NATO Intelligence and Information Sharing: Improving NATO Strategy for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

Michael Hanna, David Granzow, Bjorn Bolte, and Andrew Alvarado

Abstract: Current global conflict trends are pulling NATO away from its traditional collective defense mission into stability and reconstruction (S&R) operations with greater frequency. S&R environments require NATO to collaborate with and support host nation governments, international organizations, and a range of non-governmental organizations to address security, political, and social challenges. However, NATO encounters difficulty with collecting and sharing intelligence and information in these environments. This inability to communicate compounds the already complex issues faced by all entities involved.

This article identifies three policy options to help NATO improve its support to S&R operations by enhancing information-sharing mechanisms within NATO and with non-NATO stakeholders. These options are: 1) the completion of the Federated Mission Network that seeks to aggregate classified and unclassified information in a regulated virtual space; 2) the indoctrination of a Joint Information Fusion Cell to act as a physical clearinghouse for information; and 3) the development of Regional Coordination Centers and Stabilization and Reconstruction Teams to implement individual S&R projects.

The progression of policy options represents increases in stakeholder engagement, operational effectiveness, and overall cost. Based on an analysis of the pros and cons associated with each option, we recommend the development of the Joint Information Fusion Cell (JIFC). This option offers a centralized facility capable of collecting, processing, and disseminating information and intelligence, and a separate, neutral facility
for coordinating with non-military entities. This option confers the widest array of benefits to NATO’s contributions to S&R operations in both in-area and out-of-area environments.

**Keywords:** NATO operations, stabilization and reconstruction, intelligence sharing, information sharing, Joint Information Fusion Center

**Problem and Importance**

A key challenge facing the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO)—the world’s longest lasting and most successful multinational military alliance—is how to reform its information sharing structures to address the complex operating environments NATO will face in the future. This challenge, while seemingly perpetual, has become further complicated since the dissolution of NATO’s original opponent, the Soviet Union. Because NATO conducted no military operations during the Cold War, it never truly faced the need to share information in a rapidly evolving conflict scenario. However, since 1991 it has mobilized numerous times in response to new threats and situations that required the expedient flow of information.

Today, NATO’s European members face a disparate array of security threats ranging from a revanchist Russia to an influx of refugees from the Middle East and Africa. NATO operations have been as diverse as security and reconstruction in Kosovo and Afghanistan, military and police training for the African Union (AU) and the Iraqi government, disaster relief in Haiti, Pakistan, and the United States, counter-piracy operations near the Horn of Africa and in the Indian Ocean, and rendering humanitarian assistance to members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.\(^1\) These operating environments require NATO to move beyond Cold War-era structures that stifle information sharing.

Threats today often involve actors operating outside of formal legal and security apparatuses, requiring a more comprehensive understanding of the economic, social, and political elements that often drive modern conflict.\(^2\) To meet the security challenges of today and tomorrow, NATO must rethink how it shares information within the Alliance and with external partners.\(^3\)

Current Alliance intelligence structures do not facilitate the needed capacity for sharing. At the corps level, NATO units often have insufficiently sized intelligence staffs.\(^4\) At the Alliance level, no central authority exists with the power to

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\(^4\) Interview with Source J, US official at NATO Allied Rapid Response Corps (ARRC), March 14, 2016.
vet, empower, and lend accountability to NATO members and non-NATO organizations to share intelligence. Sharing at this level is further hindered by a lack of trust between NATO member states. NATO’s ability to share intelligence and information with outsiders is similarly compromised by a lack of trust and the absence of well-developed mechanisms for sharing. Mechanisms that do exist tend to be under-utilized.

International confidence in the willingness and ability of NATO to provide an effective response to international crises is waning in the wake of operations such as those in Afghanistan and Libya. Yet it is exactly these types of conflicts in which the Alliance and its member states are most likely to engage in the future. At the start of this decade, five out of six NATO operations took place outside of the Alliance’s territory. It is for exactly these types of conflicts new information-sharing structures need to be designed and implemented.

Shortcomings of Current NATO Policy

Intelligence policy specific to NATO is lacking standardized practices and products, mostly due to the consensus requirement for NATO decision-making. Within NATO, there exists a wide array of offices working on intelligence production and dissemination with little coordination at the working and leadership levels. A review of intelligence actors within NATO conducted by the authors of this article reveals an organizational landscape of competition, politicization, and hoarding similar to the US intelligence community prior to 9/11. In lieu of guiding policy, intelligence sharing within the Alliance remains problematic and each organization has little incentive to share. Agencies have internal rules against sharing and no rewards for sharing. NATO intelligence analysts often resort to their individual country’s production and disclosure standards, reducing the timeliness and utility of shared intelligence products.

NATO does have a more developed policy toward sharing information with non-NATO partner states and International Organizations (IOs). NATO often uses

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7 Interview with Source M, non-US official at NATO ARRC, March 15, 2016.
12 These shortcomings were expressed by most, if not all, of the interviews conducted by the authors of this article.
bilateral sharing agreements, which include non-disclosure clauses, network security and hardware inspections, provision of software in some cases, and other information assurance measures.\(^\text{13}\) Because information NATO provides to these kinds of external actors is not necessarily meant to be actionable, delays in information sharing with IOs do not pose the same security risks as it does among military partners. However, NATO continues to struggle to produce a coherent policy that facilitates the efficient and productive sharing of information with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

Unsurprisingly, many NGOs do not meet NATO’s strict information security or “need-to-know” requirements. Moreover, while NATO could benefit from on-the-ground information owned by NGOs, the absence of cooperative planning and direct lines of communication often renders such information nonexistent.\(^\text{14}\) Finally, NATO has a tendency to treat NGOs as subordinates rather than equal partners in stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations. This creates a poor working relationship and lack of trust between NGOs and NATO military forces.\(^\text{15}\)

Finally, with regard to S&R operations, NATO has failed to produce a doctrine (or agree on an established one) at the Alliance level. In fact, within the last NATO Strategic Concept published in 2010, the gap is clearly identified:

> To be effective across the crisis management spectrum, we will... further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary operations, including counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction operations.\(^\text{16}\)

Again, however, NATO’s consensus-driven decision-making continues to impede progress. Lacking a common strategy recognized by all members of the Alliance, operational planning is often ad hoc, rushed, and subject to mission creep.\(^\text{17}\) These pitfalls are easily identifiable in all of NATO’s out-of-area interventions since the end of the Cold War, including Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya. Without a common strategy within the Alliance, S&R operations often suffer from duplicative and contradictory strategies.

