Self-Interest and Cooperation: The Emergence of Multilateral Interdependence in Post-Conflict Eras

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Introduction

This paper covers theories of international cooperation and the treatment they have received from certain commentators and advocates. The first thing that one notices in such an effort however, is the lack of definitional and elementary structure in the field, particularly in James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff’s *Contending Theories of International Relations.*¹ We see that concepts such as cooperation, integration, communication, and functionalism, to name a few, become stuffed together in a hodgepodge of proto-theories that at best have the distinction of not being realist. One of the aims of this paper is to stress under what conditions international cooperation and interdependence can emerge. The relevance of the argument owes to the fact that today’s international relations are becoming more aggressive and authoritarian, due to the increased autonomy sought by states (notably in the competitive pursuit of energy resources). Therefore, the need to rekindle the spirit of cooperation that the world witnessed upon the end of the Cold War (which spawned the Partnership for Peace, in particular) is urgent.

Interdependence is a complex system of relations that has the merit of being observable in everyday international life. However, theoretical work seems limited to the descriptive and structural/systemic levels.² The apparent complexity of the system stems in part from incomprehension concerning causality and consequence. In other words, we find ourselves faced with a chicken-and-egg dilemma about what actually produces interdependence. The inability to test and predict a theory means that it makes for a poor theory. Yet we cannot dispute the *prima facie* evidence of modern international relations; interdependence, like cooperation, is a fact, even if these principles have been under attack in the era since 11 September 2001.

The various attempts at developing a theory of interdependence have on the one hand obscured several similarities and commonalities between theoretical variants (say, between regime theory and neofunctionalism), and on the other hand

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have established interdependence as the opposite of realism. This paper is an exercise that seeks to reframe the debate. It will also dispel the notion that there is a fundamental clash between interdependence and realism. In fact, each is a crucial element of the other.

This critical review begins with a brief description of the evolution of interdependence and cooperation as it is practiced in contemporary international relations. The intention here is to underscore the role of concepts such as cooperation, communication, functionalism, and regimes based on the discussion found in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff.

The review continues with a critique of the work of Katherine Barbieri, and ends with a short debate on the definitional limitations of the key concepts identified in the introduction. Theories of international cooperation and integration are understood as manifestations of interdependence. The sheer complexity of interdependence theories is such, and the level of detail so great, that confusion is the automatic outcome. Indeed, if realism is as robust and trustworthy as a sundial, then interdependence is a Swiss watch. Therefore, it is necessary to simplify the arguments given in Barbieri and Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff.

**Development of Interdependence and Cooperation**

The starting point of interdependence theorists is that international life can sometimes be cooperative. The major problems of peace and war have to do with cooperation, “defined as a set of relations that are not based on coercion or compulsion and that are legitimized by the mutual consent of [participants]” or lack thereof.³

What are the conditions that stimulate the emergence of cooperation to the point where a state’s will to power will be replaced by accommodation? Realist theory holds that the pursuit of power is the only way to ensure security in an anarchic world where war can occur at any moment. Without going into the obvious implications of the security dilemma, we notice that the twentieth century saw at least two wars that led to a higher level of cooperation than ever previously existed in history. When World War I ended, some 13 million people, from all corners of six empires, lay dead. Most of the fighting had taken place on geographically static Eastern and Western European fronts, and most of the dead were combatants. In the wake of this cataclysm, four empires collapsed: Austria-Hungary, Prussia, Russia, and Ottoman Turkey. France and England’s were fatally undermined. The system of alliances—a device to which realists subscribe—designed to balance each power’s ambitions had led to the loss of a whole generation. The League of Nations was created to bring life to the concept of collective security, and in many ways was thought to be the antidote for war. Collective security

³ Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations*, 505.
works when coalitions of “peace-loving” nations renounce their individual, nationalistic interests and intervene against threats to international security and aggression to defend victims impartially, without regard to political, ideological, or ethno-religious alignment.4

The League of Nations was created because the alliance systems could not guarantee the stability of the balance (thus, its function was to answer a need for security) and/or because the war itself had been such a universally traumatic experience as to modify behavior. This would imply a form of national “learning.” The League of Nations collapsed because the collective security system could not prevent or punish defection from the norms, and, I would argue, because some members had an interest in “forgetting” the lessons learned.

