an observer mission, it differs little from UNOMIG, which ceased its operations in 2009 and is subject to the consent of the parties. As such, the EU Council lamented the fact that Russia was not meeting its commitments with regard to the EUMM's access to Georgia's breakaway enclaves.<sup>37</sup>

The final two UNSC resolutions pertaining to Georgia were curt: UNSCR 1839, in October 2008, merely extended UNOMIG until 15 February 2009 and UNSCR 1866, on 13 February 2009, extended UNOMIG until June 2009 and fully endorsed the six-point agreement reached by the French EU Council presidency. Georgia has not been the object of a UNSC resolution since.<sup>38</sup>

As a result, Georgia is locked in an asymmetrical negotiation position vis-à-vis Russia within the Geneva Talks framework. Although the format includes the EU, OSCE and UN as well as Georgian, Russian and the American participation, talks are deadlocked. Nona Mikhelidze has argued that this is a function of format and content, but it is clear that the Russian side has been able to forestall UN and OSCE monitoring on the ground, leaving little for the negotiators of these two organizations to contribute in the Geneva talks.<sup>39</sup> The lethargic activity on the Caucasus at the UNSC and limited scope of the EU mission (itself agreed with the consent of fractious EU members) are symptomatic of the mistrust in multilateralism by major powers.

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<sup>35</sup> Kai Olaf Lang, "The Old Fears of New Europeans," in *The Caucasus Crisis: Perceptions and Policy Implications for Germany and Europe*, ed. Hans Henning-Schröder (Berlin: SWP RP 9, 2008), 31.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 31-33. Council of the European Union, *Extraordinary European Council of: Conclusions of the Presidency*, 12594/08, Brussels, 1 September 2008, para. 4, states that the mediation was carried out by the European Union, but given the fact that the six-point agreement led to the Geneva forum of bilateral negotiations, this hardly amounts to a multilateral solution.

<sup>37</sup> Council of the European Union, *Conclusions of the Council on the South Caucasus*, 3149<sup>th</sup> Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, 27 February 2012, para. 18.

<sup>38</sup> Oscar Pardo Sierra, "A Point of No Return? Georgia and the EU One Year after the August War," *Central Asia Caucasus Analyst* 11, no. 15 (2009), 3. The only international monitoring presence in Georgia is the EUMM.

<sup>39</sup> Nona Mikhelidze, "The Geneva Talks over Georgia's Territorial Conflicts: Achievements and Challenges," *Istituto Affari Internazionali* 10, no. 25 (2010), 3-5.

### *Mistrust of Liberation Movements and Small Powers*

The lukewarm enthusiasm for intervention by major powers is an indication of mistrust in the motives and intentions of small powers and liberation movements. This phenomenon is difficult to measure empirically, but it is felt relative to the enthusiasm for intervention in the 1990s, especially in the Balkans, on the European mainland. While a decade of inconclusive nation-building (what Manning equated with peacebuilding) in Iraq and Afghanistan has also taken its toll; major Western powers do not believe that small powers and liberation movements share their appetite for democracy and good governance.<sup>40</sup> The cavalier disregard by Kosovo's provisional government of the UNSC's writ has astounded many, but no more than the attempt of the Kosovo authorities to subjugate its predominantly Serbian parts and prevent its partitioning.

In the case of the Caucasus, there is evidence that some new NATO countries emboldened Georgia to take action against South Ossetia and that certain persons greatly contributed to assuring—without evidence—that NATO would support Georgia's attempt at forcibly re-integrating its breakaway regions.<sup>41</sup> Georgia's responsibility for the hostilities has been acknowledged by the international community, stalling its NATO ambitions.<sup>42</sup> Jeremy Pressman argues that alliances exist expressly to restrain recalcitrant countries and to shape their policies around more or less harmonious positions reflective of an organization's values.<sup>43</sup> If those values are not shared by the potential new members, then the enlargement drive will come to a stop. In effect, it has come to a stop for Georgia.

Similarly, Russia's presence in Georgia can be interpreted as a form of close protection of minorities seeking emancipation. In fact, the narrative of Russia's intervention in the South Ossetian and Abkhazian crises mirrors that of the NATO intervention in Kosovo: central authorities that abuse the right to self-determination of their minorities calling for humanitarian intervention that resulted in the independence of breakaway re-

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<sup>40</sup> John Herbst, "Failed States and the International Community Ten Years after 9/11: A Shifting Paradigm?" in *Preventing Conflict, Managing Crises: European and American Perspectives*, ed. Eva Gross et al. (Washington DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2011), 10. See also Pew Research Center, *The American-Western European Values Gap*, 17 November 2011, 4, where a minority of the American, British and French public supports helping other nations. The Pew Research Center concludes that the values' gap is subsiding.

<sup>41</sup> Frederic Labarre, "Russian Capabilities, '888' (the Russian-Georgian War of August) and the Impact on the Alliance," *SITREP: The Journal of the Royal Canadian Military Institute* 68, no. 6 (2008), 13.

<sup>42</sup> Rui Gomes da Silva, rapporteur, "Georgia and NATO," *NATO Parliamentary Assembly*, 180 PNCP 09 E Rev.1, 2008, para. 34. The report puts equal blame on Russia and Georgia, reflecting the split in opinions in the Assembly.

<sup>43</sup> Jeremy Pressman, *Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); and Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 357-399.

gions.<sup>44</sup> Yet it can also be argued that Russia's presence in the region is aimed at maintaining control over the policies of its Caucasus allies. Evidence for this is the allusion made by Paata Zarakeishvili that Moscow has convinced some of its allies in the region not to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia.<sup>45</sup> Although Tbilisi would call that "occupation" of its sovereign territory, *de jure* it would seem no different than the presence of KFOR troops in Kosovo for Serbia. *De facto*, the difference is that KFOR was a multinational mission, whereas Russian peacekeepers answer directly to Moscow.<sup>46</sup>

Russia's presence in Armenia responds to critical regional geostrategic needs and may also fulfill certain guarantees, but inevitably ties Yerevan's policies to the preferences of Moscow. The relative ease with which Azerbaijan has been able to support Georgian territorial integrity can partly be explained as a function of the restraining factors of the Russia-Armenia relationship.<sup>47</sup> In other words, Russia's presence constrains Armenia because it is worried about the outcome of the latter's independent policies.

As explained above, the mistrust expressed by major powers of the intentions and motives of self-determination movements and small powers is difficult to measure empirically, but between the NATO Summits of 2008 in Bucharest and Lisbon in 2010 analysts have detected a greater focus on the preferences of great powers than at any other time since the end of the Cold War.<sup>48</sup>

Conflict management in the Caucasus is a function of neither institutions nor international law, but rather of states. Regional hegemony is the driver for conflict prevention, as monopolized by powerful actors that use it to assert idiosyncratic regional interests. This leaves smaller actors in relative isolation and positions them asymmetrically vis-à-vis the hegemon. That leaves little room for political maneuvering, including choosing ones alliances. Indeed, the breakaway regions of Georgia are independent in name only. Had they followed the example of Kosovo, they might have found themselves in an international "no-country's land." Michael Rossi has shown how Kosovo's independence did not bring about regional stability and also did not bring the human and cultural emancipation it sought. For example, Kosovo is unable to gain membership in non-governmental organizations such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) or the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA).<sup>49</sup> If the Kosovo Model of conflict management was meant to bring stability, it failed. If it was designed to bestow

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<sup>44</sup> "Interview with Dr. Viacheslav Chirikba, Advisor on Foreign Policy to the President of Abkhazia," *Russian Analytical Digest* 45, no. 8 (2008), 8.

<sup>45</sup> Paata Zakareishvili, "Georgia's Relationship with Abkhazia," *Caucasus Analytical Digest* 7, no. 9 (2010), 9.

<sup>46</sup> Pierre Jolicœur, "Le maintien de la paix par la Russie dans la CEI," in *Guide du maintien de la paix 2005*, ed. Jocelyn Coulon (Montréal: Athéna éditions, 2004), 77-98.

<sup>47</sup> Sergey Markedonov, "Caucasus Conflict Breaks Old Rules of the Game," *Russian Analytical Digest* 45, no. 8 (2008), 5.

<sup>48</sup> Pierre Jolicœur and Frederic Labarre, "La Sécurité européenne et les Relations Europe-Russie à la Lumière du Concept stratégique de l'OTAN adopté à Lisbonne," in *Europe et Sécurité après le Traité de Lisbonne*, ed. Ian Roberge (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2013), 129.

<sup>49</sup> Michael Rossi, *Five Inconvenient Truths about Kosovo*.



genuine independence on oppressed minorities, it failed as well; the Abkhaz and Ossetian applications of this model are evidence to this end.

### *Welcome back, Realpolitik*

*Realpolitik* is supplanting multilateralism in conflict management. Intervention becomes driven only by political will and national interest. The multilateral flavor of intervention is nowhere to be seen; the crises of the Arab Spring of 2011 have illustrated this point clearly. Widespread condemnation of the various dictatorships by Western powers has accompanied the uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East notwithstanding that only two cases have seen intervention.

NATO's Operation Unified Protector effectively supported the rebels in Libya against Muammar Qaddafi's regime. Even this intervention betrayed the lack of appetite of the United States, which promptly abdicated the leadership role to France and Great Britain. Unified Protector was hardly emblematic of alliance cohesion; barely a third of the Allies participated, and France and Great Britain shouldered the heaviest burden.<sup>50</sup> Further, the expulsion of Islamist rebels from Mali in 2013 was handled unilaterally by France.

International intervention in Syria has not been prevented by deadlock at the UNSC. If self-help returns as a conflict management technique, the ability of international organizations to protect small powers and minorities will remain hostage to the strongest power.

Furthermore, the reputation of major powers may also suffer. For example, international opinion on France's operation in Mali suffers from a continental divide. African nations largely see the intervention in a positive light; the Middle East is more ambivalent, with only 41 percent of states approving of France's actions.<sup>51</sup> The United States' security policies have recently relied more on their technological prowess than on their soft power of persuasion, as exemplified by the extra-legal use of drones. This attitude has garnered few friends around the world and subsequently hampered US ability to claim the moral high ground in multilateral conflict management.<sup>52</sup> The fact that countries such as France, Great Britain and especially the United States are less likely to cultivate multilateral approval of the use of military force for purposes of conflict management renders the legitimization of action problematic.<sup>53</sup>

On the whole, "a multipolar and less governable world is emerging."<sup>54</sup> Unilateralism will shape relations to come more than multilateralism; for one, NATO, although re-

<sup>50</sup> Keir Giles, *The State of the NATO-Russia Reset* (Oxford: Conflict Studies Research Centre, September 2011), 22-24.

<sup>51</sup> Pew Research Center, *As Mali Votes, Mixed Reception to French Intervention from Publics in Africa and the Middle East*, 25 July 2013, 2.

<sup>52</sup> Pew Research Center, *Global Opinion of Obama Slips, International Policies Faulted*, 13 June 2012, 16-18.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 32.

<sup>54</sup> Antonio Missiroli, ed., *Enabling the Future: EU Military Capability 2013-2025*, Report 16 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2013), 19.

spected, depends on active US involvement, which is currently wanting. The EU's ability to shape the strategic environment according to its interests is hampered by the reluctance of its members to cooperate in military matters involving coercive conflict management.<sup>55</sup> The UN's case, as described above, reveals an institution that has abdicated its peacekeeping and peace enforcement imperatives. One can therefore conclude that the gap in conflict management will be taken up by the capabilities of nation-states in accordance with their willingness to intervene and their interests.<sup>56</sup> In this regard, it is interesting to note the commonality of purpose between the French White Paper of December 2008 and the British Comprehensive Strategic Review issued in March 2008.<sup>57</sup> It is even more interesting to note how the scope of global French strategic interests mirrors that of the EU Institute of Strategic Studies' assessment,<sup>58</sup> which suggests that France and Great Britain are shouldering the destiny of the EU's conflict management priorities.

Another indication that state-centered international politics is on the rise is the fleeting attempt by Russia to establish new European security architecture.<sup>59</sup> This attempt, which did not succeed, aimed to rebalance European conflict management instruments that oriented towards NATO.<sup>60</sup> President Dmitri Medvedev's New European Security Architecture was not all that new: it basically reiterated the precepts of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, whose provisions on the inviolability of borders are so precious to Russia.<sup>61</sup> Faced with Western Europe's indifference at the proposal, Russia is now banking on a Eurasian Union.<sup>62</sup> Meanwhile, Euro-Atlantic powers are no closer to reforming the international institutions that are supposedly meant to shape the global strategic environment.

It is too soon to tell whether these initiatives will forge "strategic blocks" reminiscent of the Cold War. In the meantime, there is bound to be little cooperation among great powers on conflict management and few prospects for small powers and minorities under duress to have their voices heard and resolve their grievances through international institutional mechanisms. The implications are clear for the Caucasus: when not on their

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 10-13.

<sup>56</sup> "The French White Paper on Defence and National Security," *CSS Analyses in Security Policy* 46, no. 3 (2008), 1-2.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 1-2, reiterated in Her Majesty's Government's *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: Strategic Security and Defence Review*, October 2010, 12.

<sup>58</sup> Missiroli, ed., *Enabling the Future*, 17, compared with CSS Analyses, *passim*, 2. [www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub958.pdf](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub958.pdf).

<sup>59</sup> Richard Krickus, *Medvedev's Plan: Giving Russia a Voice but not a Veto in a New European Security System* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, December 2009), 18-22.

<sup>60</sup> Keir Giles, *Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020* (Rome: NATO Defense College, June 2009), 6-7.

<sup>61</sup> Marcin Kaczmarek, "The Russian Proposal for a New European Security System," *CES Commentary* 11, 16 October 2008, 2.

<sup>62</sup> Boris Kuznetsov, "Russo-Georgian Rapprochement: A Light at the End of the Tunnel," Vienna: Landesverteidigungsakademie, July 2013, 115. Notes from a presentation to the Regional Stability in the South Caucasus Study Group (RSSC SG), delivered March 2013.

own to face the perils of contemporary international relations, they will be subject to the unrestricted sway of a local hegemon.

## Conclusion

Conflict management has been morphing ever since doubt arose about the UN's ability to muster the willingness and capacity necessary to engage in peace enforcement. The Kosovo conflict management experience by the Euro-Atlantic powers attempted to put the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and the normative (respect for human rights) aspects of the Helsinki Final Act before the letter of international law (inviolability of borders, respect for territorial integrity and national sovereignty).

The Euro-Atlantic powers were faced with a moral dilemma in Kosovo: do things *right*, or do the *right* thing. By disobeying custom, they called into question the foundations of international law with respect to self-determination, secession and independence movements. Because international law supports the edifice of multilateral institutions, even multilateralism has become suspect. Whereas multilateralism offered small powers and even groups a chance to air their grievances constructively, a return to state-centered solutions of conflict management means that eventually, "the weak will have to suffer what they must," to paraphrase Thucydides.

The Kosovo Model would have worked had the intentions of the framers of UNSCR 1244 been upheld, had the Kosovo Provisional Government been reprimanded for their UDI and had the UNSC been more deliberate in its prohibition of UDI in cases such as Kosovo, which fall outside the hitherto accepted doctrine of *uti possidetis*. The premature and unnecessary recognition of Kosovo by major Western powers is the bad example, not the conflict management model that was in use until the UDI.

Western powers recognized Kosovo after more than a decade of promising to preserve Serbia's territorial integrity. This represents duplicity of the highest order. More specifically, the UDI cast oppressed groups in a negative light, as unreliable partners in conflict management. Finally, if Operation Allied Force was a victory of human rights over state rights, the state has recovered its lost prestige by taking the mantle of conflict management in the post-UDI world. The unpredictability of the contemporary strategic environment is a source of threat for everyone, and although many argue that the economic recession and the rise of Brazil, Russia, India and China as regional and global economic powers shoulder their share of responsibility for upsetting the global equilibrium of power, the Kosovo crisis, taken in its entirety, exemplifies that the state-centered approach is, for the moment, the best guarantee against unreliable institutions and partners, big or small.



# Military Security within the Framework of Security Studies: Research Results

Ryszard Szpyra\*

**Abstract:** The present article is based on a number of key assumptions as well as a conceptual system of military security, which is anchored in the theoretical system of security studies. Since these two disciplines are relatively young, there is a need to analyze them for the purpose of determining the basic theoretical apparatus in the field of security studies. This article presents an original definition and description of the fundamental nature of security as well as a general description of military security. It includes the vital domain of the subject's own activity leading to the maintenance of the proper level of security. The paper contains original definitions of such basic categories as security, state security and military security. Indeed, much of the content is based on theories used in previous research, but these have served merely as "bricks" that are used to fill in the already existing theoretical structure. Thus, through a specific redesign, a structure compatible with the basic tenets of security studies has been devised, also taking into account recent results of other sciences that cover military affairs.

**Keywords:** Security, state security, military security.

## Introduction

Despite a number of profound changes that have taken place in the international situation, a military force is still one of the most important instruments of international policies carried out by states to protect their vital as well as less important interests. Thus, military power has a significant impact on countries' possibility of uninterrupted existence and development, which directly shapes their security.