**Information Needed to Support S&R Operations**

Support for an S&R operation will undoubtedly require NATO to work with and in support of the host nation government, relevant IOs, and a range of NGOs to address a wide range of security and humanitarian concerns. Because NATO has yet to appropriate or produce a comprehensive S&R doctrine, we utilize the end

\(^{13}\) Interview with Source K, US DoD official, March 16, 2016.

\(^{14}\) Interview with Source N, US Mission to NATO, March 17, 2016.

\(^{15}\) Interview with Michael Klosson, VP for Policy and Humanitarian Response, Save the Children, April 18, 2016.

\(^{16}\) See Annex A.

\(^{17}\) Interview with Dr. Charles (Chuck) Barry, Distinguished Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, US National Defense University, January 20, 2016.
states and cross-cutting principles outlined in *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* to outline the efforts to which NATO is most likely to provide support.\(^\text{18}\) This manual offers a general framework for addressing complex environments of instability and identifies common gaps and challenges to conducting S&R operations.

NATO’s humbling experiences in Kosovo and Afghanistan have made it very clear that emphasis must be placed on political primacy. By adopting military-dominated strategies, NATO unintentionally allowed governance issues that preceded drivers of insecurity to remain unaddressed. In order to close this self-reinforcing feedback loop, it is necessary that NATO is prepared to take on not only security roles but also play a supportive role to civilian-led S&R operations. In this way, NATO will be supporting a unified effort to build the governing capacity of the host nation government by positioning itself in such a manner that

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leverages its unique capabilities in intelligence and information gathering, along with command and control, strategic lift, and communications technologies.

To achieve this goal, NATO will need to gather, analyze, and disseminate spatial information related to refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other at-risk populations, damaged housing and critical infrastructure, formal and informal border crossings, and hazardous material sites. NATO will require robust engagement with NGOs, IOs, the civilian population, and the host government in order to obtain the information necessary to support a successful S&R operation.

**Options for NATO**

The biggest challenges facing NATO will center on the degree to which it can collect, process, and disseminate information not only within NATO, but also with the range of non-NATO entities working together toward a successful S&R operation. How NATO chooses to organize its contribution will present different implications for the mission as a whole. In the following section, we analyze three options for NATO strategy specific to intelligence and information sharing in both in-area and out-of-area S&R operations. The options are presented in increments: each one builds on the previous option and requires an increased degree of financial, material, and human contribution.

**Option A. The Federated Mission Network (FMN)**

*Subject:* A packaged, distributable network that can be used simultaneously by NATO and its partners to share classified intelligence, and by IOs, NGOs, and NATO actors to share unclassified information in a common, minimally regulated space.
**Description**

NATO established the Afghan Mission Network (AMN) in 2010. It provided a federated, classified network that allowed all NATO member states contributing forces to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission to exchange data and intelligence. Certain non-NATO states were then read on to the AMN using bilateral security agreements. However, ISAF partners continued to struggle with sharing information with non-NATO actors providing much-needed services in Afghanistan. Efforts to use unclassified interfaces, including the All Partners Access Network (APAN), Civil-Military Fusion Center (CFC), Protected Information Exchange (PIX), and RONNA-HarmonieWeb, did not resolve recurring issues of structural obstacles or lack of buy-in.\(^{19}\)

NATO has since endeavored to develop a hybrid network, known as the Federated Mission Network (FMN), to hold both classified and unclassified material on a single network.\(^{20}\) As the FMN is still under development, this paper will outline what functions and considerations should be taken into account for the final product:

- A labeling scheme allowing registered users to submit information across the classification spectrum, and an access management scheme to limit information by clearance level
- A layered archive and search function to store classified intelligence at the NATO Top Secret, NATO Secret, NATO unclassified, and open source levels, respectively
- A user-generated, Wiki-type database for unclassified information, with an open edit function regulated by a NATO administration team\(^{21}\)
- Chat functions across the classification spectrum to provide for direct communication between users
- A fillable-forms portal allowing NATO and non-NATO entities to submit requests for information (RFIs) in both directions, and
- A financial trust fund management function for tracking donations, pairing needs with resources using an open proposal scheme.

The resulting network would take the form of a distributable, off-the-shelf product that NATO could deploy to areas of instability and be used by NATO and non-NATO entities simultaneously.

**Pros**

\(^{19}\) Interview with Melissa Sinclair, former USAID employee and NGO worker, April 7, 2016.

\(^{20}\) Interview with Jean-Rene Couture, NATO Communications and Information Agency, March 17, 2016.

\(^{21}\) These standards include, among others, the stipulation that deliberate attempts to spread disinformation or engage in cyber-vandalism will result in the removal of editing privileges by the site’s administration team.
Firstly, the FMN brings multiple actors onto a common network and provides different levels of access to vetted users. Through the RFI function, the FMN provides an open line of communication, albeit indirectly, for requesting specific information from NATO and vice-versa. Admittedly, not all requests will be approved, especially when the sources and methods used to obtain the information requested are particularly sensitive. Further, the Wiki function establishes a one-stop clearinghouse for open-source and unclassified information, opening new channels for information exchange.

Secondly, the donations management function, modeled after the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, will improve the efficiency of resource allocation and will limit cases of fraud. This mechanism holds all registered monetary donations in a common account managed by the overarching political lead in a S&R context, be it the host nation government, a UN support mission, or another entity. Because all entities supporting the overall S&R operation will have access to the information contained in this element, the opportunity for graft, embezzlement, and misallocation is greatly reduced. The Request for Proposal (RFP) function allows local and foreign actors to post needs, ranging from reconstruction projects to training seminars, and for NGOs to compete for resource awards designed to fulfill specific, widely identified needs.

Finally, by developing a packaged, distributable network, NATO will be able to deploy the FMN alongside the initial contingent of NATO personnel sent to a S&R environment. From the first day of an operation, the FMN can be installed, activated, and have all dysfunctional elements worked out as the full scope of the mission is being developed. The FMN can be set up in multiple locations at once, using dedicated communications systems to manage operations separately. In this way, NATO can support multiple S&R, disaster relief, humanitarian aid, and other operations simultaneously.

Cons

The most obvious risk to the FMN’s common network structure is its increased vulnerability to hacking compared to closed networks. Despite a plethora of advanced network security products available, and the likelihood of even more advanced measures reserved for individual customers, the threat of hacking is inherently greater than with air-gapped networks. Moreover, awareness of a hacking incident is normally delayed by hours at the least, meaning sensitive information obtained through nefarious means has the potential to be used against NATO before the Alliance becomes aware of the intrusion.