When the Second World War ended, 55 million people—mostly civilians this time—had died. The war had touched all continents, and finished off France and England as imperial powers, triggering a decolonization process that created dozens of new states. The war also undermined several monarchies, replacing them with liberal or socialist democracies. This time, the collective security system that would be created would be more sophisticated, employing a large bureaucracy. Again, the intention was to ensure security in such a way as to avoid recourse to individual national military action, but not necessarily to install the United Nations as the arbiter of international disputes and enforcer of good behavior.

Good behavior is demonstrated by obedience to rules of procedure and respect for international law under this and other institutions. The collective security experience was renewed and modified again because nations had learned from the past, but also because the need was more pressing than ever; the incomparable carnage of the Second World War had introduced new words such as genocide and holocaust into our lexicon to signify unparalleled levels of horror and destruction. The orgy of violence left two superpowers, a handful of medium powers, and several scores of new and weak states, after it had consumed more than 1600 cities and villages, including two Japanese cities vaporized with what Bernard Brodie would call the “ultimate weapon,” the atomic bomb.

After some sixty years and countless volumes that were written on this history, the summary above seems redundant, but it serves to highlight that the cooperative impulse responds to a need for security after major crises unprecedented in scale. This impulse corresponds to political change in international relations, learning, and the articulation of conflict management tools removed from unilateral action. Since 1945, states have altered their power-seeking behavior and learned to cooperate.5 Analysts and scholars often overlook this fact because of their obsession

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5 Keohane and Nye, “Power and Interdependence Revisited,” 751.
with the state-centered approach. Today’s UN-based form of collective security is different from that of the League of Nations.

For one, a large permanent international bureaucracy has emerged as a power unto itself. This is the application of David Mitrany’s theory of functionalism, which sees countries evolving from the status of international citizens with rights to international citizens bestowing services on their populations and neighbors. This has brought a technical element into the notion of development, what we would today call “nation building.”6 The point is that the creation of a body like the UN proceeds on the one hand from lessons learned from the failure of the League of Nations and on the other from the need for collective security on the part of newly independent states. That argument also goes for the creation and continued existence of NATO.

There is a causal relationship between the type of international organization and the context that brought it to life. If the UN does not have the power of the purse or of the trigger, its civil servants nevertheless do have material interests. Their power resides in knowledge and control of information and procedure. The strength of procedure is not limited to the bureaucracy. UN procedures exist to discourage defection; for example, the USSR thought it could afford to walk out of a discussion over the troubles in Korea in 1950, but doing so was not the same as using a veto, and it was the Soviet absence from its seat that guaranteed the UN’s first (and only) collective security success in checking North Korean aggression against South Korea. If the USSR thought that other countries would find it in their interest to scuttle the UN the way the League of Nations had been, they were gravely mistaken. This has helped to assure the international community of states that they could not do without international organizations.

Second, a large part of the UN’s relative success lies in a more realistic organizational structure, one that preserves the privileges of Great Powers within the Security Council, yet also grants a voice to lesser powers within the Assembly, and occasionally, in UN agencies or in non-permanent seats on the Security Council. This means that international organizations (IOs) exist as great equalizers, giving power to small countries that would otherwise be unable to survive only through their own efforts. IOs often reconcile a variety of protocols and norms into formal rules and procedures that perpetuate the credibility of multilateralism. In fact, the greater the number of small powers, the greater the odds that there will be a vibrant multilateral institutional base to give them a voice.

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This results in the UN (and other institutions) becoming not only a forum
where grievances, fears, and hopes are openly exchanged between nation-states,
but also a world stage, where their actions can be scrutinized (and judged). Think,
for example, of Adlai Stevenson, on television, vociferously pressing the Soviet
Ambassador for answers on the deployment of missiles in Cuba, or of Khrushchev
pounding his shoe on his desk, or of Colin Powell producing a sample of “an-
thrax.”

At the end of the Cold War—a war which killed thousands of paramilitaries
and revolutionaries in the Third World and a few NATO and Warsaw Pact sol-
diers in isolated incidents, but yet had threatened over the span of forty-five years
to eliminate all life on this planet—there was a renewed impetus toward eliminat-
ing anarchy from the arena of international relations. Free from the constraints of
ideological and strategic self-help, states (which numbered nearly 200 by 1991)
sought to “normalize” their relations—that is, to conform to norms of behavior in
the expectation that their neighbors would do the same.