In previous studies on military questions, focus was directed on various aspects of the existence and use of armed forces. Strategic studies paid most attention to general concepts and methods of using military means in achieving policy objectives. Earlier military science, in contrast, understood mainly as the art of war, investigated and sought optimal rational "technologies" of fighting, methods of application of force that would ensure a higher probability of victory. More recently, security studies have arisen, and it has become apparent that one of the critical areas of security is the military domain. Very quickly, appropriate adaptations have been made and the results of the research done in these fields have been introduced as the body of military security studies. Undoubtedly, an important part of the *acquis communautaire* can also be the content of the *acquis* of military security studies, but it is also necessary to introduce and describe the structure derived from the basic assumptions of the general theory of security studies. This forms the inspiration and purpose of the following study.

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## Origin and understanding of security

The fundamental problem of security studies is its multi-dimensional definition. In terms of research, the lack of a clear definition of security can cause the blurring of the boundaries between science and security-related disciplines. These include international relations, political or military science—each operating with a different conceptual apparatus—and perspective and research methodology. Because of the numerous definitions of security, when focusing on its different aspects, many issues arise for security studies.

Security studies—a sub-discipline of international relations—emerged as a scientific discipline after the Second World War. During the course of developments of the Cold War era and later, the field underwent various changes. In Poland, security studies emerged primarily from the now-defunct military science by expanding the field of research far beyond military security.

The field of security studies is now located at the intersection of several disciplines, even though the field of international relations seems to dominate its overall perception. The field is based on interdisciplinary research and is characterized by a multiplicity of theoretical and epistemological perspectives, focusing attention mainly on the physical dimension, namely, structural and symbolic force and violence. In this respect, the most dynamically developing branch of research in this discipline deals with analyzing the links between security, culture and the identity of individuals and societies.<sup>1</sup>

A review of the schools of thought and the definitions of security shows that they are highly diverse and reflect the fundamental nature of security in different ways. Thus, it was decided to propose in this study a definition of security that is designed for consistency, whereby an attempt will be made to redefine the concept of security. This in turn will provide the basis for reconsidering the concept of military security. Providing a definition is an attempt to synthesize the existing *acquis* rather than to create a whole new category.

It is necessary to start basic definition considerations with a semantic analysis. In English, there are at least four words related to security. They are: safe, safety, secure, security, as follows:

- *Safe* means, among other things: not threatened by harm (not at risk of injury), protected from danger (protected against threats), not hurt, unharmed (undamaged);<sup>2</sup>
- *Safety* includes: the state of being safe, free from threats, danger, harm or risk;
- *Secure* includes: safe, protected against danger or risk, having no doubt, fear or anxiety as a result of effort;<sup>3</sup>
- *Security* includes: the state of being secure, a protection against, something which protects or makes secure.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Paul D. Williams, ed., *Security Studies: An Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 502-504.

<sup>2</sup> *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English. New Edition* (Warsaw: PWN, 1990), 921.

<sup>3</sup> *Longman Dictionary*, 944.

Language norms relating to the native language of the author are also very important. In Polish, “safe” means something that is not in danger, not threatened, not jeopardizing anything or that protects from danger.<sup>5</sup> Security is the state of a lack of threat, of confidence, of personal safety, of safety of the country and its citizens; a sense of security; to ensure the safety of anyone; to watch over someone’s safety; not to violate someone’s safety.<sup>6</sup> It is important to also understand the word “state,” which means all the circumstances and conditions in which someone or something can be found at any given time, level, quantity of something, the situation or a position.

A semantic analysis of words directly related to security leads to the following conclusions:

- Someone (something), that is, a given entity can be in a safe or a dangerous situation, hence in a particular state of the situation;
- Someone, that is, a given entity can feel secure or insecure, which is also referred to as a particular state in a given situation;
- Someone (something) or a specific instrument can provide (guarantee, protect) the security of an entity;
- Someone (something) may endanger someone (something) and is therefore a specific entity that constitutes the threat (Fig. 1).

One of the authors who quite early on, considering Polish conditions, attempted to define security is Ryszard Zięba. In one of his studies, he points out that security, derived from the Latin *sine cura* (securitas), is a state of confidence, peace, security and the feeling of the absence of risk and protection against it.<sup>7</sup>

The author notes that<sup>8</sup> in the social sciences, security, in its most general sense, includes the satisfaction of such needs as existence, survival, whole identity (identity), independence, peace, possession and self-development. Otherwise,<sup>9</sup> the study assumes that security can be defined as the certainty of the existence and survival as well as the functioning and development of the subject.<sup>10</sup> Confidence, which depends not only on

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<sup>4</sup> *Longman Dictionary*, 944.

<sup>5</sup> *Uniwersalny słownik języka polskiego A-J* (Warsaw: PNW, 2006), 235.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> Ryszard Zięba, *Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego. Koncepcje – struktury – funkcjonowanie* (Warsaw: Scholar, 1999), 27.

<sup>8</sup> Zięba, *Instytucjonalizacja*, 27.

<sup>9</sup> Ryszard Zięba, “Pojęcie i istota bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego,” *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe po zimnej wojnie*, ed. R. Zięba (Warsaw: WaiP, 2008), 16.

<sup>10</sup> “Subject” is a category that has been chosen to embrace the definitions of both state and non-state actors that take part in creating the security environment. The term originates from philosophy; Nina Power describes it as follows: “the noun ‘subject’ refers to a legal or political person/collective and to a perceiving or cognising self...” and “It is this conception of a collectivized, political subject that haunts all attempts to reduce the philosophical notion of the subject to an individuated consciousness or a primarily moral being.” Cf. Nina Power, “Philosophy’s Subjects,” *PARRHESIA: A Journal of Critical Philosophy* 3 (2007), 56 and 69; [www.parrhesiajournal.org/past.html](http://www.parrhesiajournal.org/past.html).




Figure 1: The field of security resulting from the semantic analysis.

the lack of risk (the absence or elimination thereof) is also the result of a creative activity of a subject and is variable over time or has the nature of a social process.

Bearing these considerations in mind, the following conclusions can be drawn. In the face of threats, to achieve the desired level of security it is necessary to:

- Have situational awareness;
- Strive to change the situation in which threats exist and neutralize them.

To achieve this, one must take two basic types of action, namely, those needed for:

- Obtaining and maintaining situational awareness;
- Neutralizing threats.

In conclusion, we can say that the part of the overall security model that refers to the activity of a security subject is comprised of two basic sub-elements:

- Actions necessary to achieve situational awareness;
- Actions needed to neutralize threats.

The findings also held that security is very much linked to the possibility of continuity and development of the subject. The basic condition for both the existence and the development of any subject of security is appropriately fulfilling its needs, i.e. realizing different types of supply.

*Threats.* The reflections on the essence of security lead to the conclusion that it concerns the survival and development of a security subject. These, in turn, are directly de-



pendent on the satisfaction of the needs of this subject. In this respect, at one end of the spectrum we meet needs that ensure the subject's survival and development. The other end of the spectrum is the inability to satisfy any need, which prevents the existence of the security subject. The ability to meet the needs of the subject is, therefore, a key requirement for the subject's continuity and development.

This, however, is only one possibility, because on the way to implementing this requirement many current or potential obstacles exist. The reasons may be different. One of the most important is intentional actions of others. For the purposes of this model, real and potential obstacles that may prevent meeting the needs of the subject in question are called security threats. In this situation, the threat will be understood as objectively existing and as potential obstacles that prevent any form of meeting the needs of the security subject.

*Individual activity.* Both the semantic analysis (someone/something – a specific instrument can provide/guarantee/protect the security of the entity) and the definition of security studies by different authors, as well as the assumptions of other theories (e.g. praxeology) show that one of the main factors affecting the level of security is the individual activity of the security subject. Based on the foregoing considerations, it can be concluded that threats are the main obstacle to achieving an acceptable level of security and, in practice, the desired level of supply of the subject's needs. For this reason, the activity of the security subject should be aimed mainly at countering threats or neutralizing obstacles, in order to meet the needs of the subject (Fig. 2). The main objective of this activity is to create the conditions for seamless fulfillment of the needs of the security subject or ensuring its continuity and development.

During the discussion on the nature of security, it has also been found that situational awareness is the basis for any activity, as well as a part of the fundamental nature of security. This awareness does not arise by itself, but is the result of purposeful activity and, therefore, the subject's own activity must be composed of two streams: one aimed at achieving and maintaining situational awareness at the desired level, the second aimed at neutralizing threats.

The aforementioned observation does not mean that a threat can be neutralized only by the activity of the security subject. It can happen that neutralization is dependent on other factors. However, especially when the security subject is a country, its own activity must be the basis of building the desired state of security.

As a result we may consider that:

*In social sciences, security is a state (condition) variable in time that determines the ability to meet the social needs of existence and development of the subject despite the presence of real or potential threats. It also includes the awareness of the condition in question as well as all activities aimed at achieving the desired level of security.*

*National security is a state (condition) variable in time that determines the ability to meet the social needs of existence and development of the nation despite the presence of real or potential threats. It also includes the awareness of the condition in question as well as all activities aimed at achieving the desired level of security.*




Figure 2: A simplified model of security.

With the above understanding of security, however, the level of security at any given moment is unclear. We only know that it is a state (condition), but we do not know what it is like. Therefore, to determine the level of security, one needs additional categories that describe the levels of this state and tools to measure them.

### Outline of the concept of military security

Military questions have been debated since the dawn of literature and scientific activity. These considerations, however, were suggested and developed from different perspectives and for different purposes. Some creative activity concerning military matters was dedicated to fighting technology. The authors dealing with this problem mostly sought to identify regularities governing armed struggle in order to make it more effective. In the Polish cultural area, this was the part of military science called the art of war.

Another group of researchers have studied and described armed struggle in the broader context of international relations. These authors have left combat fighting technology issues for military researchers, focusing their own scholarly activities on the political circumstances of maintaining and using military force in international state policies.

The second half of the twentieth century gave birth to another research approach based on analyzing the security of a subject and seeking ways of ensuring it. As part of this approach, considerations relating to the sphere of military security also appeared.

These considerations can be divided into domestic and foreign ones. Among the former, the considerations developed at the National Defense University are predominant.

In various studies, the term “military security” usually denotes the ability of a state to defend and/or deter military aggression. Alternatively, “military security” refers to the ability of the state to enforce its policy decisions using military force. The term “military security” is considered synonymous with “security” in a number of ways.

The *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* defines “security” as a condition that results from protective measures being established and maintained, whereby a condition of inviolability from hostile acts or influences is ensured.<sup>11</sup> This is, traditionally, the earliest recognized form of national security.<sup>12</sup> Today, however, the scope of military security has expanded from conventional forms of conflict between nation-states to the struggle between states and non-state actors.

Polish authors have made numerous attempts to define military security, but despite reaching many important conclusions connected to the fundamental nature of military security, these definitions are not wide enough to be included in the theory of security. However, this definition of military security should be derived from some generally accepted interpretations of security. Also, in the international literature on this topic, researchers have not focused enough on defining the phenomenon, concentrating rather on merely describing its different aspects. Thus, it is necessary to try to develop a definition of military security to can meet these needs.

## Elements of the Military Security Model

Military security is a category related mainly to the state (country) as its subject. As such, the greatest achievements in this field have been in the area of political science, whereas the field of international relations has studied and gathered knowledge about the relationship between states. In accordance with theories developed by these disciplines, the military security of a state is mostly derived from the existence of the subject: the state and the international environment surrounding it. It is also inextricably linked to the existence of the armed forces. These are the fundamental elements belonging to the category of neorealist theories of international politics associated with the survival of countries and their possibilities for growth.

The existence of security problems resulting from the efforts of countries to ensure their own security has a significant impact on military security. Countries, in fact, create increased insecurity between one another, because each country interprets its own actions as defensive and those of others as potentially threatening, regardless of the reasons for a particular action.

The sources of military threats should be seen within the characteristics of the international environment in which military power is one of the main instruments of states’

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<sup>11</sup> *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Joint Publication 1-02.* (Washington, DC: DoD, 2012), 279.

<sup>12</sup> Prabhakaran Paleri, *National Security: Imperatives And Challenges* (New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill, 2008), 521.

international politics. This is mainly because military power is the only instrument capable of physically destroying elements of another state or of using effective forms of violence. This power, merely through its very existence a very effective tool of influence, creates a threat to the security of other countries. This threat is exacerbated by the existence of states whose international relations are based on dishonesty. At the current level of military technology development, rapid changes in power relations between states can take place. This opens the possibility for dishonest states to overcome other parties unfairly yet successfully. A state, aware of this fact when making alliances and signing agreements on arms control, exercises caution and attempts to actively ensure its own security. Military strength, already by its very existence, creates a threat to the security of other states. This is a fact that many authors and a number of official international documents ignore.

Admittedly, there is a general awareness today that the use of force to resolve international disputes is prohibited by international law. There are exceptions to this prohibition. Military power can be used for collective or self-defense and with the consent of the UN Security Council. Therefore, each country can legally maintain armed forces for defense.

It is easy to see that this approach results from the realist school of thought in international relations, which, as is well known, is quite pessimistic. There is a more optimistic approach based on liberalism and constructivism. However, as in the methods of scenario planning, preparing for resistance in nefarious scenarios also means preparing for better scenarios. In international practice, the realist approach is still the most basic foundation for building national security strategy. Nonetheless, states generally oppose actions against military threats based on, for example, the concept of the balance of power. Theories of deterrence also have a wide application. Moreover, it should be noted that the sphere of security refers to the most dangerous consequences of threats. Military threat may, in fact, lead to a total or partial loss of sovereignty and territorial integrity, which is why states cannot accept excessively high risks.

To return to the main course of thought in this paper, from an analytical standpoint, a state typically categorizes other, potentially dangerous states based on three factors: capability, intent and circumstances.<sup>13</sup>

The term "capability" refers to the physical ability to wage warfare on a significant scale. Any sovereign entity, except perhaps the smallest ones, possesses such a capability. While to maintain the balance of power it is not necessary to cause serious harm to another country, nonetheless most countries should consider the possibility of direct threats coming from their neighbors. Also, countries with relatively long maritime borders must consider the fact that also countries other than their immediate neighbors may pose a threat to their territory. The situation is further complicated by the possibility of air strikes that can be carried out even by distant states.

"Intent," the second factor, refers to the degree of determination necessary for a country to be willing to initiate an attack. It is worth pausing to consider the problem of

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<sup>13</sup> Frederick H. Hartmann, *The Relations of Nations* (New York: Macmillan, 1978), 259-261.




Figure 3: The three main components of military security.

defense and especially its definition. Some understand it narrowly as the defense of territory and sovereignty; others understand it more broadly as the defense of national interests. An example of narrow interpretation of defense is the provision of the Polish Constitution, which states that the Armed Forces of the Polish State shall safeguard the independence and integrity of its territory and ensure the security and integrity of its borders.<sup>14</sup>

Meanwhile, many countries with national interests located outside their borders entrust their forces with the task of promoting national interests in places and in the manner specified by their governments. In such cases, the use of the armed forces is based primarily on the need to endorse a country's national interests, rather than to defend its sovereignty and territory. Since states use the term "security"<sup>15</sup> to indicate the preservation of anything they regard as their vital interests, this notion has defensive connotations only in the sense that each nation is prepared to defend those interests against interference by the use of force. Depending on the nature of the security concept, a state's activity may appear to the world at large as either defensive or offensive. However, to the

<sup>14</sup> Article 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997.

<sup>15</sup> Hartmann, *The Relations of Nations*, 264-265.

state involved, the actions are *ipso facto* defensive – that is, defending its vital interests.<sup>16</sup>

We can now resume defining the fundamental nature of military security. It is clear that this is a category which should be directly linked to the understanding of security. Based on a pre-defined understanding of security as the security of the state, it must be recognized that military security is a condition that is variable in time and determines the ability to meet a nation’s need to exist and develop, despite the presence of real, or potential, military threats. The concept also includes awareness of the condition in question and all activities aimed at achieving the desired level of security.

It is worth looking at three main components of security (Fig. 3):

- Condition variable in time;
- Awareness of this condition;
- Activity aimed at achieving the desired level of the condition.

Military security also concerns the impact of various countries and other stakeholders as well as environmental factors that affect the military sphere. In turn, this affects the state’s ability to meet social needs related to the existence and development of these entities (Fig. 4).

Therefore, military security exists at the time sequence of the states (conditions) resulting from the activity of the subject of security and independently of the changes in activity of the entity’s environment of (Fig. 5).




Figure 4: A general model of military security.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

The fact that the conditions for military security change and that these changes depend on many factors indicates that security is also a process. Therefore, we can assume that this process can be shaped in the same way as other similar processes. This means that it is necessary to conduct the activity leading to the desired effect. This effect is also the result of factors other than one's own activity. Military security subjects strive to minimize the effects of factors other than their own activity. Usually, subjects seek to actively shape the largest part of their environment that is possible. We can simplify this and assume that the main part of a state's military security is a function of its activity.