22 “The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) was established in 2002 to provide a coordinated financing mechanism for the Government of Afghanistan’s budget and priority national investment projects. Today, the ARTF remains the vehicle of choice for pooled funding, with low transaction costs, excellent transparency and high accountability, and provides a well-functioning arena for policy debate and consensus creation.” Quoted from http://www.artf.af/.
A second challenge is NATO’s ability to design and fund the development of a FMN. There can be no certainty that NATO member states will be able to come to a consensus on the technical specifications of the FMN’s sharing functions. Past approaches have always included separate, or air-gapped, networks for housing classified and unclassified information, respectively. Judging by NATO’s enduring reliance on a centralized paper records policy, due to its inability to agree on digital storage standards, member states are unlikely to agree on the structure of the FMN. It is also unlikely that all NATO member states will be willing and able to declassify information on a network shared with states, IOs, and NGOs with which there may be sour relations. Additional obstacles include how to train and pay the analysts and disclosure officers tasked with transferring information between classification layers.

Finally, the FMN provides a mere technical solution to a much larger policy problem. Should NATO even come to agreement on its design, there is no guarantee that NGOs will buy in to the common network idea. Especially dubious is the assumption that all contributing entities to an S&R operation will be de facto allies. Some NGOs may be willing to contribute information to the network, but with the stipulation that certain NATO member states or IOs be barred from viewing it. Gaining the buy-in from the host-nation government itself is not guaranteed. To repurpose a line from *Field of Dreams*, “If you build it, they will come,” may not apply to the development of the FMN.

**Option B. The Joint Information Fusion Center**

**Subject:** The Joint Information Fusion Center (JIFC) is a centralized facility through which NATO collects, processes, and analyzes intelligence and information. The JIFC would be capable of analyzing both threat activity and atmospheric information. Acting as a physical clearinghouse, with dedicated personnel, it is a mechanism to help create a more focused civilian-military coordination effort.

**Description**

The JIFC will be staffed with intelligence analysts to conduct both threat assessments and atmospheric analyses relating to the wellbeing, governance, infrastructure, and economy of the local populace. While the analysts conducting threat assessments will work in access-restricted areas, those conducting atmospheric analyses will be involved in fieldwork by meeting with active

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23 interview with Catherine Gerth, Head of Archives and Information Management, NATO HQ, March 17, 2016.
24 Interview with Catherine Gerth.
25 Universal Studios’ 1989 movie directed by Phil Alden Robinson.
contributors to the S&R operation. This will allow NATO personnel to gain an on-the-ground understanding of the situation and exchange information regarding known threats to S&R projects throughout the conflict area. These analysts would then collate information into cogent, unclassified products and disseminate the information to the widest audience possible, perhaps using the FMN. These analysts would act as “...information integrators vacuuming up data already collected by military personnel or gathered by civilians in the public realm and bringing it back to a centralized location.”

The intelligence analysts within the JIFC would be comprised of National Intelligence Cells (NICs). NICs are made up of intelligence analysts from individual NATO member states (i.e. Italian NIC, Spanish NIC, etc.). Ideally, each NATO nation involved in a S&R operation would have its own NIC in the JIFC that could conduct their work on the FMN while retaining the capability to ‘reach back’ to their national intelligence architecture. Theoretically, the JIFC could also include disclosure officers whose sole duty is to facilitate the downgrading of national intelligence to transferrable levels. A subsequent tier of officers would consider how to transfer that information or intelligence from national networks to the FMN and vice-versa, otherwise known as ‘air-gapping.’ This would provide safeguards against spillage.

Recently, NATO acquired an Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system comprised of five Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These assets will allow the JIFC to collect and ‘own’ aerial imagery intelligence (IMINT), which is a critical element to individual S&R projects focused on security, large-scale infrastructure repair, border control, etc. Memorandums of understanding (MoUs) will outline which NATO member states dedicate trained personnel to analyze the information collected by those assets. These MoUs would further clarify that the JIFC commander has the authority to share the information gathered with members of the Alliance, non-NATO states involved in the S&R operation, and with outside observers.

Lastly, the JIFC would have a physically separate and unclassified facility in which NATO leaders and intelligence analysts could hold meetings with civilian agencies, NGOs, or private entities. This facility would serve as a location for high-level coordination meetings between NATO leadership and other parties involved. In addition to civil-military coordination, this facility could also be used for joint training exercises and information sharing.

28 Interview with LTC Karsten Vestergaard, CIMIC Director at NATO ARRC, March 15, 2016.
30 Interview with Source J, March 14, 2016.
31 Interview with Source B, non-US official at NATO ARRC, March 14, 2016.
34 Interview with Col. James Saddler, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 Plans and Policy at NATO ARRC, March 15, 2016.
as a meeting place to hold discussions between host nation government entities, NATO, NGOs, civilian agencies, and private firms, ensuring complete synchronization with all stakeholders in the region.

**Pros**

The JIFC has the potential to provide a robust information and intelligence clearing house between NATO members, civilian agencies, NGOs, and private entities. The freedom of information sharing, particularly on the unclassified side, would allow entities to collaborate at an unprecedented level, ensuring a high degree of civil-military unity of effort. In past operations and exercises, the existence of a separate, unclassified area for civil-military coordination received increased buy-in from involved actors, especially NGOs, as they found the information exchange beneficial for their missions or projects. The information shared among NATO allies would create a shared, holistic understanding of the S&R environment.

The NICs allow intelligence analysts to collaborate with fellow analysts from their nation in a secured environment. The ‘reach back’ capability allows forward deployed analysts to request complex analysis from their respective national intelligence agencies. While the proximity to other NICs will foster an environment for collaboration among NATO analysts, the physical security protocols will protect against spillage or direct efforts to obtain classified information. The dedication of disclosure and safeguard officers would increase the speed at which information is approved for release to, or sharing with, the desired network or audience. Such measures reduce the lag time in which information can be transferred between networks and increases the timeliness of intelligence products.

By allowing NATO to ‘own’ more intelligence collection assets, the delay in disseminating information will be reduced at the operational and tactical levels. NATO operational commanders would have access to collection assets, such as UAVs, which he or she can directly task to fulfill intelligence gaps and share with other member states and non-NATO entities involved in the operation. This capability increases the utility of NATO’s intelligence products and will further incentivize information sharing between NATO and non-NATO entities by offering enhanced information collection capability to all those involved.

**Cons**

A major obstacle to successful implementation of the JIFC model is fielding a properly trained staff. In the event multiple NATO intelligence units are deployed simultaneously, they would be considerably under strength in terms of intelligence analysts and other critical staff functions. Thus, a NATO JIFC could

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35 Interview with LTC Karsten Vestergaard, CIMIC Director, NATO ARRC, March 15, 2016.
37 Interview with Source K, US DoD official, March 16, 2016
38 Interview with Source L, non-US official at NATO ARRC, March 14, 2016.
find itself with an insufficient number of personnel to conduct the necessary analyses. This personnel shortage would be difficult to overcome, especially in the event of a renewed threat from Russia. With Russia becoming more of a concern for NATO members, it is increasingly unlikely that many of the smaller member states would provide personnel support to an out of area S&R operation, leaving the burden to the wealthier and larger NATO members.