At the same time, the international bureaucracy of vast international organiza-
tions saw that the time was ripe to establish their presence internationally. If the
First and Second World Wars toppled empires, the end of the Cold War did the
same for certain institutions, namely the Western European Union (WEU) and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). But it also dealt a
severe blow to state sovereignty, as newly democratic civil societies world-wide
focused their attention on decidedly “liberal” topics of security, such as human
rights, the environment, and conflict resolution. At the same time, the sphere of
the non-coercive activity of states seemed to limit itself to commercial and trade
issues, and most efforts were concentrated on ensuring predictable and enforce-
able trade regimes between states (hence the creation of the World Trade Organi-
zation, which was only possible with the collapse of communism).

In sum, states act individually in pursuit of their own interests as long as it is
not catastrophically self-defeating to do so. When a major trauma happens, such as
after the Napoleonic Wars, after the revolutions of the mid-nineteenth century, af-
fter the First and Second World Wars, and after the threat of mutual assured nu-
clear destruction, there is a tendency to articulate international relations around
more predictable principles. Hence each trauma listed above yielded its own re-
gime of international interdependence: the Congress of Vienna, the Congress of
Berlin, the League of Nations, the UN, and finally, the general blossoming of in-
ternational multilateralism that is often mistaken for cooperation and interdepend-
ence. Each trauma also created a change of identity in actors. Thus each of the
traumas listed above transformed absolutist monarchies into ordinary monarchies,
ordinary monarchies into parliamentary monarchies, parliamentary monarchies
into varying degrees of democracies and republics, and finally, into liberal democ-
racies of generally socialist leaning. These changes were not only the products of
major wars, but also of increased international communication, of the homogenization of ruling elites, economic regimes, and technological development.

So the conditions for variations in interdependence and cooperation have to do with the occurrence of a major catastrophe or watershed event—one that is recognized as such by a majority of actors (or at least by the most powerful ones) and is concomitant with ideological/identity homogenization and propelled by technological development. Again, this does not tell us anything of the causal processes, short of the historical evidence of major events.

**Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff: A Critique**

Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff do not perceive the essential causal relationship between the creation of an international organization and its context. Functionalism does not help us understand integration, as they claim.\(^7\) Rather, it is integration that helps us understand functionalism in general, and spill-over in particular. Mitrany was always clear about the need for an international organization to be conceived first and foremost around topics that can be handled by technical experts, and in such a fashion that the habits of cooperation developed in that area could be replicated for others. In fact, this is exactly what happened with the creation of the European Steel and Coal Community, the precursor to the EU.

Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff complicate matters when they use the Prisoners’ Dilemma as a model of cooperation.\(^8\) Reading Schelling, game theory can account for conditions of pure collaboration, which are related because they “contain problems of perception and communication that quite generally occur in nonzero-sum games.”\(^9\) Furthermore, Prisoners’ Dilemma outcomes are influenced by repetition. In international relations, wisdom recommends prudence in the application of coercion precisely because one cannot simply behave as if one’s neighbors—no matter how hostile—did not exist. As Keohane and Nye have noted, “Since regimes have little enforcement power, powerful states may never-

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7 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations*, 511.
8 Ibid., 506.
theless be able to take forbidden measures; but they may incur costs to their reputations, and therefore to their ability to make future agreements.”

The structure of relations must account for the fact that there will be a “tomorrow.” Because of this, Prisoner’s Dilemma is a poor model on which to base a theory of interdependence, but it is a good model to help us identify elements within a relationship that affect outcomes, such as communication, and the value of relative versus absolute gains. Spill-over—the phenomenon that takes place when the habits of integration in one field (say, in trade) become precedents for integration in another field (say, strategic resources trading)—occurs because of integration, but integration is poorly defined. Karl Deutsch has pushed Mitraný’s thinking further by looking into social communities that have developed through integration. These elements are not separate, as Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff seem to imply. They help constitute one another, and are certainly not in opposition to realism. In fact, their discussion of Haas’ neofunctionalism clearly states that integrative schemes do not proceed from altruistic motives, but from interests elicited by the elite.

Similarly, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff bring up the issue of hegemonic stability as one motivator of cooperation. Hegemony carries notions of compellence, which can be frankly coercive; witness how the American hegemon behaved towards its French, British, and Israeli confederates in the 1956 Suez Crisis, and compare that with Soviet behavior toward Czechoslovakia and Hungary the same year. Hegemonic stability may create interdependence through the provision of economic benefits and maybe even military protection, but in general, hegemons tend to say, “Scratch my back or I’ll stab yours.”