Due to the previously described nature of the international environment and, above all, the suspicion and desire of states to secure their own interests, their condition would be worse without action on the part of military security subjects. Therefore, as in the case of living organisms, where a continuous activity of the relevant organs is necessary to sustain life, in the instance of military security continuous activity is required on the part of the subject in order to maintain an acceptable level of security. The purpose of this activity is to maintain the desired level of military security.

This raises the question of the overall shape of the activity system that sustains the desired level of military security. The importance of this question stems from the fact that the structure of the model and its performance have a direct impact on the level of military security.

If the general model of action to achieve security translates into the model of activity aimed at achieving the proper state of military security, we obtain the following (Fig. 6):

- Activity to achieve and maintain military situational awareness;
- Measures to neutralize military threats, especially military attacks.




Figure 5: Military security states in time.




Figure 6: Model of system activities carried out in order to maintain the desired level of military security.

While seeking the elements of such an activity system, it should be noted that the most general models always contain a management module. Its existence depends on the basic assumptions of praxeology or management theory. According to Krzyżanowski, a steering element, as it is widely understood, is an indispensable attribute of any organization.<sup>17</sup>

Therefore, the first essential element of an activity system existing to maintain the desired level of the proper state of military security should be a management module. This module should meet the management functions shaping behavior, which have been widely discussed in literature on this topic.

Activities aiming to prevent military threats must be integrated into the other activities of the state. They should also remain within the limits of applicable national and international law and demonstrate their effectiveness as well as many other features. This activity is typically conducted under various constraints, the most important today being deficiencies and the level of public support for this activity.

From the discussion above we know that the basis of any rational activity is the awareness of the situation in which the subject finds itself. This awareness is essential

<sup>17</sup> Leszek J. Krzyżanowski, *O podstawach kierowania organizacjami inaczej: paradygmaty, modele, metafory, filozofia, metodologia, dylematy, trendy* (Warsaw: PWN, 1999), 32.



for making reasonable decisions about any actions to be undertaken. Therefore this awareness shapes any decisions that are made, with these directly guiding the activity of the subject. In the case of military security, an important part of this awareness is the knowledge of military threats, particularly of the military capabilities and intentions of the enemy or enemies. This is what F.H. Hartmann calls the circumstances and environmental concerns.

This knowledge is the result of significant efforts undertaken by a state to reveal aspects that its opponent assiduously attempts to conceal, that is, its armed forces' capabilities and intentions. Without this knowledge a state is unable to properly assess military threats and thus, to select appropriate strategies to counter it. Therefore, it should be assumed that one of the main elements of an activity model system that is necessary to maintain the desired level of military security is its information module.

This brings us to another essential element, namely the module of activity used to neutralize military threats. The existence of a management module and a module for acquiring situational awareness enables reliable knowledge of military threats and the environment to be obtained and to make rational decisions on the action needed in response. However, there must be an element of the executive module that enables the designed action to be realized and military threats to be opposed.

The executive sphere in the proposed model reflects the operating module. The module represents the type of activities aimed at countering a detected military threat. Such activity is shaped by a subject's own strategy and the military operations of outside bodies. Therefore, military security is a process in which constant changes take place. These changes are a function of the state's activity in the military field and modifications in a state's environment.

It is worth noting that actors in international relations, both state and non-governmental (non-state) organizations, are to some extent dependent on the surrounding environment. This environment affects their behavior and performance, whereby a state can indirectly influence the actions undertaken by actors in international surroundings. State military activity may, therefore, directly address the various aspects of another country (or a non-state entity) or its surroundings.

The proposal contains a simplified model of an action carried out in order to maintain the desired level of military security, covering its most important elements. While a supply module is of course necessary, it is not unique enough to be included at present. The extracted modules are the core activities of the model and, in practice, should be complemented by elements of service and support. Here, however, the aim is to extract the most relevant elements of military security activity.

## **Management of Military Security**

The management of military security includes activities that are undertaken to achieve the desired level of security. The proposed model of military security includes two main areas of state activity. One concerns the desired condition of political and military situational awareness and the other aims to prevent military threats.

With regard to the first sphere of military security, the management activity module should effectively perform the tasks primarily involved in planning and conducting activities for securing a suitable condition of political and military situational awareness.

In the next sphere of activity, the military security management module should fulfill tasks related to planning and conducting activities against military threats. In addition, the management module should also perform a military advisory role to the top management of the state in matters of military security.

*Obtaining Situational Awareness of Military Security: the Model’s Informational Module*

From the perspective of military security, the aim of the process described above is to achieve an information model in the form of political and military situational awareness (Fig. 7).

In current international literature, situational awareness is defined as having an understanding of what is happening around you. It involves gathering the correct amount of information (all that is needed, but not too much), being able to analyze it and making projections based on this analysis.<sup>18</sup>




Figure 7: Obtaining situational awareness.

<sup>18</sup> Eric S. Toner, “Creating Situational Awareness: A Systems Approach,” in *Medical Surge Capacity: Workshop Summary* (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2010), available at <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK32848> (18 July 2014).

In other terms, it is the perception of the elements in the environment, in time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future.

Situational awareness must include the following four specific steps:

- Extracting information from the environment;
- Integrating this information with relevant internal knowledge to create a mental picture of the current situation;
- Using this picture to direct further perceptual exploration in a continual perceptual cycle;
- Anticipating future events.

Taking these four steps into account, situational awareness is defined as the continuous extraction of environmental information, the integration of this information with previous knowledge to form a coherent mental picture and the use of that picture in directing further perception and anticipating future events.<sup>19</sup>

Acquiring increasingly better situational awareness means limiting what Carl von Clausewitz has called the “fog of war.” The ideal condition would be, of course, full insight into the situation, namely to achieve a condition similar to playing a game of chess. Players see the exact situation or the state of reality that exists in both their own field and that of the opponent. Although they do not have access to the opponent’s thoughts, purposes and considerations, they see each of the opponent’s moves.

Mica Endsley has distinguished three levels when creating situational awareness (SA) (Fig. 8):<sup>20</sup>

*Perception* (Level 1 SA): The first step in achieving situational awareness is to perceive the status, attributes and dynamics of relevant elements in the environment. Thus, Level 1 SA, the most basic level of situational awareness, involves the processes of monitoring, cue detection and simple recognition that lead to the awareness of multiple situational elements (objects, events, people, systems, environmental factors) and their current states (locations, conditions, modes, actions).

*Comprehension* (Level 2 SA): The next step in situational awareness formation involves a synthesis of disjointed Level 1 SA elements through the processes of pattern recognition, interpretation and evaluation. Level 2 SA requires integrating this information to understand how it will impact upon an individual’s goals and objectives. This includes developing a comprehensive picture of the world or of that part of the world that is of interest to the individual.

*Projection* (Level 3 SA): The third and highest level of situational awareness involves the ability to predict the future actions of the elements in the environment. Level 3 SA is achieved through knowledge of the status and dynamics of the elements and

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<sup>19</sup> “Situational Awareness,” available at [www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Situational\\_Awareness](http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Situational_Awareness), 23 August 2011.

<sup>20</sup> Mica R. Endsley, “Toward a theory of situation awareness in dynamic systems,” *Human Factors* 37, no. 1 (1995): 32–64.




Figure 8: Situational awareness.

comprehension of the situation (Levels 1 and 2 SA) and by subsequently projecting this information to determine how it will affect future states of the operational environment.<sup>21</sup>

Thus, situational awareness involves the perception and understanding of the current situation as well as its future states. It is formed during the processing of information. It is also worth noting that situational awareness is the cognitive field (domain) of people’s minds and includes not only the “knowledge” of information systems, but also the knowledge of commanders and staff personnel, as well as the awareness of this knowledge.<sup>22</sup> Situational awareness is directly related to another category that includes the situation or set of circumstances in which one finds oneself: the state of affairs as well as the location and surroundings of a place.<sup>23</sup> It can be assumed that this is an objectively existing part of reality.

These considerations relate to the part of reality called the political and military situation and, therefore, the one that is related to the objective existence of the armed forces in the international environment. The existence of these forces is a source of military threat to the environment in which they exist. As the name suggests, this situation has both political and military components. The political situation, seen in the context of the military, is the part of objectively existing reality that has a political dimension and is related to the armed forces. The military situation is a reality associated with the existence of the armed forces.

Military force is a state’s instrument for engaging in international politics. The direct disposal of the forces is within the scope of authority of the state concerned. The armed forces in most countries of the world are players with the ability to use military violence, applied strictly in accordance with the will of the state administrator of these forces. The

<sup>21</sup> Endsley, “Toward a theory of situation awareness in dynamic systems.”

<sup>22</sup> David S. Alberts, “Key Concepts for Information Superiority,” *Military Technology* 32, no. 11 (2008): 75-83.

<sup>23</sup> <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/situation?q=situation>.

military is, in fact, an organization whose sole owner is the state. This situation means that the size, quality and capabilities of the armed forces, the forms and methods of their use as well as the direction of their development are determined by the government of that country. Therefore, maintaining up-to-date knowledge of the condition of a military force is just as important as acquiring knowledge of a government's intentions and strategies guiding these forces and keeping this knowledge up to date. Reconnaissance should hence focus on achieving situational awareness related to the activity of both the authorities of the state and the condition of its armed forces as well as the environment that supports them, or on maintaining awareness of the political and military situation.

Understanding the political and military situation corresponds to implementing the first and second step in Endsley's model. A further, important part of this awareness is knowledge of military threats, which is understood as the evaluation of military threats. As previously noted, according to F.H. Hartmann, a state assesses other potentially dangerous countries according to three factors: capability, intent and circumstances.<sup>24</sup> The examination of the political and military situation is carried out primarily to determine situational awareness, taking into account the aforementioned assumption and the fact that the elements of this situation are military and political ones.

It can be assumed that the basic elements of a military situation are:

- The composition and deployment of the armed forces;
- The state of the armed forces and their supporting infrastructure;
- Factors affecting the armed forces;
- The ongoing processes.

Furthermore, the situation of the armed forces should be seen in the context of the internal (inside the country) and external environment (a state's surroundings). In the internal environment, particular attention should be paid to political directives and supporting infrastructure. The external environment is also important because it is the arena in which these forces may conduct military operations. Furthermore, in this environment various impacts emerge that are directed at the forces acting within it.

In a study of the political situation, the following factors should be particularly taken into account:

- Characteristics of the political culture prevalent in a particular country or nation;
- Characteristics of its dominant worldview, religion and ideology;
- Characteristics of the national interests of the country;
- Characteristics of the security strategy of the country;
- Characteristics of the military strategy of the country;
- Perception of threats to the security of the state;

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<sup>24</sup> Hartmann, *The Relations of Nations*, 259-261.

- Usefulness of military capabilities to secure the national interests of a member state in specific geopolitical and cultural conditions;
- Strategic capabilities of an existing military power in the country;
- Ability to generate military capabilities by the social and economic system of the country;
- Characteristics of the military doctrine of the strategic and operational level;
- Geostrategic characteristics and environmental conditions of the country.

A general model of reconnaissance activities is thus aimed at meeting the informational needs of the military security of the state. This activity is conducted by gathering information in order to obtain political and military awareness and prevent similar activities carried out by the opponents.

The existing need for up-to-date political and military awareness generates the necessity of the continued organization and maintenance of activities connected with finding and refining information processing systems. This requires adequate financial and organizational efforts on behalf of the state. It can be assumed that the basis of military security is to have political and military awareness of the right quality. Often, the significance of this observation is reduced mainly to focusing efforts on buying weapons. However, without the aforementioned awareness, these expenses may, to an extent at least, appear aimless. Reconnaissance efforts, due to the dynamics of the contemporary situation, must be constantly maintained. This is because the adequate early detection of symptoms of increased military threats enables measures to ensure protection against surprise.

Undoubtedly, social development requires meeting the needs of various actors, states and their societies. All subjects operate in an environment containing other bodies. In meeting the needs of the subjects we can identify situations where the needs are similar to those of another subject, or when they are divergent. In accordance with both praxeology and the theory of international relations, meeting these needs is the result of activities that can be carried out under conditions of convergence or a conflict of interest. Depending on the situation, the activity in question takes the form of cooperation or struggle in a broad sense.

In the theory of international relations, interests are a category expressing the needs of a state and they are vital in determining the type of interaction of a state with other states, which can result in either cooperation or struggle. In fact, the activity of a state is a mixture of cooperation and struggle. The relationship between the two factors changes depending on the situation.<sup>25</sup>

Maintaining the desired level of security requires constant activity on the part of the state. This activity is mainly intended to counter a potential or actual military threat and may take a military or non-military form. Both of these may, in turn, take the form of cooperation or struggle (Fig. 9). Non-military activity includes all non-military actions

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<sup>25</sup> Ryszard Szpyra, *Militarne operacje informacyjne* (Warsaw: AON, 2003), 44-48.




Figure 9: Activities needed to neutralize a threat.

of the state in areas such as economics, finance, culture, etc. Due to the subject matter of the foregoing considerations, the focus of further analysis will be military activity.

If we take time as a criterion for threat-preventing activity, we obtain an action taken before the military attack or after it has begun. The activities carried out in the military sphere before military attacks primarily include deterrence in a broad sense. Its main aim is to prevent the emergence of a military attack. Deterrence does not always prove to be effective, in which case a military attack becomes necessary. Military action should aim to quickly overpower the ongoing attack and restore the pre-attack status.

The activity described above may be portrayed as a general model of the operational activity of a state, carried out to achieve and maintain the desired level of military security (Fig. 10). The main elements of this model are:

- Sources of military threats;
- Subjects of military threats;
- Operational elements to counteract these threats, including:
  - Deterrence of possible attacks;
  - Overpowering of emerging attacks;
  - Activities associated with the creation of resistance to eradicate factors of military attacks.

This is obviously a simplified model which nevertheless contains the main components of the phenomenon.

Clearly, the overpowering of attacks materializes after they have begun, however, in order to achieve the effectiveness of the actions described, proper capabilities and systems of activities must be prepared in advance. At the same time, there is a factor of mutual feedback. Having an efficient system of overpowering military attacks is also a strong deterrent in itself. On the surface, maintaining a high-quality system to overpower military attacks during long periods of quiet may seem to be an unnecessary effort, but the lack of attacks itself is precisely the result of sufficiently high defense capabilities.




Figure 10: General model of operational activity of a state, carried out to achieve and maintain the desired level of military security.

*Military Activity of a State Aimed at Achieving the Desired Level of Military Security*

There is a general agreement about the fact that the military component of the state is one of the main instruments of its policy. It is also one of the main elements of what is called the power of a state. The component referred to as the military power of a state is the potential capability of sustained or periodic destruction of elements of another state’s organization. It is one of several tools used in different ways in accordance with other tools and forms of activity.

The individual components of state power, including military power on the grounds of its characteristics, have their own patterns of use. However, they can be used independently of each other both in cooperation and struggle. Military power can be applied across a spectrum of activities ranging from extreme forms of struggle to deep cooperation.

*Military cooperation* may take different forms. Depending on the criterion we adopt, the following forms can be singled out: ad hoc contacts, contracts and international



agreements, actions in the context of international security organizations and activities carried out within the framework of other international organizations.

Military cooperation is commonly present in international relations and is one of the main ways of improving the military security of many countries. Even major powers, such as the United States, would not be able to maintain the desired level of military security without international military cooperation. This cooperation is necessary and important both in peacetime and during armed conflicts and wars.

### **Forms of Struggle in the Military Sphere**

In search of possible forms of struggle in the military sphere, one should refer to the disciplines related to military security that are accepted by the scientific community. Undoubtedly, one of these disciplines is international relations. In this discipline, the theory of balance of power, developed by David Hume and perfected by various authors such as Hans J. Morgenthau, still proves valid. In many cases this theory retains full explanatory power.<sup>26</sup> According to realists, the balance of power is one of the key mechanisms that for centuries have been essential to preserving the freedom of states.<sup>27</sup>

The concept of the balance of power has been interpreted in a number of ways. According to the most general definition thereof, if the survival of a state, or of a few weaker states, threatens the hegemony or a coalition of more powerful states, they should join forces to tie a formal alliance and seek to maintain their independence by balancing the forces of the opposing party. The mechanism of the balance of power is intended to provide a situation in which the forces of the players are aligned, such that they remain in a state of equilibrium. In this case, no state or coalition of states can reach a position in which they can dominate all the others.

Realist and neo-realist theories are the subject of criticism among various representatives of liberalism. Nevertheless, even among them, one can see the effort to modify the forms of implementation of the principle of the balance of power rather than its total denial. This is the point of view of Charles and Clifford Kupchan, who claim that the introduction of the institution of collective security will cause a better balance of power by balancing powers that remain subject to rules and are institutionalized. Such balancing is of greater value than unregulated balancing, which occurs in a state of anarchy.<sup>28</sup>

According to the realist theory of international relations, four techniques have traditionally been used by competing states.<sup>29</sup> Because these techniques are at the heart of the balance of power, we shall term them the techniques of the balance of power. They are:

<sup>26</sup> Thierry de Montbrial, *Działanie i system świata* (Warsaw: Dialog, 2011), 224.

