Between “Venus” and “Mars”: Canada and the Transatlantic “Gap”

by Joel J. Sokolsky*

Canada’s relations with NATO have always had a special character. Unlike the European countries, it was not directly threatened; unlike the United States, it could not be decisive in the common defense. … (It) was beset by ambivalences which, while different from those of Europe, created their own complexities. It required both close economic relations with the United States and an occasional gesture of strident independence. Concretely, this meant that its need for American markets was in constant tension with its temptation to impose discriminatory economic measures; its instinct in favor of common defense conflicted with the temptation to stay above the battle as a kind of international arbiter. Convinced of the necessity of cooperation, impelled by domestic imperatives toward confrontation, Canadian leaders had a narrow margin for maneuver that they utilized with extraordinary skill.

Henry Kissinger, 1979

Introduction: Is Canada “Lost in Space”? 2

In his celebrated recent book, Of Paradise and Power, Robert Kagan looks at the “gap” between the United States and Europe and declares that “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.” 3 The refusal of several major allies to support the United States in the Second Gulf War has only reinforced this view. Canada, too, pointedly opposed the war. But for most commentators on either side of the Atlantic, Canada is not even in the same universe, much less in the same solar system. One American commentator observed that, “For everyday, non-political Americans, Europe is simply not a preoccupation one way or the other. It is Canada with castles … a nice place, but hardly the furnace where our future will be forged.” 4

Though largely overlooked in discussions about the future of the transatlantic relationship, how – or, indeed, whether – Americans and Europeans resolve their current difficulties will have profound implications for

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1 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 383.
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Canadian defense and foreign policy. This paper discusses what some of those implications may be. It begins with a brief overview of Canada’s place in NATO from the Cold War era. It then turns to what I have referred to as the new “trans-European” bargain that emerged in the post–Cold War era, or what U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld referred to as the differences between “old” and “new” Europe. It then turns to an examination of current trends in American national security policy and what they mean for NATO and for Canada’s place in the Alliance. Accepting that trends in American national security policy since 1993, and especially since 11 September 2001, have resulted in a change in Washington’s approach to NATO, this paper argues that, given the present differences among the NATO allies, such differences will not easily, if ever, be fully reconciled, although the Alliance itself will survive. Finally, the paper looks at the implications of changes in NATO and American national security policy for Canada’s bilateral security relations with the United States.

The argument here is that Canada’s defense ties with the United States may be impaired if Ottawa puts too much emphasis on trying to maintain a military and political role on both sides of the gap that has opened between America and Europe. In attempting to do so, Canada may simply fall into a transatlantic chasm and be “lost in space.”

In Search of a “Proper Place”: Canada and NATO in the Cold War

During the negotiations that led to the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a Canadian diplomat cabled Ottawa from London about the advantages of the new Alliance. “This link across the North Atlantic,” he argued, “seems to me such a providential solution to so many of our problems that I feel we should go to great lengths and even incur considerable risks in order to consolidate our good fortune and ensure our proper place in this new partnership.”

Since its inception, the Atlantic Alliance appeared to offer Canada both security and a means of maintaining a measure of independence in an international environment characterized by a growing Soviet threat and the marshalling of American power to meet it. From 1949 on, participation in NATO became one of the two pillars of Canadian defense policy. From the weapons acquired and the forces deployed to the very strategic and tactical assumptions under which the Canadian Forces operated, the needs and perceptions of the Alliance were dominant. During the Cold War and beyond, despite declining defense expenditures, Ottawa maintained its commitment to and active participation in NATO, to the benefit of both its own national security and broader Western and global stability.

The other pillar of Canadian defense policy was the bilateral strategic relationship with the United States for the security of North America, the centerpiece of which was the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), complemented by maritime and, to a lesser extent, land co-operation. While Canada’s political leaders sometimes argued that NORAD was a seamless part of the NATO transatlantic bargain – one that, by virtue of its multilateralism, assured Canadian independence – the reality was that there was always a transatlantic disconnect between the security of North America and that of Europe. Canada, alone amongst the other NATO allies of the United States, was obligated to maintain a proper place in both camps.