Another obstacle is the continued unwillingness of nations to share information. Though NATO member states and non-NATO states are more likely to share unclassified information during an S&R campaign, there will still be hesitancy to share developed intelligence products. This is increasingly true for the United States, where intelligence leaks by Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden have resulted in tighter intelligence sharing access. Today, intelligence professionals often possess an increased apprehension to intelligence sharing for fear of breaking federal laws or contributing to intelligence spillage.\(^\text{39}\)

Compounding this hesitancy to share is the slow process by which many member nations approve intelligence for release. The US has a rather liberal sharing policy in terms of empowering lower echelons to share information, compared to many other NATO member states. In fact, many NATO members do not possess occupational specialties in military intelligence, and those that do often have no foreign disclosure standards. As a result, analysts tend to overclassify their work. When asked to share intelligence products, analysts with no disclosure training are required to request authorization from their national agencies. The time it takes for this turnaround often renders the intelligence useless.\(^\text{40}\)

Getting NGO buy-in is the main concern. The establishment of a JIFC in and of itself will not necessarily encourage NGOs to share information with NATO. Based on research, NGOs and other civilian agencies are willing to work with NATO forces only once they experience the benefits gained from information sharing. Not only does this exchange of information help to establish a greater security environment, it also enables coordination amongst them and other organizations and agencies to more effectively and efficiently coordinate projects.

**Option C. Regional Coordination Centers and Stability and Reconstruction Teams**

**Subject:** The Regional Coordination Center (RCC) and Stability and Reconstruction Team (SRT) would coordinate civil-military efforts at a regional level. The role of the SRTs is to carry out reconstruction efforts within RCC areas of responsibility.


\(^{40}\) Interview with Source B, non-US official at NATO ARRC, March 15, 2016.
Description

The Regional Command (RC) model was used in Afghanistan to coordinate all regional civil-military activities conducted by the military elements of the PRTs in their area of responsibility, under the control of ISAF. Each RC had an established command and control component that provided logistical support for civilian projects within the RC’s area of responsibility. Subcomponents of the RC, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were “joint-civil military organizations that aspired to promote progress in governance, security, and reconstruction.” At the operational level, the RC developed coordinated lines of effort between civilian agencies, private firms, NGOs, and ISAF. At the tactical level, the PRTs conducted S&R activities such as building schools, police stations, repairing infrastructure, and other projects.

Changing the nomenclature to Regional Coordination Center and Stability and Reconstruction Team recognizes that political considerations, not military end-states, have primacy in S&R operations. However, by retaining a similar organizational structure to the RC model, the proximity of actors and close coordination maintains an environment conducive to information sharing. This proximity includes collaborative interactions such as daily briefings, intra-agency reporting requirements, and informal information exchanges. Furthermore, NATO would not attempt to subordinate NGOs and other non-NATO actors, but instead incorporate their unique skills and resources into the larger effort. This acknowledges the neutral space between political and military objectives that NGOs often occupy.

Pros

The relationship established between NATO forces and NGOs under the RCC and SRT model would be mutually beneficial. The security and logistical capability provided by the RCC would allow civilian agencies, NGOs, and even private enterprises to conduct their operations under the security of NATO forces. In turn, the governance and reconstruction efforts of the civilian agencies, NGOs, and private entities could create a more secure and stable environment. The close vicinity of actors would facilitate information pertaining to security and atmospherics being shared between NATO forces and civilian entities. NATO forces could coordinate logistical capabilities between military and civilian entities as well as facilitate coordination amongst each other via communication technologies.

An example of such information sharing occurred in 2011, when the US 82nd Airborne Division headquarters assumed responsibility of RC South. At the time, the Headquarters and its subordinate forces were focused on fighting Taliban forces in the area, leaving few military personnel to assist in reconstruction operations. However, the PRTs operating in the area provided invaluable information concerning infrastructure, social well-being, and governance in areas where ISAF forces did not have the manpower to operate. Likewise, the Division Headquarters was able to relay information to the PRTs and NGOs concerning the security environment, a necessity given the amount of violence occurring in the area at the time.44

The RCC concept allows NATO to implement some of the more flexible aspects of its intelligence sharing structure. Though NATO may be the primary security provider in a S&R operation, the involvement of other non-NATO states will require inclusion into planning and information sharing efforts. The RCC commander can facilitate the signing of security assurance agreements, which outline the limits to which non-NATO states can receive and utilize shared intelligence.45 The same goes for NGOs; the RCC commander has the discretion to share information with any party that could benefit from it. The empowerment of the RCC commander to approve intelligence and information sharing circumvents otherwise lengthy bureaucratic processes and allows them to manage access to intelligence and information as contributing entities in S&R operations come and go.46

**Cons**

The RCC concept does not provide for a unity of civil-military effort at the national level. Rather, each RCC is led by a different NATO member state, subjecting operations and information sharing to the perceived needs of that particular nation’s military and political priorities. In Afghanistan, “American PRTs had less than 100 personnel and stressed force protection and quick impact assistance projects... [the] British PRT was somewhat larger, emphasized Afghan security sector reform, and helped defuse confrontations between rival warlords... [the] German PRT had over 300 members and was strictly bifurcated between its military and robust civilian component.”47 Lacking a central authority to guide RCCs, each individual SRT will succeed or fail based on chance rather than strategy.48

The RCC model does not guarantee buy-in from NGOs, especially those who wish to maintain the appearance of neutrality or whose reputation is built upon their independence from military forces. Larger NGOs have coordinated with

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45 Interview with Catherine Gerth, March 17, 2016.
46 Interview with Source C, non-US official at NATO ARRC, March 15, 2016.
NATO to varying degrees at the RC level and will likely do so in the future. Others will be resistant to cooperate with the RCC in future operations due to intractable concerns about neutrality. The RCC also has the potential to be overwhelmed by an encumbering cornucopia of actors, hampering effective civil-military coordination. Further, there is no guarantee that smaller entities will understand how to interact with the RCC, in which case the smaller entity could place itself and its members at risk.49