<sup>27</sup> Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, "Realizm," in *Globalizacja polityki światowej. Wprowadzenie do stosunków międzynarodowych*, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2008), 199-200.

<sup>28</sup> John Baylis, "Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe i globalne w epoce pozimnowojennej" in *Globalizacja polityki światowej. Wprowadzenie do stosunków międzynarodowych*, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2008), 379.

<sup>29</sup> Hartmann, *The Relations of Nations*, 328.

1. The acquisition of allies;
2. The acquisition of territories;
3. The establishment of buffer states;
4. The undermining of a potential or actual enemy's strength.

The first two are especially designed to increase absolute strength; the third to allow for the creation (often through neutralization), by mutual consent, of a strategic zone that neither power (or block) can afford to allow the other to occupy; and the fourth to increase one's own relative strength by decreasing the absolute strength of the enemy.

*The neutralization of military threats.* The worst form of military threat is an armed attack on a state. Whatever the nature of the attack, it usually has either strategic implications such as loss of territory, blocking the ability to secure vital national interests, and the total or partial loss of sovereignty, or it causes significant costs that set back the state's development for many years. Therefore, the primary objective of neutralizing military threats is the prevention of military attacks and the use of armed violence. The desired form of such prevention is deterrence which, when effectively carried out, prevents an armed attack from materializing.

However, deterrence is not always effective and may lead to an armed attack on a state. Due to the importance of the security of the state, it must maintain an effective system of neutralizing potential military attacks in keeping with its capabilities. The essence of such a system should be the ability to directly stop, or paralyze, a launched military attack as early as possible and to restore the status from the time before the attack. Paralyzing attacks primarily means conducting effective defense. It can take many forms, such as maneuvering or positional defense. It may also take the form of air defense, antimissile, sea or even cyber defense.

It is desirable to have the military capabilities to conduct strategic attacks because these could force the enemy to cease its own attacks. The basis for obtaining effectiveness in overpowering an opponent's military attacks are deliberately developed, prepared capabilities. These capabilities should ensure effective deterrence and military action against surprises, namely overpowering military attacks.

*Deterrence.* According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, deterrence is military strategy by which one power uses the threat of reprisal to effectively preclude an attack from an adversary.<sup>30</sup>

According to Thomas Schelling, deterrence is a threat aimed to stop the enemy from doing something.<sup>31</sup> The author clearly distinguishes deterrence from compellence, which he defines as a threat aimed to provoke the enemy into action. Similarly, Glenn Snyder says that deterrence is the strength of dissuading as opposed to the forces of coercion.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, John Mearsheimer explains that deterrence, in its broadest sense,

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<sup>30</sup> <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/159558/deterrence> (18 June 2014).

<sup>31</sup> Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 69.

<sup>32</sup> Glenn H. Snyder, "Deterrence and Defense," in *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, eds. Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (New York: University Press of America, 1988), 31.

means persuading the enemy not to take any action because the perceived benefits do not justify the estimated costs and risks.<sup>33</sup> Another well-known theorist, Colin Gray, believes that deterrence happens when a person, institution or policymakers decide not to take actions that would otherwise be performed.<sup>34</sup> Such a failure to act is based on their belief or deep suspicion concerning unacceptable consequences resulting from the possible adoption of the abandoned actions.

### *Military Activity of a State Aimed at Paralyzing Armed Attacks*

The military security of states, understood as their security in relation to military threats, is achieved by, inter alia, the establishment and maintenance of an effective system of operation that is capable of paralyzing armed attacks. The system of such actions is called the defense system of a state. Its basic elements are:

- Steering system;
- Executive element, paralyzing armed attacks;
- Supply module;
- Shaped environment.

The steering system primarily comprises political authorities supported by the appropriate military institutions. The executive element of the defense system consists of the armed forces supported by various paramilitary forces. To carry out its work, the executive element needs information, materials and an energy supply. Most of the executive element's needs are catered to by the state. The development of the environment, understood primarily as military engineering, also has a significant impact on the military capabilities of states.

Strategies are important elements of these systems and there are many different strategies for defense. They can be divided into:

- Strategies not accepting temporary losses;
- Strategies accepting such a possibility.

The former strategies are positional defense strategies, i.e. those that do not allow for temporary losses or acquisition of specific targets (e.g. territorial gains) by the attacking forces. The latter rely on the gradual weakening of the attacking forces and the temporary loss of certain targets to the enemy. These activities, designed and conducted to neutralize any military attacks, are called actions against military surprise. The essence of such activities comes down to preventing the enemy from reaching its potential or actual objectives.

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<sup>33</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 14.

<sup>34</sup> Colin S. Gray, "Deterrence and the Nature of Strategy," in *Deterrence in the 21st Century*, ed. Max G. Manwaring (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 18.

*Activity of a State Aimed at Improving the Protection of its Organization and Infrastructure*

State activity in the field of countering military threats should also take the form of improving the protection of the organization and infrastructure of the state. It can be carried out either in the absence of a crisis or during its existence and take the form of, for example, critical infrastructure protection, which immunizes objects against different types of attacks. Such activities include, inter alia, the construction of shelters for civilians, equipment and other ancillary facilities. One of the measures in this group of activities is also the development of information security systems.

The authors of the monograph "*Polish National security in the twenty-first century. Challenges and Strategies*," draw attention to yet another aspect of this broader issue.<sup>35</sup> They argue that creating widespread territorial defense is of fundamental importance in ensuring the effective defense of critical infrastructure. One of the main functions of this type of defense is to protect and defend the important areas and facilities throughout Poland in cooperation with civil services, guards and NGOs. Widespread territorial defense provides an opportunity to ensure the effective protection of critical infrastructure by the military organization of a society in order to defend its patrimony, of which the critical infrastructure is an essential element.

**Conclusion**

The basic premise of this study is that the key assumptions and the conceptual system of military security must result from the conceptual system of security studies. Since both disciplines are relatively young, there is a need to analyze them for the purpose of determining the basic conceptual apparatus in the field of the security studies. As in any discipline, and in this one in particular, there is a plurality of concepts that compete with each other in a "free market" and clash in scientific debates. It was necessary, therefore, to find one that meets the needs of this study. Since none of them were fully satisfactory, it was necessary to analyze many of them and synthesize their major components.

The proposed model contains an original definition and description of the fundamental nature of security as well as a general description of military security. It includes the vital domain of the subject's own activity leading to the maintenance of the proper level of security.

Undoubtedly, such content is based on theories presented in the aforementioned fields of research, but these serve merely as "bricks" that are used to fill in the already existing theoretical structure. Thus, through a specific redesign, a structure compatible with the basic tenets of security studies has been devised, also taking into account recent results of other sciences that cover military affairs.

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<sup>35</sup> *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe Polski w XXI wieku. Wyzwania i strategie* (Warsaw: Bellona, 2006), 356.

# International Experiences in the Operationalization of Culture for Military Operations – Field Research Results

*Kamila Trochowska* \*

**Abstract:** The following article intends to summarize the conclusions and recommendations of research on the operationalization of culture for pre-deployment and operational training and activities. The results are based on research and interviews conducted by the author at Polish and foreign military institutions in the years 2009-2013, among others during study visits to international military institutions, US Army War College and multinational coalition forces representatives at US CENTCOM in 2012. This piece of research analyzes the solutions implemented in the preparation and conduct of operations by NATO (among others, Canada, the UK, Germany, Poland, and Turkey) and other armies (such as Australia, South Korea, Pakistan, Singapore, and Nepal).

**Keywords:** Operationalization of culture, cross-cultural competence, military operations, pre-deployment training.

**Acknowledgements:** This project was funded by the Polish National Science Center, grant no. DEC-2011/01/N/HS5/00981. The author would like to express her gratitude to all the multinational coalition representatives at US CENTCOM for their support.

## Introduction

The emergence of population-centric operations has drawn attention to the need to consider the cultural factors of the Area of Operation. However, the missing link between the awareness of the cultural aspects of threats and the development of operational plans that take these aspects into consideration has not yet been found and fully utilized in military planning and conduct of operations. Due to the wide spectrum of cultural and social factors influencing the operational environment, the aforementioned operations gave priority to non-kinetic military activities, such as psychological operations (PSY-OPS), information operations (INFO OPS), or the significance of civil-military coopera-

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tion components (CIMIC), which are based on a profound understanding of the cultural aspects of the reality in which they work.

Hence, contemporary operational success can be achieved only when the situational awareness of the operational environment is full and in-depth, as cultural awareness of the area of operation is a vital component of overall situational awareness. Therefore we face a need for the skill of operationalization of culture, understood as all the processes and skills involved in identifying the cultural features of any object of the activity (either the population in the Area of Operation [AOO], the Area of Responsibility [AOR], the “enemy,” or Allied forces) vital to military activities paired with the integration of such knowledge and skills in planning, pre-deployment preparation, decision-making process, and general conduct of operations. It also includes the integration of universal cultural competence training into the overall career training development of officers. The general culture competence training has proven to be an optimal solution that enables the soldiers not only to adjust to the culturally “alien” operational environment, but also the more effective cooperation within multinational environments.

Thus, the aim of this article is to analyze the current status of the implementation of operationalization of culture in military operations in order to identify solutions, methods, and tools that can be used to design an improved model of operationalization of culture: one that would actually improve the efficiency of operations, as the analysis of American solutions demonstrated that not all serve their functions properly.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, a critical review of guidelines and experiences in NATO and non-NATO countries was undertaken, including the experiences of Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, Turkey, Australia, Singapore, Romania, Thailand, Pakistan, Armenia, and Afghanistan.

### **NATO’s “Cultural Turn”**

Both the “cultural turn” of the U.S. Department of Defense and the deteriorating situation in Iraq and Afghanistan effected changes in NATO operational doctrines and solutions. They were summarized in the recommendations following Multinational Experiment 6 (MNE 6) that ended in 2010, particularly within goal 4.3, which focused on improving the efficiency of operations through the increase of cultural awareness of soldiers working in an operational environment that is “alien” in terms of traditions, social relations, way of life, and culture. As detailed in the initial report, Multinational Experiment 6 Baseline Assessment 2008 by USJFC, the basic cultural issues in the operational environment addressed in the edition of the MNE were primarily:

- Lack of ability to understand the dynamics of the operational environment in the social, cultural, political, legal, and economic aspects;

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<sup>1</sup> The analysis was performed by the author in “Operationalization of culture in population-centric operations – the American experience”, paper presented at the ISMS Annual Conference *Balancing domestic and international security requirements*, International Society of Military Sciences, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, 23-24 October 2012, [www.isofms.org/cms\\_uploads/Trochowska\\_Abstract2012.pdf](http://www.isofms.org/cms_uploads/Trochowska_Abstract2012.pdf).

- A negligible number of staff beyond the special forces trained in combating asymmetric threats and counterinsurgency operations (COIN) and educated in the issues of cultural awareness and cross-cultural communication;
- Lack of effective intercultural communication strategies;
- The diversity of the organizational cultures within the operational environment and problems with procedural and operational coordination between the different military, governmental and non-governmental organizations working in the area of operation;
- Joint forces and other interagency components must reach a common understanding of the operational environment;
- Commanders need comprehensive training in the competencies and capabilities of combined, international and other governmental organizations (OGA).<sup>2</sup>

After the NATO Bucharest summit of 2008, five key regions of Allied activities were set out that included planning, conduct, and coordination of military and non-military tasks during operations; assessment of the environmental impact of operations and activities of civilians in the post-conflict reconstruction phase; consolidation, development, and the exchange of operational experiences between countries; training and educational programs to prepare for participation in operations; development of cooperation with international actors and organizations in the context of civil-military relations; and the issues of public diplomacy and the quality of stabilization and reconstruction during all phases of an operation.<sup>3</sup>

Aspects of multiculturalism in the collaboration of multinational and multiagency components were also explored during MNE 7 (2011-2012). Here, however, the focus was on effective intercultural cooperation in the security management of maritime, air-space, and cyberspace.<sup>4</sup>

MNE 6 was based on the comprehensive approach to effectively combating asymmetric opponents also through emphasis on social determinants of developments in the area of operations, cross-cultural awareness, and the enhancement of an integrated civil-military reconstruction process. The intended goals to be achieved by the sixth edition of MNE in relation to our terms were:

*Goal 4. Common situational understanding of the operating environment.*

- 4.1. Development of methods, processes, structures, personnel, and tools that enable the collection and analysis of information by multinational military components.

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<sup>2</sup> Francesco Pamplos and Jacinto Pena, eds., *Cross-Cultural Awareness: Analytical Concept*, MNE 6 Goal 4.3. Draft Version (Granada: TRADOC Directorate for Research, Doctrine and Materiel, January 2010), 18-19.

<sup>3</sup> "Comprehensive Approach," *NATO A-Z*, [www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_51633.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm) (25 October 2010).

<sup>4</sup> "MNE 7: Access to Global Commons," 16 May 2011.

- 4.2. Development of capacity and skills of the coalition forces, their international partners, government agencies, and NGOs to combat asymmetric threats and guerrilla warfare.
- 4.3. Development of a cross-cultural awareness concept for military operations and the use of cultural studies' tools to create training programs for the implementation of cross-cultural awareness among soldiers and commanders of the Allied forces.
- 4.4. Improvement of logistics in the ISAF operation.
- 4.5. Creation of an operational and strategic model of logistics management in the asymmetric threats environment.<sup>5</sup>

In essence, Goal 4.3. was a set of recommendations created on the basis of the best possible Allied solutions in the field of operationalization of culture for the purpose of military operations. They were summarized in three products of the goal, namely *Guidelines for Commanders and Staffs: How to Engage with Local Societies During Military Operations*; *Guidelines for Commanders and Staffs: Operationalization Of Culture Into Military Operations (Best Practices)*, and *Guidelines for Commanders and Staffs: How to Incorporate Cross Cultural Awareness into Syllabi/Curricula and Training Programs*.<sup>6</sup> The basis of the concepts and solutions was laid out in *Operationalization of Culture into Military Operations, Best Practices*. The solutions proposed in the publication are the concepts of training foreign officers and employing cultural advisers (CULADs), the use of Human Terrain Teams (HTTs), and the Red & Green Teaming and Re-framing/Profiling actors' analysis method.

The concept of regional officers, cultural specialists or "foreign area officers" (FAO), and cultural advisors originated from the U.S. military. Such positions are usually attached to the Marine Expeditionary Force component or other units, depending on their geographical locations, where such officers serve as advisors to commanders on cultural matters. Their main roles are providing expertise in the integration of cultural factors in the planning and conduct of operations and assistance in predicting the secondary and tertiary effects of the operation on the local population and culture.<sup>7</sup> Advisors also participate in exercises, simulations, conferences, and workshops to maintain an appropriate level of professionalism. Interestingly, the process of training lasts from two to five years for the FAO and ten years or more for CULADs.<sup>8</sup> It includes in-depth education on the local culture, mainly in the form of living and working in the area.

HTTs—the second recommended concept—are based on the American concept with the same name, but due to several lessons learned during the original HTT activities,

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<sup>5</sup> Royal Norwegian Army, *Multinational Experiment 6*. Multimedia presentation. Oslo, 9 June 2009.

<sup>6</sup> *Multinational Experiment 6. Campaign Report*. 4 February 2011, <http://mne.oslo.mil.no:8080/Multinatio/MNE6produkt/MNE6FinalR/file/MNE6%20Final%20Report.pdf> (11 October 2013).

<sup>7</sup> Victor Bados, *Operationalization of Culture into Military Operations: Best Practices* (Granada: SP TRADOC, 2010), 13-14.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 38.



they have been modified. They still consist of five to nine-person teams with social sciences and operational backgrounds deployed by the Human Terrain System (HTS) to support field commanders by filling their cultural knowledge gap in the current operating environment and providing cultural interpretations of events occurring within their area of operations. Their goal is the same: to fill the cultural knowledge void by gathering ethnographic, economic, and cultural data about the AOO and provide databases and tools to support analysis and decision-making processes. The NATO-recommended HTTs, however, have a significantly more developed structure and support and are built on seven components or “pillars”: HTTs, reach-back research cells, subject-matter expert networks, a tool kit, techniques, human terrain information, and specialized training.<sup>9</sup> Their broader scope of research and reach-back support is intended to prevent the mistakes of the original American HTTs.