To be sure, during these years Canada had also become an active participant in and supporter of the United Nations. Here, too, Ottawa sought its proper place. Under its auspices, the Canadian armed forces developed a justified reputation as peacekeepers par excellence. But while – even more than NATO – the UN offered the comfort of multilateralism, Canada did not rely upon the world body for its national security. The United Nations was an organization that dealt largely with issues tangential to the core strategic interests of the United States and its allies, including Canada. When Canada did become involved in UN peacekeeping operations, it was mainly in those that were of interest to the U.S. and the West, as in Cyprus and the Middle East. It was, as Sean Maloney has recently argued, very much a matter of carrying on the “Cold War by other means.”

As the Cold War progressed, Canada contributed fewer and fewer assets to NORAD and NATO requirements in Europe and at sea. Yet Ottawa found, especially after the cuts of the late 1960s, that it could maintain its proper place within Allied council, even with declining levels of defense expenditures.

The United States, Canada, and the Trans-European Bargain in the 1990s

When, despite greatly exaggerated predictions as to its imminent demise, NATO flourished in the first decade of the post–Cold War era, it continued to provide Ottawa with a comfortable niche in international security affairs. But Canada’s overseas activities in the 1990s must be viewed in the context of changes within NATO and trends in American foreign and national security policy during the immediate post–Cold War years. While the current Bush Administration has been explicit in its unilateralist approach, the Clinton Administration was no less determined to maintain America’s freedom of action – a freedom that, after the fall of the USSR, now appeared unlimited. As Michael Mastanduno observed in 1997, the Clinton Administration “followed a consistent strategy in pursuit of a clear objective – the preservation of the
United States’ pre- eminent global position.”7 There was, though, a difference in tone on Washington’s part, and therefore in the receptivity on the part of old allies and adversaries to America’s unipolarity. Far from alienating other countries, in the 1990s the United States seemed to be able to maintain its traditional ties and forge new ones as it sought to engage itself across the globe, especially in Europe.

The Alliance was quick to respond to the breathtaking crumbling of the Warsaw Pact and then the Soviet Union itself. Beginning in the early 1990s, it revised its strategic concepts and then its very organization and structure. It immediately reached out eastward. A North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was created to bring old adversaries (now neutral states) into the consultative process. Special agreements were concluded with Ukraine and with Russia. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program provided a mechanism for the involvement of more than thirty countries in European security through a web of military exchanges and exercises. In addition, the Alliance became involved in the new peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations of the 1990s. Most importantly was the move toward expansion, beginning with the admission of three new members – Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary – and now continuing with a second round of accessions, adding Slovakia, Romania, and the former Baltic republics of the old USSR.

Behind the Alliance’s expansion and change was the U.S. In essence, these processes have provided Washington with a multilateral institutional framework for the further extension of American influence in Europe in a way that diminished the importance of the older – and most particularly the smaller – Western European Allies. It resembled in some ways the old transatlantic bargain, whereby the U.S. guaranteed the security of Western Europe. In this new “trans-European” bargain, U.S. links to the former Warsaw Pact members and Soviet republics extend directly across Western Europe, so that, even before the crisis over the Second Gulf War, such links were the core of the reshaped NATO, at least insofar as concerns the U.S.

To be sure, the Western European Allies are deeply engaged in the PfP process. And they are trying to develop a more coherent approach to European security through the European Security and Defense Identity and the European Union. But in the absence of a single European defense policy it is not surprising that the links now binding America to Europe run over and around these countries. Even the admission to the Alliance of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and the forthcoming new members may be viewed as less the accession of these states to NATO membership and more the formalization of their security ties to the U.S.