Findings

NATO has demonstrated that it is aware of the issues regarding information sharing with NATO and non-NATO members and is working to correct them. Through trial and error, NATO has developed many ad-hoc policies and mechanisms for sharing information in crises. Despite this, many common obstacles remain persistent. Intelligence sharing within the alliance remains problematic and each organization has a lack of incentive to share. Agencies have internal rules against sharing and no rewards for sharing. For the individual analyst, there are only risks for disclosing information to foreign partners. Although NATO and NGOs are increasingly working together in theaters such as Kosovo and Afghanistan, barriers to effective information sharing remain. NATO forces encounter difficulty collaborating with situational “partners of opportunity” that arise from the NGO community upon the initiation of S&R operations. Some NGOs, in fact, may have been working in the area for several years or have goals that do not align with overall S&R objectives. Many NGOs are simply hesitant to collaborate with military forces due to perceptions that it may compromise their neutrality and credibility.50 However, as NGOs feel they are gaining valuable information through information exchanges, they are increasingly likely to collaborate with NATO.51 Furthermore, NGOs are coming to the realization that more locations throughout the world are becoming increasingly hostile, even towards NGOs.52 With an increasing threat towards NGOs, there is an increased necessity to forge relationships between them and NATO. Finally, NATO and military units writ large must stop referring to NGOs as force multipliers or enablers. Doing so disenfranchises NGOs and distorts their stated neutrality.53 Rather, NATO must view NGOs as partners and establish mutually beneficial relationships with them.

Where the US and UK militaries each have a professional intelligence corps within their military structure, other NATO member states do not. For many nations, this issue stems from a lack of resources, either fiscally or simply not having the collection capability to justify an intelligence corps. To remedy this

50 Interview with Melissa Sinclair, former USAID and NGO worker, March 7, 2016.
51 Interview with LTC Karsten Vestergaard, CIMIC Director, NATO ARRC, March 15, 2016.
52 Interview with Melissa Sinclair, former USAID and NGO worker, March 7, 2016.
53 Interview with Michael Klosson, Save the Children, April 18, 2016.
lack of intelligence professionals, Alliance members will often assign officers and enlisted soldiers from other branches (i.e. infantry, engineers, fighter pilots) to intelligence positions, with their first intelligence duty sometimes coming late in their careers. Though these officers and enlisted personnel are intelligent and capable individuals, they lack experience in intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination. This slows the rate at which intelligence is shared, as the individuals must first learn their own intelligence architecture and rules for sharing information.

Many NATO member states have a stovepiped, bureaucratic process to approve the release or classification downgrade of national intelligence products. This sluggish process often results in intelligence losing timeliness. Most NATO states do not have an equivalent position to the US Foreign Disclosure Officers (FDOs) that are trained in US classification regulations and their caveats. FDOs understand what level of intelligence can be shared with other nations and how to release unclassified portions of classified products. However, the process of requesting authority to share intelligence from an external agency can be lengthier still.

**Recommendation**

A review of the pros and cons associated with the three options supports the Joint Information Fusion Center (JIFC) as NATO’s optimal choice for enhancing the sharing of information and intelligence. Although each option builds on the others, shortcomings in policy bandwidth and obstacles to doctrine formation in the FMN and RCC options, respectively, diminish their utility for NATO in a doctrinal sense. The JIFC confers benefits to NATO ability to support S&R operations in both in-area and out-of-area environments.

Mentionable differences exist between in-area and out-of-area operations. In-area operations feature concerns about sovereignty and the unwillingness of the host nation (a NATO member) to relegate authorities to external actors. Such dynamics can obstruct efforts at coordination. Further, the host nation engages in information sharing agreements at potentially significant domestic political cost. Sharing information in out-of-area operations, such as those executed by KFOR and ISAF, can be easier because of the relative absence of sovereignty issues for participating NATO member states. However, concerns by NATO members about protecting sources and methods can still hinder information sharing between partners. In addition, poor relationships between NATO states and other stakeholders can sometimes preclude information sharing. Considering the rising concern among some of NATO’s eastern members about hybrid threats coming from Russia, a doctrine that can be applied to both in-area and out-of-area operations is more likely to receive their support.

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54 Interview with Source M, non-US Official at NATO ARRC, March 15, 2016.
Advocacy

The creation of the JIFC is the only option with a reasonable chance of being developed into doctrine for information sharing. As a purely technical option, the FMN alone fails to provide NATO members with adequate guidance and processes for information sharing in S&R operations. A better network does not address the challenges posed by a lack of trained intelligence personnel. Nor does it guarantee that the information transiting the network will be actionable. The tendency to over-classify, lacking buy-in incentives, and other endemic obstacles cannot be overcome by merely boosting the bandwidth for sharing.

On the other hand, the RCC concept is an oversized doctrinal option because it is heavily affected by context: different geographic environments will require different considerations and distinct RCC models. For example, a RCC model deployed to S&R operations on NATO’s southern periphery will not necessarily be as applicable to that on NATO’s eastern periphery. For these reasons, NATO will encounter difficulty incorporating the RCC concept into a doctrine that can be applied to both in-area and out-of-area operations.

Following through on the JIFC concept will grant NATO improved processes for sharing information within and outside the alliance during S&R operations. As a centralized center with personnel dedicated to managing disclosure and air gapping, the JIFC has mechanisms that encourage a better flow of information between NATO members and protection against inadvertent spillage. The inclusion of an off-site location for face-to-face meetings with NGOs and IOs can also help foster information transfer between military and non-military entities involved in S&R. Because the JIFC will be operational at all hours, it will foster a cadre of analysts familiar with atmospherics analysis and processes for intelligence moving.

Where the JIFC succeeds is in its flexibility, deployability, and its refrain from necessarily compromising intelligence or the sovereignty of the host nation. The physical risk of spillage or espionage is greatly reduced using the NIC model where only personnel from that respective state can physically have access to national intelligence networks and information. Furthermore, having trained FDOs will help to ensure only authorized intelligence is being shared or released to NATO and other parties.

Response to Counterarguments

Consensus-driven decision-making could potentially weaken the role and capabilities of the JIFC, making it a less capable asset to NATO in a S&R operation. However, NATO has a precedent for establishing the JIFC vis-à-vis the NATO Intelligence Fusion Center (NIFC). Focusing on out-of-area NATO operations, the NIFC consolidates intelligence efforts from member states at one location. The NIFC exemplifies the fact that NATO member states can and will share intelligence within certain security structures. The capability that it currently lacks is
an information sharing aspect with NGOs and other entities outside of NATO member states.

NGOs could forego sharing with the JIFC due to concerns about their neutrality, diminishing the amount and quality of information exchanged. Improvements in this area will require better familiarization and recognition of NGO needs by NATO’s higher offices. Despite this, some attributes of the JIFC facilitate better cooperation between both parties. The JIFC’s neutral meeting site for analysts and civilian groups working in country can help build familiarity between both parties. Repeated face-to-face meetings can foster a better understanding of NGO capabilities and concerns, and vice-versa. The information exchanged through the JIFC would also be mutually beneficial and contribute to a perception of equality between NGOs and NATO. Better familiarization and communication would improve both parties’ ability to respond in complex S&R operations.