Thus cooperation in such systems is begotten under duress. Hegemonic stability, like the Pfaltzgraff and Dougherty discussion on alliances, belongs within the domain of realism. As we have seen, most work on alliances has been performed

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10 Keohane and Nye, “Power and Interdependence Revisited,” 743. Prisoner’s Dilemma is a good model to use to study rationality as long as the game is played in limited iterations. Since this does not reflect actual international relations, it is a bad model to explain cooperation, since the rational choice is to defect. In fact, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff misinterpret Keohane and Nye; they say that “allowing players of Prisoners’ Dilemma to communicate with one another changes the nature of the game…” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations, 746). See also Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 43.

by realists, but there are eloquent advocates of interdependence theory that can think of alliances as something other than counterweights to hostile neighbors.\(^{12}\) According to Keohane and Nye’s critique of their own work, much of the utility of regime theory has been to invalidate hegemonic stability theory because how scholars conceive of hegemony varies too greatly.\(^{13}\) Most agree that a hegemon will produce “order and stability in an interdependent world economy—when it uses its power to enforce order on others” in the strongest terms, while the benign understanding of the concept says that “hegemony is a necessary, but not always sufficient, condition for order.”\(^{14}\) Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff show that the work of Liska and Riker, in particular, draws important conclusions about the role of community and ideology (as a function of identity), but is essentially sympathetic to realist theory.\(^{15}\) This portion of their analysis is better suited to discussions of balance of power.

Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff cast liberal theories outside the realist paradigm, whereas regime, interdependence (and complex interdependence), and neoliberal economic theories participate in the system of realism; they confuse constructivism and liberalism, but subscribe to the notion promoted by Stephen Walt that the three (including realism) are in fact three different paradigms.\(^{16}\) Walt goes even further by claiming that constructivism has replaced radical theories (like Marxism) in the conceptual toolbox.\(^{17}\) This is a claim that is not contested by constructivists, who tend to lump together a certain number of neorealist and neoliberal concepts, like balance of power, bureaucratic politics and the intrinsic nature of state identity, but then so does Walt.\(^{18}\) Keohane and Nye, on the other hand, were “cognizant of the realities of power, but did not regard military force as the chief source of power, nor did [they] regard security and relative position as the overriding goals of states.”\(^{19}\) They never sought to “challenge realism,” as Walt suggests.\(^{20}\)

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\(^{13}\) Keohane and Nye, “Power and Interdependence Revisited,” 741.


\(^{15}\) Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations, 533.


\(^{17}\) Ibid., 41.


\(^{19}\) Keohane and Nye, “Power and Interdependence Revisited,” 733.

A Critique of Barbieri

Katherine Barbieri’s 1996 article “Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?” bears evidence of similar misconceptions. The model she proposes to base her measures of interdependence and conflict incidence is suspiciously similar to the Prisoners’ Dilemma matrix.\(^{21}\) Compared to Thomas Schelling’s *Strategy of Conflict*, quadrants I and IV denote zero-sum outcomes, and quadrants II and III indicate mutual vulnerability and mutual invulnerability respectively.\(^{22}\) Barbieri hypothesizes that mutual vulnerability (trade interdependence)—what liberals think is a win-win outcome—in fact brings conflict, whereas the lose-lose outcome would seem to bring peace. For Barbieri, the difference has to do with the degree of symmetry in trade relations.\(^{23}\)

This is a misapplication of the Prisoners’ Dilemma model. Trade is never a zero-sum game; there must be an exchange involved, otherwise the transaction is theft instead of trade. Barbieri’s hypothesis that increased dyadic trade and interdependence do not bring peace is well supported because of her suspicious sample. The period 1870–1938 was vastly different from the post-WWII and post-Cold War eras. It is not surprising that she agrees with Waltz, who says that the “decrease in interdependence during the post-WWII period is one of a set of factors contributing to peace in that era.”\(^{24}\)

This is rather spurious; it is evident that the ideological differences as they pertain to the role of the economy in domestic and international society had a great influence on the degree of trade. Blocs traded within each other according to their ideological rules; the Western bloc trades in the belief that the laws of the market should be allowed to rule, and that increased trade means increased peace (and within that bloc, the institutionalization of this belief into the European Union, or NAFTA or the WTO, matches liberal and constructivist notions about interdependence). Meanwhile, in the socialist bloc, the Soviet hegemon entertains tributary relations with its satellites, whereby production is commandeered from the periphery to the center. The Third World was as yet unable to offer the educated labor force that is now employed by the global economy.