Canada, as always, was in a somewhat different situation. The trans-European bargain also offered advantages to Canada. Its overarching political

character accorded with Ottawa’s long-standing desire to obtain maximum participation at minimal costs in defense expenditures. Thus, while Canadian forces were withdrawn from Germany in 1993, Canadians have been active participants in the new NATO’s eastward thrust through peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans and the whole range of political activities. As with the U.S., there is a sense now that Canada’s ties to European security extend through Western Europe to the emerging democracies of the East.

The new NATO actually drew Canada closer to the United States militarily. Because of Washington’s efforts to promote NATO’s eastward turn, the Canadian Forces have been on active duty in Europe almost continually since the end of the Cold War. At the end of the 1990s, Canada had almost as many personnel in Europe as it had when the Cold War ended. More importantly, unlike the previous forty years, the Canadian Forces have been involved in actual military operations – with increasing frequency as the decade wore on – under NATO. Not surprisingly, therefore, the ability to operate with its NATO allies, especially the U.S., became the focal point of Canadian military planning in the 1990s. This was the kind of multilateralism that Ottawa said it preferred.

But for the U.S., multilateralism has always been a tool to be employed when it suited American interests. The multilateralism of the 1990s, including the wide-ranging use and involvement of the UN, was possible because by and large it was employed to deal with issues that did not touch vital U.S. interests. It was, as Coral Bell argued in 1999, only the “pretense of concert.”8 This led to the wholly misguided view, shared by the current government in Ottawa, that force could only legitimately be employed pursuant to a Security Council resolution or, as in the case of Kosovo, when NATO adopted a unified response.9

The Alliance invoked Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty in the aftermath of September 11, the Allies offered assistance to the campaign on terrorism “out of area,” and NATO Airborne Warning and Control System planes were dispatched to patrol American skies. But the unity of the immediate post–September 11 world could not hide the fundamental differences that have arisen in the Alliance. As the United States responded to the most immediate and real external threat to its security since 1812, it reached back to the bedrock fundamentals of unilateralism and the protection of liberty at home, which had long been the basis of American national security policy.10 As Robert Kagan has noted, “America did not change on September 11. It only became more itself.”11

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9 The former Canadian Ambassador to Washington, Allan Gotlieb, noted this misunderstanding on the part of the Canadian government in its response to the Second Gulf War. See Allan Gotlieb, “The Chretien Doctrine: By Blindly Following the UN, the Prime Minister is Hurting Canada,” Maclean’s, 31 March 2003.
U.S. National Security Policy, NATO, and the Second Gulf War

At the heart of the disharmony between the United States and Europe are not differences over fundamental values or approaches to social programs. After all, Europe and the U.S. have not always shared the same approaches to the role of the state in the economy and the life of individual citizens. And when the U.S. needed allies in the fight against communism, it was – as it should have been – fully prepared to collaborate with governments that shared none of the common values of the Atlantic Alliance. Indeed, we should not forget that NATO itself for many years had members who could hardly be characterized as democracies. Nor has the Alliance ever been in complete agreement on its mandate to apply force out of its immediate geographic area. The difference now – and it is a difference of direct relevance to Canada’s role in NATO – is that the United States, consistent with trends evident in the 1990s, but becoming more pronounced after September 11, has given up even the pretense of concert.

Kagan, writing before the final diplomatic moves and the beginning of the Second Gulf War, also noted that the new Europe is not one upon which America can rely as it did in the past. The strategic relationship has changed. “Can the United States,” he asks, “prepare for and respond to strategic challenges around the world without much help from Europe?”