The quality of information and intelligence disseminated by the JIFC could suffer if participating NATO members decline to share intelligence. Collection is one of the essential tasks of an intelligence agency, and safeguarding the capabilities of operatives, UAVs, and sensors is of paramount importance. The National Intelligence Cells within the JIFC are designed to expedite this process through the training of disclosure officers, by building relationships between personnel on the ground, and by providing reach-back. However, the JIFC itself will be unlikely to overcome the national proclivity to protect sources and methods. This obstacle may be ameliorated by the appointment of a NATO civilian director of intelligence, as outlined in Annex C. This position could provide a senior-level authority that could advocate for greater intelligence sharing and reform.

Implementation

The foremost task is for NATO to develop the personnel and equipment requirements for the establishment of the JIFC. These requirements can be determined through current intelligence commanders and other staff members relaying what they feel the requirements are. Because different offices will provide different requirements, NATO HQ in Brussels will need to determine the baseline personnel and equipment requirements for the establishment of a JIFC. Finally, NATO will need to produce the cost estimate and request member states to fill the billets and equipment requirements.

Based on the authors’ research, it is likely the JIFC will require approximately 100-120 intelligence personnel. However, personnel numbers can increase as more nations become involved in an operation. These would be comprised of all-source, signals, imagery, and human intelligence analysts. Additionally, there would be individuals dedicated to establishing and maintaining a civil-military relationship with both non-military governmental agencies and NGOs alike. Furthermore, the JIFC would need to be self-sustaining with power generation,
vehicles, and tents. This equipment would cost approximately USD 45 million and would increase as the JIFC established more permanent site operations.

Before being indoctrinated, NATO should conduct a two-year test period of the JIFC after it is fully staffed and operational. A two-year period is recommended because of the difficulty associated with training intelligence analysts, establishing standard operating procedures, and gaining a general understanding and comfort with billet specific duties and responsibilities. This should be established in a garrison environment at either of the NATO Response Force (NRF) headquarters in Brunssum or Naples, or at the ARRC in the UK. A two-year test period will allow NATO to determine where personnel and equipment shortages exist. Furthermore, this will allow the JIFC to be tested in training exercises to determine its viability not only through the lens of NATO but also civilian partners and non-state actors as well.

After the two-year test period NATO should examine viability of the test JIFC and address shortcomings of the test period. After shortcomings have been identified, NATO should codify the requirements, role, and responsibilities for the JIFC so that it can become part of NATO doctrine and planning efforts. Once codified, NATO should operationalize a JIFC at the ARRC and the NRF headquarters in Brunssum and Naples. These headquarters are ideal for a JIFC because of the role they play in crisis response.

Because the JIFC will be beneficial to all members of the alliance, funding for the JIFC will come out of the NATO military budget, which is directly funded by NATO member states. Though the costs associated with establishing and operating a JIFC are undetermined at this time, cost estimates will be easy to establish once NATO has identified its personnel and equipment requirements for the JIFC. In the meantime, NATO can use existing costs of its headquarters to begin cost analysis of the JIFC.

As with any other commonly funded program, the JIFC will need to be unanimously approved by the NAC. Given that NATO members perceive threats with varying degrees of importance, unanimous approval of the JIFC and its funding could prove to be a difficult task. Where some NATO members view S&R operations with a critical role in NATO strategy, others view the traditional conventional threat, particularly Russia, as the primary threat to NATO and feel it should constitute the bulk of NATO's attention and financial resources. As more member states begin to contribute 2% of their GDP, as they have pledged, NATO funds will increase to a size appropriate to support NATO efforts to counter conventional threats and properly plan for future S&R operations.

**Annex A. NATO Strategic Concept 2010, S&R Excerpts**

- “It commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with our

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international partners, most importantly the United Nations and the European Union.” (p. 4)

• “Instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and transnational illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people.” (p. 11)

• “Crises and conflicts beyond NATO’s borders can pose a direct threat to the security of Alliance territory and populations. NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.” (p. 19)

• “The lessons learned from NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management. The Alliance will engage actively with other international actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximize coherence and effectiveness of the overall international effort.” (p. 19)

• “Even when conflict comes to an end, the international community must often provide continued support, to create the conditions for lasting stability. NATO will be prepared and capable to contribute to stabilization and reconstruction, in close cooperation and consultation wherever possible with other relevant international actors.” (p. 20)

• “To be effective across the crisis management spectrum, we will:... further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary operations, including counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction operations.” (p. 21)

• “We are firmly committed to the development of friendly and cooperative relations with all countries of the Mediterranean, and we intend to further develop the Mediterranean Dialogue in the coming years. We attach great importance to peace and stability in the Gulf region, and we intend to strengthen our cooperation in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.” (pp. 30-31)

Annex B. Guiding Principles, End States and Necessary Conditions

Safe and Secure Environment – Ability of the people to conduct their daily lives without fear of systematic or large-scale violence. This end state includes the majority of conditions that NATO is prepared to support. NATO has the capability to provide training and technical support to the development of host nation armed forces as they work to separate warring parties, negotiate sustainable cease-fires, and establish disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs. In addition, NATO possesses the unique ability to transport troops and
humanitarian aid to areas in need of population and infrastructure protection. Finally, NATO can provide command and control assets using its Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) to assist host nations in efforts to secure its borders and manage spoilers.

Rule of Law – Ability of the people to have equal access to just laws and a trusted system of justice that holds all persons accountable, protects their human rights and ensures their safety and security. As a military alliance primarily focused on the collective defense of its member states, NATO will, admittedly, contribute less to the conditions necessary to promote the rule of law than in other sectors. Still, NATO possesses a wealth of experience in training indigenous law enforcement and national guard units resulting from its work in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. A distinction here exists between primary security responsibilities that are not appropriate for police units, such as emergency response, explosive ordinance disposal, and the management of hazardous materials.
Most importantly, by providing this type of support, NATO can work to ensure host nation officials develop a respect for human rights and transparency in the enforcement of the law.

**Stable Governance**—Ability of the people to share, access or compete for power through nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the state. Similar to the rule of law end state, NATO’s security focus will preclude its direct involvement in governance reform. Stable governance, however, requires the legitimate state monopoly over the means of violence, which can be achieved through security sector reform (SSR). SSR is not confined to training police units to conduct investigations and enforce laws, but includes efforts to strengthen government control, management, and oversight. In addition, NATO has the communications technologies needed to facilitate the host government’s ability to communicate with its population. Efforts to maintain transparency during the transition process will support the host government’s efforts to remain legitimate in the eyes of civilians.