The final recommended solution is the Red & Green Teaming and Re-framing/ Profiling actors’ analysis method, a concept put forth by the Swedish Ministry of Defense, which is in principle a modified version of the aforementioned U.S. Army Red Teaming concept. The concept was developed to a point where it was possible to apply a method to generate all the involved actors’ analyses in order to become more holistic and comprehensive and engulf the range of stakeholders that coalition forces must confront:

It could be defined as a method to understand the mindset of relevant actors in an area of operation and to contribute to the staff’s learning of the Operational Environment: the Red & Green teams give voice to the key actors in the operation and their main purpose is that of challenging Blue thinking. They discover hidden assumptions and mirror imaging. The method used by the Red & Green teams (Profiling/reframing) focuses attention on seeking to understand the actors’ frames of references in order to come closer to how they might think, what they might want, how they could interpret our actions, and how else we could interpret their beliefs and actions. As opposed to using Blue mindset and frames of reference to guess what other actors might think or do. This, in turn, lays a better ground for the development of potential Red or Green Course of Action.<sup>10</sup>

Having laid solid theoretical and doctrinal foundations, let us look at managing culture in military action in various countries.

### **Operationalization of Culture in the British Army**

In NATO countries, operationalization of culture takes numerous forms, but apart from the UK, Germany, and Canada (and, of course, the U.S.), nowhere does it take the shape of an institutionalized system. In addition, the majority of the solutions are modeled on the American ones and hence the means of their implementation are similar. It is worthwhile to examine more closely several approaches and solutions in the countries with the most extensive experience in the field.

One such example is the British Army, which offers well-designed pre-deployment training in intercultural competencies. Among other factors, this is thanks to a long tradi-

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 14-15.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 15.

tion of multiculturalism within its own ranks and years of experience in conducting operations abroad. In addition to differences between individual citizens of the United Kingdom (and sometimes animosity, for example, among the soldiers of Scottish descent and the British ones), more significant cultural differences may occur. The British land forces consist of diverse national groups originating from various regions of the world, including Nepal with 3,400 people (most in the Brigade of Gurkhas), 2,000 from Fiji, more than 900 Jamaicans, 800 from South Africa and Ghana, and 600 from Zimbabwe. Other countries of British soldiers' origin also include the Seychelles, Mauritius, and Malta.<sup>11</sup>

Therefore, the British Army stresses the promotion of intercultural understanding and, above all, respect as the basis of the soldiers' morale. As apparent in the basic doctrinal document regulating these issues, the *British Army Cultural Guidance*, respect for others is one of the British Army's core values. Respect lies at the very heart of fighting power and requires trust, cohesion, morale, and unit effectiveness. Respect is earned and respect is mutual. One cannot force another to respect them just as one cannot be forced to respect another. Respect is built on an understanding of other people, taking time to find out who they are, what their background may be and how that background affects how they think and act.<sup>12</sup> The document also contains basic information about the aforementioned national groups that constitute the army, divided into categories of differences, similarities, hidden cultural patterns, and cultural differences that may pose the greatest problems in daily cooperation.

The British Army also includes the aforementioned Brigade of Gurkhas, composed of soldiers of Nepalese origin. Every year, out of more than 17,000 applicants, 230 are selected for training as snipers to serve within British Army ranks. The new arrivals' training includes 37 weeks of military and language preparation, of which two weeks are spent on cultural familiarization and integration, both in the theoretical and practical dimension.<sup>13</sup> The first phase of cultural adjustment focuses on general orientation and the use of public transport. The second phase is dedicated to functioning in daily life and the third contributes to the continued improvement of everyday functioning in a culturally different environment, either in military or civilian aspects. Some of the knowledge developed during the preparation is later used during pre-deployment training.

Cultural preparation for functioning in various AOOs for the British contingents is well established for the majority of components that need it and is largely based on the US Marine pre-deployment solutions in this field. Pre-deployment training is obligatory for all troops; major attention, however, is paid to the preparation of the Defense Cultural Specialist Unit (DCSU). As of Afghanistan, its role was "to do what HTS does, and more: cultural awareness training for troops, and providing 'cultural specialists' to be deployed" (they appear to be, for the most part, linguists). The DCSU was involved in

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<sup>11</sup> Directorate of Educational and Training Services, *British Army Cultural Guidance* (Wiltshire, UK: Headquarters Land Forces, 2008), 2.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> British Army. Ghurka Training "Cultural Orientation Programme," British Ministry of Defense, [www.army.mod.uk/training\\_education/training/18265.aspx](http://www.army.mod.uk/training_education/training/18265.aspx) (11 February 2013).

the recent failure, Operation Moshtarak, in the so-called “Marjah region.” It is based at Royal Air Force Base Henlow and officially came into being in April 2009. Lieutenant Colonel Steven Windmill, from the defense ministry’s Afghan specialist implementation team, set up the DCSU. The DCSU’s “cultural advisors,” deployed in Afghanistan, perform a mission very similar to that of HTS: “They help to identify and understand issues relating to the local cultural, political, economic, social and historical environment to help commanders make better and more informed decisions.” There are twenty-five such individuals, assigned to senior military commanders, with the intention of increasing their number to forty. Each one speaks either Dari and/or Pashto.”<sup>14</sup> Nowadays, however, with the changes in training doctrine, the idea of incorporating cross-cultural competence into the lifelong professional development of the soldiers is emerging.<sup>15</sup>

### German Solutions

In 2011 the Bundeswehr began a program of transformation and modernization that includes the incorporation of cross-cultural competence training in pre-deployment activities. The Central Command (*Zentrum für Innere Führung*) is responsible for cross-cultural matters, with the Center for Intercultural Competence in Koblenz as the research and coordination center. The survey on intercultural competence in the armed forces, performed on the twenty-second ISAF rotation in 2010,<sup>16</sup> provided valuable results to this field of activity of the armed forces. Among other findings, the following facts were established:

- Situations in which intercultural interactions create specific implications for the effectiveness of the armed forces are more common among personnel responsible for the security and training of the Afghan army and police, where 41 % of respondents claimed to have had such contact daily and 42 % indicated weekly encounters. For the rest of the component situation is as follows:

The commanding component had the smallest share in dealing with the local population, but this does not mean that intercultural skills are unnecessary for them. On the contrary, those responsible for major decisions need a broader range of skills to enable the creation of operational plans tailored to the socio-cultural reality of the AOO.

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<sup>14</sup> Maximilian Forte, “More European Press Coverage of the Human Terrain System,” *Zero Anthropology* portal, 17 July 2010, <http://zeroanthropology.net/2010/07/17/more-european-press-coverage-of-the-human-terrain-system> (1 September 2013).

<sup>15</sup> More about the training and solutions in Table 1.

<sup>16</sup> Julius Hess, *The Operational Relevance of Culture and the Effectiveness of Cross-Cultural Competence. Empirical Findings from a Panel Study among German Soldiers of the 22nd ISAF contingent*, multimedia presentation at the CIMIC Center of Excellence, Enschede, 2012.

**“How often have you been in contact with the local population outside the camp?”  
...by military branches**




Chart 1: The frequency of soldiers’ contact with the local population.<sup>17</sup>

- Intercultural interactions are important for security as misunderstandings can easily turn into violent conflicts. Still, the majority of respondents experienced events of a positive nature, with 46 % having experienced minor verbal misunderstandings, and 34 % were involved in serious conflicts with the local population. This remains an indication for an increased focus on multicultural issues, as indicated in Chart 2.

Intercultural competencies are mastered to varying degrees by soldiers at various levels of command, where the higher the rank, the higher the level of intercultural competence tends to be, as shown in Chart 3.

Remarkably, a number of soldiers gain the most knowledge and skills during operations, while the situation is reversed for higher-ranking officers. In their case we face a major abatement of the cross-cultural competence level in relation to the level achieved during training, which should be addressed in the design of pre-deployment training programs.

- Concerning the effect of cross-cultural competence in the conduct of operations, it was found that the appropriate level of intercultural skills has a significant impact on reducing misunderstandings with the local population. It also plays a significant role in resolving debates and major conflicts and decreases the levels of stress and uncertainty associated with the operation conducted in a foreign culture.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

**“In the context of these contacts how often did the following occur?”**




Chart 2: Cultural interactions with the local population.<sup>19</sup>




Chart 3: Intercultural competence training among soldiers of various ranks.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

In light of these studies, the Bundeswehr has expanded the scope and methods of cross-cultural training conducted by both the center in Koblenz as well as individual units, as explained in Table 1 below. One type of tools used to improve the level of cross-cultural competence is, among others, study boards. Their aim is to develop both universal skills (resolving conflicts, ethic warfare) and regional cultural skills (ISAF and KFOR training boards). Each consists of six to ten large-format boards that lead the students through several discussions and problem-solving tasks during group work facilitated by a qualified instructor. An excerpt of the ISAF training board is displayed in Picture 1.

Currently, the Bundeswehr works on 3C distance learning courses and enhances the solutions in operationalization of culture within the framework of the annual international *Coping with Culture* workshop that involves institutions such as US TRADOC, the British defense ministry, the NATO CIMIC Center of Excellence in Enschede, and the Polish National Defense University.

**Task 1**  
Take Annex A out of the envelope attached to the last page. On this page, you will find stickers with different statements about typical forms of social interaction and customs that apply to Germany. There are always exceptions, of course.  
Read out loud the individual statements and, after a group discussion, decide in which area of the picture on the training board you think the sticker fits best. Then attach the sticker to what you think is the appropriate space. Please note: There is at least one statement for each area.

**Task 1**  
In summary, how do you rate our forms of social interaction with others in Germany on the basis of the 4 areas? Discuss each area and express your joint assessment by adding a point or a cross to the respective scale, the scale ranging from "very high" to "not high". Then, join up the dots with lines to make a square. We will use this picture again in the final module when making comparisons with forms of social interaction in Afghanistan. You can then identify similarities and differences at a glance.

**Forms of Social Interaction and Customs - Starting with Germany**  
Many of the things you will see in Afghanistan will be new to you. Moreover, some things will not be self-evident, e.g. values, customs and rituals.  
To gain an understanding of these, it makes sense to start by looking at forms of social interaction and social customs in Germany because we are used to these. They are completely obvious to us and are thus applicable to other cultures.  
However, you will discover that in Afghanistan, totally different customs, which we find unusual, prevail. This can lead to unnecessary misunderstandings as well as to tensions during your deployment.  
so, let's take a look at ourselves first.

relationship-oriented/harmony-oriented  
very high  
fact-oriented/time oriented  
not high  
directness in communication  
very high  
very high  
very high  
hierarchy-oriented and respect-oriented

Picture 1: ISAF training board sample.

Source: Author's archives courtesy of Cross-cultural Competence Training Center: Koblenz, 2013.

## Operationalization of Culture in Other NATO States

Other NATO states implement various solutions in the field of operationalization of culture at different levels. A review of solutions in the land forces, as compared to the developed German and British solutions, is presented in Table 1 below.<sup>21</sup>

The table below compares various solutions in the field of operationalization of culture within select NATO states. In most countries, except the United Kingdom, Canada, and Germany, which are now beginning their programs, operationalization of culture is rather limited to preparations for the mission and the use of cultural advisors during the operation. Concerning the attempts to integrate cultural factors into the decision-making process, in none of the countries are such attempts reported and the development of intercultural competence in life-long vocational education and the training of commands and staffs, in addition to irregular initiatives, is not carried out in a systematic manner.

### Foreign Good Practices

Concerning non-NATO states, the situation is no less varied and worth investigating.<sup>22</sup> The interviews in this group were conducted with the military representatives of diverse countries such as Australia, South Korea, Nepal, El Salvador, Singapore, Romania, Armenia, and Thailand. In particular, the group includes both Australia and South Korea, whose solutions for operationalization of culture should be regarded as good practices in the field.<sup>23</sup>

Other countries, such as Romania or Thailand, present no less interesting ways of realizing the operationalization of culture schemes. Also Pakistani and Afghan representatives agreed to contribute to the survey, which added a valuable perspective on cultural training in the countries that are usually the subject of cultural education.

The aforementioned variety of solutions and experiences in the field of the operationalization of culture poses the question of the effectiveness of training. Is “the more the better” always true? For instance, although the United States has the most advanced training programs, the overall efficiency of its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is not always as high as expected. On the other hand, the non-kinetic operations carried out by the Dutch component (where cultural training and deployment solutions are not as extensive) or Turkish stabilization activities (where there is virtually no training) have

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<sup>21</sup> The data were gathered from interviews conducted by the author with multinational coalition forces representatives (with experience in the operationalization of culture) during a study visit to the US CENTCOM in 2012, along with an overview of doctrines and other available documents. This part mainly summarized ISAF solutions. A full report about the research can be found in Kamila Trochowska, *Operationalization of Culture in Contemporary Military Operations*, PhD dissertation (Warsaw: Polish National Defense University, 2013).

<sup>22</sup> Data gathered from interviews (as described above), along with an overview of the doctrines and other available documents. This part mainly summarized peacekeeping operation solutions.

<sup>23</sup> For details, see Zaytun Division, *Civil-Military Operations Handbook*, ROK Peace and Reconstruction Division, MND-NE Iraq, 2006.

been judged favorably both by leaders and the local population.<sup>24</sup> As research proves, the impact of cultural awareness on operational effectiveness depends on many factors, ranging from the time of year (during the winter months in Afghanistan, for instance, the number of attacks drops) to the ethnic composition, the security situation in a given AOO, up to the cultural structure of the multinational military component that is responsible for a given region. With regard to the last factor, it might seem that the experience of living in a multicultural society expedites cultural familiarization. It depends, however, on the type of multicultural society one comes from. For example, the American multiculturalism model is more “caste-like” and aims at providing a common cultural framework for all. This makes it more difficult for the soldiers to function in a culturally foreign area than it is for, say, Dutch and Australian soldiers who come from more flexible and egalitarian societies.

## Conclusion

In light of the aforementioned considerations about the multitude of doctrinal and potentially effective solutions, the question of their operational effectiveness arises. A perfect case study in this respect is provided by ISAF’s “Hearts and Minds” operation.<sup>25</sup> On the one hand, many innovative operational initiatives undertaken within its framework were successful. On the other, as indicated by one of the interviewees (an Afghan major working for the Directorate of Religious and Cultural Affairs), much of the good has been destroyed within a short time, as

ISAF forces still lack a lot of cultural sensitivity, skills and knowledge when dealing with local population. They get perfect training in theory, and then they come to us and break all the rules as if they have forgotten. A major problem is the American forces’ lack of respect for religion (less so in the case of Europeans). Bombarding mosques, interfering with weddings, burning the Quran – those are incidents, but they completely undermine the trust of the local people and destroy what good has been done. Therefore, the people turn to the Taliban.<sup>26</sup>

PSYOPS products that aim at boosting the popularity of Allied forces among Afghan society, such as the *Sada-e-Azadi* (Voice of Freedom) newspaper and radio station, or propaganda videos or billboards, do not much alter the situation.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Oskari Eronen, *PRT Models in Afghanistan. Approaches to Civil-Military Integration* (Kuopio: Crisis Management Center Finland, 2008), 45, available at [www.cmcfinland.fi/download/41858\\_Studies\\_5\\_Eronen.pdf](http://www.cmcfinland.fi/download/41858_Studies_5_Eronen.pdf).

<sup>25</sup> The author avoids using the “hearts and minds” rationale since she believes that “winning hearts and minds” pertains more to the medical sciences, especially transplantology.

<sup>26</sup> For the source cf. reference 21.

<sup>27</sup> Official website of the ISAF *Sada-e-Azadi* radio station and newspaper, <http://sada-e-azadi.net> (21 March 2013).



Table 1: Solutions in operationalization of culture within select NATO countries.<sup>1</sup>

	<b>Germany</b>	<b>Canada</b>	<b>UK</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Turkey</b>
Average length of cultural pre-deployment training	2 weeks	6 weeks of general training that includes elements of 3C	Depending on the unit and specialization, from one week to several (for the DCSU)	Several days during pre-deployment training	Several days during pre-deployment training	No institutionalized training; units carry out such training if needed on their own
Organization of training. Forms and methods	Center for Intercultural Competence in Koblenz provides training boards and instructors for pre-deployment exercises and country studies publications.	Peace Support Training Center conducts most training programs. Their scope depends on the mission, rank and position of the training unit/ individuals. Soldiers are usually trained in the basic rules of conduct in a foreign cultural environment. A wider range of training covering the history, customs and simulation is mandated to higher rank soldiers. Part of	Pre-deployment training is obligatory for all. Major focus is put to Defense Cultural Specialist Unit, however with the change of doctrine, the integration of cross-cultural competence training in overall career development is being introduced. Pre-deployment training is realized in the form of practical exercises that focus on both universal and	3C training is a several-hour part of a four-week pre-deployment training in the field of history, culture and customs of the future AOO.	There is no institutionalized training. Each branch of the armed forces and even each individual unit prepares itself in this regard. Generally, a unit learns about the geo-political conditions, cross-cultural diversity and proper modes of behavior in foreign cultural AOO.	Mainly officers training in the cultural aspects of the area of operation is conducted, usually based on literature and reports prepared by soldiers returning from a mission.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Own elaboration on the basis of interviews conducted by the author. For details see Kamila Trochowska, *Operationalization of culture in contemporary military operations* (Warsaw: Polish National Defense University, 2013).