The simple answer is that it already does. The United States has maintained strategic stability in Asia with no help from Europe. In the various crises in the Middle East and Persian Gulf over the past decade, European help, even when enthusiastically offered, has been of little more than a token character. Whatever Europe can or cannot offer in terms of moral and political support, it has had little to offer the United States in strategic military terms since the end of the Cold War – except, of course, that most valuable of strategic assets, a Europe at peace.12

In an ironic geopolitical twist, it seems that America has created in Europe a Frankenstein’s monster in reverse. Whereas, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Europe was a problem for America because it was too warlike, too willing to take up the sword against itself and in imperial conquests, it now appears that at least the “old Europe” is too reluctant to apply force. It is a Wilsonian’s dream, but a realist’s nightmare. America has succeeded too well. Michael Mandelbaum’s “ideas that conquered the world” – peace, democracy, and free markets13 – have helped turn Europe into the “paradise” Kagan describes. But this has come at the price of making Europeans less willing to follow the American lead when it comes to the use of military power – even, as in the most recent case, when Washington believes its vital interests are at stake. The result is that the “old Europe” both complains about U.S. unilateralism yet

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12 Kagan, Of Paradise and Power, 98
at the same time encourages it by its reluctance to join in U.S.-led multilateral operations.

There is, however, a level of receptivity to U.S. unilateralism in Eastern Europe – the “new NATO” – that does not exist in “old Europe.” This was made evident when Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia signed a new Adriatic Charter. As U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell noted, these countries were “adamant that the fourth signatory in that charter should be the United States of America – not the EU…”

The fundamental point is that September 11 and the Second Gulf War, whatever efforts may now be made to smooth things over within NATO, and especially with the French and Germans, was indeed a watershed in transatlantic relations. The fact is that NATO, as a unified body, was not there for Washington, and Americans, including those who had doubts about the war, will never forget it. And even if the American public and Congress grow weary of the continued occupation of Iraq, the behavior of some allies will be remembered, even should they try to make amends by sending troops to Iraq under a new UN mandate. Infidelity in a marriage can lead to separation and divorce. Or the couple may stay together in the same home. But, although the act can be forgiven, it will never be forgotten, and the relationship will never be quite the same.

For Canada, which in America’s view also failed the test of allied fidelity and loyalty, the situation may be even more uncomfortable. Whatever their disagreements, Canada and the United States are fated to share the same North American home. Yet here, too, even though it may also seek to shore up ties with the U.S. by sending forces “over there,” to Afghanistan and Iraq as part of NATO or UN operations, Canada would be in a unique position. The more Washington emphasizes the direct defense of the United States, in all its military and especially non-military dimensions, the more Washington will take notice of what Ottawa is doing to defend itself “over here” at home, so that America will not be vulnerable.

**A Pillar Apart: Canada and North American “Homeland Security”**

In theory, the NATO region included North America from the beginning. In practice, the European Allies played no direct role in the defense of the United States and Canada. To be sure, the Atlantic Command was headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, and European Allies were duly represented on SACLANT’s staff, but there was no European participation in North America’s major combined command, NORAD, and the protection of the maritime approaches to the continent were primarily a bilateral Canada–U.S. undertaking. This was not only a U.S. preference; it represented the reality that North America was for all intents and purposes a geo-strategic backwater. For Canada, this meant that,

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while bilateral defense collaboration often raised political issues relating to sovereignty, it did not demand a great deal of resources.

This changed on 11 September 2001. The emphasis that the U.S. is now placing on “homeland” security represents a dramatic shift in overall American national security policy, and as such it will have an impact on Canada’s place in Western collective defense.

The Alliance’s most recent reorganization of its military command structure is a factor in the future of transatlantic relations. Instead of NATO’s operations being run by either the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in Mons, Belgium, or the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic in Norfolk, Virginia, all operations will now come under the control of the new Allied Command Operations based at SHAPE in Mons, commanded by the SACEUR, who will continue to also wear the hat of Commander U.S. European Command. SACLANT will cease to exist. It will become Allied Command Transformation (ACT), still in Norfolk, whose purpose will be “to take responsibility for promoting and overseeing the continuing transformation of Alliance forces and capabilities.” The Supreme Commander ACT (SACT) will also fill the role of Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). Below this level there is a reduction and consolidation of subordinate commands as well as an emphasis on bolstering the Alliance’s capacity for joint operations, with two standing Joint Forces Commands (JFCs), Combined Joint Task Forces Headquarters (CJTF), and six Joint Force Component Commands (JFCCs).