### Necessary Conditions:

- **Just Legal Frameworks** is a condition in which laws are consistent with international human rights norms and standards; are legally certain and transparent; are drafted with procedural transparency; are equitable, and are responsive to the entire population, not just powerful elites.

- **Public Order** is a condition in which laws are enforced equitably; the lives, property, freedoms, and rights of individuals are protected; criminal and politically motivated violence has been reduced to a minimum; and criminal elements (from looters and rioters to leaders of organized crime networks) are pursued, arrested, and detained.

- **Accountability to the Law** is a condition in which the population, public officials, and perpetrators of past conflict-related crimes are held legally accountable for their actions; the judiciary is independent and free from political influence; and horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms exist to prevent the abuse of power.

- **Access to Justice** is a condition in which people are able to seek and obtain a remedy for grievances through formal or informal institutions of justice that conform with international human rights standards, and a system exists to ensure equal and effective application of the law, procedural fairness, and transparency.

- **Culture of Lawfulness** is a condition in which the general population follows the law and seeks to access the justice system to address its grievances.
Necessary Conditions:

- **Provision of Essential Services** is a condition in which the state provides basic security, the rule of law, economic governance and basic human needs services; essential services are provided without discrimination; and the state has the capacity for provision of essential services without significant assistance from the international community.

- **Stewardship of State Resources** is a condition in which national and sub-national institutions of governance are restored, funded, and staffed with accountable personnel; the security sector is reformed and brought under accountable civilian control; and state resources are protected through responsible economic management in a manner that benefits the population.

- **Political Moderation and Accountability** is a condition in which the government enables political settlement of disputes; addresses core grievances through debate, compromise, and inclusive national dialogue; and manages change arising from humanitarian, economic, security, and other challenges. A national constituting process results in separation of powers that facilitates checks and balances; the selection of leaders is determined through inclusive and participatory processes; a legislature reflects the interests of the population; and electoral processes are free and fair.

- **Civic Participation and Empowerment** is a condition in which civil society exists and is empowered, protected, and accountable; media are present, professional, and independent of government or political influence; equal access to information and freedom of expression are upheld; and political parties are able to form freely and are protected.

**Sustainable Economy** — Ability of the people to pursue opportunities for livelihoods within a system of economic governance bound by law. While NATO is not necessarily positioned to encourage macroeconomic stability in a legal or regulatory sense, it does have the ability to aid the host government in controlling its land and maritime borders to erode illicit economies and illegal migration networks. Moreover, NATO is poised to provide for the initial security of national resource infrastructure ahead of the development of domestic capabilities to do so. In the near term, the security of these two sectors will encourage the return of foreign and domestic private firms, promote the rehabilitation of a market economy, and provide the government with the revenue needed to expand its influence and ability to govern.
Necessary Conditions:

- **Macroeconomic Stabilization** is a condition in which monetary and fiscal policies are established to align the currency to market levels, manage inflation, and create transparent and accountable systems for public finance management. This condition requires a robust and enforceable legislative and regulatory framework to govern issues such as property rights, commerce, fiscal operations, and foreign direct investment.

- **Control over the Illicit Economy and Economic-Based Threats to Peace** is a condition in which illicit wealth no longer determines who governs, predatory actors are prevented from looting state resources, ex-combatants are reintegrated and provided jobs or benefits, and natural resource wealth is accountably managed.

- **Market Economy Sustainability** is a condition in which a market-based economy is enabled and encouraged to thrive. Infrastructure is built or rehabilitated, and the private sector and the human capital and financial sectors are nurtured and strengthened.

- **Employment Generation** is a condition in which job opportunities are created to yield quick impact to demonstrate progress and employ military-age youths, and a foundation is established for sustainable livelihoods.

*Social Well-Being* – Ability of the people to be free from want of basic needs and to coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement. The most significant way NATO can assist in this area is through its ability to move people and equipment over long distances in a short period of time. NATO can support at-risk populations directly by facilitating the provision of basic needs and services and the establishment of medical facilities and transitional housing for returnees.
### Necessary Conditions:

- **Access to and Delivery of Basic Needs Services** is a condition in which the population has equal access to and can obtain adequate water, food, shelter, and health services to ensure survival and life with dignity. These services should be delivered in a manner that fosters reliability and sustainability.

- **Access to and Delivery of Education** is a condition in which the population has equal and continuous access to quality formal and non-formal education that provides the opportunity for advancement and promotes a peaceful society. This condition involves system-wide development and reform, and equal access to relevant, quality, and conflict-sensitive education.

- **Return and Resettlement of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons** is a condition in which all individuals displaced from their homes by violent conflict have the option of a safe, voluntary, and dignified journey to their homes or to new resettlement communities; have recourse for property restitution or compensation; and receive reintegration and rehabilitation support to build their livelihoods and contribute to long-term development.

- **Social Reconstruction** is a condition in which the population is able to coexist peacefully through intra- and intergroup forms of reconciliation—including mechanisms that help to resolve disputes non-violently and address the legacy of past abuses—and through development of community institutions that bind society across divisions.

### Annex C. Option Independent Recommendations

**The United States as Flagship Nation**

Information sharing often occurs when an asymmetry of power exists between the parties involved. Smaller parties in an information sharing agreement must allow those with more power a higher degree of influence and control over the process to secure their participation. Any new information-sharing framework will require the United States’ buy-in and resources. To ensure the success of any framework, the United States should assume the lead role.

NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) provides a model for US leadership on joint projects. The United States played the crucial role in trans-

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forming the three-man office into a functional headquarters in 2006. US personnel staffed the most important positions in NSHQ, and the United States further provided most of the money for NSHQ’s day-to-day operations. Because NSHQ’s structure matched the United States’ power and credibility in special operations with influence in NSHQ, the United States could shape doctrines and hold other members accountable for meeting NSHQ requirements and participating in necessary training.\(^{57}\)

The United States should use its experience with NSHQ as a template for establishing a successful information-sharing regime in NATO. The US intelligence community is the best resourced of any NATO member, and will bring the necessary doctrines and guidance to the table. Matching US-personnel to positions of authority within NATO’s intelligence apparatus will create a greater unity of effort and a more expedient process for standing up the structure.

The drawbacks of this option manifest at the national level of member states. First, the United States government must be convinced of the necessity of the outlays for training and equipping. The other source of contention will come from other member states’ governments concerns over increased sharing of intelligence among themselves. The United States can be convinced of the need for these measures by considering the investment as a force multiplier for future operations. The ability to share both operational and strategic level intelligence faster will improve alliance operations across the board. The US intelligence community will be sharing the same level of intelligence it already is releasing to NATO. The difference is that the channels will be more thoroughly understood by all participants and the likelihood of reciprocation will be greater due to other members being better trained in the disclosure processes. Pushback from member states unwillingness to increase sharing with each other can be overcome by leveraging the leading position the US has within NATO’s current intelligence structure. The US produces the majority of all intelligence for the alliance and can use this as a resource to convince the other members to streamline the sharing processes already in use.