Globalization really obtains when the Communist bloc starts to depend on trade with (or aid from) the capitalist West and when homogeneous (i.e., free market) trade practices become universal. In the post-Cold War era, we are used to


\(^{23}\) Barbieri, “Economic Interdependence,” 32.

\(^{24}\) Barbieri, “Economic Interdependence,” 30.
seeing conflict develop in areas that are not economically integrated.25 This situation is vastly different from that of the period from 1870 to 1938.

When Barbieri says that trade relations will always be to the benefit of the developed states, maintaining powerless states in dependence, she argues along the lines of Walt’s discredited radicals. Ironically, when she says (further supporting this claim) that imperial colonialism “illustrates how military force may be used in conjunction with trading strategies to establish and maintain inequitable trading relationships,” she is absolutely right; gunboat diplomacy was the favored method of opening closed trading relationships between 1870 and 1938.26

The structure of international trade is important, but so is the structure of the internal economy. In addition to exaggerating the level of democratic development during the period she analyzes, she neglects the fact that trade was pressed mostly by very large and resource-hungry enterprises. It is not unreasonable to believe that realism explains international relations better in certain periods, and that advances in social measurements and other improvements in social scientific enquiry make newer theories more appealing. The problem with Barbieri’s claims is that she tries to disprove a theory that did not exist in the period that she examines. Because the theory did not exist, it could not have informed elite decision-making, and because it did not exist, they had to rely on realist explanations.27

One of her better insights concerns the incidence of peace as being more likely correlated with the balance of trade rather than with the extent (salience) of trade ties. Her article does not say whether the intensification of trade creates balance or imbalance.28 By defining salience as the importance of trade ties, she neglects that trade itself might be a factor of state survival. In other words, importance should be understood as a priority of elite decision-making, and not as a variable unto itself. (Also, trade may be salient, but relative to what? How do we know that trade is sufficiently salient to cause imbalance?)

Barbieri repeats that “conflictual or pacific elements of interdependence are directly related to perceptions about trade’s cost and benefits.”29 Trade is not a zero-sum activity, nor is it an activity that states enter into as a matter of central decision-making. This is an activity entered into by state constituents, and the best a government can do is to negotiate trade relations with other countries to manage private activity, unless one conceives of trade as a controlled economy, like the

26 Barbieri, “Economic Interdependence,” 32.
28 Barbieri, “Economic Interdependence,” 40.
29 Ibid., 43.
Soviet Union. By not qualifying her findings in light of the relationship between captains of industry and the monarchical elites that populated the period under review, her conclusions are anachronistic. Her study “provides little empirical support for the liberal proposition that trade provides a path to promote peace,”\(^30\) and because she extrapolates the findings of the modern era onto the post-modern one in which we live, she is unable to see that “psychology and mood have changed far more than military indices of power resources.”\(^31\) Keohane and Nye were referring to the difference between the 1970s and the 1980s. Imagine how much the “mood” has changed between 1938 and 2008! Failing to account for these admittedly immeasurable variables leads her to think that what is true for 1870–1938 will be true for the seventy years since then.

In addition to her analytical mistakes, she, like Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, makes definitional errors as well. Interdependence denotes reciprocal effects taking place within a dyad. These dyads can be composed of adversaries as much as they can be of allies.\(^32\) Complex interdependence does not represent reality. It was “deliberately constructed to contrast [not challenge] with a realist ‘ideal’ type that [Keohane and Nye] outlined on the basis of realist assumptions about the nature of international relations.”\(^33\) It refers to a situation among a number of states between which a multitude of contacts take place, contacts over which the state does not always have control.\(^34\) This is a condition of post-modern international relations, not classical ones. Indeed, “the belief that economic forces are superseding traditional great power politics enjoys widespread acceptance among scholars…,” but that does not mean that the state will totally disappear.\(^35\) Neither liberals nor constructivists have made that claim.\(^36\)

The basic problem of Barbieri’s article is the level of analysis. By concentrating on structure rather than on system, and by not acknowledging that domestic factors are far more important in today’s system than in yesterday’s, she reifies the

\(^{30}\) Ibid., 42.

\(^{31}\) Keohane and Nye, “Power and Interdependence Revisited,” 726.

