International and National Security in the World Community in the Twenty-First Century: Outlines of New Realities

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The turns of centuries and even millennia are naturally associated in public opinion with fundamental changes in various social spheres. Therefore, one should expect on the threshold of the twenty-first century that the world order that was established after the Second World War and ensured a more or less stable world community for several decades should change. As a result, the paradigm of international and national security that was dominant throughout this historical period has ceased to “work.”

Many analysts see the tragic events of September 11, 2001 as a historical watershed in the transition from one world order to another. Actually, such an assessment is surely only a metaphor. Global changes on this scale have always occurred over long periods of time. Therefore it would be fair to speak about the contemporary stage as the beginning of a transition from one world order to another. The transformation of the world from bipolar (the U.S. and NATO on the one hand, and the USSR and Warsaw Pact on the other) to monopolar, in which just one superpower—the U.S.—dominates is considered the fundamental reality underlying the current change in the world order. In fact, this is a superficial explanation for a variety of complex processes that are occurring in the modern world. The American doctrine of punishment after September 11 was conceived on the basis of this simplistic conception. Despite the success of U.S. military action in Afghanistan, the strategic perspective of this doctrine has been the source of much skepticism around the world.

Speaking about the monopolar world, it is also necessary to remember that in critical situations the force ratio between nuclear powers will be determined not only by (and in some cases not so much by) economic potential, but also by the presence of warheads and means of transporting them into enemy territory. And if during the 1950’s there were serious discussions on the governmental level about the issue of the legitimacy of the use of 200–300 warheads, now it is quite obvious that the use of one single warhead could be catastrophic even for larger countries.

In my opinion, it is more correct to say that the world order varies in connection with changes in the very status of the power center in the system of modern international relations, and, I would argue, by virtue of changes in the very conception of “power center.”

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If until now the “power center” in world politics was understood as governmental systems with clearly delineated parameters of military-political and economic potential, with well-known and very clear strategic and ideological concepts, the new formations, whose exact strategic purposes and (most importantly) material potential are difficult to identify, have begun to claim for themselves the role of “power center.” This should lead to fundamental changes in underlying principles in the relationship between power centers and to changes in the basics of international and national security.

In order to understand the essence of such changes, it is necessary to outline first the principles of the old world order, which certainly still continue to operate. The existing (or still existing) world order is based on the two fundamental principles of world politics:

- **First principle.** This is the principle of parity (or approximate quantitative-qualitative equality) of forces and deterrence capability. Thus, each side knows the potential enemy well enough; the forces and means of potential enemies are mutually quantified and are under mutual control.

- **Second principle.** This is the principle of mutual deterrence based on the instinct of self-preservation of biological and social systems: the first to attack will inevitably be struck back. Restraint is founded on the fear of mutual destruction.

Both these principles of the old security system indicate that it was based on the physical or material realities and capabilities of the combatants. Thus the old paradigm presupposed the collision of powerful cumulative and approximately equal forces, which (hypothetically) would overcome each other in a mighty struggle. It was on the basis of this perspective that two world wars were fought and the world system of the twentieth century developed.

In the world of today, the principles of the old world system (or old paradigm of security) are beginning to significantly transform and collapse.

- **First,** the principle of parity is changing. The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, whose impact should not be underestimated, has shown that instead of the potential enemy, whose power and direction of attack were possible to anticipate, and hence, to defend against, the unknown and invisible enemy has appeared. One cannot ascertain from where and with what forces and means this enemy could attack.

- **Second,** the principle of deterrence is transforming. Alongside single suicide attackers, suicidal organizations have appeared, forces strong enough to obtain resources sufficient to pose a real threat to entire countries and regions. But the most important thing is that, by virtue of their religious and
ideological outlook, *they are not afraid to die* for the sake of achieving their goals in order to drag down with them the peoples and countries that they hate. Will these new and terrible realities of September 11, 2001 become a prototype of the wars and military conflicts of the twenty-first century?

- **Third,** the information component is becoming dominant in the security system. Thus the unknown and invisible enemy can be destructive not only through the physical or material environment but also (and even mainly) through the *spiritual and ideological* sub-base of society.

In recent years, the reality of threats to national security via modern information systems has become more and more evident. During its session in August 2000, the World Scientist Federation ranked number one on the list of threats to human beings in the twenty-first century the threat to information security. The issue refers to information security not in the narrow sense of network security but in the broader sense of this concept: the security of the people and societies who use these networks.

The leaders of the largest countries in the world have expressed their concerns about the development of these dangerous trends in information security. In the summer of 2000 the Okinawa Charter of the global information community was adopted. The Charter states that, along with the significant expansion of opportunities which new information systems offer the economy and society, the broad introduction of such systems into public life poses certain concerns. These concerns have an objective basis primarily in the gap between the fields of information and competence. The Charter offers guidelines to overcome such a gap.

Organized crime and private businesses have quickly appreciated the ample opportunities and benefits presented by technology in obtaining confidential information on the activities both of governmental structures and non-governmental organizations (stock exchanges, banks, private companies, etc.). The FBI in the U.S. investigates about 100 cases of illegal extraction of commercial information from American computer networks every day. At the end of 1999 the Computer Security Institute (CSI), in association with the FBI branch in San Francisco, published the fourth annual report “Issues and Trends: 1999 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey.” The report reveals a sharp increase in the number of lawsuits concerning computer crimes (32 percent of those surveyed). 30 percent of respondents noted that their information systems were broken into by hackers. 57 percent of those surveyed were attacked through the Internet, while 55 percent noticed such violations from among their own employees.

The special danger to the world posed by new information technologies is based on the fact that information systems could be widely used as a means of terrorist action, first to impact the technical and tactical capacities of the enemy, and then to influence the spiritual and ideological environment of the adversary.
Of particular concern is the terrorist activity of those unknown and invisible forces that are not afraid to die.

The reality of information threats is also defined by the fact that, for example, as opposed to arms systems, global information systems that allow free access on a wide basis could get out from under the control of various governmental and public institutions. This can be seen with the example of television. Psychologists have proven, for instance, the so-called “effect of secondary impact,” where the viewers of a broadcast showing catastrophes are psychologically affected in ways similar to the actual participants themselves. Last year on September 11, the leading broadcast networks showed repeatedly for several hours the horrifying scenes of the falling skyscrapers of the World Trade Center. It was absolutely uncalled for from the point of view of politics, ideology, and even common sense.

Moreover, through the “effect of secondary impact,” a lot of damage was caused to the physical and mental health of millions of people worldwide, and anti-American forces rallied and were inspired. It seemed as though the most democratic broadcasting companies in the world (for example, CNN) became so absorbed that they grew oblivious and worked according to their own internal rules and principles beyond the comprehension of outsiders.

Therefore, the modern realities of the relationship between various military-political and ideological forces on the world scene outlined above have forced us to find new terms to speak about the formation (by virtue of objective circumstances) of a new paradigm of the world order, of international and national security, in place of the old paradigm that shaped international relations during the previous century.

In conclusion, I would like to make the following remark. The assessments and conclusions formulated in this essay might be considered by some a bit exaggerated given current conditions. But I remember one speech at a conference in Washington in January 2002. An American admiral, the head of a federal organization engaged in the control of the information infrastructure, delivered a speech. He said that the previous September 11 was literally a wakeup call for us. Until then we slept soundly, thinking that the world was arranged and organized in a manner that was desirable for America, which is now not only a dominant power, but even the only “power center.” The bell that rang reminded us that the world is more complicated than we had previously thought, and that complacency could lead to unpredictable consequences. The emergence of this new paradigm forming the global order indicates that this alarm has sounded not only for America but also for the entire world.