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	<b>Germany</b>	<b>Canada</b>	<b>UK</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Turkey</b>
		intercultural training is conducted in “Afghan villages” (training facilities modeled on a sample Afghan village to provide a most realistic training environment.	regional intercultural competence. Teaching tools include computer programs and distance learning systems such as ADL courses. <sup>2</sup> The training is also contracted to a civilian company. <sup>3</sup>			
Using foreign solutions in operationalization of culture	Own program built on the basis of NATO standards. Female Engagement Teams (FETs) as a support to several units. <sup>4</sup>	British solutions and employment of their instructors. The use of White Teams modeled on Human Terrain Teams (HTTs). <sup>5</sup>	The concept of FETs, data gathering methods by the DCSU based on the ones used by HTTs.	The FETs concept.	Exercises run by foreign experts according to the needs.	None

<sup>2</sup> A sample British Army ADL course, *Cultural Awareness Afghanistan Course*, can be found at [www.adl.aon.edu.pl/pl/kursy/kursy-adl/17-cultural-awareness-afghanistan-course](http://www.adl.aon.edu.pl/pl/kursy/kursy-adl/17-cultural-awareness-afghanistan-course) (11 August 2012).

<sup>3</sup> For example, the British contractor TQ. For a sample training plan see [www.tq.com/filelib/OPTAG-Case-Study.pdf](http://www.tq.com/filelib/OPTAG-Case-Study.pdf) (11 August 2012).

<sup>4</sup> Female Engagement Teams are a concept introduced by the U.S. Army in Afghanistan. For more about their organization and functioning cf. the Center for Army’s Lessons Learned, *Commander’s Guide to Female Engagement Teams. Handbook* (Kansas: CALL, 2011), 11-28.

<sup>5</sup> Maximilian Forte, “Canada’s Own Human Terrain System: White Situational Awareness Team in Afghanistan,” *Zero Anthropology*, 12 April 2008, <http://zeroanthropology.net/2008/11/24/canadas-own-human-terrain-system-white-situational-awareness-team-in-afghanistan/> (12 September 2013).

	<b>Germany</b>	<b>Canada</b>	<b>UK</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Turkey</b>
Are cultural advisors to the commander employed in the AOO?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No <sup>6</sup>
What are the field solutions in operationalization of culture?	FETs, cultural advisors	Cultural advisors, interpreters, White Teams	Defense Cultural Specialist Unit, FETs	FETs, translators advising on cultural matters	A place for discussions on the most burning cultural issues during briefings	None institutionalized
Is there a system of feedback, assessment and lessons learned in the field of culture and 3C training?	Yes, on a lessons-learned basis	A lessons-learned basis and post-deployment feedback. Training programs are updated after every deployment.	Yes, an organized system of gathering experiences on a lessons-learned basis	Yes, on a lessons-learned basis	Yes, a system of operational assessment on a lessons-learned basis	On a lessons-learned basis

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<sup>6</sup> The respondents indicated that advisors were not considered necessary since cultural differences between Turkey and Afghanistan were not an issue.

Table 2: Solutions in operationalization of culture in non-NATO countries (1).

	<b>Australia</b>	<b>South Korea</b>	<b>El Salvador</b>	<b>Nepal</b>	<b>Singapore</b>
Average cultural pre-deployment training length	Depending on the position, from a few hours (for example logistics) to one year (intel specialists).	As part of the overall preparation for the operation from one to eight weeks, depending on the position.	Several hours as part of a general pre-deployment training, content depending on the position.	A few hours up to a several days as part of pre-deployment training, depending on the position.	No answer
Organization of training. Forms and methods	Typically, as part of the pre-deployment training conducted by the unit. Lack of a formalized program for the Army and other armed forces.  Reconnaissance specialists subject to a year of cultural training in the target country.	Training consists of sequenced modules: general cross-cultural competencies for all, basic rules of conduct in a particular culture, cultural aspects of the procedures at the operational level, the principle of co-operation with cultural specialists and the appropriate language training.	Mainly the <i>United Nations Training Package for Peacekeepers on Cultural Awareness</i> is used. During the training, basic information about the culture of the future AOO, some skills enabling cross-cultural communication and rules of correct behavior in a given culture are taught.	Depends on the operation and should be realized in individual units. In reality, it is limited to basic socio-cultural information and the etiquette of a given AOO.	It forms part of the pre-deployment training realized in a basic form of regional competence training.
Using foreign solutions in operationalization of culture	No	Yes, mainly American ones	Yes, <i>United Nations Training Package for Peacekeepers on Cultural Awareness</i>	No	Yes, Red Teaming and some solutions of the Human Terrain System

	<b>Australia</b>	<b>South Korea</b>	<b>El Salvador</b>	<b>Nepal</b>	<b>Singapore</b>
Are cultural advisors to the commander employed in the AOO?	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
What are the field solutions in operationalization of culture?	Working closely with local communities and respect for the customs in the AOO (e.g. Afghanistan: women perform searches on women, all decisions follow a consultation with the elders if possible).	The emphasis is on ensuring good cooperation and friendship with the local population. It is also important to facilitate understanding of Koreans and their culture through initiatives such as the organization of a Korean culture day, and, if security conditions allow it, football matches, or taekwondo classes.	Depending on the needs of the operation, the activities, tools, and means are chosen.	Respect for the culture of the AOO and its rules. Cultural advisors to the commander and attention to proper media image as support.	No answer.
Is there a system of feedback, assessment and lessons learned in the field of culture and 3C training?	Yes, an organized assessment system: surveys after each rotation and a “lessons learned” base	Yes, an organized system of assessment and a “lessons learned” base	Yes, an organized system of assessment based on surveys (irregular) and a “lessons learned” base	Yes, a “lessons learned” base	Yes, an organized system of assessment and a “lessons learned” base

Table 3: Solutions in operationalization of culture in non-NATO countries (2).

	<b>Romania</b>	<b>Armenia</b>	<b>Thailand</b>	<b>Pakistan</b>	<b>Afghanistan</b>
Average cultural pre-deployment training length and form	One day in 3 months of overall training	A few hours up to a few days depending on the position, but it is obligatory for all the forces deployed	No answer	None. Religious and cultural similarities to the AOO makes it unnecessary.	The Directorate of Religious Affairs is the institution responsible for improvement of cultural awareness among the governmental and military structures and the local population.
Organization of training. Forms and methods	The entire unit/ detachment to be deployed follows a specific program of cultural awareness through different courses (1-3 months).	Briefings in peace-keeping brigade for the entire deployed personnel, then familiarization with the culture of countries in which the army will be deployed.	An instructor is invited to brief the troops. A training on cultural issues that are important to the unit is conducted, for example on how to perform a body search in a different culture.	During the pre-deployment training, the focus is mainly on negotiation as a prerequisite of success.	Everyday cooperation with American or other forces training us is a kind of cultural training itself.
Using foreign solutions in operationalization of culture	No	No. Other Armenian Army units use the American ones.	United Nations, in particular Indonesian experiences.	No	Yes. The Americans and other ISAF nations train us and we apply their solutions.

Are cultural advisors to the commander employed in the AOO?	No	No	No	No	Yes
What are the field solutions in operationalization of culture?	Using interpreters' experience. Cooperating with and using the experiences of other deployed contingents.	Soldiers learn from their predecessors (no specific group)	No answer	Civil Affairs unit	The Directorate of Religious and Cultural Affairs has advisors for every unit (Religious and Cultural Affairs Officers).
Is there a system of feedback, assessment and lessons learned in the field of culture and 3C training?	Yes. Surveys after service and a "lessons learned" base.	No	Yes. Surveys during/after service abroad. "Lessons learned" base.	No	Yes, collected by Afghan "Lessons Learned" Center.



Picture 2: ISAF’s Sada-e-Azadi newspaper (Source: from the author’s archive).

A further indicator of the effectiveness of the troops’ cultural competence may be the degree to which the objectives of an operation have been achieved. In the case of ISAF, the situation is unsatisfactory when we look at the assessment made by ISAF and Afghan governmental and non-governmental organizations. The majority of efforts to provide security, support the reconstruction and development processes, and provide full legitimacy to the government failed. Those assessments are reflected in both official summaries<sup>1</sup> and in Afghan opinion polls. It is difficult to argue otherwise when fewer and fewer respondents consider the current situation in Afghanistan better than in 2001, before the fall of the Taliban regime (41 % of respondents believe that their families do better, but as many as 50 % say that the situation is similar or worse). In addition, one third of society is not satisfied with their situation, and 40 % are dissatisfied with the

<sup>1</sup> Anthony Cordesman, *The Afghanistan-Pakistan War at the End of 2011: Strategic Failure? Talk Without Hope? Tactical Success? Spend Not Build (And Then Stop Spending)?* (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011).



direction in which the changes in Afghanistan appear to be leading.<sup>2</sup> To a large extent, what contributed to a partial failure of the realization of strategic goals was the underestimation of cultural factors at the strategic level, such as the nature of Afghan society, its primary needs after the violent change of the political system, and the need for adjusting the democracy to the people, and not the other way around. But the lack of proper preparation to set realistic goals in a culturally different environment is a different story and would necessitate another article.

In most of the armies described in the present article (except the United Kingdom, Canada, and Germany), the operationalization of culture is limited to a few hours of training during the pre-deployment preparation for the mission, and to the use of cultural advisors during the operation. In such circumstances, it is rather difficult to realize the full potential of the operationalization of culture, which comprises all the processes and skills involved in the identification of aspects of the culture that are vital for military activities (either the AOO/AOR population, the “enemy” or Allied forces) and the integration of such knowledge and skills in the planning, pre-deployment preparation, decision-making process, and general conduct of operations. Moreover, trainings involving universal cultural skills that would expedite the process of acculturation and the gaining of regional knowledge during the vocational education of soldiers, commands, staff, and reserve officers are not carried out in a systematic manner in any of the countries under consideration. Pre-deployment training in regional knowledge, rather than skills, are mandatory in the majority of armies; however, they are usually limited to a few hours of lectures on basic aspects of the AOO culture. Only in some countries is the lecture system supplemented by seminars, discussions, simulation games, role-playing, distance learning, and multimedia support. The situation should be changed because cross-cultural competence embraces a set of interdisciplinary skills that cannot be developed by simply attending lectures.

In short, our search for an effective solution in this field does not aim at creating an army of passionate anthropologists or ethnographers. We seek a set of skills, attitudes, and knowledge that is adequate for the level of operation, rank, and function, and that is capable of enhancing operational effectiveness in a culturally different and diverse environment. Military culture is regarded as one of the most rigid structures, with very specific tasks that may sometimes contradict the rules and demands of genuine cross-cultural competence. Yet, for all the differences on the surface, under each uniform there is a human being who belongs to one human family. Soldiers should never forget that.

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<sup>2</sup> “Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan,” Brookings Institute, January 30, 2012, 29-30, <http://www.brookings.edu/afghanistanindex> (20 March 2013).



# Content Language Integrated Learning in Polish Higher Military Education

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**Abstract:** The article discusses the issue of the Content Language Integrated Learning (CLIL) method and its application in military education programs. Firstly, it focuses on CLIL's concept and models, discusses opportunities and challenges arising out of the method in educational institutes with regard to a Spanish-led research; secondly, it formulates challenges for CLIL implementation and enumerates barriers related to it. The final part concerns recommendations on the CLIL application for one of the Polish military universities. In the recommendations authors emphasize that CLIL is an advantageous tool for professionally-oriented education by which, apart from the linguistic skills, self-directed learning and intercultural communication skills can be highly improved.

**Keywords:** CLIL method, military education, linguistic skills, language education.

## Introduction

The European Commission's recommendation that every citizen of the European Union should know at least two Community languages apart from their mother tongue (European Council, 2002),<sup>1</sup> the increased mobility of EU citizens that is possible as a result of the agreement on open borders (The Schengen Agreement, 1985), and the free movement of goods and services are considered the main causes of the enormous popularity of foreign language learning. Along with these political and social changes new ideas for didactic methods have emerged, resulting in a number of methodological approaches

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<sup>1</sup> European Council (2002). Barcelona European Council. Presidency Conclusions. Press Release 100/1/02.

which combine and integrate a particular subject and a language. In pedagogical or linguistic literature notions such as *language across the curriculum* and *language supported subject learning* appeared. A recent concept that has appeared in scholarly discussions about subject and language teaching in Europe is that of Content Language Integrated Learning (CLIL). This concept was created in 1994 by David Marsh and Anne Maljers and stands for the name of the approach which relies on using a foreign language for the acquisition of a particular topic (non-language subjects). It constitutes a promising and effective tool in the promotion of multilingualism in Europe and beyond it and relates to any language, age as well as educational level: from pre-primary, primary, secondary and higher to vocational and professional learning. The European context is noticeable in four crucial works that provide a good overview of CLIL: the two publications by Marsh (*Profiling European CLIL Classrooms*, 2001; *CLIL/EMILE: The European Dimension*, 2001), which were commissioned by the European Commission, the European Commission Eurydice Report from 2006, and the recently published Council of Europe Country Report.<sup>2</sup> The objective of the present analysis is to reflect on two aspects of these publications: the prevalence of CLIL in European education systems and the organizational structure of CLIL teaching in Europe.<sup>3</sup> In Poland, the term CLIL has become increasingly popular and is known as *subject-language teaching* (translated into Polish as *nauczanie przedmiotowo-językowe*) (“Eurydice Report” of 2006;<sup>4</sup> “Profile Report Bilingual Education (English) in Poland” of 2008<sup>5</sup>) and *bilingual education* (*edukacja dwujęzyczna* in Polish).<sup>6</sup> Teaching a curriculum subject in a foreign language also gains popularity in Polish military universities. Since the use of specialist language and colloquial terminology is crucial to effective communication, this methodological approach of teaching is increasingly perceived as a tailor-made solution. The case study of CLIL implementation described in the present paper concerns the National Defense University, the highest level educational institution of the Polish Armed Forces. There, the CLIL methodological approach seems to be a key factor for the development of the offer of both international and national courses. Teaching both international and Polish military students who would like to participate in specialist courses conducted in a foreign language, can be facilitated with the CLIL methodological approach. In order to popularize CLIL in a military environment, the authors of the present article discuss various models of teaching based on this approach and stress its

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<sup>2</sup> Anne Maljers, ed., *Windows on CLIL. Content and Language Integrated Learning in the European Spotlight* (Alkmaar: European Platform for Dutch Education, 2007).

<sup>3</sup> Goethe Institute Website, [www.goethe.de/ges/spa/dos/ifs/ceu/en2751287.htm](http://www.goethe.de/ges/spa/dos/ifs/ceu/en2751287.htm) (6 April 2014).

<sup>4</sup> *Content and Language Integrated Learning (CLIL) at School in Europe*, Strasbourg: European Commission, Eurydice, 2006, available at [www.eurydice.org](http://www.eurydice.org) (6 April 2014).

<sup>5</sup> David Marsh, Marek Zajac, and Hanna Gozdawa-Gołębiowska, *Profile Report Bilingual Education (English) in Poland – Overview of Practice in Selected Schools* (Warsaw: British Council Poland, University of Jyväskylä, 2002).

<sup>6</sup> M. Roda, “Edukacja bilingwalna w Polsce na tle innych krajów Unii Europejskiej,” in H. Komorowska, ed., *Nauczanie języków obcych. Polska a Europa* (Warsaw: Academica SWPS, 2007), 51-58.

advantages by making a reference to Spanish research concerning CLIL effectiveness and the emerging challenges of its application. The final part of the article offers recommendations for implementing this approach at the National Defense University in Warsaw.

## Considerations on the Concept of “Content Language Integrated Learning”

An analysis of the relevant literature indicates that there are discrepancies in the use of the concept. According to Marsh, CLIL commonly refers to when “any dual-focused educational context in which an additional language, thus not usually the first foreign language of the learners involved, is used as a medium in the teaching and learning of non-language content.”<sup>7</sup> This means that CLIL assimilates notions such as bilingual language programs, content-based instruction, foreign languages across the curriculum, foreign languages as academic languages, dual language programs, immersion programs, or multilingual programs. Marsh proceeds to stress that CLIL invites a reconceptualization of how we consider language use and learning. It enables the improvement of an integrated educational approach that actively involves the learner in using and developing the language of learning, the language for learning and language through learning. It has been referred to as education through construction, rather than instruction.<sup>8</sup> Mehisto, Frigols and Marsh also define CLIL as an umbrella term covering a dozen or more educational approaches.<sup>9</sup> Sharing Marsh’s view, they claim that CLIL is a “cognitively demanding approach.”<sup>10</sup> Another author, Meyer, states that it is “an approach that is mutually beneficial for both content and language subjects;”<sup>11</sup> Dalton-Puffer views it as an “educational approach.”<sup>12</sup> Ruiz de Zarobe, Sierra, and Gallardo del Puerto also main-

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<sup>7</sup> David Marsh, *Content and Language Integrated Learning: The European Dimension—Actions, Trends and Foresight Potential* (DG Education & Culture, European Commission, 2002), 15.