\(^{32}\) Keohane and Nye, “Power and Interdependence Revisited,” 730–31. See also Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Ch. 4., “Interdependent Decisions,” where there is interdependence of expectations. This is not a material understanding of dependence.

\(^{33}\) Keohane and Nye, “Power and Interdependence Revisited,” 731.

\(^{34}\) Ibid.

\(^{35}\) Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” 40.

\(^{36}\) Keohane and Nye, “Power and Interdependence Revisited,” 733. Keohane and Nye admit to being “cognizant of the realities of power,” but argue that they do “not regard military force as the chief source of power.” Constructivists, although more strident, argue that the “security environments in which states are embedded are in important parts cultural and institutional, rather than just material.” See Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security,” 33.
status of trade relations. As Keohane and Nye note, “One needs information about [state] preferences as well as about structure to account for state action…. It is not enough to know the geopolitical structure that surrounded Germany in 1886, 1914 or 1936; one also needs to know whether German strategies were the conservative ones of Bismarck, the poorly conceived ones of the Kaiser, or the revolutionary ones of Hitler.\(^{37}\)

**Reframing the Debate About Interdependence in Relation to Realism**

Liberal and constructivist theories account better for processes taking place below the structural and systemic levels of analysis. In a world where civil society and the media play a greater part in shaping public opinion, which in turn informs elite preferences, this is a significant advantage that realism does not enjoy. Bureaucratic processes, which support much of functionalist concepts, were shown by scholars such as Graham T. Allison and Richard Barnet to be extremely significant, even though they remained anecdotal.

The irony, of course, is that interdependence is helped by institutionalization and the multiplication of formalized and rule-based contacts between states, because this formalization strengthens expectations. These are the fruit of functionalism, and the spill-over effect is not only due to states’ long-term preferences but also to the preferences of the bureaucracy. If the result is an expansion of bureaucracy, we have to reckon with the fact that state sovereignty is surrendered to the benefit of international organizations. Therefore, realism remains a powerful explanatory tool at lower levels as well.\(^{38}\) Unfortunately, as long as realists continue to insist that the only actors worthy of the name are states, their theory will never escape the exogenous logic of power.

Jepperson, *et al.* remind scholars that the first misunderstanding is “assuming that materialist [realist] theories are about conflict and cultural ones are about cooperation.”\(^{39}\) Realism can explain cooperation, just as culture can apparently explain conflict. Liberal theory completes realist theory, for “the world has been poised between a territorial system composed of states that view power in terms of land mass and a trading system based on states which develop the sophisticated

\(^{37}\) Keohane and Nye, “Power and Interdependence Revisited,” 745.

\(^{38}\) Again, the intention of liberal institutionalists is not to deal a major blow to realists, as some contend. See Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” *International Organization* 42:3 (Summer 1988): 487.

economic and trading apparatus needed to derive benefit from commercial ex-
change with it.”

Realism needed to find a liberal complement because states, in order to ensure
their security, do not compete for territory anymore, but for markets. When
Schumman and Monnet created the European Coal and Steel Community, they
were denying states a monopoly over the resources to wage war. The compromise
on the sharing of raw resources was the genesis of an economic balance of power.
The management of this balance of power has taken place through economic,
commercial, and financial institutions, as well as through the structures of interna-
tional law. It has kept the discourse at a purely political level (which is, by defini-
tion, the absence of violence).

Neither Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff nor Barbieri elaborate on the various defini-
tions of integration, interdependence, anarchy, and international actor. This sug-
gests that the incomprehension surrounding the position of liberal and construc-
tivist theories relative to realism have only spurred efforts to refine particular areas
pertaining to these theories, with no further effort at definitional rigor past that of
regimes, which are norms, rules, procedures surrounding mutually shared expect-
tations.

Communication enables the addition of new information in the shaping of ac-
tors’ perceptions—in other words, learning. Neoliberal and constructivist
contributions to realist theory emphasize the power of states to change because
they integrate lessons learned. Neither of the two texts discussed here do a par-
ticularly good job of elaborating on the processes of change and learning, yet they
are central to the perceptions we have of the world of today, and to how we relate
to the past as “progress.”

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41 Paul Rogers, “Learning from the Cold War Nuclear Confrontation,” in Deconstructing
and Reconstructing the Cold War, ed. Alan P. Dobson (Aldershot, Hamps.: Ashgate
Publishing, 1999), 202–25; see also Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Nuclear Learning and U.S.-So-
these works are indicative of state learning and regime creation.
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