**Civilian Director of Intelligence**

The appointment of a NATO Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence would create a principal level position to improve intelligence operations and sharing by reducing structural inefficiencies within the alliance. Creating a principal position for intelligence, at the equivalent level of a three-star command, would provide senior level advocacy for intelligence sharing between the NATO civil and military intelligence organizations. This position would also provide a senior platform to reduce the resource waste inherent in the competition and

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duplication of effort of the current split system. There are currently seven Assistant Secretaries with portfolios ranging from Public Diplomacy and Executive Management to Defense Investment and Emerging Security Challenges.\(^{58}\) These issues have been deemed critical to the operation of the alliance, and the lack of effective intelligence oversight is a critical issue hindering unity of effort at both the operational and strategic levels.

A key spoiler to intelligence sharing between NATO member countries is that dissemination is performed on a national basis in accordance with national policies rather than in a unified effort under the alliance’s structure.\(^{59}\) Another obstruction to intelligence sharing is the split nature of intelligence providers to the alliance. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Military Committee (MC) are supported by separate entities; the Intelligence Unit (IU) and the International Military Staff – Intelligence (IMS-INT), respectively. The IU collects its intelligence predominantly through member’s national civilian services, on a bilateral basis, which is then presented to NATO’s civilian authorities in the NAC.\(^{60}\) IMS-INT is tasked with providing day-to-day strategic intelligence to all NATO Headquarter elements and Commands, and collects from both member countries’ militaries and the NATO commands.\(^{61}\)

Currently the only structural integration between these two bodies is the Intelligence Steering Board which falls under the purview of the Deputy Secretary General. Neither the Steering Board nor the Deputy Secretary General can provide the requisite leadership for alliance intelligence operations. The Deputy Secretary General is responsible for a multitude of duties, intelligence being only one, and is generally not an individual with a background in intelligence work. The Intelligence Steering Board typically only meets between six and eight times a year in response to specific issues, and as such is not designed for operational leadership.\(^{62}\) A dedicated Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence would provide a permanent senior position for an intelligence professional. This position would stand up a permanent office for integration of effort between NATO’s intelligence offices, as well as endow that office with the authority to advocate for necessary structural reforms and provide a locus for strategic intelligence planning.

The creation of another large bureaucratic organization is the most significant drawback to this option. NATO is operating in an environment of fiscal austerity, and any significant expenditure will receive pushback from both within the alliance structure as well as member states. This is likely a reason for development of smaller more parochial focused intelligence billets in the form


\(^{59}\) Interviews at NATO ARRC, March 14-15, 2016.

\(^{60}\) Interview with Source K, US DoD official, March 16, 2016.


\(^{62}\) Interview with Source N, March 17, 2016.
of the IU and IMS-INT in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks. This fiscal expenditure can be mitigated by filling new positions with personnel currently serving in NATO intelligence shops, as their organizations are brought under the fold of the ASG-I’s office. Another significant obstacle to NATO intelligence reform will be member states’ national interests, and an extensive discourse must be enacted if the national intelligence bodies are to agree with the proposal.  

**Operationalizing Intelligence Staffs**

During our research process, it was found that the joint intelligence staffs at headquarters of NATO maneuver elements (J2 and G2) are underprepared to operate in the complex environment in which the alliance finds itself. Operationalizing these intelligence staffs would require a number of reforms. These would include an increase in the personnel dedicated to intelligence collection and analysis, providing increased and more realistic training, integrating better real-world scenarios into the headquarters’ training exercises, and allowing the integration of the staff into NATO or the framework nation’s intelligence structure.

Our research found the underpreparedness particularly true for the nine High Readiness Headquarters for NATO’s Rapid Deployable Corps. These corps participate in the NATO Response Force (NRF) – a joint combined arms force that can be deployed at short notice to wherever needed. Each corps participates in the NRF’s rotation system where it will be placed on a 12-month standby phase, and while on standby will be responsible for command of the NRF’s land component. These corps are central to NATO operations. The Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), for example, has served as a headquarters for NATO led missions in Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, twice in Afghanistan, and as a mentor to two Iraqi joint headquarters in 2008. The mission sets NATO headquarters have been called on to perform have ranged from counter-piracy, border security and peacekeeping to multinational counterinsurgency campaigns. All of these missions require an in-depth understanding of the environment’s atmospherics as well as timely intelligence concerning opposition forces. But these headquarters’ intelligence staffs are not receiving the training and resources that they require when they are not on rotation as the sole NRF headquarters.

The first reason for this under resourcing is the structural and attitudinal predilection of NATO intelligence organizations to focus solely on strategic level

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planning. This focus, while understandable at the alliance level, fails to properly prepare the analysts for the work that they will be expected to perform while in the field. Training exercises, such as Trident Jaguar, while having proven effective at developing and internalizing standard operating procedures for intelligence staffs, still do not provide the requisite skill-base for real world intelligence work that a deployed staff would be responsible for developing.

Another challenge facing intelligence staffs is that a number of member militaries do not field dedicated intelligence units, and as such personnel that is deployed to joint staffs often fails to possess even a rudimentary understanding of the intelligence process.

Cost is the primary drawback of this option. Money must be found to find, hire, equip, and ultimately train the analysts and staff for the expanded headquarters’ sections. Time is also a factor that must be taken into account as this expansion process and its requisite training will not be completed overnight. Operationalization would require an increase in manpower to compensate for the greater workload that the staffs would be expected to complete. This increase in personnel would also ease the transition from dormant to operational standing by acclimating the staff to a larger and faster paced environment. The staff would gain vital experience by analyzing real world intelligence, and increase its efficiency by exercising its standard operating procedures on a consistent basis.

Training exercises for the entire headquarters unit would become more realistic as a result of the staff working with the current and real intelligence its intelligence section has been analyzing. This operationalization would also provide an opportunity to increase the analytical bandwidth of either NATO or the participating national militaries as their personnel will be able to become subject matter experts through handling particular sets of intelligence on a daily basis. While expensive, this option would develop national intelligence professionals who would return to their countries after completing a deployment versed not only in their own nation’s policies, but also equipped with an understanding of joint intelligence processes.

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66 Foster, *Enhancing the Efficiency of NATO Intelligence*, 3-7.
67 Interview with Source J, March 14, 2016.
69 Interview with Source B, March 15, 2016.
70 Interview with Source J, March 14, 2016.