With operations throughout the NATO region now under a single European-based American commander, and with ACT remaining at Norfolk (with a commander also dual-hatted as head of a U.S. unified command), the new command structure appears to be designed to shore up transatlantic relations. But the thrust of the reorganization, which was pressed for by Washington, is designed to reduce the costs of maintaining the Alliance while enhancing its capacity to conduct operations outside the European theatre.

To a certain extent, these changes correct the imbalance in the NATO bargain by acknowledging that North American security is essential to European security. An America that feels itself at risk at home cannot effectively be the indispensable bulwark for European security. At the same time, the disestablishment of SACLANT, in so far as it removes the one operational NATO command on American soil, does constitute something of a widening of the transatlantic divide. This is compounded by the fact that the United States has also changed its own national command structure to reflect the increased importance of homeland defense. In April 2001, it set up Northern Command (NORCOM). For the first time, there will be an American unified command for North America involving aerospace, maritime, and land forces, with further responsibilities to support American civil authorities in the event of an emergency. The area of responsibility for NORCOM includes the continental United States, Canada, Mexico, and parts of the Caribbean. Its seaward boundaries extend five
miles off the North American coast. The Commander of NORCOM has been also been given the role of commander-in-chief (CINC) of NORAD, and the bilateral nature of this command has, for the moment, been preserved.\textsuperscript{15}

But NORAD itself has changed, from the American side. United States Space Command (SPACECOM), whose commander had also been CINC-NORAD, has been abolished, and instead combined with United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM), which has responsibility for U.S. strategic nuclear forces. In addition, SPACECOM’s missile warning and space surveillance assets, upon which NORAD relies, have also been shifted to STRATCOM. Most importantly, the Bush Administration is on the verge of deploying a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system which, understandably, it wants to integrate into NORAD’s warning and assessment role.

All of this has presented Canada with a set of challenges it has not faced since the earliest days of the Cold War. While the thrust of U.S. national security policy remains the ability to defend the nation by projecting power overseas, for the first time since it became a superpower the United States is taking major steps to deal with its own direct defense in a comprehensive way. Once again, the United States cannot afford to have Canada become a security liability.\textsuperscript{16} It would prefer and would expect that Canada will make contributions to North American security. Ironically, however, given its power and technological capabilities, the United States does not necessarily need Canada to make material contributions. Rather, what Washington is looking for is a clear statement on Ottawa’s part that it takes seriously the increased importance that the United States is now giving to continental homeland security.

At the moment, the most significant thing that Canada can do to assure the U.S. that it shares these security concerns is to agree to the integration of BMD into NORAD. The Canadian government has recently indicated that it will begin talks with the U.S. on this issue, yet it has also reiterated that, while Canada may favor BMD, it is still against the “weaponization of space,” which would come about if the actual interception of missiles were effected by space-based systems. Present U.S. plans call only for land-based interceptors, none of which need to be based in Canada. Nor will the enhanced land-based radars associated with the planned system be located on Canadian soil. But the Bush Administration has not ruled out space-based interception in the future. Thus these Canadian reservations may not be welcomed in Washington, especially since Canada itself will not contribute – nor is it being asked to contribute – assets or territory for the purposes of BMD.

More importantly, given the consolidation of SPACECOM’s warning assets into STRATCOM, any Canadian hesitation over BMD could well per-


suade the Bush Administration to disestablish NORAD as a bilateral command. Its missile warning and attack assessment roles, along with its space surveillance functions, would be assumed by STRATCOM. The air defense role, where the availability of Canadian territory still matters, has taken on new importance since 11 September 2001 and would fall under NORCOM for U.S. forces, with arrangements being made with Canada for air defense collaboration similar to those which existed prior to the establishment of NORAD in 1958. This would simplify things for the United States by placing both missile warning and BMD under a U.S.-only command. For Canada, not only would this be a politically and symbolically important reduction in its direct links to U.S. missile and space defense activities, it would exclude Ottawa from access to information about a potentially key component in its own defense, that of protection against ballistic missiles and perhaps cruise missiles.