<sup>8</sup> David Marsh, *Project D3 – CLIL Matrix – Central Workshop Report 6/2005* (Graz, 3-5 November 2005). European Centre for Modern Languages, 2005, 6, [http://archive.ecml.at/mtp2/CLILmatrix/pdf/wsrepD3E2005\\_6.pdf](http://archive.ecml.at/mtp2/CLILmatrix/pdf/wsrepD3E2005_6.pdf) (1 April 2014).

<sup>9</sup> Peeter Mehisto, Maria-Jesus Frigols, and David Marsh, *Uncovering CLIL: Content and Language Integrated Learning and Multilingual Education* (Oxford: MacMillan, 2008).

<sup>10</sup> Peeter Mehisto and David Marsh, “Approaching the economic, cognitive and health benefits of bilingualism: Fuel for CLIL,” in Yolanda Ruiz de Zarobe, Juan Manuel Sierra, and Francisco Gallardo del Puerto, eds., *Content and Foreign Language Integrated Learning* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2011), 36.

<sup>11</sup> Oliver Meyer, “Towards quality CLIL: successful planning and teaching strategies,” *Puls* 10 (2010): 11-29.

<sup>12</sup> Christiane Dalton-Puffer, foreword to *Content and Foreign Language Integrated Learning: Contributions to Multilingualism in European Contexts*, ed. Yolanda Ruiz de Zarobe et al. (Bern: Peter Lang, 2011), ix-x.

tain that, within the European landscape, “it is firmly becoming a preferred educational approach.”<sup>13</sup>

According to Marsh, Zajac, and Gozdawa-Gołębiowska, teaching with the CLIL methodological approach can be conducted in accordance with four models, conveniently labeled A, B, C, and D.<sup>14</sup>

Model A: lessons are conducted primarily in a foreign language and the mother tongue is used to translate the important terminology.

Type A (monofocal): the attention of the course participants is focused mainly on the subject, whereas linguistic issues are rarely raised and usually concern the pronunciation and spelling of particular terms;

Type B (bifocal): the emphasis is placed on both the subject taught and the linguistic issues, although it may vary in individual cases and content is usually a priority. This model is used in order to achieve the objectives of the subject along with the development and use of a foreign language at a very high level.

Model B: the lessons are conducted in a foreign language and Polish. This method of teaching is called “code switching”. Code switching takes place both during the lesson and throughout the entire teaching program. A lesson devotes significant attention to linguistic issues (up to 50%).

Type A: the two languages can be used in many ways and the transition from one to the other can be sudden and appears necessary.

Type B: much attention is paid to promoting foreign language learning. As in the case of Type A, the solution is applied in order to achieve the proposed learning objectives. Moreover, it allows for ample opportunities to practice a foreign language.

Model C: the use of a foreign language is limited to between 10 % and 50 % of the lesson time. The norm is an interweaving of both language and content (in the students’ mother tongue).

Type A: one language is dominant.

Type B: there is a focus on both the subject and the elements of a foreign language, but attention is paid mainly to the content. Language learning is limited.

Model D: to achieve very specific goals, a foreign language is used only on specific occasions and rather sporadically.

Type A: the lesson is conducted primarily in a foreign language and the series of classes concludes in Polish. The main objective is to consolidate existing knowledge rather than the development of language skills, which results in the so-called *macro-switching* of the languages used.

Type B: lessons are conducted in Polish but are based on foreign language materials.

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<sup>13</sup> Yolanda Ruiz de Zarobe and Rosa María Jimenez Catalan, *Content and Language Integrated Learning: Evidence from research in Europe* (Bristol: Multilingual matters, 2009), 13.

<sup>14</sup> David Marsh, et al., *Raport ewaluacyjny. Edukacja dwujęzyczna w Polsce. Praktyka w wybranych szkołach* (Warsaw: CODN, 2008).

Type C: students prepare projects and present them in a foreign language. This model complements the Polish language teaching and creates opportunities to use and develop the foreign language. Its function is to motivate, its aim to consolidate knowledge and learning by creating an alternative means of learning the material.

This model aims to support the organization of the teaching process and permits the individualization of the curriculum for a particular group.

### **Opportunities and Challenges Arising out of CLIL in Educational Institutes**

Research data on CLIL effectiveness collected during a study trip to Spanish educational institutions revealed that the CLIL methodological approach works very well, especially in the area of vocational education (in the field of services where communication skills, including the extended use of foreign languages, are crucial), and primary education.<sup>15</sup> A recent study confirming the effectiveness of this methodological approach was conducted by a group of Spanish teachers from Granada's Hurtado de Mendoza school (Andalucía, Spain).<sup>16</sup> The research team conducted a survey of language competences that aimed to compare the two groups of students attending the school.<sup>17</sup> Group A was comprised of Spanish-speaking students who had four standard hours of English per week in the curriculum, whereas Group B was comprised of Spanish-speaking students with four hours of English per week in the standard curriculum and an additional eighteen hours of teaching in a variety of subjects (such as marketing, entrepreneurship) with the CLIL methodological approach focused on the use of English. The study began by conducting identical tests for the two groups (listening and reading comprehension in English) in order to compare their language skills at the very beginning of the study (October 2012). The test results confirmed that Group B (which declared its willingness to learn in the classroom using CLIL) had a slight advantage with an average score of 3.23 for the "reading section," and of 1.65 for the "listening section." In comparison, Group A achieved, respectively, the following results: 2.88 and 0.88. The average general language competence of groups A and B thus had the ratio of 1.88 : 2.44.

In May 2013 the test was repeated under the same conditions. Groups of students from both classes were subjected to the test without prior notice. The results were sur-

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<sup>15</sup> Thanks to a grant awarded by the *Foundation for the Development of the Education System in Poland*, in June 2013 the authors of the present article were able to collect data about the implementation of the CLIL methodological approach in secondary and higher education schools (Hurtado de Mendoza Escuela de Granada Universidad de Alcalá de Henares, Politécnica de Madrid) as well as in leading Spanish educational institutions (Dirección General de Mejor de la Calidad de la Enseñanza, Madrid; Junta de Andalucía, Granada).

<sup>16</sup> "Hurtado de Mendoza" is a renowned 50-year-old professional school with more than 2,000 students.

<sup>17</sup> Research staff members include Eva Beatriz Ramal Rodríguez, Jaime Jesús Ocaña Martínez, Pilar Ortega Cabezedo and Antonio Reyes Gómez. They gave permission to the authors to cite their research data in the present article.

prising because in Group A there was a decline in the reading skills from 2.88 to 2.40. In the area of listening comprehension there was an increase from 0.88 to 1.43. In contrast, Group B showed progress in both areas, reaching a rate of 3.64 in the reading section (previously 3.23) and 2.08 for the listening section (previously 1.65). In summary, the average score of both groups in May was represented by the ratio 1.91 : 2.86.

The data clearly show an increase in the average progress of competence in Group B in comparison to Group A. The group of students who over a period of eight months studied with the standard curriculum of English remained at a level of language competence that was very similar to the initial one. Group B learned in the classroom with the CLIL program and showed strong progress. To confirm the effectiveness of the methodological approach, further tests will be carried out in February 2014. In the interview with the research team it was stressed that students in classrooms with the CLIL program showed greater motivation and achieved significantly better results with the subjects taught in a foreign language. Presumably, the bilingual program required greater attention and led teachers to repeat contents more frequently than in teaching with the use of the native language.

To support the research results, it is vital to refer to Ida Kurcz, a professor at Gdańsk University, who deals with the issues of bilingualism. In her book, *Psychological Aspects of Bilingualism*, she indicates that bilingualism may influence the functioning of

Table 1. Average for specific receptive skills for Group A.

Description	GROUP A			
	OCTOBER		MAY	
	READING	LISTENING	READING	LISTENING
Average for particular receptive skills	2.88	0.88	2.40	1.43
Average in general	1.88		1.91	

Table 2. Average for specific receptive skills for Group B.

Description	GROUP B			
	OCTOBER		MAY	
	READING	LISTENING	READING	LISTENING
Average for particular receptive skills	3.23	1.65	3.64	2.08
Average in general	2.44		2.86	



cognitive structures, citing a 1962 study by Elisabeth Peal and Wallace Lambert, according to which bilingualism influences creative thinking and flexibility in thinking.<sup>18</sup>

### **Challenges for CLIL Implementation and Barriers to Overcome**

An interview with researchers permitted the collection of information about the challenges posed by CLIL implementation. In their opinion, the scope of these challenges includes:

1. Supporting traditional teaching with the CLIL methodological approach.
2. Introducing foreign language terminology to a greater extent than in traditional teaching.
3. Introducing cultural components to a greater extent than during traditional foreign language teaching methodological approach.
4. The possibility of using CLIL not only in the official language of a given country, but also in regional languages and dialects, languages of national minorities or other official languages of the country.
5. The possibility of implementing the CLIL methodological approach for periods of different lengths, ranging from a few weeks to a few years.
6. The increase of students' motivation and concentration as a result of CLIL implementation.

Said challenges are connected with the necessity of reducing barriers in the following categories: stereotypes concerning CLIL, insufficiently prepared teaching staff and programs, lack of didactic tools. These barriers are discussed and analyzed in the following paragraphs.

#### *Stereotypes Concerning the CLIL Methodological Approach*

- a) The belief that the CLIL applies only to the English language.
- b) The belief that the CLIL applies only to specific subjects.
- c) The traditional approach to foreign language teaching (with an exclusive focus on language).
- d) Difficulties in establishing priorities between linguistic and thematic contents.
- e) The belief that the CLIL is only for gifted students.

CLIL is not limited to learning official languages, but can introduce the languages of minorities, regional languages and other official languages of a country. It is not limited to the taught topics. Moreover, CLIL can be applied to both the humanities and technical sciences. The emphasis on the traditional concept of teaching foreign languages is still strong and it is not expected that this will change or that the CLIL methodological ap-

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<sup>18</sup> Idy Kurcz, ed., *Psychologiczne aspekty dwujęzyczności* (Gdańsk: Gdańskie Wydawnictwo Psychologiczne, 2007); Elisabeth Peal and Wallace E. Lambert, *The Relation of Bilingualism to Intelligence* (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 1962).

proach will replace the classical methodological approach fully. However, CLIL merely supports the teaching of a foreign language, introduces professional vocabulary, and its goal is to concentrate on content rather than language and to develop the habit of using a language for a specific purpose. It is emphasized that there should be a balance between content and language (50/50) and that content and didactic methods should play a leading role. This can be an important criterion in determining priorities and assessing students, since language value is *added* to the content. The belief that CLIL applies only to gifted students is completely unsubstantiated. The methodological approach can be used for all types of learners, regardless of their abilities. It has been proven that in vocational education and training, students can achieve very good results by using this methodological approach. The reason for the success of the CLIL method, in a manner similar to the natural approach of language teaching, is “learning by doing” in a social environment, through interaction: language is not the learner’s main objective, it is rather a tool to achieve other goals. In a sense, a foreign language is a *working language* used to acquire knowledge and abilities.

### *Staff*

A further barrier to the use of CLIL in schools and universities is the human factor, as described in the following points:

- a) Lack of evident interest in CLIL on the part of teachers and lecturers in Polish higher education institutions.
- b) Lack of competence on the part of teachers and lecturers in higher education.

Competent staff understands the essence of an integrated teaching method that combines content and language. An adequate preparation and the ability to use the available tools is a key factor in CLIL. Of course, teachers who want to introduce this methodological approach in their curricula must first learn about it and have access to materials and information about its effectiveness. Therefore, a crucial point appears to be the dissemination of information concerning CLIL and the creation of a network or a kind of “support group” for those brave teachers and lecturers who are willing to take up the challenge. In the aforementioned Spanish vocational school, like many other schools in Andalusia, the CLIL methodological approach was introduced by providing a so-called “assistant” teacher who conducted CLIL classes. The assistant is usually a person who speaks the language of instruction as their mother tongue. The assistant’s task is to be present during each lesson and to offer linguistic support to both teacher and students. Assistants are often volunteers: students or retirees for whom the assistantship is a form of entertainment, additional pastime, and an opportunity to explore a new country.

### *Introducing CLIL into curricula*

- a) The curriculum is often focused on working on the content rather than developing competencies.
- b) The belief that in the CLIL methodological approach the issue of formal rigor and time take control of the entire program.

- c) The belief that the CLIL methodological approach requires additional funding, labor and time.

Curricula that use CLIL have their own characteristics, but do not need to be changed to a radical extent. First of all, programs should be focused specifically on the development of skills and competencies. The CLIL cycle can be varied: there are programs that last only a few weeks, and there are others covering several years of education. Depending on the model, the content presented in a foreign language should be a minimum of 10 % and a maximum of 50 % of the teaching program. It seems that it is possible to start working with CLIL gradually: for example, in the D model, a foreign language is used occasionally, for specific purposes, such as the introduction of terminology and definitions. In this way, by observing the progress of learning, the teacher is able to assess “the amount of foreign language” in the class in the next semester. The belief that the preparation of the CLIL program is more time consuming and costly than a traditional program is misleading. Much information is available on the Internet that can replace expensive course books and make the preparation of lessons less time consuming.

### *Tools*

- a) Troubles with assessing the competence and skills of students.
- b) The problem with different input and output levels of language competence among students.
- c) Lack of teaching materials for foreign language classes.

The competence and knowledge assessment largely depends on the learning path a teacher chooses. With a variety of choices available, it is necessary to build an assessment system with universal criteria allowing for a reliable knowledge check.<sup>19</sup> An additional difficulty for the assessment itself is the speed of foreign language learning in a group with different levels of language competence. This issue is strongly connected with the availability and the choice of the teaching materials. The number of possible CLIL paths and the amount of specific teaching materials available for each path are not sufficient. If foreign language materials are too difficult for a student, they exceed his or her perception capabilities at a linguistic and cognitive level. Therefore, fulfilling a didactic goal and avoiding the aforementioned situation requires a greater effort on the part of the teacher with regard to the choice of adequate teaching materials.

### **Content Language Integrated Learning at the National Defense University in Warsaw: Some Recommendations**

The effectiveness of the CLIL methodological approach, as suggested by the aforementioned Spanish researchers, would encourage its implementation at a military university,

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<sup>19</sup> Anna Czura and Katarzyna Papaja, “Classroom-based and external assessment in CLIL,” *Anglica Wratislaviensia* 49 (2010): 163-170.

specifically the National Defense University in Warsaw. The National Defense University (NDU), the highest level educational institution of the Polish Armed Forces, educates both military and civilian students and conducts scientific research especially for the needs of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland. The university conducts studies in both Polish and English and its research interests include the following areas: the national defense system and defense strategy of the Republic of Poland; contemporary military conflicts; Land Forces and Air Force in the defense system of the Republic of Poland; peace support operations; command and management in crisis situations (including contemporary terrorism); territorial and civil defense; CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation); the logistics and economics of defense; and education for security. The aforementioned subjects are supported with online courses in English (which can be used alone or combined with teaching). Since the students who attend the courses master foreign languages at different levels, NDU's academic teachers focus their attention on approaches that help students to acquire new language skills together with the subject taught. As the CLIL methodological approach gains popularity, it is increasingly perceived as a solution that meets the students' needs. It may prove especially helpful for the acquisition of specialized vocabulary that is crucial in the communication between experts from different countries on a specific subject. To introduce this methodological approach, there are some pilot practices that intersperse specialist courses with a "portion" of a foreign language. One instance is the series of workshops on critical thinking for civilian students at the National Security Faculty, where teaching a language takes up 30 % of the course time. On the basis of their observation of participating students, tutors maintain that the key issues are memorized faster and better understood as a result of a deeper exploration of the meaning of concepts.

With reference to the aforementioned Spanish research and taking into consideration the pilot practices at the National Defense University in Warsaw, we would like to put forward a few recommendations concerning the implementation of the CLIL methodological approach. Firstly, the construction of suitable teaching materials can be considered a crucial point in order to reduce barriers and make the implementation of standardized CLIL programs smoother. With appropriate guidelines, academic teachers have the opportunity to practice and modify the course of the lesson according to the educational needs of students. Secondly, a wide range of valid assessment tools should be specifically designed in order to give learners feedback about their performance with regard to the key concepts of the subject taught. Finally, the preparation of the teaching staff is essential to the effective implementation of CLIL.

## Summary

Teaching a subject in a foreign language is not a new idea, and specialized literature offers a number of terms that are synonymous with Content Language Integrated Learning. The CLIL methodological approach, which is applicable to various languages as target languages, can be implemented according to various models and cover from 10 % up to 50 % of the teaching program accordingly. The variety of models available for Content Language Integrated Learning permits the adjustment of the teaching content to the

group of learners, thus enhancing their ability to acquire both the content and a language, and hence supports the development of knowledge and competence. Building a content-language competence is particularly important for effective communication between military staff members from various academies.