Yet while bilateral collaboration in missile and space defense may diminish, the establishment of NORCOM could well herald an expansion and formalization of co-operation in other dimensions of North American defense. This is because it is the intention of the United States government to bring both land and especially maritime aspects of homeland defense under NORCOM. For example, the United States Coast Guard will play an important role in NORCOM’s missions. Heretofore, maritime collaboration between the two countries lacked a central organizational structure. On the East Coast, the two navies worked under the SACLANT framework, while on the West Coast the Canadian Navy cooperated on an informal basis with United States Pacific Command. Combined with NATO’s disestablishment of SACLANT and shifting of responsibility for Atlantic security to SACEUR, this suggests that U.S. maritime security will become even more an exclusively U.S. undertaking, with Canada now required to find a new role and relationship.17

To be sure, the final architecture of U.S. homeland security and defense remains to be seen. There is still a measure of uncertainty and bureaucratic jockeying within the government in Washington. Nevertheless, the Canadian government is aware that the creation of NORCOM fundamentally changes the nature of its security ties with the United States. Thus the two countries have established a bilateral planning group to work out the future of all aspects of cooperation with NORCOM. Here we have the long-standing Canadian dilemma. On the one hand, Ottawa cannot afford to have the United States structure and plan for continental homeland security without some input and participation from Canada. On the other, there is concern that too much integration with NORCOM, a U.S.-only Command, could well lead to a single command for North America in which Canada, while participating, would have only limited influence, thus raising fears about Canadian sovereignty.

It should be noted, however, that in the wake of September 11, other, non-military, dimensions of North American security have come to the fore. These include everything from immigration and border control to domestic counter-terrorism. Indeed, these issues are perhaps more relevant to the direct security of the U.S. public than the traditional military aspects of homeland security. They are also vastly more salient for Canada, given that U.S. concerns about Ottawa’s ability to monitor potential terrorists operating in Canada could impinge upon the flow of Canadian exports across the border. Since the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the early 1990s, over 85 percent of Canada’s exports now go to the United States. Canadian prosperity, the standard of living, and the basic well-being of its citizens depend upon unfettered access to the broader North American market. This is “national security” at its most basic.

Not surprisingly, therefore, the majority of Canada’s efforts to provide assurance to the United States, and the greater part of the increases in Canadian security spending since September 11, have been directed outside the military sphere. Ottawa has agreed to review its immigration policies and augment its domestic counter-terrorism capabilities. In addition, the two countries have sought to address the border issue through the “Smart-border” program, which seeks to maintain the free flow of goods, services, and people while addressing U.S. security concerns.

And yet, to further compound the Canadian defense dilemma, it must be recognized that, however much Ottawa increases its political and material contribution to North American security, this will not be enough in the post–September 11 world. As was made clear during the Iraq war, the litmus test for loyalty to Washington and sympathy with U.S. national security interests is a willingness to support, preferably with direct military contributions, U.S. overseas operations. Thus, as Canada now faces heightened demands in North America, it is preparing to send the equipment-starved and over-commitment Canadian Forces back to Afghanistan. This, even while it sustains over one thousand troops in Bosnia.

**Conclusion: The Margin Gets Narrower**

Between Venus and Mars is Mother Earth, and for Canada in the post–September 11 world, global security concerns have indeed come home. The trends in NATO and U.S. security policy now confront Canadian leaders with an even narrower margin for maneuver than they did in Kissinger’s time, demanding an even greater measure of diplomatic and political skill on the part of decision-makers. Given the restricted space within which they must now operate, it remains to be seen whether past approaches will succeed. For in this post–September 11, post–Second Gulf War era, trying to maintain a proper place on both sides of a growing transatlantic divide may result in Canada sim-
ply falling further into a chasm, with no solid footing on either side for the pursuit of its national security interests.
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