CLIL implementation in military universities can be a bridge between studies in their native language and studies conducted entirely in a foreign language. This scenario is more comfortable for staff members who do not have sufficient language proficiency and would like to develop their knowledge of a foreign language, especially for a specific purpose. In case of an insufficient number of teaching materials, professional training and language learning can be supported with online materials, teaching modules, and other resources.<sup>20</sup> The advantage of this solution conducted in an asynchronous mode makes it possible for learners to return to the training content at any time and any place. This is important for staff members who are stationed outside their home unit and cannot attend classes on a regular basis. The rich repertoire of courses can provide a basis for teaching materials, and these can be modified according to teaching needs and objectives.

Since in military areas a specific language must be used in different contexts and circumstances, the CLIL methodological approach is a viable tool for the maximization of teaching effects. Not only do students become familiar with specific issues, but they are also equipped with linguistic knowledge. Consequently, the barriers of intercultural communication are reduced or disappear and students are better prepared for self-study and searching materials for their own interests. Also, CLIL provides opportunities to study content from different perspectives. It also encourages learners to develop multilingual interests and attitudes and prepares them to interact in international environments. In this regard, Mehisto emphasizes that CLIL promotes the development of learning skills: social, cultural, cognitive, linguistic, academic, etc. The acquisition of these learning skills facilitates achievements with regard to both content and language.<sup>21</sup> In light of these advantages, and considering that language elements can be included in almost every curriculum, the implementation of CLIL in specialized curricula for military staff should be broadly discussed by education experts and decision-makers.

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<sup>20</sup> This approach is promoted by the *Comunidad de Madrid*, supported by the Dirección General de Mejora de la Calidad de la Enseñanza, an organization dealing with bilingual education in different forms.

<sup>21</sup> Peeter Mephisto, Maria Jesus Frigols, and David Marsh, *Uncovering CLIL: Content and Language Integrated Learning and Multilingual Education* (Oxford: Macmillan Education, 2008), 11-12.



# From Adjusting to Rebuilding Police Institutions

Tibor Kozma\*

**Abstract:** This article is intended for academics, think tanks and practitioners dealing with modern policing. The scope of the article is intentionally wide, and gives a general overview of issues involved, with minor adjustments, up to large-scale reestablishment of police institutions. The author aims to provide useful guidance to those who are in charge of conducting any police capacity building related activities. No matter the scale of the envisaged change, general background knowledge on police is essential in order to understand the implications of change.

**Keywords:** Police reform, capacity building, law enforcement, police organization

Everything is subject to change; many philosophies describe very well the dynamic nature of society. However, not only societies undergo change, but all its sub-elements, including the police. To provide a safe and secure environment the police should also observe, learn and adapt. Adaptation is a frequently observed institutional reaction but it does not go beyond a certain scale. If we would set up a scale measuring change as it occurs in police institutions beyond a regularly occurring adaptation, the first mark would be *Adjust*, the second *Reform* and the third *Rebuild*. In this regard, adjusting is more than a minor correction, may not take place often and, in an idealistic situation, one can observe such actions not more than once every few years. This activity is internally conducted by top professional police leaders who are in charge of planning, approving and executing. For instance, this may involve establishing a new team or a new unit within a department. In case of adjustment, there is no shocking or provoking event – I would argue that this is part of the organic institutional refreshing mechanism.

Reform, as next on the scale, is a much larger action, occurring perhaps just once in a decade. One of the significant differences in comparison with the adjustment phase is that police reform may be politically led. Sometimes it is also related to a change in po-

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litical administration. It could also be an institutional reaction to a shocking event after a long time ignored adjustment or a significant modernization meant to provide institutional solutions to various internal and external security related challenges. In this category, the change is well pronounced, supposedly well communicated and should aim for the mid to long-term. For instance, under police reform many modern police witnessed the establishment of a new (elite) police service in charge of organized crime, counter-terrorism, high-profile crimes, etc. However, the scope of reform may likely go beyond and can even include merging police services into one single service, as was the case in Luxemburg (2000), Belgium (2001) and Austria (2005) when the former national *gendarmierie* service was merged into one single police service. Police reform requires thorough governmental planning, parliamentarian oversight and the adoption of a new police law. In some cases, such police reform occurs hand in hand with larger sectorial reforms either in tandem with the security sector or with the rule of law sector.

The rebuilding of a police service is inherently very different. Rebuilding almost always follows a war (armed) crisis or a total collapse and disintegration of the police institution. Unfortunately, there are several recent examples of this, many, but not exclusively, on the African continent. We could cite significant rebuilding case studies from West Africa, the most advanced and successful of which occurred in Sierra Leone. In all cases the state authority was not and could not be the driving engine of police rebuilding; rather, there was always the need for a strong, external partner to guide, foster and assist the host nation throughout the process. That could be based on bilateral or multi-lateral work partnering with states, as was the case with the generation of the new Palestine Police Service. In other cases, the driving engine could be a non-state actor, such as the United Nations (UN), the European Union, the African Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, or, to a lesser extent, some sub-regional institutions. Due to its nature, rebuilding is the most time and resource-consuming exercise. Case studies show that, at a minimum, a decade of constant external influence and activity is needed to generate a new police service from the ground up. Most of the cases required between 15 to 20 years, such as rebuilding the police in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which took almost two decades to complete. However, in some cases not even two decades are enough. The financial, infrastructural-material and human resources of a police rebuilding process may require a vast and long-lasting budget. The situation can be even more complex and add further challenges to an ongoing police capacity building operation, such as the case in Ivory Coast during the post-election crisis from November 2010 to April 2011, where unexpected political and armed conflict hampered the previously achieved results and, due to deep crisis, law enforcement institutions again suffered total disintegration. In some other cases, such as Somalia, the placement of the first cornerstone of the new police institution is lagging behind, thus the preparation of the rebuilding process (including the full scale of state authorities) may require not decades, but rather generations.



Some rare cases of police rebuilding may not be directly connected to a crisis situation, but rather to a total change of the political climate. The establishment of the Catalanian Police is worth citing as a good case study, among other examples.<sup>1</sup>

There is also a need to mention the transition of police institutions, as it differs from any of the above due to its very specific nature. Probably the best example occurred in the early 1990s when many former communist countries in Eastern Europe regained their sovereignty and their own security sectors had to undergo a transition process. The transition of police service from a communist type to democratic police remains an issue in Central Asia and elsewhere. This is almost as great a challenge as rebuilding a new police service from the ground up, and some may see it as a very large scale reform process. However, it is more than an institutional reform since several elements beyond the scope of reform should be addressed, such as the de-politicization of the police, the establishment of civilian oversight and the transformation from a strongly centralized military type to a non-military model designed to be part of the rule of law and not above the law. Such a transition occurs extremely rarely since such a change is always associated with a major change of political course.

No matter the aim and scope of the change, there is a need to 1) conduct a multidimensional assessment, 2) determine the desired structure of the future police, 3) find the means to move the existing police (or start rebuilding from the ground up) towards the end stage police model using measurable benchmarks and 4) compile all envisaged goals and means into a strategic plan and implementation plan.

There are many well written academic publications about the aforementioned procedure, therefore this article will not address this, but rather focus on specific orientation points for designing a new police. All democratic police institutions can be measured against the categories examined in detail below. The author of this article believes that it is useful to compare any existing police or newly designed service against these categories in order to see the possibilities of potential changes ahead. With this in mind, the reader may find answers or at least orientation points when trying to answer the question, "What police do we need?"

### *Dual/MultiPolicing System versus One Dominant Police Institution*

The best examples of two key cooperating and, at the same time, competing policing institutions within one country are those of France, Italy and Spain and their national police and paramilitary police services, the Gendarmerie, Carabinieri and Guardia Civil, respectively.<sup>2</sup> This dual system exists in less than a dozen European countries and in

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<sup>1</sup> The Catalanian Police, Mossos d'Esquadra, developed from the ground up over a period of 22 years. It was established in 1983 and the development of the service concluded in 2005 reaching full scale operational capabilities.

<sup>2</sup> It should also be noted that besides the gendarmeries and the national police services there are additional institutionally independent police services such as: city police/ municipality police, regional police, etc.

many African countries,<sup>3</sup> where the colonizing state's administration—including the dual police system—and institutions remain as a legacy of colonization. The authority of the police services is divided according to population, where highly populated areas fall under national police authorities and the less inhabited rural areas fall under the gendarmerie type services. Both institutions have full scale capabilities although the parallel capabilities are not equally well developed; some would argue that the gendarmerie is better suited to address large scale, violent public order related matters. Despite the disadvantage of the competing coexistence, the dual system seems a better fit for medium or large countries, especially when the state administration is centralized under the continental type of legal system. Due to institutional competition, checks and balances are better maintained in this type of system; however, most recent European case studies show that it is not worthwhile to establish or maintain a dual policing system in a country with less than 10 million inhabitants.<sup>4</sup>

### *One Single Police Model versus one One Single Service with Special Police Services*

While there is no dual system on the policing front, the healthy rivalry may be maintained by having one single, dominant police institution surrounded by either 1) other (special) policing institutions with nationwide jurisdiction, such as a counterterrorism service or a high-profile organized crime police service (specialization based approach) or 2) some county/city police institutions may also be competitive police bodies having shared or exclusive police authorities in legally defined areas (territory based approach). In rare cases, there is one single integrated police service without limitation of territorial jurisdiction. However, such a model may be effective only in small territories (smaller island states) where integration is the only reasonable solution to create the most effective service.<sup>5</sup> Additionally, a highly integrated police service may also be very centralized and concentrated.

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<sup>3</sup> There are more than 30 countries worldwide with gendarmerie, such as Algeria, Argentina, Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Egypt, France, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Lebanon, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Romania, Rwanda, Serbia, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey and Vatican City.

<sup>4</sup> Please see the European example. Among countries with gendarmerie services, by territory and population Portugal is the smallest. Belgium and Austria (both under 10 million inhabitants), in the frame of the police modernization reform program, merged its gendarmerie services into one national police system. The Vatican City Gendarmerie service is 130 strong but due to its small size and unique appearance, this is not viewed as a potential role model.

<sup>5</sup> Under the head of the Malta Police Service there are various police branches, including: crime dept., financial crime dept., protective dept., traffic dept., immigration and border control dept., visa office, VIP protection, admin dept., finance dept., forensic science laboratory, etc. – the list is not exhaustive. See Malta Police Force Organizational Chart, [www.police.gov.mt/en-us/organisation-chart.aspx](http://www.police.gov.mt/en-us/organisation-chart.aspx) (4 November 2013).

### *Police Force versus Police Service (Military Type versus Civilian Based Police)*

Often, even practitioners fail to correctly distinguish between the two very different terminologies. Indeed, experts with military background may wish to use the term “Police Force” when they actually mean to describe democratic policing. The difference may appear as only a nuance but it is significant. Unless the “Police Force” approach is preferred for specific reasons, I would argue to use the term “Police Service,” since the police is part of the civil administration system. As described, this is not only a terminology issue but rather a subtle cultural interpretation on how the police should be viewed externally. The word “Force” denotes the military, thus when the police is organized it should be separated from military force by many means, both figuratively and literally. It is fascinating to see the police ranking system, which in some countries differs from classical military ranks but not always. Traditionally, many post-communist countries still use military type ranks in their police services.

### *Reactive versus Reactive & Preventive Police*

The police service is also part of the more encompassing rule of law sector. It is worthwhile examining how the integration takes place, the role of the supervising authority over the investigating police authority, autonomy in investigations versus directed, dictated course of investigating actions, etc. All should be carefully studied since there are several well-functioning models in this regard. Here, the focus is given to the general police approaches towards crimes. First and foremost, all police services should have an effective criminal investigation skill set in order to fulfill its reactive roles, which come into effect as soon as some crime is detected and investigation must commence. However, society lawfully expects crime and public order related preventive measures. Modern police institutions should be measured and tested against their ability to develop preventive measures. In this segment preventive measures may be limited by two factors: 1) financial and 2) the (challenging) efficiency measuring methods, thus only limited attention is paid to prevention, especially not before the reactive police mechanism is fully developed. In short, capabilities to provide effective and visible preventive measures are clear indicators of a highly developed police service.

### *Centralized versus Decentralized Police: State Primacy on Policing or Shared Primacy with Regional, Municipal Authorities*

Historically, the first modern police services were not centralized but established in order to serve highly populated, particularly metropolitan areas.<sup>6</sup> Some services (such as those in the UK and the Netherlands) never reached a centralized model; meanwhile other services (especially following the Soviet model) have been extremely centralized. Of course, in all cases, the type of state administration and the type of legal system

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<sup>6</sup> One of the first modern police services, the Metropolitan Police, was created by Sir Robert Peel with the implementation of the Metropolitan Police Act, passed by Parliament in 1829.

should also be closely examined to determine the complexity of the case. Out of the European scope, the U.S. policing system should be noted as a very complex and multi-type policing model. There are more than 17,000 police institutions at six different levels;<sup>7</sup> the scope is extremely large and varied from federal jurisdictions to municipal jurisdictions. Regarding the centralized and partially decentralized models, perhaps the French system should be closely studied as a classical model. The German federal and state level policing model is also interesting as it is a well-balanced and effective combination of some centralized and decentralized models. The current tendencies are showing ambivalent pictures since there are examples of both centralization interest and decentralization trends that deploy and hand over more policing tasks to the municipal level.

### *One Police Model Including Crime, Public Order and Traffic Pillars versus a Separate Model*

All police services consist of at least two fundamental pillars. The first, public order and traffic services as the high visibility uniformed police service and, second, the criminal investigation service. Both are essential parts and the author of the present article would argue that their proximity is essential in order to achieve effective synergy and close co-operation. However, this is mostly the case of the centralized police system, whilst police services built up on a different philosophy often separate the uniformed and investigative services. Positioning the two pillars close to each other is therefore advisable.

### *Specialized Police Staffs versus Generalists*

One would expect that in the twenty-first century all modern police services are moving towards specialization, but this is not always the case. For instance, Norwegian police officers are expected to be generalists, meaning that they should possess several police skills and be equipped to answer to all security related calls. This approach seems to be more rarely applied, but nevertheless it is worth studying further. Such a model could work better in a large, less populated country when the police are extremely developed, well trained and with high-tech capabilities.

### *Community Oriented Police Philosophy and the Latest Trends*

The author of the present essay recognizes that modern community policing is not at all a modern phenomenon since it has long been in existence, for example the UK system. As of today, almost all modern police services (despite the many aforementioned diversifications) have implemented some sort of applied community policing. There is no debate about its existence in modern policing, but rather about how community policing is understood and implemented. Should this be further investigated, the UK and the USA systems would be important case studies. Additionally, in the UK, among different

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<sup>7</sup> Source: [http://discoverpolicing.org/whats\\_like/?fa=types\\_jobs](http://discoverpolicing.org/whats_like/?fa=types_jobs) (12 September 2013).

policing trends the latest is “Total Policing.”<sup>8</sup> Meanwhile, in the USA there are several co-existing policing schools, such as “Zero Tolerance,”<sup>9</sup> “Problem-oriented Policing” (POP),<sup>10</sup> and “Intelligence-led Policing” to mention just a few among many implemented policing trends.<sup>11</sup>

### *Police to Population Ratio*

The ratio between the total population of a country and the total police staff seems to be an internationally used and objective way of measuring and comparing police services. However, it has to be noted that this is not as exact as it looks. To illustrate this, one should focus a bit on police strength. In some countries the border guard service is treated as an integrated part of the national police service. This is the case of Hungary (as of many other European countries that are members of the Schengen System) and yet the border guard pillar as an integral part of the Hungarian Police Service may falsely skew the total number of police by 15-18 % more. For this reason it is necessary to carry out a careful study of the relevant figures. Some experts may posit that 1:500 is a good ratio, as the North European countries fall under the 1:400 to 680 range, but the ratio of most developed democratic countries tends to fall mostly in the range between 1:250 to 500.<sup>12</sup>

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For limits of space, the article must draw to a close without touching upon other police attributes, such as gender mainstreaming, political/civilian oversight, internal control, police education system. Each of these subjects would require a separate article to discuss the topic fully.

The present essay is by no means exhaustive and all of the points it discusses ought to be further expanded with other substantial elements. Despite this, its author believes that defining the aforementioned nine types of police service may offer sufficient points of orientation towards a better understanding of the variety of existing police services and the different stages of rebuilding, transferring, reforming, or adjusting national police services.

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<sup>8</sup> The Total Policing has been introduced by Police Commissioner Bernard Hogan-Howe, head of the Metropolitan Police Service, appointed in 2011. The short description is: “A total war on crime, total care for victims, and total professionalism from our staff.”

<sup>9</sup> This was first introduced by the current New York Police Chief, William Bratton in the mid-1990s.

<sup>10</sup> Herman Goldstein, *Problem-oriented Policing* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990).

<sup>11</sup> Mark Riebling (Editorial Director at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research), *Hard won lessons: the new paradigm – merging law enforcement and counterterrorism strategies* (Safe Cities Project, January 2006), [www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/scr\\_04.pdf](http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/scr_04.pdf) (10 October 2013).

<sup>12</sup> Used sources: <http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries>; [www.interpol.com](http://www.interpol.com); [http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=crim\\_plce&lang=en#](http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=crim_plce&lang=en#) (18 November 2013).